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SUMMARY
As soon as the reading public realized that the much-enjoyed first volumes o f Tristram 
Shandy were written by a priest and, furthermore, that this parson was publishing 
sermons under the name of Hamlet’s exhumed jester, the sincerity of Sterne towards his 
vocation was questioned—if not flatly denied. This immediate reticence and indignation 
has expanded and persisted. The stumbling blocks are two: bawdy fiction is not fitting 
from a priest; and, the sermons, full of plagiarism, lack evangelical heat.
The aim of this dissertation is to review the contexts o f mid-eighteenth century Anglican 
homiletics with reference to Sterne’s oeuvres. Once we understand what was expected 
from the pulpit in content and style, we are equipped to observe ways in which Sterne 
strove to meet those expectations. To date no published work has responsibly considered 
his much-alleged plagiarism. This is rectified, and the evidence unveils an interested and 
very capable sermon-writer.
We then consider Sterne’s fictions. That, alongside ribaldry, the first volumes o f Tristram 
contain an entire sermon has led some to conclude Steme was mocking religion. On the 
contrary, tracing themes of the homilies through both novels we come to appreciate an 
intended reciprocity between the works. Of interest in this regard is Sterne’s engagement 
with fideistic scepticism, and the manner in which he developed his parabolic 
contribution to this tradition of faithful, learned ignorance. I suggest that, far from the 
buffoonery o f a snickering prankster, Sterne’s fiction represents the elements o f his 
orthodox sermons within a provocative and curiously accessible mode. As such, his 
canon has integrity. He lusted earnestly, and endeavoured carefully that these little books 
might stand instead o f  many bigger books; and his hope was that they would do us good.
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1I-INTRODUCTION
Concluding ‘A Defence of Nonsense’ G.K. Chesterton wrote: “the well-meaning person 
who, by merely studying the logical side of things, has decided that ‘faith is nonsense,’ does not 
know how truly he speaks; later it may come back to him in the form that nonsense is faith.”1
The study of things was well attended in Sterne’s day, and their logical side was 
appreciated as difficult to establish. Searching for truth and accuracy scientists revealed and 
explicated serious curiosities, but these were tending rather to increase than to relieve perceived 
complexities. Current alternatives of broad scepticism and focused determinism offered little 
comfort to those considering their validity. The epigraph to the first two volumes o f The Life and 
Opinions o f  Tristram Shandy is appropriate, in Cotton’s translation of Montaigne’s use of it: 
“men . . .  are tormented with the Opinions they have of Things, and not by the Things 
themselves.”2
This phrase of Epictetus, echoed through centuries, alerts Tristram’s readers that a lesson 
in perspective will follow. We do well to register the philosophic implications that such a 
quotation conjures. It has been of no service to discuss Sterne’s use o f Locke, for example, while 
Locke’s own contexts -his texts as well- have been neglected. Fortunately in recent years the 
heritage of epistemological discourse from which Sterne works, proposed in scripture especially 
by Job, Ecclesiastes and St. Paul, has begun to be accurately addressed. That the truly wise are so 
by understanding primarily that they know nothing is a Socratic commonplace embedded in the 
Bible:
2I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I perceived that 
this also is vexation of spirit. For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that 
increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. (Eccles. i. 17-8)
Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath 
not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of 
God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of 
preaching to save them that believe. (I Cor. i.20-1)
Gradually Sterne’s appreciation of this tradition of humble access is evolving. O f late,
“fideistic scepticism” is being appreciated by Stemeans through the contributions of J.T. Parnell
and Donald Wehrs, and Peter Briggs wrote perceptively in 1985:
it is important to note that the perceptual relativism and consequent skepticism 
implicit in Sterne’s methods is not necessarily bound up with moral relativism.
Commenting upon this tradition o f faithful doubting, reading backwards from Nietzsche
and recalling Keats’ coining of “negative capability,” Melvyn New claims “resolution and
positiveness are the tempting and inevitable vices of Sterne’s world-view; suspension and doubt,
its difficult, if  not impossible, virtues.”4 This unfortunate conclusion is repeated in the
introduction to Critical Essays on Laurence Sterne [1998]5 and a disservice will be done to
Sterne if such a summary of Christian scepticism is allowed to stand for lack of experience with
the tempers of Sterne’s mentors. In Tristram Shandy: A Book fo r  Free Spirits New continues.
Here is skepticism pressed into the service o f religious faith . . . .
A comic and tragic futility is found in the human desire for certainty and 
conviction, and somewhere among Rabelais, Montaigne, Burton, Locke, 
Chambers, and Swift, Sterne sought a skeptical stance that would deny the 
absoloutism of dogmatists while preserving his own (and his congregation’s) 
capacity to believe in the concept of Truth. Sterne could not abandon his own 
certainty concerning Anglican centrism; hence his blindness to the rhetorical 
gambits and dogmatics of his own argument that one need only “preach the 
gospel” or direct words “to the heart.”6
New’s rhetoric of poles and response leaves little room for any viable sense of an 
appreciation for what faith  might entail in a believer. We have yet to be offered an accurate 
assessment of Sterne’s considered investment in the discourse of fideism then current. Even 
recently in Steme studies we continue to hear more o f Nietzsche than of More, Pope, Berkeley or 
Hume, so it is not surprising Sterne’s world-view continues to be widely misrepresented. When 
we become familiar with the tradition that seeks to “reconcile us to our condition” and to 
maintain scepticism within a sphere corresponding to that condition, a better reckoning of 
Sterne’s epistemology -and ontology- will become possible. He did not seek a hoary stance 
somewhere to press it into service of a faithful (though allegedly blind) discourse. Steme is a 
mature descendant o f Erasmus and Erasmus’ love child Rabelais. As such he displays the 
elemental truths of that tradition with the jocular parabolae long associated with it. The equivocal 
nature of dogmatic confidence does not discount the essence o f faith but through questioning 
validities of systematic means to it, discovers that essence to be rightly mysterious, ‘known’
o
instead by the experience of grace: “an extraordinary infusion” as Montaigne called it.
Pierre Charron’s recitation of the creed of academic scepticism “la vrai etude de l’homme 
est l’homme”9 is a catalyst to orient one’s study to its proper spheres. To assault the torments of 
opinions —the pedantic and frequently dangerous uses of dogma based on authority, tradition, 
and blind assent— is no idle frolic. Bishop Joseph Butler’s sermon ‘Upon the Ignorance o f Man’ 
(his text is Ecclesiastes viii. 16-7) is as good a contemporary introduction to Sterne’s thought as
Creation is absolutely and entirely out o f our depth, and beyond the extent of our 
utmost reach. . . . And we know little more of ourselves, than we do of the world 
about u s . . . .
This surely should convince us, that we are much less competent judges o f the 
very small part which comes under our notice in this world, than we are apt to 
imagine.
And as the works of God, and his scheme of government, are above our capacities 
thoroughly to comprehend; so there possibly may be reasons which originally 
made it fit that many things should be concealed from us, which we have perhaps 
natural capacities of understanding; many things concerning the designs, methods, 
and ends of divine Providence in the government o f the world. There is no manner 
of absurdity in supposing a veil on purpose drawn over some scenes of infinite 
power, wisdom, and goodness, the sight of which might some way or other strike 
us too strongly; or that better ends are designed and served by their being 
concealed, than could be by their being exposed to our knowledge. The Almighty 
may cast clouds and darkness round about him, for reasons and purposes of which 
we have not the least glimpse or conception.
If to acquire knowledge were our proper end, we should indeed be but poorly 
provided: but if  somewhat else be our business and duty, we may, notwithstanding 
our ignorance, be well enough furnished for it; and the observation of our 
ignorance may be o f assistance to us in the discharge of it.
[The inquirer] should beforehand expect things mysterious, and such as he will 
not be able thoroughly to comprehend, or go to the bottom of. To expect a distinct 
comprehensive view of the whole subject, clear o f difficulties and objections, is to 
forget our nature and condition; neither of which admit o f such knowledge with 
respect to any science whatever. And to inquire with this expectation, is not to 
inquire as a man, but as one of another order o f creatures.
Knowledge is not our proper happiness.
Our province is virtue and religion, life and manners: the science of improving the 
temper, and making the heart better. This is the field assigned us to cultivate; how 
much it has lain neglected is indeed astonishing. Virtue is demonstrably the 
happiness of man; it consists in good actions, proceeding from a good principle, 
temper, or heart. Overt acts are entirely in our power. What remains is, that we 
learn to keep our heart; to govern and regulate our passions, mind, affections: that 
so we may be free from the impotencies of fear, envy, malice, covetousness, 
ambition; that we may be clear of these, considered as vices seated in the heart, 
considered as constituting a general wrong temper; from which general wrong 
frame of mind, all the mistaken pursuits, and far the greatest part of the
5unhappiness o f life, proceed. He who should find out one rule to assist us in this 
work, would deserve infinitely better o f mankind than all the improvers o f other 
knowledge put together.10
Sterne’s faith is part and parcel with his epistemology, his vocation as preacher: to assist us in
this work. If we misunderstand the value and hope inherent in Socratic ignorance (and Socratic
dialogue) for a person of faith, we are liable to stray from Sterne’s intentions. Certainly we have
missed his sincerity and conscious fidelity to this epistemology as a preacher. Our lack of
familiarity with its strains in the novels has therefore fared no better.
Increased interest in the sermons this past decade has been a mixed blessing. Professor
New’s consistent labour is significant and well reflected in Ian Ross’ biography, but we may now
be tempted simply to replace Lansing Hammond’s version of the preacher with theirs and to
delve no further into Sterne’s religion.11 The impressions o f Steme one gathers through these
recent works can, for their nearness to truth, be more misleading than the post-Victorian
caricatures drawn by our critical forebears. Better than most on Sterne’s theology, Elizabeth
Kraft, for example, using New’s notes concludes, “Sterne’s sermons were largely secondhand
1 7stuff.” Ian Ross, more fair than most, repeats the bias: “his sermons show a notable dependence
11on the published work of other preachers.” Ross presents Steme the sermon writer as ill at ease
with his alleged plagiarism, and ill at ease “dealing abstractly with such theological problems [as
providence and chance].”14 He is correct to draw attention to Sterne’s scepticism, but his
implications leave much to be desired:
Christian faith is accounted essential: not because it provides answers, but—
Steme asserts in his conclusion [to sermon 10]—as consolation for the fact that no 
answers are to be found.. . .
6If this seems an unlikely conclusion for Steme, then it points to a notable tension 
both within his sermons and within Steme himself.15
After quoting a passage from Sterne’s sermon ‘Self-Knowledge’, Ross claims:
this is a repeated theme in the sermons. What is striking about such passages is 
that here Steme is not, as so often elsewhere, citing or paraphrasing the sermons 
of other divines, but re-articulating an idea evidently important to him—the 
impossibility o f arriving at true self-knowledge. So, in ‘Evil-Speaking’ he argues 
that ‘the bulk of mankind live in such a contradiction to themselves, that there is 
no character so hard to be met with, as one, which upon a critical examination, 
will appear altogether uniform, and, in every point, consistent with itself.’ This,
Steme contends—in a manner which recalls Montaigne, Bayle, or even Hume 
more than contemporary Anglicanism—is true only o f men over the course of 
many years: ‘the observation is to be made of men in the same period of their lives 
that in the same day, sometimes in the very same action, they are utterly 
inconsistent and irreconcilable with themselves.’16
Ross is correct that this theme is central to Steme, but the repeated bias claiming dependency,
coupled with a disregard of keen Anglican divines such as Berkeley, Butler, and Swift severs
Sterne’s integrity. As headlines to reviews of the biography suggest, Sterne’s Thackerayan
persona: “All Too Human”, “An Unclerical Taste for Bawdiness”, will survive amongst casual
readers.17
Sterne’s use of innuendo in his fiction has naturally engendered incredulity regarding his 
sincerity with religion. It is humorous to observe that most comments on Sterne’s sexuality 
suggest either a desperate judgementalism on one hand and hopeful assumptions, on the other, 
that he is really our contemporary: a faithless sex machine. Sterne’s contemporaries were not so 
precisely preoccupied. In the 1750s Horace Walpole “recalled seeing Dr. Blackbume Archbishop 
of York, at dinner where ‘his mistress, Mrs. Curwys, sat at the head of the table, and Hayter, his
1 ftnatural son by another woman, and very much like him, at the bottom, as chaplain’.” Sterne’s 
more discreet alleged amours are still dredged up with an unbecoming sneer. We hear o f “the
7overwhelming evidence of Sterne’s lifelong promiscuity”19 and his “flagrant and repeated 
infidelities”20 but, like citizens of a superpower brought to their enthusiastic knees by a 
presidential indiscretion, focusing on insignificant handles we are distracted from more pressing 
matters.
In fact, more has been read into Sterne’s public character than there is evidence to 
support. Those accusations are based primarily on two accounts: that o f John Croft, who, living 
away from England, is unreliable on other matters regarding Steme, and that o f Richard 
Greenwood who related his tales to an antiquarian sixty years after he was dismissed from the
o iStemes’ service. When reading a conclusion such as “what Steme illustrates is that sex is
00everyone’s hobby-horse” one does well to recall Sterne’s interest in unmasking readers’ 
propensity to be consumed by their own prepossessions and the desire to make an author’s life fit 
one’s impressions of his fiction. Steme may, with our chronological snobbery be forgiven as a 
man, his religion playing second fiddle to his libido and his sermons at best derivative orthodoxy. 
Such condescension seems accepted among writers referring to Sterne’s sermons and his 
involvement with them. Promiscuous or not, we have taken Sterne’s alleged sexual engagements 
too much to heart, and lacking an appreciation for more significant drives are still in danger of 
assuming sensuality to be Sterne’s religion.
It comes as no surprise that in preparation of Approaches to Teaching Sterne’s Tristram 
Shandy “respondents to the MLA questionnaire without exception omitted the Sermons from 
works they might use in teaching Tristram Shandy.” Arthur Cash, in his response for that 
volume begins: “a few years ago someone took a poll of graduating college seniors asking them
8which of the texts assigned during their college careers they most hated. Tristram Shandy
won.”24 As students of literature we are uneasy with children of mixed background who defy
immediate classification and which we have not been educated to appreciate. Sterne’s education,
we should remember, was primarily theological, with a foundation of philosophy and classics. I
hope in the often tedious pages that follow to present evidence that Sterne’s publications have a
valuable and quite simple integrity, and that an appreciation of his investment in sermon
preparation is a useful window into the hopes behind that integrity.
We should be wary of patronizing the cleric. “You thought in your heart the vein of
humour too free and gay for the solemn colour of my coat” he writes recalling Erasmus’ Moria,
“—A meditation upon Death had been a more suiting trimming to it (I own it) —but then it could
not have been set on by Me.”26 Sterne’s publications are above all honest. His books are like
himself, and, as such, are a study o f man. But are we prepared for his media? Steme openly
struggled to communicate. By 1765 he refers to the first 8 volumes o f his novel as “a moral work,
more read than understood” [p. 255.5 in The Sermons o f  Laurence Sterne. Ed. Melvyn New,
1996. Subsequent quotations from Sterne’s sermons will be referenced as S  followed by page and
first line number in this Florida edition]. And he there excuses his third publication o f ‘The
Abuses of Conscience considered’ by judging “that some might better like it, and others better
understand it just as it was preached” (S  255.9). Clearly he had previously presumed that more
persons would like it, and even more understand it, in the form by which it is, even today, most
usually encountered: “in the body” of “that moral work.” Thus Walter Scott:
the first two volumes of Tristram proved introductors— singular in their character, 
certainly—to two volumes of sermons which the simple name of the Reverend
9Laurence Steme (ere yet he became known as the author of a fine novel) would 
never have recommended to notice, but which were sought for and read eagerly 
under that o f Yorick. They maintained the character o f the author for wit, genius,
7 7
and eccentricity.
Sterne’s moral communication, unlike that o f many of his ancestors and contemporaries, is no
Treatise, no Essay or Enquiry Concerning. It is, instead, in his own words “an assay upon human
nature” [p. 36.15 in A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy By Mr. Yorick. Ed. Melvyn
New and W.G. Day, 2002. Subsequent quotations from A Sentimental Journey will be referenced
as A S J followed by page and first line number in this Florida edition].
The assay is infused with titillating joy, but mightn’t there be more to it? Marjory David,
in her introduction to a sampling of Sterne’s sermons suggests
the fact that his listeners would probably leave church thinking 6’tis only a 
sermon’ could not have failed to annoy Steme. He clearly believed that his 
message, joyous or sad, could reach people better through his fiction than through 
his turns in the pulpit.28
Given Sterne’s description of Tristram Shandy as a moral work, one would not have expected 
David’s to be a rare conclusion. But, that Steme had a “message” and that he consciously shifted 
from homily to fiction to proclaim it, or at least that certain themes in the novels are indebted to 
his maintained religious perspective, is a theory slow to mature. Arthur Cash operated
70sympathetically with Sterne's Comedy o f  Moral Sentiments [1966] in which he hails his
mentors: Jean Paul as developed by Edmond Scherer, and Coleridge as developed by Herbert
Read. Read, we should recall, wrote that
this paradox of a moral Steme will be found more acceptable when the world 
begins to read that neglected half of Sterne’s genius —  his Sermons. There is no 
inconsistency—in style, in manner, and in sincerity and aim—between the 
Sermons and Tristram Shandy or the Sentimental Journey. . . . there, more 
explicitly than in his works of fiction, Steme reveals his approach to life.30
10
More than thirty-five years later, one senses, Read was beginning to be heeded, and it is fitting he 
wrote the foreword to Sterne’s Comedy saying Cash’s use of the sermons is an “original feature” 
of his critical method.
Initially suggestive more of nonsense than of conclusive argument, Sterne’s fiction is 
both an examination of human nature, and a trial o f his reader’s ability to cooperate with that 
examination. His frequent flourishes are a far cry from lines of argumentation, but they do 
provide an engaging entertainment. The “familiarity” [p. 9.14 in The Life and Opinions o f  
Tristram Shandy, Gentleman. Ed. Melvyn New and Joan New, 1978. Subsequent quotations 
from Tristram Shandy will be referenced as TS followed by page and first line number in this 
Florida edition] that Tristram hopes will grow between himself and his readers throughout the 
novel o f his life, is the sincere gesture o f a magnanimous parson. Frankly, Steme ushers us into a 
fantastic salon where ancient and recent anxieties are addressed with sincerity in an atmosphere 
of shocking good humor. The salon is odd, the assay disjointed, but our impressions and 
conversations thereby provoked are entirely applicable as authentic experience. In Tristram’s first 
chapter, ripe with misconceptions, we are initiated into the mysteries o f time and the creative 
process which are of singular importance to the narrator and his family. Throughout that book, 
images o f love, death, personal identity and the challenges of conversation wheel around us so 
lightly we almost embrace them. For we too are weary of worrying alone with inadequate minds 
upon such weighty trifles as spontaneous generation and the impossibility o f objective 
perception.
11
Tristram and Yorick become masters of ceremonies, intermediaries between texts and
selves, perpetually present, recalling our responsibility to fertilize their narratives. The creative
implications o f Sterne’s writing are fundamentally and ultimately redemptive. This becomes
obvious when his interested and humanitarian theology is appreciated. His concentration on time
and death, love and writing, remind us of Donne and Shakespeare. In his concern for the
individual and his mockery of gravity, we anticipate Coleridge and Blake. As Montaigne uses
Epictetus’ quip to open his essay entitled ‘That the Relish of Goods and Evils, does, in a great
measure, depend upon the Opinion we have of them’, so Steme in giving his life and opinions is
concerned to offer an accurate reckoning of life and to delineate the scope o f dogmatical
responses to that life. To read Steme well we must be prepared for such an inclusive adventure.
His ancestors in this vein were likewise chided and misunderstood; the Vindication o f
Montaigne’s Essays addressing the virtue of honest presentation that first appeared in the third
edition of Cotton’s translation [1700] could well stand for Steme too:
I do not however design to defend Montaigne in every thing; far from it, I blame 
his Freedom in several places, and I cannot abide, that having discours’d o f the 
exemplary Life of a Holy Man, he should immediately talk as he does of 
Cuckoldom and Privy-Parts, and other things of this nature, which, tho’ perhaps 
tolerable in another place, cannot be suffer’d in this; and I wish he had left out 
these things, that Ladies might not be put to the blush, when his Essays are found 
in their Libraries, and that they might improve themselves by reading this 
excellent Book, without putting their Modesty to any Torment, as they must needs 
do, when they come to these places.
As for the rest, there is hardly any humane Book extant so fit as this to teach Men 
what they are, and lead them insensibly to a reasonable Observation of the most 
secret Springs of their Actions; and therefore it ought to be the manuale o f all 
Gentlemen, his uncommon way o f teaching, winning People to the Practice of 
Virtue, as much as other Books fright them away from it, by the dogmatical and 
imperious way which they assume.31
12
Chroniclers of folly such as Rabelais and Swift likewise unnerve us explicitly by bringing the
Privy-Parts of our nature to light in works that insensibly lead to reasonable observation o f our
most secret springs. Sterne’s bawdy stems from this comprehensive desire.
Reading him now, in an age no less sceptical and even more weary o f alienation, we
should be glad to dig up Yorick’s skull and joyfully recall the limitations and enduring worth of
all things earthly. Like David Hume, we may sigh at having lingered too long with scientific
approaches to integrity:
Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what 
condition shall I return? Whose- favour shall I court, and whose- anger must I 
dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who 
have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to 
fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the 
deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d of the use o f every member and faculty.
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these 
clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical 
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mine or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras.
I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse and am merry with my friends; 
and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these 
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in
X*)my heart to enter into them any farther.
The mania to collect and weigh evidences, well meant and useful as it may be, tends frequently to 
confuse and to disorient. Opinions begin to warp rather than assist the life entertaining them. 
Relaxation or diversion from such lines of gravitation -in  theatrical comedy and social rapport 
for example- may in fact be the best direction to the philosopher’s stone, reconciling quest with 
capacity. We smile to think of Hume relaxing in the presence of the Reverend Mr. Yorick in
Paris:
13
—  I had preached that very day at the Ambassador’s Chapel, and David was 
disposed to make a little merry with the Parson; and, in return, the Parson was 
equally disposed to make a little mirth with the Infidel.; we laughed at one another, 
and the company laughed with us both—33
Hume’s challenge, in 1739, that “Human Nature is the only science of man; and yet has been
hitherto the most neglected”34 was met by Parson Steme. By 1773 Hume was stating that
Tristram Shandy is “the best Book, that has been writ by any Englishman these thirty Years . . .
bad as it is.”35
So, the best book is naughty. Like uncle Toby’s bowling green, Sterne’s works are 
offered as havens from which pragmatically to follow, and as nearly as possible participate in, the 
adventures and crises o f worlds around and within. By entering into these mythic encounters 
catharsis and revelation may occur. We enter the ‘little world’ he presents (TS 10.10) and 
quixotically sally forth to incarnate our readings. If attentive we may find that it is this pageant, 
not an efficient production, that is valuable —a value inherent in the absurdities of any high- 
minded quest. The author himself is not aloof. He cannot help being involved and affected by the 
intimacy he has encouraged, and we sense his own delight in the amusements.
Sterne’s sermons, no less than his novels, engage us in conversation by developing and 
presenting accessible environments wherein we may see and assess ourselves. Unlike those of 
many of his mentors, Sterne’s homilies are personable, short, uncluttered and simple. He was not 
alone in realizing his congregation would best profit from sensible discourses. As early as 1675 
Henry Hammond begins the first sermon of a serious collection saying he will deal with his 
theme of sin in God’s chosen people “briefly and plainly; not to encrease your knowledge, but to 
enliven and enflame the practical part o f your souls; not to enrich your brains with new store, but
14
to sink that which you have already down into your hearts.” As we shall see, Steme goes even 
farther in attempting to plumb the inner motives of the personalities he presents. Reading 
Anthony Blackwall’s popular The Sacred Classics Defended and Illustrated [1725], we
recognize Sterne’s fidelity to realistic theology:
"True native eloquence consists in . . . such a style and manner o f speaking as is 
proper and suitable to the subject; and such as is apt to teach, to affect, and 
persuade.
The sacred writers are earnest and fervent: they speak o f things within their 
knowledge; are thoroughly acquainted with, and zealously concern’d in the 
importance of the great things they deliver. These good dispositions and 
qualifications produce a style natural, unaffected and lively; which is admirably 
fitted to convince and inflame the readers.37
Vigor without artifice was the goal, and it should be no surprise that the products o f many
careful mid-century sermon writers are considerably less formal than the chambered discourses
of previous generations. A sermon that is natural and in line with the divine mysteries will by
definition have elements that seem arbitrary. As Bishop Berkeley states,
Is it at all absurd or unsuitable to the notion we have of God or man, to suppose 
that God may reveal, and yet reveal with a reserve upon certain remote and 
sublime subjects, content to give us hints and glimpses, rather than views? May 
we not also suppose, from the reason of things and the analogy of nature, that 
some points, which might otherwise have been more clearly explained, were left
l a
obscure merely to encourage our diligence and modesty?
As in Sterne’s novels, what would otherwise seem to be lapses of explication serve as challenges
to reinforce our necessary participation; again Blackwall:
A style that imitates the different appearances of nature, and, as some express it, its 
beautiful irregularities, which I would rather call its beautiful varieties, entertains 
the mind and imagination with a most grateful variety of sensations and 
reflections; and gratifies the curiosity of human nature with a perpetual succession 
of new-rising scenes and fresh pleasures.
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ELLIPSIS or defect in the first-rate authors often makes the language strong and 
close, and pleases an intelligent reader, by leaving something for him to fill up, 
and giving him room to exercise his own thought and sagacity.39
In light o f Sterne’s reiteration that he trusts his readers to supply half the entertainment,
these statements are telling in a theological context. Thus the advice of John Norris: “ ’tis
convenient to leave something for the Contemplative Reader to work out by himself.”40 This
cooperative approach, and Sterne’s reticence to rehearse dogma with a congregation already
saturated, lies behind the content (or what some have seen as the lack of it) o f his sermons. Once
aware of this context we can begin to appreciate how faithfully Steme applies his concern. In
sermon 24, for example, he says
thus much for the illustration of this one argument o f our S aviour’s against Pride:
—there are many other considerations which expose the weakness of it, which his 
knowledge of the heart of man might have suggested . . .  the other arguments 
might be omitted, which perhaps in a set discourse would be doing injustice to the 
subject. I shall therefore, in the remaining part of this, beg leave to offer some 
other considerations of a moral as well as a religious nature upon this subject, as 
so many inducements to check this weak passion in man. (S 228.25)
Following the lead of Jesus, his parabolic hero, Steme constructs discourses that do not presume
to offer a comprehensive study of his text and theme, but rather “hints and glimpses” in
Berkeley’s words. Steme notes that it is to be wished that one could, for maladies of the mind
“write a history of the distemper,—and ascertain all the symptoms of the malady, so that every
one might know,” as one may for “the more malignant and epidemical cases of the body.” “—
But alas!” he says (regarding slander) “the symptoms of this appear in so many strange, and
contradictory shapes, and vary so wonderfully with the temper and habit o f the patient, that they
are not to be classed,—or reduced to any one regular system.” (S 108.9)
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Any one regular system will not do for Steme. Realizing that the complexities o f the
human mind and spirit are likewise mysterious, he refrains from composing a nousapaedia.
Instead he skirmishes with evils on their own chaotic turf. We should reassess the heritage that
claims his meanderings trace a ‘freethinking’ or ‘sentimental’ religion; Steme was attempting
neither to entertain his parishioners nor distract them from essentials. Reviewing the history of
Jacob for example, he is careful we not indulge ourselves with fruitless pathos:
—every looker-on has an interest in the tragedy;—but then we are apt to interest 
ourselves no otherwise, than merely as the incidents themselves strike our 
passions, without carrying the lesson further:—in a word—we realize nothing:— 
we sigh—we wipe away the tear,—and there ends the story of misery, and the 
moral with it.
Let us try to do better with this. (S 207.1)
Discussions of Sterne’s sentiment will do well to acknowledge his appreciation for the moral 
hidden in passions struck.
He wrote that preaching “is useless where men have wit enough to be honest.”41 In 1759, 
wit and honesty presiding, he began to accomplish a dramatic shift o f his prebendal forums. If 
Hume, discussing ‘Personal Identity,’ would proclaim that the so-called self is “nothing but a 
bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement,”42 then Steme would address that se lf  as it is, 
with a novel o f dizzying proportions. The scope confused some wise heads, Johnson and 
Walpole for instance, but theologically we should not be surprised. A semblance o f chaos usually 
attends significant revelation. As a congregation around the first Christian disciples at the feast o f 
Pentecost learned, when divinity chooses to address curiosity, the effects are more often
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surprising and mysterious than rational and familiar.43 The elusive nature of individuals and of
the Word provoked Steme to embrace a universe of compelling media.
Consequent to this approach, much of the pliable reader’s delight is in realizing the
entertainment, or Holy Ghost, was already within him. That he as reader and communicant was,
in fact, trusted to bring a luncheon o f that entertainment with him. The reader is not so much put
upon a quest to understand Steme, as he is prevailed upon to attempt to know himself.
Montaigne likewise concluded in the above referenced essai, “all external Accessions receive
Taste and Colour from the internal Constitution, as Cloaths warm us, not with their Heat, but our
own.”44 Far as this approach may seem from the straightness of pulpit discourse, it is classic
preaching, from Gorgias to the Dalai Lama. “It is significant]’ wrote Chesterton,
that in the greatest religious poem existent, the Book of Job, the argument which 
convinces the infidel is not (as has been represented by the merely rational 
religionism o f the eighteenth century) a picture o f the ordered beneficence of the 
Creation; but, on the contrary, a picture of the huge and undecipherable unreason 
of it. “Hast thou sent the rain upon the desert where no man is?” This simple sense 
of wonder at the shapes o f things, and at their exuberant independence of our 
intellectual standards and our trivial definitions, is the basis of spirituality as it is 
the basis of nonsense.45
In an era concerned to explicate the reasonableness of religion and the accessibility of 
empirical knowledge, Steme was inclined to represent and to celebrate the undecipherable 
unreason of things. I believe he hoped this would be a basis of spiritual understanding and thus of 
faithful optimism. The following study is meant in particular to examine the longstanding 
charges of plagiary and dogmatic laxity against Steme the sermon writer, and to see if, in a 
complementary way, the seeming chaos and evident humor of his fiction might be said to serve 
and encourage healthy, faithful, even reasonable perspectives. This should begin to illuminate
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Sterne’s appreciation for ‘fideistic scepticism;’ that communicating the value o f unknowing was
for him as for Job, Ecclesiastes, and Saint doubting Thomas, a transitional endeavor long-since
become rhetorical and reconciled by an epiphany of grace.
This thesis proceeds first by outlining the contexts —and establishing the vigor— of
Sterne’s sermon preparation. The use he makes of his sources and of scripture is presented within
the forum of his contemporaries’ works and expectations. This milieu developed, I then suggest
ways in which Sterne’s understanding of the gospel, and his rhetorical skill in communicating it, is
borne out in his fiction.
While he was composing what was to be the final instalment of Tristram, Steme wrote to
John Hall-Stevenson suggesting they attend the York races: “—If you would profit by y*
misfortunes, & laugh away misery there for a week—ecco lo il vero Punchinello! I am your man.”46
Naples, where Steme had enjoyed Carnival a few months before, is home to the anecdote to which
he alludes. Lewis Curtis provides the setting from Samuel Sharp’s Letters from Italy [1767].
At Naples there is a place called the Largo del Costello, not unlike our Tower-Hill, 
the resort o f the idle populace. Here, every afternoon, Monks and Mountebanks, 
Pickpockets and Conjurors, follow their several occupations. The Monk (for I never 
saw more than one at a time) holds forth, like our itinerant field-preachers, to what 
congregation he can collect; the mountebank, by means of Punch, and his fellow 
comedians, endeavours to gather as great an audience as he can. It happened one 
day, that Punch succeeded marvelously, and the poor Monk preached to the air, for 
not a living creature was near him: Mortified and provoked that a puppet-shew, 
within thirty yards of him, should draw the attention of the people from the Gospel 
to such idle trash, with a mixture of rage and religion he held up the crucifix, and 
called aloud, Ecco il vero Pul cinella; — “Here is the true Pit/ chinello, —come here,
—come hereT  —The story is so well known in Naples to be true, that the most 
devout people tell it; and, were it not for such a sanction, I should hardly have 
repeated it.47
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Steme was not so squeamish, and could appreciate the poignancy. Despite claims of many a critic,
such theatrics are absent from his sermons. With his fiction however, Steme draws a larger circle,
well aware of God’s apparent folly and of his own vocation as a fool in Christ.
Therefore, my dear friend and companion, if you should think me somewhat sparing 
o f my narrative on my first setting out,—bear with me,— and let me go on, and tell 
my story my own way:—or if I should seem now and then to trifle upon the road,—  
or should sometimes put a fool’s cap with a bell to it, for a moment or two as we 
pass along,-don’t fly off,—but rather courteously give me credit for a little more 
wisdom than appears upon my outside;—and as we jogg on, either laugh with me, 
or at me, or in short, do any thing,—only keep your temper. (TS 9.18)
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II -  STERNE’S COMPOSITION OF SERMONS 
Why Bother?
One can hardly relish the task of being critical with Steme. Do we not with every page 
scribbled admit an unwillingness to follow his critical jests? Shouldn’t we be cheered by Gerald 
Weales’ Afterword to an edition of Tristram Shandy which, in its entirety, reads “And so it is”?1 
Awareness of personal and topical limitations is only the beginning. Because Sterne’s assay o f our 
paradigms and perspectives is masked and gentle, vivisection seems inappropriate. We are 
attempting to fix a character who declares, as part o f his oddly placed preface to Tristram Shandy, 
“I hate set dissertations” (TS 235.9), and who perpetually defied his readers to anticipate their 
destination. These taunts engage us though, and lead us, as in all good conversation, to a previously 
unknown place, or to a new vision of familiar territoiy. This is the Steme of Tristram and the 
Journey.
I recently purchased the Shakespeare Head edition of the sermons [1927] as a discard from 
a busy public library ~ the pages were uncut. Reading Steme criticism we may be surprised at the 
lack of attention afforded these popular homilies. The sounds that have reverberated are of 
varying quality. Clearly, few critics have bothered to read the sermons with care and an informed 
sense of theological texts and contexts that would have been second nature to Steme. Until 
recently, no comprehensive outline of Sterne’s homiletic character had emerged. Instead, we 
have been offered statements suspiciously convenient to arguments of critics wishing to elaborate 
on theories developed according to the fiction, or conclusions presented from the exclusive 
domain of a certain school o f thought. Otherwise perceptive scholars confidently present
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statements having no possible basis in fact: “his most dramatic sermons were preached to rural 
congregations and never committed to paper except as notes;” “Sterne was not a religious man. 
He had no true religious leanings or principles himself, and he could not appreciate them in 
others,” and so on.
Common homiletic devices and then-current theology are misread and dubbed Shandean. 
Dramatization of scripture has been fathered on Sterne with little understanding of its traditional 
place in preaching.4 Accusations of plagiarism are accepted with scant recourse to his alleged 
sources, and of secular humanism with little understanding of the context and presuppositions of 
his congregations.5 Harlan Hamilton, one of the few to devote more than a glance to the 
background of Sterne’s discourses, gives us extraordinary detail surrounding the Paris sermon, 
right down to the room’s present decor and unobtrusive heating system. But, when he renders 
what was preached that day into “Sterne would have us get what enjoyment we can from life. He 
justifies the behavior of Hezekiah, and incidentally that o f Lord Hertford,” too few will realize 
that Hamilton is writing from the realm of extravagant fantasy.6 Fortunately we can be 
undeceived in fifteen or twenty minutes ~ by reading the sermon.
Readers of his homilies may be excused for an initial inclination to hear the bells and catch 
the winks with which we are familiar from the novels. But Sterne had spent over twenty years 
composing those sermons, and preaching from pulpits before introducing us to his fictional 
progeny. Like Tristram himself, the overnight success of The Life and Opinions was not 
spontaneously generated, so the influence of these decades of clerical gestation ought to be well 
marked. Steme consistently reminds us of the pitfalls of prepossession. From abuses of conscience
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to Diego’s nose he evokes impressions of the claim that minds prematurely convinced and hearts 
inaccurately disposed account for the world’s greatest tragedies, and for countless inconveniences. 
To give the sermons their due it is appropriate to forfeit expectations based on his fiction, and 
chronologically apt to begin with Sterne’s beginning, not grasping with critical forceps an 
homuncular Tristram, but evaluating effects o f the religious milieu enveloping his career.
Two long-reigning critical complaints about Sterne’s sermons have encouraged neglect. 
These are alleged plagiarism and the alleged substitution o f a sentimental or jocular morality for 
the gospel o f Christ. Because these charges are as unfounded as they are persistently adopted, 
there is considerable merit in establishing correctives.
While it has been recognized that to weigh charges o f thoughtless copying, clarification is 
required to understand the role o f “plagiarism” in the composition of sermons, we have yet to 
appreciate how Sterne used and revised material available to him. He repeats himself, plunders 
others, and weaves hundreds o f allusions to scripture through his forty-five sermons. Is he 
faithful to the gospel, is he dependent on his sources? Is his exegesis classic, unique or trifling? 
Are the forms and moods of his sermons extraordinary? May we accurately assign dates to their 
composition? Are there significant differences between the sermons Sterne chose to publish 
(Vols. i-iv) and those swept up by his wife and daughter (v-vii)? By addressing these questions 
towards a better understanding of Sterne’s perspective on sermon composition and content, we 
will be prepared to examine extents to which his faith informs his more popular works.
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COMPOSITION DATES & INITIAL PUBLICATION
Curiously, an issue much discussed by critics who have attempted the sermons is o f no 
great importance if  we have no prejudice against sincere parsons writing odd novels. Beside the 
overblown revelation that some of his phrases originated with others is this question o f the initial 
dates of composition. The tedious work of sifting what Sterne probably read, in preparation for 
his duties as parson, sheds light on his capacities. Lansing Hammond concentrated on this in 
Laurence Sterne’s Sermons o f  Mr. Yorick [1948], but his influential work is a mixed blessing.7 
His appendix of source material is valuable, but the text preceding it is awash with contradictions 
and insupportable generalizations. It is typical o f interest in Sterne’s sermons that this pioneering 
work survived the guidance of C.B. Tinker, the suggestions of Cross, Curtis and Pottle, and thirty
o
years of readers before its presuppositions and conclusions were publicly reassessed.
One of Hammond’s more suspect contributions to Steme studies is the result o f his 
extended attempt to assign composition dates to the sermons. The reader who takes Hammond at 
his word is likely to dismiss what he is told are Sterne’s early sermons as, at best, youthful 
imitations full o f plagiarized commonplaces, and to view the later as primarily proto-fictional 
exercises, each group void of considered religious application on Sterne’s part. That, according 
to Hammond, almost all were composed at least a decade prior to TS suggests, we are told, 
Sterne’s waning interest and argues a desire for fame and fortune. As this has fitted comfortably 
into most readers’ sense o f what the author o f TS and A SJ  would think of conventional religion, 
the dating game has sewn bells to the parson’s frock.
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Hammond’s comments suggest that the image of a careless parson informs his attempt at 
devising a timeline for the sermons. While he claims to offer a comprehensive view of the 
sermons, he instead bequeaths to us the inherited prejudice for reading in them a weakness o f 
commitment:
though Sterne may thus be absolved from charges o f heresy, there is not a great 
deal o f evidence to show that he was particularly concerned with the doctrines 
peculiar to or distinctive to the Christian religion; his precepts tend to make of
Christianity a moral philosophy rather than a religion — ___
Yorick’s Christianity was of a less strenuous, more agreeable nature; he preached 
what he liked to believe, always emphasizing the pleasantness o f his creed.9
However, as James Downey makes clear in “The Sermons o f  Mr. Yorick: A Reassessment
o f Hammond”, the more closely one reads Hammond, checks his footnotes and delves into his
appendix, the more one becomes frustrated with his conjectures regarding the time-line. “My
own analysis o f Hammond’s book [“to date the only serious study o f Steme as preacher”] has led
me to believe that his hypotheses are not sound and that his reasoning in support o f them is
challengeable at many points.”10
Downey’s comments on Hammond’s attempt to discern a pattern in Sterne’s style and
habits in order to date and categorize the sermons are accurate. Given the common practice of
reusing well-worded phrases, even the few sermons for which we have a particular date are
composites o f many years’ alterations and repetitions. Hammond bemoans the “brief and
superficial generalizations” of his forebears, and then begins weakly to support his own.11 His
decision that in Volumes v-vii we are faced with Steme immature, given to “uninspired
borrowing,” and that in Volumes i-iv we have “Yorick’s self-emancipation from a more-or-less
slavish dependence upon others” and from an “obvious and conventional use of the Scriptures”12
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is gratuitous, without regard for the contexts that the sermons are developing or for the
expectations of a mid-eighteenth century Anglican congregation — contexts and expectations we
will soon address. Hammond is confused in noting that Sterne’s “earlier” practice of verbatim
borrowing is both “slavish” and skilful: the result o f considered approval o f the words and
meaning of the original. Arriving at the so-called mature Steme (still pre-1750) we find
Hammond praising as unique, features that are typical of any good preaching:
the same ability to conceive dialogue, create characters, and furnish a scene with 
sharply etched backgrounds; the digressions and the eccentricities o f punctuation; 
the obvious delight in alternately shocking and then moving people to tears by 
deft portrayals o f the soft and delicate states o f emotion; and the whole, clothed in 
a style as subtle and flexible in texture and showing as great an economy o f means 
as any that English prose had yet known.14
His ancillary proclamation: “in the four earlier-published volumes . . .  the majority of discourses
could have been composed by no one but Yorick,” is a misleading symptom of allowing an
impression of Sterne’s fiction to rule one’s reading of his sermons. It would be prudent instead to
recognize that those “distinctive” skills we appreciate in the author o f Tristram Shandy and A
Sentimental Journey, were honed during and in large part a product o f decades of preaching
weighty matters enveloped in commonplace themes, using classic oratorical tools. Hammond’s
self-contradictions lead one to conclude that questions o f an ‘original composition date,’ whether
that be during an earlier or later period of Sterne’s career, are better answered by thinking of
Steme choosing sermons to his liking, regardless of when they were composed, and polishing
them for press. As we shall see, deftly manipulating tradition, Steme mastered the art of
commonplace religious conversation.
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Melvyn New in Laurence Sterne as Satirist [1969] claimed that TS is best “understood by
locating it in the mainstream of conservative, moralistic Augustan tradition.”15 Over three
decades New has consistently offered provocative readings involving the sermons, recently given
us the first complete edition of the sermons since Shakespeare Head, and eclipsed Hammond’s
appendix with his notes to the sermons: the fifth volume of the Florida edition of Sterne’s works.
New’s preface to this volume offers elements o f a much improved context within which to begin
to read the sermons. In a few pages he withers the presumption that Steme, incorrigible
plagiarist, was haphazardly organizing moral essays full of unique sentimental description and
empty of doctrine. The introduction and comprehensive notes of the volume help to illustrate
Sterne’s manner of sermon composition and his Anglican background while illuminating New’s
own perspective on the extent to which that background influenced Steme and his writing. I pick
some bones with New’s generous writings in this dissertation, but without him there would be 
is
nary a bone pick.
Like Hammond’s, New’s conjectures regarding the sermons’ initial publication need 
further consideration. I do not agree “it is important to keep in mind that the twelve sermons of 
Volumes iii and iv are the only ones Steme labored over to any extent in preparing his sermons 
for the printer.”16 We should recall Sterne’s insertion of the sermon which a decade prior “could 
find neither purchasers nor readers” (S 1.15), into the first instalment of his surprising novel, with 
the “promise” (S 1.16) “that there are now in the possession of the Shandy Family, as many as 
will make a handsome volume” (TS 167.20). Sterne’s letter of November 1759, usually quoted 
for its “I am tired of employing my brains for other people’s advantage,” also says “as I shall
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1 7publish my works very soon, I shall be in town by March.” It is doubtful that “works” refers
only to the first volumes of Tristram, and, clearly, though Croft’s lift to London may have been a
surprise on the day he offered it, Steme was not as unprepared about getting himself and his
£
sermons to town as the Whiteford papers (and subsequent biographers until Ross) have 
implied.18 On 4 March The DRAMATIC SERMONS o f  Mr. YORICK were advertised in the York 
Cour ant, prior to Sterne’s first meeting with Dodsley the following day.
New admits “Steme clearly knew what he wanted to do when he left York,” so one would 
expect that considerably to allay any remaining “wonderment” at Sterne’s having “had the 
presence of mind to throw some of his sermons into his bag” when he rushed to London.19 
Though we remember the first two volumes o f sermons were issued (22 May) only six weeks 
after the first London edition of Tristram (3 April), and just five days prior to the next, we should 
not conclude that he was too busy sufficiently to edit chosen sermons, that Volumes i and ii are 
the fruit of a careless attempt to flourish. Probably Steme was preparing the first volumes of 
sermons simultaneously with those of his novel, careful to choose discourses that would 
“balance” his “ihandaic character” and at the same time complement what he was
7 0communicating: “at the world’s service,—and much good may they do it.” (TS 167.21)
CONTEMPORARY EXPECTATIONS
How then, was this good to be communicated? If one were to define the popular notion of 
shandyism, translated into homiletic mode, the list of requirements would include all the 
elements with which Steme as published parson has been charged: scattered sentimental musings
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without regard for doctrine or structure, and some form of snickering that makes light of the 
gospel and its requirements. Expecting this, of course, we’ve found it. But are his sermons really 
that extraordinarily poor ~ the half-plagiarized product o f a winking deist? Critics o f literature 
have displayed considerable ignorance in their attacks upon Sterne’s clerical sincerity. So it is fit 
to review elements of what mid-eighteenth century congregations were expecting or desiring 
from the pulpit, as their age was witnessing a dramatic shift in sermon format. Improvements 
advanced over the previous century began to take root, and in the words of John Eachard, 
Anglican preachers were dissuaded from “high tossing and swaggering Preaching; either 
mountingly Eloquent or profoundly Learned,” and from relying upon “hard Words, high Notions, 
and unprofitable Quotations out of learned Languages.”21 Beginning with John Wilkins’ 
Ecclesiastes: or A discourse concerning the gift o f  preaching as it falls under the rules o f  Art 
[1646] a number of guides to preaching had outlined a new emphasis, away from the 
embellishments and obscurities o f earlier decades. John Eachard, James Ardeme, and Joseph 
Glanvill among others, all wrote in the latter half of the seventeenth century extolling the virtues 
of the ‘plain’ sermon, simply introduced, reasonably expanded with an emphasis on 
practicalities.
Familiarity with these popular works is necessary to achieve a sense of how Steme would 
have been educated to preach. If one parallels them with examples from Sterne’s contemporaries, 
a just reckoning is possible. A few decades after Sterne’s death, Hugh Blair the famed sermon 
writer and professor of rhetoric makes clear the challenge of the preacher’s vocation. Though,
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even because he speaks to a captive audience, the preacher’s responsibility requires considerable 
investment.
His subjects o f discourse are, in themselves, noble and important; but they are 
subjects trite and familiar. They have, for ages, employed so many speakers, and 
so many pens; the public ear is so much accustomed to them, that it requires more 
than an ordinary power o f genius to fix attention. Nothing within the reach of art 
is more difficult, than to bestow, on what is common, the grace o f novelty. No 
sort o f composition whatever is such a trial of skill, as where the merit o f it lies 
wholly in the execution; not in giving any information that is new, not in 
convincing men o f what they did not believe; but in dressing truths which they 
knew, and o f which they were before convinced, in such colours as may most
99forcibly affect their imagination and heart.
As we shall see, Blair’s is a superb summation of Sterne’s duty as he apparently viewed 
it, and critics who mark the lack o f doctrinally compelling material in Steme should note it and 
its precedents. For example, James Ardeme in Directions Concerning the Matter and Stile o f  
Sermons [1671] had long since suggested “there are another sort of Doctrines, which though 
useful and true, ought not to be the frequentest matter o f Sermons; those are the Fundamentals of 
our Religion.” Repetition of dogma, he claims, is not only useless, but suggests that there might 
still be room for doubt. “Reason” he goes on to say, is indispensable “to confirm our faith”
9^because “Enthusiasm or bare Tradition” are “both of them bad Nurses.” Even the appeal to
reason has limits in matters mysterious. Jonathan Swift, in his Letter to a Young Gentleman,
Lately enter’d  into Holy Orders [1721] is succinct:
I do not find that you are any where directed in the Canons, or Articles, to attempt 
explaining the Mysteries of the Christian Religion. And, indeed, since Providence 
intended there should be Mysteries; I do not see how it can be agreeable to Piety, 
Orthodoxy, or good Sense, to go about such a Work.24
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The Church of England preacher, as the previous quotation of Blair makes clear, was not
in a position of weekly catechizing the adult congregation before him, his duty was to rekindle
and maintain gospel interest. John Conybeare [1692-1755: Lord Bishop of Bristol and Dean of
Christ Church Oxford] ends his sermon on "The Excellency o f Charity above Faith and Hope’
with words echoed by countless preachers in that era: “these are only hints of what has been
explained to you, with much greater Advantage, on other Occasions; and in which I pretend not
so much to instruct, as to remind you.”25 In fact, elaborate attention to details, anxiety to
explicate mysteries and to say everything on one’s chosen topic was by Sterne’s day generally
appreciated as unhelpful. The best sermons are not studied dissertations. Blair illuminates with
relish themes nurtured more than a century earlier:
the eloquence of the pulpit, then, must be popular eloquence. One of the first 
qualities of preaching is to be popular . . .  in the true sense of the word, calculated 
to make impression on the people; to strike and seize their hearts.
. . . never study to say all that can be said upon a subject; no error is greater than 
this. Select the most useful, the most striking, and persuasive topics, which the 
text suggests, and rest the discourse upon these.. . .  It is much less for the sake of 
information than of persuasion, that discourses are delivered from the pulpit; and 
nothing is more opposite to persuasion than an unnecessary and tedious fullness.
There are always some things which the preacher may suppose to be known, and
96some things which he may only slightly touch.
Such exhortations serve us well in observing elements o f Sterne’s reasoned but lively 
discourses which were developed to serve best the doctrines at the heart of Christianity. During 
the century and a half from Wilkins to Blair, simplicity and practicality became the chief virtues 
of a good sermon style. To fault Steme for discourses void of complexities o f critical theology is
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inappropriate. “In short, a Preacher is to fancy himself, as in the room of the most unlearned
77Man in his whole Parish.”
Though we have accounts o f his success, when Steme preached “nearly extempore” was 
he shirking a duty to offer a well-composed sermon? Bishop John Wilkins: “as for the manner o f 
composing sermons, it will not be convenient for one that is a constant Preacher, to pen all his 
discourses, or to tie himself unto phrases: When we have the matter and notion well digested, the
70expressions o f it will easily follow.” Indeed a considerable distinction is made between three 
manners o f preaching: “extempore,” “speaking,” and “reading.” Reading was admitted to be the
• i nunfortunate peculiarity o f English preachers. Speaking, that is reciting from memory or notes a
carefully crafted sermon, and a well presented extempore sermon, were seen both to be valuable
when coming from capable clergy. A good extempore sermon signifies interested vigor rather
than laziness, as it indicates a preacher’s thorough facility. Thus Archbishop Fenelon in his
Dialogues Concerning Eloquence [1722]:
if they who get their sermons by-heart, were to preach without that preparation,
’tis likely they wou’d succeed very ill.: nor am I surpriz’d at it: For, they are not
accustom’d to follow Nature: they have study’d only to compose their sermons;
and that too with affectation. They have never once thought of speaking in a
noble, strong, and natural manner. Indeed the greatest Part o f Preachers have not a
sufficient fund o f  solid knowledge to depend on, and are therefore afraid to trust ^|
themselves without the usual preparation.
Blair is in complete agreement:
as to the question, whether it be most proper to write sermons fully, and commit 
them accurately to memory, or to study only the matter and thoughts, and trust the 
expression, in part at least, to the delivery? I am of opinion that no universal rule 
can here be given. The choice of either o f these methods will be left to preachers, 
according to their different genius.
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Sterne’s sermons are on the short side compared to those o f his contemporaries and 
mentors. Though this could indicate va interest, it has noble precedent. Bishop Gilbert Burnet, 
suggesting a half-hour as appropriate, wrote in A Discourse o f  the Pastoral Care [1692]: “the
7  *
shorter Sermons they are, they are generally both better heard, and better remembered.” The 
sermon at George Ill’s coronation lasted fifteen minutes. Steme found his congregations 
similarly inclined to brevity, as is evident in his letter to the treasurer o f the foundling hospital at 
which he was to preach in May of 1761. Steme writes promising to “discharge my conscience of 
my promise in giving you, not a half hour (not a poor half hour,) for I never could preach so long 
without fatiguing both myself and my flock to death—but I will give you a short sermon.” The 
oft-quoted lines that preaching is a “theologic flap upon the heart” and “useless where men have 
wit enough to be honest” conclude this letter.
A significant element of Sterne’s vocation was seen to be an encouragement o f this 
verifying wit. Preaching would be useless and is, among men wise enough to maintain self- 
knowledge. But, as the majority of mortals require a catalyst, it behooves the preacher to proceed 
in a manner calculated for maximum effect. Steme does not imply that preaching was useless or 
beneath him, but rather that his brevity was a result o f healthy sensitivity and good manners. It is 
not too fanciful to suggest that as in his fiction, where the reader is expected to bring half the 
entertainment with him, so the attentive listener could be relied upon to contribute thoughts 
sufficient to supplement brevity or lack of explication. Indeed the financial return for this charity 
sermon, ‘The Parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus’, was considerable.37 It should be of interest 
that Fenelon’s reasons for homiletic brevity parallel Sterne’s:
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in fine, I wou’d have every preacher make such sermons as shou’d not be too 
troublesome to him; that so he might be able to preach often. They ought therefore 
to be short; that without fatiguing himself or wearying the people he might preach 
every Sunday, after the gospel.38
REPETITION OF SELF
We should now examine elements surrounding the important and reiterated charge that
“Sterne’s sermons are largely secondhand stuff.” This implication that much of his material is
thoughtlessly copied is incorrect. That the reuse of one’s own sermons or parts thereof was
common practice in Sterne’s day is evident from the following quotations of Thomas Sharp’s
Discourses on Preaching [1755-7] which were initially intended for younger clergy “who were
still closely employed in composition, and had neither hitherto attained a sufficient stock of
sermons, nor had formed, by custom and practice, a settled mode or habit of delivery.”
Young preachers are but too apt to be solicitous about elegance in their phrases, 
and study to be polite in all their expressions; and sometimes polish them so high, 
that vulgar hands can lay no hold on them . . .  whereas old preachers are generally 
so sensible of these mistaken notions and misplaced labours, that they commonly 
grow sick of their own juvenile compositions, and scarce know how to bring them 
up again into the pulpit; at least without some proper retrenchment o f the 
redundances.. . .
I am only giving you some general hints of points which may be persued at leisure 
by as many of you as are yet employed in compositions, and are not already 
furnished with a stock of discourses sufficient for the demands of your stations 
and cures.40
Once furnished with a sufficient stock of homilies, the conscientious preacher 
occasionally reworks them to suit his temper and that o f his congregation. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that one inescapable conclusion in reading the forty-five sermons is that Steme 
had a catalogue of preachable themes and a number o f well-worded phrases he enlisted for
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appropriate contexts. The themes that most engaged Steme will be outlined in the following 
chapter, what interests us here is marking his use of others’ material.
USE OF SCRIPTURE
Beside lack of textual evidence, perhaps the most pointed objection to the view of Steme 
as uninterested copyist is his flair for communication. The sermons flow with ease and integrity, 
even in his use of scripture, commonplaces, or sources, auditors would not have the sense of 
hearing a string of quotations or cliches. Platitudes he was bound by his office, if  not by his faith, 
to proclaim, are presented vigorously, not in formal dogmatics but with dramatic style, seeming 
to emanate from the heart. As indicated above, this accords with the general trend of 
contemporary Anglican discourse. That Steme was not unique in so presenting the gospel41 
should not lessen our appreciation for how well he works. It is especially this skill, not alleged 
novelty or the effects of alleged plagiarism, which his contemporaries —often in spite of 
themselves— admired.
Some of Sterne’s critics have noticed his capacity to use the language of scripture to great 
advantage. Vicesimus Knox did not approve of TS or ASJ, and objected to what he took to be wit 
in the sermons. It is striking therefore that in Essays Moral and Literary [published 1778 on the 
advice of Samuel Johnson] he uses Steme as his prime example of one who managed to use 
scriptural idiom to great effect. While our concentration is the sermons, it is imperative to note 
that Knox is referring to the entire Steme canon:
there are a thousand instances of his imitating scripture interspersed in all the
better parts of his works, and no reader o f common observation can pass them by
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unnoticed. . . . [Steme] felt himself unequal to the task o f advancing the style of 
pathos to its highest perfection, and sought assistance from the Bible.42
Not only are Sterne’s phrases, even in his letters, overflowing with biblical allusions, but his
style is so saturated with the cadence and vitality o f scripture and the Book of Common Prayer
that in places the language is indistinguishable. Through his notes to the sermons New offers
statements regarding Sterne’s biblical usages, for example:
in the forty-five sermons, I suspect there are more than one thousand scriptural 
allusions.
The passage [S 215.32-216.11, paralleled in part at 290.1, and 320.30] glances at 
several scriptural verses, a good indication o f just how steeped was Sterne’s pulpit 
voice in the language of the Bible and the BCP___
The ease with which Steme (or an undiscovered source) gathers scriptural verses 
on the subject of pride . . . may be natural to a Bible-centered theology, but a 
sermon-writer could also seek help in such works as A Common-place Book to the 
Holy B ible*
Freely to quote scripture to support one’s argument or prose style was of course essential. 
Recalling Fenelon’s requirement for a sound extempore sermon, it is vital to grasp Sterne’s 
intimate familiarity with the Bible. We can do away with New’s suspicion concerning the use of 
extra-biblical sources for scriptural flourishes, by recognizing Sterne’s habit of alluding to a 
biblical phrase or event without direct citation. The consistent presence of scriptural hints in 
various contexts of all Sterne’s writings, personal and public, highlights his ability. Most 
noticeable is his penchant for using relatively familiar phrases in contexts quite removed from 
their original. Often the use is of only a few words, but the result is striking, no less for the 
integrity the phrase possesses; as if what in others seems to be a technique of imitation, in Steme 
after years of practice had become natural.44
36
If we recall Blair’s license to metaphor, Sterne’s whispering use of Joseph’s coat in
sermon 1 may be appreciated. Biblically it is Jacob’s gift to his favorite son, returned to him
bloody by jealous sons as proof that the boy was dead. With Steme it is an emblem o f false
happiness: a deceitful chaperone to pleasure “tells the enquirer . . . that happiness lives only in
company with the great in the midst o f much pomp and outward state. That he will easily find her
out by the coat o f many colours she has on” (S 3.19; cf. Gen. xxxvii,3). Two paragraphs later,
Steme conflates Ecclesiastes ii.24 and iii.22 and continues with a subtle connection o f the devil
to ambition: “to rescue him from this brutal experiment—ambition takes him by the hand and
carries him into the world—shews him all the kingdoms of the earth and the glory o f them—”
(cf. Matt, iv.8; Luke iv.5-6).
Sterne’s ability to conflate portions of multiple verses otherwise unconnected (e.g. at
9.10), could be attributed to undetected borrowings or ‘preachers’ helpers, but we would then
need to account for the frequency of these allusions in miniature. His instinctive wielding o f the
idiom argues for thorough saturation and creative interest. Too many hints are dropped to warrant
another conclusion.45 In the following excerpt from sermon 34 for example, Steme conflates
parts of at least 4 psalms from the Authorized Version and two from the Psalter.
—He knew this infinite Being, though his dwelling was so high—that his glory 
was above the heavens,—yet humbled himself to behold the things that are done 
in heaven and earth:—that he was not an idle and distant spectator o f what passed 
there, but that he was a present help in time of trouble:—that he bowed the 
heavens and came down to over-rule the course of things; delivering the poor, and 
him that was in misery, from him that was too strong for him; lifting the simple 
out of his distress, and guarding him by his providence, so that no man should do 
him wrong:—that neither the sun should smite him by day, neither the moon by 
night. (S 325.6-16)
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Sterne’s familiarity with scripture’s language enabled him spontaneously to recollect
phrases and to apply them in appropriate contexts. As he is a master of fragments this should not
seem inconsistent. One surprising but doctrinally apt example of this is his inoculation of Jesus’
statement in Matt, xix.29, for his dramatization o f the man sent from the dead to reassure us that
we need not forsake houses, lands, possessions . . . .
He might tell us, (after the most indisputable credentials o f whom he served) That 
he was come a messenger from the great GOD of Heaven, with reiterated 
proposals, whereby much was to be granted us on his side,—and something to be 
parted with on ours: but, that, not to alarm us,— ’twas neither houses, nor land, 
nor possessions;— ’twas neither wives, or children, or brethren, or sisters, which 
we had to forsake;—no one rational pleasure to be given up;—no natural 
endearment to be tom from.—
—In a word, he would tell us, We had nothing to part with—but what was not for 
our interests to keep,—and that was our Vices; which brought death and misery to 
our doors. (S 215.7-18)
Exegetes trying to apply the gist of Jesus’ harder sayings to a stable community of 
believers had long since interpreted renunciation in like manner, but Sterne’s zest is particularly 
compelling in having a messenger from heaven proclaim the practical morality in reversed gospel 
language.
We can see the same pattern in Sterne’s use o f certain favorite phrases of other sermon- 
writers, and, as New says in his headnote to sermon 13, “watching Steme re-weave the same 
ideas again and again, one is tempted to argue he is reaching into materials thoroughly absorbed 
within his own repository of arguments and illustrations, whatever their origins might once have 
been.”46 This is a temptation we need not resist. Two statements of Anthony Blackwall accord 
with Sterne’s habit o f repeating himself and others often in commonplace expressions:
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REPETITION of precepts and morals is often found in the sacred writers, and is 
design’d to waken mens attention; and by repeated strokes to impress those 
important truths, deeper in their minds.
Proverbial expressions are generally very significant, and contain much sense in 
few words, as resulting from the long observation and constant experience of 
mankind.47
Sterne’s use o f scriptural medleys is of course not unique to the genre. As Gilbert Burnet 
suggests, in preparation for a life of ministry the young priest should first “read the Scriptures 
very exactly, he must have great Portions of them by heart; and he must also in reading them 
make a short Concordance of them in his memory.”48 Thomas Sharp writes “great benefit may be 
made [of “scripture examples”], when they are properly selected, and discretely accommodated 
to the business at hand. They weigh much with the vulgar, and are easily remembered.”49 We can 
safely assume a glimpse of Sterne’s manner and personality in the hundreds of passing allusions 
which, regardless o f their context in scripture, are brought forth vibrantly to serve the gospel.
PLAGIARISM AND CREATIVE REAPPLICATION
As we pass now directly to observe Sterne’s use of some of his alleged extra-biblical 
sources we should briefly note the popularity of scripture commentaries. As usual, New is useful 
in his introduction to the volume of notes (pp. 9-11), except that if one is unfamiliar with these 
gargantuan texts one could conclude that with them we have the key to Sterne’s genius. Such 
books as Matthew Poole’s Annotations upon the Holy Bible [I: 1683, II: 1685] and William 
Burkitt’s Expository Notes, with Practical Observations on the New Testament o f  our Lord and 
Saviour Jesus Christ [1700] with their verse by verse outlines may be said to “contain sermons in
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miniature, masked as textual commentary ”50 but their simple observations would generally offer
no more than obvious suggestions to Sterne’s educated imagination. These miniature sermons
have little in common with Sterne’s and we would over-stretch his dependence in saying he
relied on this sort o f commentary for anything other than background hints and allusions from
time to time. Nothing o f what has been admired in his discourses owes its presence to these
paraphrases and brief notes of historical interpretation.
Joseph Hall’s Contemplations upon the Principal Passages in the Holy Story51 are the
notable exception, appealing to Steme with conversational examinations of scripture’s
sensational stories. Sterne’s interpretations, using Hall or not, were neither surprising nor
original. Now and then we do find a morsel of novel interpretation, such as the extraordinary use
of the event recorded in Genesis where Jacob, after toiling for seven years to gain Rachel the
second daughter of Laban, is deceived. The father-in-law sends Leah, the elder daughter into the
dark nuptial chamber. Steme unites the sisters into one person, and alludes to the story as a savvy
metaphor for marital undeception:
—Some disguise either of body or mind is seen through in the first domestick 
scuffle;—some fair ornament—perhaps the very one which won the heart,— the 
ornament o f  a meek and quiet spirit, falls off;— It is not the Rachel fo r whom I  
have served,— Why hast thou then beguiledme!
Be open—be honest: give yourself for what you are; conceal nothing—varnish 
nothing,—and if  these fair weapons will not do, — better not conquer at all, than 
conquer for a day:—when the night is passed, ’twill ever be the same story,— And  
it came to pass, behold it was Leah! (S 209.18-28)
So Steme was capable o f performing, or borrowing, unusual exegesis of course, but he seems to 
have realized that his talent was best invested in application and illustration rather than in
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imaginative readings or splenetic dogmatics. Only a handful of references are extraordinary, the
majority in sermons 22 and 41, most are noted by New. This seeming lack of ‘novelty’ argues
more for Sterne’s careful orthodoxy and reticence inappropriately to flourish than for disinterest
or lack of theological imagination.
It is a pulpit commonplace that preachers are not only encouraged but really have no
choice but to build upon the works o f their predecessors. Generally the practice o f simply
borrowing passages and even reciting entire sermons of others has not been frowned upon. This
is not a tradition of neglect or plagiarism, but the result o f ordinary human beings participating in
an office requiring orthodox distillation of eternity for particular congregations. O f primary
importance is the flock’s health and safety. The Anglican pulpit is meant to be neither a theatrical
cubicle nor an avenue for the parades of ignorance and genius. Unless the parson happens to be
the risen Christ, the message coming forth from that pulpit is not expected to be original to the
speaker. The preface to the Book o f  Homilies [1562] reestablishes this tradition:
CONSIDERING . . . that all they which are appointed Ministers have not the gift 
of preaching sufficiently to instruct the people, which is committed unto them, 
whereof great inconveniences might rise, and ignorance still be maintained, if  
some honest remedy be not speedily found and provided: the Queen’s most 
excellent Majesty . . .  hath . . .  caused a Book of Homilies . . .  to be printed anew, 
wherein are contained certain wholesome and godly exhortations. . . . All which 
Homilies her Majesty commandeth and straitly chargeth all Parsons, Vicars, 
Curates, and all others having spiritual cure, every Sunday and Holy-day in the 
year . . .  to read and declare to their parishoners plainly and distinctly one o f the 
said Homilies, in such order as they stand in the book. . . .  And when the foresaid 
Book of Homilies is read over, her Majesty’s pleasure is, that the same be 
repeated and read again.
Long before Steme these Homilies had been reshaped into more familiar sermons, but this 
communist tradition o f homiletic inheritance, in the Church stretching back beyond Augustine,
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needs to be appreciated.54 Repetition from the pulpit is not a concession, it is a moral and 
didactic requirement.
Gilbert Burnet echoes himself and countless others in writing-“We have so vast a Number 
o f excellent Performances in Print, that if a Man [meaning a preacher] has but a right 
Understanding o f Religion, and a true Relish o f good Sense, he may easily furnish himself this 
Way.”55 Samuel Johnson, so haughty with Steme, breaches no decorum in composing some forty 
sermons to sell for others to preach as their own: “about this time [before 1760], as it is 
supposed, he [Johnson], for sundry beneficed clergymen that requested him, composed pulpit 
discourses, and for these he made no scruple of confessing, he was paid.”56
Clearly Sterne’s culpability would lie in the publication o f lengthy unacknowledged 
verbatim borrowings, and in any prefatory deception attempting to mask them. That he was fond 
of loaded requests, creating situations in which a reader is dishonored by refusing to follow the 
author, is familiar to any who know his letters, particularly those seeking subscriptions. 
Concluding the preface to his sermons, resting “with a heart much at ease, upon the protection of 
the humane and candid, from whom I have received many favours” (S 2.15), he suggests one 
would be miserly to accuse him of impropriety. This sort o f sentimental bullying to provoke an 
eager accomplice is a key to the effective flow of his fiction. Sterne’s canonical salon affords 
ample room for conversation and participants do well to remember that their reflections are 
anticipated and chaperoned. However, it is imperative that we reassess Sterne’s ‘debts,’ for in 
his preface he is in fact being honest.
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As he will later instructively play with ‘plagiarism’ in TS and ASJ, reworking
Montaigne’s and Burton’s reworking o f others on the subject, so, at the sensational beginning of
his career as published parson, he acknowledges the nature of his debts. If, as Ross claims, we
are to sense Sterne’s “uneasiness” with his borrowings, that sense needs to be balanced with a
full appreciation for Sterne’s hearty involvement. It has not been noticed that he is in fact
‘borrowing’ his commonplace admission and disclaimer o f plagiary from a man he elsewhere
uses, William Wollaston, who in dedicating The Religion o f  Nature Delineated [1722] wrote
notwithstanding what I have said, in a treatise o f natural religion, a subject so 
beaten and exhausted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which so many 
notions will inevitably occur that are no one’s property, and so many things 
require to be proved, which can scarce be proved by any other but the old 
arguments (or not so well), you must not expect to find much that is new. Yet 
something perhaps you may . . . .  So that they are indeed my thoughts, such as have 
been long mine. . . .  It is not hard to discern, whether a work of this kind be all of 
a piece; and to distinguish the genuine hand of an author from the false wares and 
patch-work of a plagiary.58
In his turn, Steme, after excusing himself for publishing discourses not penned “with any
thoughts of being printed” (S 1.21) writes what many have assumed contributes to accuse him of
plagiarism:
the reader, upon old and beaten subjects, must not look for many new thoughts,—
’tis well if  he has new language; in three or four passages, where he has neither 
the one nor the other, I have quoted the author I made free with—there are some 
other passages, where I suspect I may have taken the same liberty,—but ’tis only 
suspicion, for I do not remember it is so, otherwise I should have restored them to 
their proper owners, so that I put it in here more as a general saving, than from a 
consciousness o f having much to answer for upon that score. (S 2.5)
“where he has neither the one nor the other” — Steme is being candid. This is a blanket apology,
but not for transcribing paragraphs without acknowledgment. His subjects, like Wollaston’s, are
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old and beaten but his language is new, and we shall see that the use to which he put the
language of others is new as well. John Dussinger, Judith Hawley, and Philip Stevick fault
Melvyn New for over-touting Sterne’s unoriginality in the sermons without delving into the ways
in which Steme makes others’ words his. Concluding his Scriblerian review o f the Florida
volumes Stevick, recalling Sterne’s sermon ‘Time and chance’, rightly notes the gap in New’s
efforts that I presume below to address.
Surely it is a conventional treatment o f a conventional theme, heavily indebted to 
others, traditional in its rhetoric, orthodox in its theology. Yet to say so does not, 
for me, account for the sermon’s capacity to move me: it is Sterne’s voice that 
does so. And so it is curious that Mr. New’s magisterial and magnificent edition, a 
result of a personal devotion to Steme scarcely exceeded in our time, tells us 
eveiything we would wish to know about the content and the context o f the 
sermons while minimizing those elusive elements that make the sermons sound 
like Steme and not someone e lse .59
That Steme “in oral delivery” rarely acknowledges his sources for particular passages,
writes New, “stems not, I think, from any sinister desire to deceive his auditors but rather from
the conviction that displays of learning should be avoided.”60 This reluctance is encouraged in all
sermon guides. That Steme would maintain it for sermons published in his lifetime, in any of
which contrary to critical misconception rarely are more than a few sentences copied verbatim, is
small price to pay for the advantage o f reading uncluttered homilies. They were, after all,
intended for inspiration not criticism. “The grand maxim” wrote Thomas Sharp,
by which we are to be guided in all those compositions which are distinguished by 
the name of sermons, is this, viz. That they are verbal instructions, designed to be 
taken by the ears of the persons instructed, and are not originally formed to be 
taken by their eyes: therefore like all other addresses to an audience, if  not 
understood at first hearing, are good for nothing.61
Steme had nothing to hide. Swift in his Letter to a Young Gentleman is unequivocal:
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as to quotations from ancient Fathers, I think they are best brought in, to confirm 
some opinion controverted by those who differ from us: In other cases we give 
you full power to adopt the sentence for your own, rather than tell us, as St. Austin 
excellently observes: But to mention modem writers by name, or use the phrase of 
a late excellent prelate o f  our church, and the like, is altogether intolerable; and 
for what reason I know not, makes every rational hearer ashamed. O f no better a 
stamp is your heathen philosopher, and famous poet, and Roman historian; at 
least in common congregations, who will rather believe you on your word, than on 
that o f Plato or Homer.62
Indeed during Sterne’s century the caution to this form of borrowing revolves around the
need for a sermon’s integrity, and it is Blair the rhetorician who brings it to our attention.
Interestingly the warning focuses on the very difficulty to which Steme alludes in playfully
quoting from Burton and Montaigne in Tristram Shandy. Blair warns the young from
immediately perusing others’ passages on the topic at hand before first forming and considering
their own ideas. Without this preliminary preparation both preacher and sermon will appear
confused and disjointed. One might also here recognize the shift, in the latter part o f the century,
to greater individual freedom in the composition of one’s discourse.
Though the writings o f the English divines are very proper to be read by such as 
are designed for the church, I must caution them against making too much use of 
them, or transcribing large passages of them into the sermons they compose. Such 
as once indulge themselves in this practice, will never have any fund of their own. 
Infinitely better it is, to venture into the pulpit with thoughts and expressions 
which have occurred to themselves, though of inferior beauty, than to disfigure 
their compositions by borrowed and ill-sorted ornaments, which, to a judicious 
eye, will be always in hazard of discovering their own poverty.63
There is a significant difference between Sterne’s theology being commonplace, and his sermons
being plagiarized, derivative, lack-luster, or confused.
Wilbur Cross notes in his introduction to the sermons, that an element of Sterne’s
‘plagiarism’ is attested by Isaac Reed who saw the sermons in manuscript. We should now be
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able to read it without prejudice. “On sermon forty-four, Justifying the Ways o f Providence to 
man, Steme has the memorandum; ‘I have borrowed most o f the Reflections upon the Characters 
from Wollaston or at least have enlarged from his hints, though the sermon is truly mine, such as 
it is.’ ”64
From what we know o f Sterne’s antics with ‘sources’ for his fiction, it behooves us to 
observe what use he made with the detectable mines of his sermons. Accordingly there is no 
substitute for reading entire blocks of homilies from John Tillotson, Samuel Clarke, and others 
whom he sifted. Popular and comprehensive, those who influenced Steme are of his 
grandfather’s generation, elders who dominated the eighteenth-century latitudinarian forum in 
word and thought. Reading them after Steme, one immediately recognizes a difference in tone 
and mannerism. As beloved as they were in their day, by people of similar theological leanings, 
most sermons of these men now seem mechanical and dry. Though colleagues held their sermons 
in highest regard for clarity, theology and vigor, one now may wonder at the patience of their 
congregations. A few of Sterne’s sources are closer to his style, encouraging one to explore those 
passages from which it seems likely that he borrowed. In these, what he changed is as interesting 
as what he deleted or retained, and the themes he chose to present offer valuable clues to his 
intentions.
Because Sterne’s sermons have suffered from poor critical attention, engendering 
fantastic misconceptions, it is necessary to establish a few important correctives before 
examining further elements o f his borrowings. We are indebted especially to Hammond and New 
for direction to writers Steme used, as he mentions only a few by name. The evidence supporting
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the following claims was gathered using that direction, rooting through those and other sources, 
and charting Sterne’s sermons accordingly. It is clear from the following selections of many 
possible evidences that he was not indiscriminately borrowing any o f his material. The use o f 
identified sources in lifetime volumes is almost exclusively very short if  verbatim, or 
considerably reworked if  longer. Bespeaking greater independence or sensitivity to publication, 
often authors used sparingly in Volumes i-iv are more fully used in v-vii, and longer borrowings 
used in v-vii have been reworked to shorter less verbatim usage in i-iv. None of the borrowings 
occurring in both the lifetime and posthumous volumes is used more boldly in the former; in 
every case the ‘lifetime’ borrowing is shorter and less verbatim.65
As further witness to Sterne’s considered involvement, often he borrows exclusively from 
the first or last paragraph of his source, or conflates parts of sentences from passages originally 
occurring many pages apart. His verbal debt to many writers (among whom: Thomas Wise, 
Walter Leightonhouse, John Rogers, Richard Lucas) is limited to only one of their sermons. 
Though future detection is probable, the only authors found to be used verbatim from more than 
two of their sermons are Tillotson, Clarke, Norris, James Foster, and the elder Edward Young, 
and o f these Foster and Young barely qualify. Words of Wollaston are used roughly a dozen 
times, but with reference to only three two to six page areas in his book of 219 pages, and the one 
longer borrowing (parts of 410.20-411.30) occurs in Volume vii considerably reworked. Joseph 
Hall, the only other writer from whom Sterne consistently borrows for his sermons is touched 
upon over twenty times, with reference to six places in his voluminous Contemplations and to a
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four page section of his sermon ‘the Righteous mammon’.66 This is not damning evidence; a jury 
o f his peers would shrug it out o f court.
Having unearthed a desirable phrase in his notes or elsewhere, Sterne may be forgiven for 
avoiding the charade of hunting different words to repeat what he liked. Time after time where he 
borrows from a recognized text it is clear given the old and new contexts o f the passages and 
Sterne’s customary reworkings that he would have considered himself borrowing words and 
aspects o f the discourse, but with reference to a renewed sense o f its essential message. When 
Sterne conflates his sources so that one sentence is made from what initially occurred on 
different pages, or dissects a sentence and uses its parts in different contexts, or weaves the 
words o f two or three writers into a pattern that reads much better than the originals we cannot 
accuse him of plagiarism. A writer capable of such editorial resurrection is not dependent upon 
the originals. According to accepted homiletic practice he made good use o f what was at hand, 
mined the riches of his predecessors, and used those catch phrases, lyrical progressions, and 
theological implications to anchor his congregation in the familiar while launching them into 
participation with the core of his text. Had Steme been incapable o f composing a passable 
sermon without recourse to others, his discourses would not be such as they are.
It is worth noting that the commonality of homiletic jargon and the brevity o f Sterne’s 
borrowings in lifetime volumes would have virtually prohibited contemporaries from recognizing 
a ‘source;’ hence Sterne’s alterations would not have been appreciated as such. Thirty years 
elapsed after publication before evidence of borrowing began to trickle in to periodicals, and 
these were by no means condemning.
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It is always pleasing to trace the origin and progress of the thoughts o f eminent 
writers, and therefore I hope it will not be supposed, that I am possessed of the 
spirit o f Lauder, if  I point out a passage which Mr. Steme appears to have read. I 
heartily wish to see any other writer employ his reading to as good a purpose.67 
Charges of Plagiarism in his Sermons have been brought against Steme, which I 
have not been anxious to investigate, as in that species of composition, the 
principal matter must consist o f repetitions.68
As we have seen, by Sterne’s day a good sermon was generally regarded as one which 
engaged the affections o f the congregation, one that did not come “too faintly” from the preacher 
and was easily applicable to daily practice. To some extent Sterne’s alterations of his 
predecessors’ words may be accounted for by custom. When he is borrowing from sermons or 
discourses initially penned up to a century earlier, in some cases for extraordinary congregations, 
we can expect a certain amount o f fashionable or parochial rephrasing that need not imply further 
diligence. Nevertheless, the contemporary success of Sterne’s craft should be reason enough to 
probe the sorts of altering he seems most consistently to have practiced.
More important though, than release from a charge of plagiarism is the unappreciated fact 
that, upon comparing Sterne’s passages with their alleged sources, he appears fully interested. 
This is clear from a number o f alterations he consistently practices. He personalizes exhortations, 
moderates condemnations, simplifies muddy prose, and often alters the original context of his 
borrowing, changing the use to which the words are put. Observing the short passages he seems 
to have borrowed, one is often at a loss to detect why Steme even bothered (if in fact he did), as 
the essence o f the original is disregarded in favour of something else, and the words retained are 
more like souvenirs o f something laid aside than necessarily integral to what remains. More than 
this, in a number o f passages containing others’ words, Steme seems implicitly to be
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commenting on, even criticizing the originals. These implicit alterations, alongside his interest in 
natural characterization, prove Steme to have contributed with exceptional interest. A few of 
these important involvements we now observe in detail. Recalling the gist o f appropriate sermon 
preparation outlined above, we turn to witness Sterne’s use o f his two most-mined sources: John 
Tillotson and Samuel Clarke.
JOHN TILLOTSON
The sermon-writer Steme seems most frequently to have used is John Tillotson,
Archbishop o f Canterbury from 1691. Considering the esteem in which the archbishop was held,
and the comprehensiveness of his sermons, this is unremarkable. Gerard Reedy, without
reference to Steme, claims: “it appears that especially the sermons of Archbishop Tillotson were
a staple o f clerical education and a source of ideas before and after ordination. . . . Tillotson’s
collected sermons (1695-1704), in fourteen volumes arranged around different themes, became a
summa theologica anglicana for succeeding generations.”69 Of course Tillotson himself was no
lone wolf, as Isabel Rivers records:
Doddridge, who made a thorough study of the divines of the established church, 
pointed out in his Lectures on Preaching that Tillotson made great use o f Wilkins 
and Barrow, going on to claim that “Many of Tillotson’s finest sermons were a 
kind o f translation from” Barrow, and that Tillotson’s ‘The Wisdom o f Being 
Religious’ “is taken in great measure” from Wilkins. (Doddridge also noted that 
Tillotson made great use o f the ‘Fratres PolonV (i.e. the Socinians) without 
mentioning them).70
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Though Rivers couches this assessment with “it seems safer to assume a convergence o f opinion
and a process of mutual influence” we do well to recall the communal heritage and free-hand
borrowing discussed above. Blair, writing in retrospect, refers to the archbishop thus:
Archbishop Tillotson’s manner is more free and warm [than Samuel Clarke’s], 
and he approaches nearer than most of the English divines to the character o f 
popular speaking. Hence he is, to this day [1783] one of the best models we have 
for preaching. We must not indeed consider him in the light o f a perfect orator; his 
composition is too loose and remiss; his style too feeble, and frequently too flat, to 
deserve that high character: but there is in some o f his sermons so much warmth 
and earnestness, and through them all there runs so much ease and perspicuity, 
such a vein o f good sense and sincere piety, as justly entitle him to be held as
71eminent a preacher as England has produced.
Obviously a fit mine for source material, but let us consider instances of what Steme does to 
improve upon the ‘flat’ and ‘feeble’ style, and the ‘loose’ and ‘remiss’ composition.
The difference in structure and tone between the archbishop and Steme is striking and, on 
first comparing their sermons in general, one cannot help noticing Sterne’s more conversational, 
less academic manner. It would be a mistake to attribute the rudiments of the difference to 
Sterne’s genius or trifling. Congregational expectations, location, and fashion could account for 
his attempt to develop short affective exhortations. Already a half century prior to Sterne’s 
sermons’ publication Shaftesbury noted, and lamented, the trend away from comprehensive 
divisioned discourses outlined above. The time-honored practice of serving an entire animal at a 
feast, dissected “by the appointed carver, a man of might as well as profound craft and notable 
dexterity, who was seen erect, with goodly mien and action, displaying heads and members, 
dividing according to art, and distributing subject matter into proper parts, suitable to the 
stomachs of those he served” was being jettisoned. Instead, many of “our religious pastors . . .
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have quited their substantial service and uniform division into parts and underparts, and in order
77to become fashionable, they have run into the more savoury way of learned ragout and medly.” 
After reading thousands o f pages of Tillotson’s divisible discourses one can only applaud the 
rebellion. What Gordon Rupp writes of Tillotson’s friend, John Sharp [1645-1714, archbishop of 
York], applies equally (or more so) to Steme: “it was all lucid, moralistic, and if  he lacked the 
gravitas of Tillotson, it was all gain that he spoke simply in the pulpit as a man speaketh to his 
friends.”73
Tillotson’s style was in large measure developed to offer maximum clarity without hint of
‘enthusiasm.’ W. A. Speck’s comment on G. R. Cragg’s assessment is just. He quotes Cragg
‘“because the heroic note has vanished there is no deep sense o f urgency in Tillotson, his
sermons now dismay the reader by their uninspired repetition of arguments directed to an
unimaginative common sense.’ But [writes Speck] it was this very quality which made them
attractive to Augustan churchmen.”74
After claiming that “a Divine hath nothing to say to the wisest congregation o f any parish
in this kingdom, which he may not express in a manner to be understood by the meanest among
them,” Jonathan Swift makes a point of distinguishing between Tillotson’s
elaborate Discourses upon important Occasions, delivered to Princes or 
Parliaments, written with a View of being made publick; and a plain Sermon 
intended for the Middle or lower Size of People. . . . Besides, that excellent 
Prelate [Tillotson] above-mentioned, was known to preach after a much more 
popular Manner in the City Congregations.
We cannot presume to disparage the archbishop, in his day a beacon for candid, moderate
Christianity expressed to various congregations. Our parson’s consistent plundering of his
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sermons testifies to the enduring worth of their contents—and to Sterne’s orthodox taste.
Nevertheless a difference is evident.
It is important to note that while Steme may be following a trend away from ‘set
discourses’ he is not thereby avoiding the weightier matters o f a preacher’s vocation. After all,
the intent of the comprehensive approach was also to clarify basic theology as appropriately as
possible to the congregation at hand. John Wilkins, Tillotson’s stepfather-in-law, classically
expresses the scheme of this sort o f sermon, in his early Ecclesiastes. Wilkins begins by
reminding his charges that it is presumptuous to think oneself a good preacher from simply
possessing an adequate knowledge of divinity “as if  the gift o f Preaching and sacred Oratory
were not a distinct Art of itself.” It is instructive to note how both Tillotson and Steme, with
different styles, manage skilfully to follow Wilkins’ guidelines. The event is to be organic: “a
good method will direct to proper matter, and fitting matter will enable for good expression.”
The principall scope of a divine Orator should be to
Teach clearly 
Convince strongly 
Perswade perfectly
Sutable to these, the chief parts o f a Sermon are these three:
Explication
Confirmation
Application
Each o f these may be further subdivided and branched out according to this 
following Analysis 76
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The scaffolding o f the three-page chart that follows this in Wilkins, as we have noted, began to 
lose its appeal and effect. Wilkins himself was careful to warn against its heavy usage: 
the phrase should be plain, full, wholesome, affectionate.
1. It must be plain  and naturall, not being darkened with the affectation of a 
Scholasticall harshnesse, or Rhetorical flourishes. Obscurity in the discourse is an 
argument o f ignorance in the mind. The greatest learning is to be seen in the 
greatest plainnesse.77
Steme refrains from showing us the skeleton of his message, exchanging gestures and
pauses for headings and sub-headings. This is fully current with the advice of Sterne’s near
contemporary Thomas Sharp:
it matters not whether this disposition [to clarity] be made by regular and formal 
divisions into heads, or by any other artificial disposition of the several 
arguments, for the better engaging the attention at present, and the better helping 
the memory afterwards.
Some preachers too fancifully adhere to a method of splitting into heads, and into 
a certain number of them too, on most occasions. I do not mean hereby to blame 
them; for, what is in method, and due order, is, generally speaking, well. But yet 
this rule o f splitting may oftentimes be changed into a better; and especially on 
those occasions where the preacher takes upon himself the part of an orator: under 
which character, the concealment of method often proves an advantage to the 
address. For a discourse, we know, may be full of art and contrivance, and even 
elegantly methodical, and yet shall seem, at least to the unlearned, to have no 
traces o f skill discoverable in it.78
One gets a fair perspective on this shift of styles and Sterne’s capitalization on the 
tendency towards creative simplicity by observing what he does with the well-worn theme of 
slander as developed in Tillotson’s ‘Against evil-speaking’. While composing his sermon ‘Evil- 
Speaking’, Steme seems to have been well acquainted with Tillotson’s effort. New’s headnote to 
the sermon alerts us that “much of the second half echoes Tillotson’s serm on.. . .  but it is worth
noting the extent o f Sterne’s rewriting of Tillotson in almost every instance.”79 Again,
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unfortunately New has yet to make public what he makes of Sterne’s rewritings. On comparison 
here, the immediately evident shift is one of form. In place of Tillotson’s sub-headinged agenda, 
Steme takes us on an unpunctuated ramble through this “delusive itch for slander.” Preaching 
before the king and queen, in the last year of his life, the archbishop opens his second paragraph 
describing how persuasives to repentance and a good life which are ineffectual for not having 
touched the consciences o f people in a “sensible and awakening manner,” may be likened to a 
physician who “instead of applying particular remedies to the distemper o f his patient, should 
entertain him with a long discourse of disease in general, and of the pleasure and advantages of
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health.” Tillotson is clearly trying to be of practical use, and he continues by telling us how this 
will be accomplished:
for the more distinct handling o f this argument, I shall reduce my discourse to
these five heads.
1 .1 shall consider the nature of this vice, and wherin it consists.
2 .1 shall consider the due extent o f this prohibition, To speak evil o f  no man.
3 .1 shall shew the evil of this practice, both in the causes and effects o f it.
4 .1 shall add some further considerations to dissuade men from it.
5 .1 shall give some rules and directions for the prevention and cure o f it.81
Steme is simultaneously less and  more present to his congregation. As preacher he 
appears less central than Tillotson and others whose didactic personae are magnified by the 
frequent reminders of the sermon’s divisions and precisely where we stand in relation to what is 
being conveyed. At times Steme reminds us where we are in the course o f his presentation, but 
this appears aside—the gesture of a guide—not as emphasis to structure.
Now bear with me, I beseech you, in framing such an address, as I imagine, would
be most likely to gain our attention. (S 215.3)
Give me leave, therefore, in the first place, to recall to your observations, what
kind of world it is we live in, and what manner of persons we really are.
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Secondly, and in opposition to this, I shall make use o f the apostle’s argument, 
and from a brief representation of the Christian religion, and the obligations it lays 
upon us, shew, what manner of persons we ought to be in all holy conversation 
and godliness. (S 283.27)
Sterne’s showings read more like invitations to consider than pre-conceived treatises. Again, this
is in line with Sharp’s advice: “preachers should not appear as disputants, nor carry themselves
as preceptors; they should rather put on the character of counsellors and friendly advisors.’
In ‘Evil-Speaking’ Steme launches into his prose without warning. Not surprisingly we
hear echoes of a number of themes already rehearsed in ‘Abuses’ and the ten prior sermons of
Volumes i and ii. Immediately we are reminded o f human inconsistencies and the problems
associated with fulfilling the duty o f benevolence. That these are due to ruling passions and lack
of self-knowledge is once again illustrated, this time as a check to slander. Tillotson is more
thorough in his overview. He outlines six causes o f evil-speaking and feels it necessary to
describe consequences of the vice.
Once they are well into their treatments, both preachers appeal to their congregations with
a commonplace exhortation. Steme says, as he reiterates in some form throughout his sermons,
“lay your hands upon your hearts, and let your consciences speak” (S 106.6). Tillotson has “let
every man lay his hand upon his heart, and consider how himself is apt to be affected by this
usage.”84 Where Steme is content to trust this appeal to his listeners’ conscience, Tillotson
explicitly lists seven practical reminders o f how one should remember not to speak evil o f others.
Thus, it is probably with regard to Tillotson’s attempt to write a summa on slander that Steme,
exasperated at the futility ot comprehensively penetrating the mass of human contradictions with
lists, just before his first ‘borrowing’ from Tillotson writes “—But alas! the symptoms o f this
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appear in so many strange, and contradictory shapes, and vary so wonderfully with the temper 
and habit o f the patient, that they are not to be classed,— or reduced to any one regular system” (S 
108.15). In fact, we shall see that Steme often includes implicit criticism o f those he 
incorporates.
An important shift o f style visible in a comparison o f these sermons is Sterne’s apparent 
lack of comprehensive completion. Unlike Tillotson he avoids covering all possible occasions of 
evil-speaking, and refrains from suggesting corresponding remedies. Steme examines the causes 
o f evil-speaking in individual consciences and asks his congregation to address the problem in 
personal manners. We are not confronted by a dissertation on the branches of a particular vice, 
but offered clues to its roots in human nature and an impression o f its insidious consequences, 
the most accurate dissuasions possible.
After establishing a solid basis for the sin in the inconsistencies o f ruling passion, Steme 
concentrates on the various ways and gestures by which the sin is communicated. This is in direct 
contrast with Tillotson who seems compelled to berate the facts that “men generally love rather 
to hear evil of others than good” and that people find it easier to use their wits to blame than to 
praise. Sterne’s treatment is far more likely to affect those inclined toward slander. Though he 
uncharacteristically changes Tillotson’s “our” to “her” at 109.5, he speaks to the heart o f the 
issue at hand. Even a passing comparison of the passages from Tillotson quoted in Florida Works 
V p. 157 and their parallel in Steme 108.28-109.7 gives an immediate sense of the fluid and 
personal tone of Sterne’s exhortation. The idea of slander in Tillotson is retained, but it is given
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the drama of a living sin, enveloped in fittingly indulgent language. Instead of the general routine
outlined by Tillotson, Steme personalizes the victim and the gossips:
—How large a portion of chastity is sent out o f the world by distant hints,—  
nodded away, and cruelly winked into suspicion, by the envy of those, who are 
passed all temptation of it themselves.—How often does the reputation o f a 
helpless creature bleed by a report—which the party, who is at the pains to 
propagate it, beholds with so much pity and fellow-feeling,—that she is heartily 
sorry for it,—hopes in God it is not true. (S 108.29)
In effect we are left with two very different sermons. Sterne’s borrowings are almost 
incidental and o f no great importance to his sermon. The similarities o f ideas are sufficiently 
commonplace to be little more than classic guidelines. Verbal borrowings, separated by more 
than ten pages in Tillotson, are thoroughly reworked and show evidence of restraint: 
incorporation o f familiar ideas into a lively sermon, rather than slavish regurgitation. What is 
most useful to remember is that Tillotson himself was trying for an equally affecting discourse. 
He achieved it with at least one correspondent to the Spectator whose praise of Tillotson is set 
off by the misuse to which a junior clergyman had subjected this same sermon. Steme managed 
to produce the antithesis o f what that critic disapproved. Instead of the “young gentleman” who 
kept “all the heads and sub-divisions of the sermon” but “made so many pretty additions; and he 
could never give us a paragraph of the sermon, but he introduced it with something which 
methought looked more like a design to show his own ingenuity than to instruct the people,”85 
Steme did away with the presumably over-rehearsed heads and sub-divisions and offered a 
passionate plea with less than a third o f Tillotson’s length. In effect he fulfilled Tillotson’s 
promise of preaching in a “sensible and awakening manner” (p.l) what would most likely incite 
reform.
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SAMUEL CLARKE
It should be o f interest that, true to the advice of earlier divines, Thomas Sharp’s two 
primary rules for sermon composition are “I. Never to think one’s se lf obliged, on any subject, to 
say all that one can say . . . [And] II. Never to pursue any subject over-curiously into its 
minuteness.”*6 Personalizing and enlivening his style, we have seen how Steme, taking hints 
from Tillotson, represents the vice of slander by focusing on personality and the unaccountable 
nature of human inconsistencies. To understand that this is not extraordinary for Sterne’s canon, 
we can look at his reworking of his selections from a charity sermon of Samuel Clarke [1675- 
1729], who, like Tillotson, was very much in vogue mid-century. His collected sermons had eight 
editions by 1765, and o f the sermon writers from whom Steme is recognized as having drawn, in 
volume it appears Clarke is second only to Tillotson. William Seward writes “a friend of Dr. 
Johnson asked him one day, whose sermons were the best in the English language. ‘Why, sir, 
bating a little heresy those o f Dr. Samuel Clarke’.”87
It is worth considering that Sterne’s two sermons published prior to the first volumes of 
Tristram are classic. Two of his most revisited themes, self-deception and benevolence, are in 
these treated at length, and echoes o f those treatments can be heard through the rest o f his works. 
That Steme in some way approved of ‘The Abuses o f Conscience considered’ seems clear from 
its reappearance in Tristram Shandy. Evidently he also retained interest in ‘The Case o f Elijah 
and the widow of Zarephath considered’ first published in 1747. This was sent as an affectionate 
gift to Catherine Fourmantel in 1759 and became #5 in Volume i. The sermon, in support of two 
charity-schools, holds echoes of Clarke’s sermon ‘On the Duty o f Charity’ likewise seeking
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donations for the education of poor children. Sterne’s lively rendition of a charity theme, 
involving considerable expansion o f a biblical story is neither original nor shandaic, but his
particular uses of a sermon he knew well, and the differences of treatment, compel further
* 88 investigation.
In his note to 47.10-18 New writes, “Sterne’s capacity to gather scriptural fragments as he
80does here bespeaks great familiarity with the Bible— or with an unidentified aid.” This is true,
though use o f an “aid” would not negate great familiarity. In any case verses to which Steme
alludes in that passage have been put to use by countless preachers, but their occurrence in the
last third of a sermon which parallels Sterne’s #s 3 and 5 is fair evidence that in this case he drew
from Clarke. In no other sermon, by the way, does Steme so consistently italicize biblical
phrases, a common practice with Clarke who stacks references that inevitably draw visual
attention to his heavy use of scripture. After expanding the Elijah/widow story Steme suggests
the central theme of his sermon: that charitable acts are likely to rebound with interest on those
who practice them. Clarke too makes much of this incentive:
for such is the instability o f all temporal things, that, as the wise man elegantly 
expresses it, Riches make themselves wings, and f ly  away, as an eagle towards 
Heaven; that is, we cannot with all our Care, secure them to ourselves for any 
certain time; much less are Riches for ever, or do our possessions endure for all 
generations. We know not how soon they may be snatched from Us, by 
numberless unforseen Accidents; or we may as suddenly be taken from them, and 
our Soul be required of us this very Night. In this Case no other part of them will 
be really beneficial to us, but that which by works o f Charity hath been before lent 
unto the Lord, who in the Life to come will repay it again. And even in respect o f 
our continuance in this present World, That which has been well laid out in doing 
Good to Mankind, has a greater Probability of turning to our Advantage even 
here; (considering the variety of Accidents all human Affairs are subject to;) than 
that which may have been covetously treasured up. For, as Solomon excellently 
expresses this matter, Cast thy bread upon the Waters, and thou shalt fin d  it after
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many days; Give a portion to seven, and also to eight, fo r  thou knowest not what 
evil shall be upon the earth, Eccles. xi.i. and iii.31. He that doth good turns, is 
mindful o f  that which may come hereafter; and when he falleth, he shall f in d  a 
stay. . . .
Be as a Father unto the Fatherless, and instead o f  a Husband unto their Mother; 
so shalt thou be as the Son o f  the most High, and he will love thee more than thy 
Mother doth, Ecclus. iv.10. . . .
Shut up alms in thy storehouses, and it shall deliver thee from  all afflictions. It 
shall fight fo r thee against thine enemies, better than a mighty shield and a strong 
spear.90
Steme edits these to read:
a charitable and good action is seldom cast away . . . even in this life it is more 
than probable, that what is so scattered shall be gathered again with increase. Cast 
thy bread upon the waters, and thou shalt fin d  it after many days. Be as a father 
unto the fatherless and instead o f  a husband unto their mother, so shalt thou be as 
the son o f  the Most High, and he will love thee more than thy mother doth. Be 
mindful o f  good turns, for thou knowest not what evil shall come upon the earth; 
and when thou fallest thou shalt find  a stay. It shall preserve thee from  all 
affliction, and fight fo r thee against thy enemies better than a mighty shield and a 
strong spear.
The great instability of temporal affairs, and constant fluctuation of every thing in 
this world, afford perpetual occasions of taking refuge in such a security.
What by successive misfortunes; by failings and cross accidents in trade; by 
miscarriage of projects:—what by unsuitable expences o f parents, extravagance o f 
children, and the many other secret ways whereby riches make themselves wings 
and fly away. (S 47.9-25)
Surrounding the passages above, Clarke quotes many other verses from which Steme 
could have chosen, so it is worth marking Sterne’s choice and alterations. The instability/wings 
element is retained, and the probability of present recompense, as in Clarke, is supported with 
references. In the first quotation Steme and Clarke have “and thou shalt” against the Authorised 
[KJV] “for thou shalt.” Clarke continues with Eccles. xi.2 while Steme jumps over to another 
series o f quotations in Clarke and takes Ecclesiasticus iv.10, retaining Clarke’s “he will love”
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against Authorised “he shall love.” Then, Steme returns to the previous block of quotations and 
rewords Ecclus. iii.31, which by Clarke is misreferenced but quoted verbatim, and conflates that 
with his rewording o f Clarke’s later quotation of Ecclus. xxix.9-15. What is noteworthy is not the 
preacher’s ability to find relevant quotations in scripture, which with the devices to find them are 
legion, but the finesse with which a few are chosen to augment the sermon’s development. Steme 
refrains from interrupting us with references and the seemingly endless bolstering o f points with 
quotations. It is impossible to note such alterations and maintain the view of him as disinterested 
plagiarist.
Sterne’s next point, at 48.2-6, that “charity and benevolence, in the ordinary chain of
effects, have a natural and more immediate tendency in themselves to rescue a man from the
accidents o f the world, by softening the hearts, and winning every man’s wishes to its interest” is
also Clarke’s immediately following the above quoted “he shall find a stay.” ‘Immediately,’ that
is, after:
but this leads me to the
lid Thing I proposed to speak to . . .
1 st; As has already been hinted; the Charitable man in the natural and ordinary 
course of things, lays up for himself a truer Security against the Accidents o f the 
World, in the Love and Favour, the Affection and Good-Will o f Men; than he 
could do by hoarding up the largest treasures.91
While their ideas are identical, Sterne’s treatment is more personal and sensually 
oriented. Clarke, though eminently capable, almost seems to be layering his own brief prose with 
scripture to avoid making a point in his own words. Steme rushes in, imagining the situation o f a 
compassionate man in need of pity, and elaborates with language chosen to affect the would-be 
donors. Clarke presents his points with more reserve, we hear nothing of “a tear of tenderness,”
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“a seasonable kindness” or “the expressions of unutterable pleasure and harmony in his looks” (S 
48.19, 21, 23). This difference in tone does not, o f course, discourage Steme from continuing to 
make use of him.
It is a reiterated theme of Platonic and latitudinarian theology that human nature needs 
considerably to be warped before it will succumb to a vicious life; so Steme needed no source to 
remind us:
what we say of long habits of vice, that they are hard to be subdued, may with 
equal truth be said concerning the natural impressions of benevolence, that a man 
must do much violence to himself, and suffer many a painful struggle, before he 
can tear away so great and noble a part o f his nature.. . . —then NATURE awoke in 
triumph, and shewed how deeply she had sown the seeds of compassion in every 
man’s breast; when tyrants, with vices the most at enmity with it, were not able 
entirely to root it out. (S  50.14-18, .32-51.3)
O'*)New gives examples from Tillotson, Herring and Norris upon which Steme could have relied,
but in the present context I suggest Steme reviewed this portion o f Clarke’s sermon, which
occurs earlier in the same paragraph as the “For such is the instability” quoted above [p. 59]:
compassion is by the Wisdom of our great Creator, implanted in the very frame of 
our Nature; and men cannot without great and long habits o f Wickedness, root out 
of their minds so noble and excellent an inclination. ’Tis almost as natural for us 
to feel an agreeable Satisfaction and unexpressible Pleasure o f mind, upon 
satisfying a hungry Soul with bread, or cloathing the naked with a garment; as ’tis 
for Them to be pleased with the Sense of their being relieved from these natural 
wants.
Steme engages our imaginations, asking us to conceive of “the most perfect and amiable 
character” leading up to his praise of Christ’s ultimate charity. Again, the borrowing, if  it is one, 
is insignificant for such a commonplace utterance, but we do well to note the passion with which 
Steme renders his plea. Clarke has:
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we are all Members o f one body, and members also one o f  another, Rom. xii.6.
We all profess to be Worshippers o f that One Supreme God, who giveth to all 
men liberally and upbraideth not. We are all redeemed by the blood o f that 
Saviour, and depend upon his merits, for the hope of Salvation; who voluntarily 
became poor, that we might be made rich; who went about doing good; who laid 
down his life for our sakes; and in all this, set us an example that we shouldfollow  
his steps. . . .  These considerations, if  we will be Christians indeed, cannot but 
produce in us the greatest Endearments of mutual affection; and those, if  they be 
sincere, must necessarily show forth themselves in suitable effects.94
Whereas Steme writes,
we should endeavour to think o f some one, if human nature could furnish such a 
pattern, who, if occasion required, was willing to undergo all kinds o f affliction, 
to sacrifice himself, to forget his dearest interests, and even lay down his life for 
the good of mankind.— And here,— O merciful SAVIOUR! how would the bright 
original of thy unbounded goodness break in upon our hearts? Thou who becamest 
poor, that we might be rich—though Lord o f all this world, yet hadst not where to 
lay thy head. . . .
The consideration of this stupendous instance of compassion, in the Son of God, 
is the most unanswerable appeal that can be made to the heart o f man, for the 
reasonableness of it in himself. (S  51.24-31, 52.6-8)
Unlike Clarke, Steme goes on for a paragraph drawing the appeal of precedent from 
Christ to disciples and then moves ahead in Clarke to the conclusion o f his sermon. Clarke 
briefly considers the ways in which the “Duty” of charity “may best and most usefully be 
performed.” Typically he gives a list, paraphrasing Matt, xxv.35-6: “we are to visit the sick, to 
relieve the needy, to feed the hungry, to cloathe the naked . . ..” He goes on to say “only here I 
must not omit to observe, that there is one comprehensive method o f Charity, which in its extent 
and effects is a compendium o f all the instances of beneficence in one; and That is the education 
o f poor children, to which your contribution is now desired.”95 Clarke mentions potential social 
advantages, but only briefly. Steme, instead, proceeds to make a considered plea for the by no 
means universally popular charity, but this he begins with an echo o f Clarke’s conclusion,
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(glancing at it again at 54.18 when he repeats Clarke’s reference to compassion as the
“compendium of all charity”):
and indeed, o f all the methods in which a good mind would be willing to do it, I 
believe there can be none more beneficial, or comprehensive in its effects, than 
that for which we are here met together.—The proper education of poor children 
being the ground-work of almost every other kind of charity, as that which makes 
every other subsequent act o f it answer the pious expectation o f the giver.
(552.21-27)
Before leaving Clarke’s sermon we should note Sterne’s use of it in his other charity 
sermon in Volume i. Like Tillotson, Clarke is usually explicit in giving us the headings and sub­
headings of his discourses, frequently reminding us where we are in his scheme. Steme takes a 
different course, and its effect is to us perhaps best realized in these charity sermons, discourses 
particularly developed to work with the affections o f a congregation. In order to give his listeners 
some scriptural context [his text is Matt, v.48: “Be ye therefore perfect. . .”], to tell them what 
they could but would not be hearing, Clarke explicates the word ‘perfection’ as it relates to 
humanity and divinity, the call to imitate the perfection of God, the nature of perfection, and 
what is signified by perfection in different passages o f scripture: holiness, patience in suffering, 
forgiveness and charity. Then, settling on charity as his topic, he says
in this latter Sense therefore, I shall take leave to understand the words at this 
time; and shall accordingly endeavour in the following Discourse, to recommend 
to you this excellent Duty of Charity, in the following Method.
1 st, By showing how many and great Obligations we are continually 
under, to practice this Duty.
2dly, What great Benefits and Advantages accrue to ourselves, by the 
practice of it. And
3 dly, In what particular Methods and Instances, it may best and most usefully be 
performed.96
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Clarke’s ‘On the Duty of Charity’ is aptly titled. Sterne’s ‘Philanthropy recommended’ is an
earnest plea, Clarke heavily explicates a duty.
Clarke breaks his first heading into subdivisions o f obligations to God, to neighbors, and
to one’s self. By the time he reaches his second heading, and its five points, he admits he is
running out o f time. The first of these points was quoted above regarding the probability of a
charitable man being repaid in this life. In contrast to this, Steme begins his examination of Luke
x. 36,37 [his text for #3, ‘Philanthropy recommended’] by expanding and illustrating the
background and nature of Jesus’ meeting with the lawyer. Steme carefully shows how Jesus,
instead o f giving a direct answer . . . immediately retorts the question upon the 
man who asked it, and unavoidably puts him upon the necessity o f answering 
h im se lf ....
[and] makes answer to the proposed question, not by any far fetch’d refinement 
from the schools of the Rabbis, which might have sooner silenced than convinced 
the man—but by a direct appeal to human nature.. . .
On the close of which engaging account—our SAVIOUR appeals to the man’s own 
heart in the first verse of the te x t. . .  and instead of drawing the inference himself, 
leaves him to decide. (S 21.13-17,22.14-17, 22.23-27)
Then, after establishing this context at a point where Tillotson or Clarke would give us a 
list of headings by which to lead us to understand the benefits and reasonableness o f generosity, 
Steme says “in the remaining part of the discourse I shall follow the same plan; and therefore 
shall beg leave to enlarge first upon the story itself, with such reflections as will rise from it; and 
conclude, as our SAVIOUR has done, with the same exhortation to kindness and humanity which 
so naturally falls from it” (S 23.1). This he does, the enlargements and reflections on the parable 
consuming all but the last paragraph of his sermon. Steme has the Samaritan offer a soliloquy on
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the brotherhood of man (S 27.21-28.21), echoing in first-person sentiments that are warm in
Q7Clarke but studded with scriptural citations and generally less engaging.
Steme leaves his lively reenactment with a statement that sums up much of his concern in
the sermons: “inconsistent creature that man is! who at that instant that he does what is wrong, is
not able to withhold his testimony to what is good and praise worthy” (S 29.21). He embellishes
with sensible reflections and a marked absence of didacticism, and says •'
I have now done with the parable, which was the first part proposed to be 
considered in this discourse; and should proceed to the second, which so naturally 
falls from it, of exhorting you, as our SAVIOUR did the lawyer upon it, to go and 
do likewise: but I have been so copious in my reflections upon the story itself, that 
I find I have insensibly incorporated into them almost all that I should have said 
here in recommending so amiable an example; by which means I have unawares 
anticipated the task I proposed. (S 29.24)
The significance of this remark, one of the few in the sermons where Steme comments on 
the form of a particular discourse, becomes clear when we realize Steme is emulating the 
teaching method of Jesus. If we compare this remark with those above from pages 21 and 22 we 
see him explicitly drawing attention to Jesus’ appeal to the heart o f — and his refusal to ‘draw the 
inference’ for— his interlocutor. Steme explains that he will “follow the same plan.” He does not 
blurt out correct statements to silence inquirers; he engages listeners, sets up a situation that 
involves them and which “insensibly” requires conclusive participation. That Steme believed the 
least inaccurate way to appeal to a congregation was through this sort o f communication, and that 
he rooted it in Jesus’ method of using parables, is our best clue to understanding his 
conversational style and deviation from the comprehensive bent of his predecessors. He felt free 
not to utter everything on a given subject, because he understood that the meaning necessary to
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communicate was incorporated more in an experience o f a doctrine’s efficacy than in its 
reiteration.
As with John Tillotson’s, Steme obviously admired and found suggestive the sermons of
Samuel Clarke, and was not shy of using them as a springboard. At most, in places he
incorporated their gist and brief phrases, but from a very clear vantagepoint of knowing what he
himself wanted to communicate. As he improved on Tillotson, so he improved on Clarke; and
again Blair’s perception of a deficiency speaks well o f Sterne’s endeavour:
Dr. Clarke . . . every where abounds in good sense, and the most clear and 
accurate reasoning; his applications of scripture are pertinent; his style is always 
perspicuous, and often elegant; he instructs and he convinces; in what then is he 
deficient? In nothing, except in the power of interesting and seizing the heart. He 
shows you what you aught to do; but he excites not the desire o f doing it: he treats 
man as if he were a being of pure intellect without imagination or passions.98
FURTHER EDITORIAL EXAMPLES
We may have imagined Steme departed from proper modes o f sermon delivery in 
forming texts without regard for apparent structure. He rarely elaborates on a noticeable 3-point 
theme, or proceeds by following clearly defined divisions. But James Ardeme in a passage 
devoted to suggesting that the three homiletic parts o f “Proposition, Confirmation, and 
Inference” are generally useful “where the matter will bear it,” says although an “unmanaged heat 
o f wit” will be unsuccessful, “if you ask me what method you should constantly use, I must tell 
you no one. Many things bring their own disposition and order along with them, and stubbornly
OQrefuse to be subject to any other Lawes.”
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Clearly the nature of the discourse is to be dictated by its subject matter and the capacity
of its recipients. Adam Smith in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres [1762-3] states
the perfection o f stile consists in Express<ing> in the most concise, proper and 
precise manner the thought o f the author, and that in the manner which best 
conveys the sentiment, passion or affection with which it affects or he pretends it 
does affect him and which he designs to communicate to his reader.100
While the style o f strict divisions with subsections was continued rigidly by a few preachers101 it
was increasingly unpopular as a rule, and when practiced, was serving more conversational
sermons. F rancis  Fenelon’s much heeded advice is:
for the most part, Divisions give only a seeming order; while they really mangle 
and clog a Discourse, by separating it into two or three parts; which must interrupt 
the Orator’s action, and the effect it ought to produce. There remains no true unity 
after such Divisions.102
At the other end o f the century, Blair refers to this advice and to the French archbishop as
•  i m •“a very able judge” and one with considerable authority and arguments. Blair disagrees to a 
point though, noting that divisions, if properly and sparingly used, may still be useful to a well- 
ordered sermon. However, it is important to note, that one of the few preachers Blair singles out 
for highest admiration, Joseph Butler, did not use divisions.104
We have now some sense of what Steme does with works from which he borrowed in the 
homiletic tradition. He steers clear o f binding passages of scripture together to prove or illustrate 
a point. Instead of giving references, he includes verses and bits of verses, conflates otherwise 
unconnected passages and offers them inextricably mixed with his own prose. This use is no 
more unique than his preference for a more conversational style, but by any standards his ability 
is remarkable. Instead of numerous biblical illustrations, he gives one, briskly, as if in passing to
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people who need to be reminded rather than convinced. That, by 1760, many sermon writers 
were attempting the same proximity, should not blind us to Sterne’s careful genius, and his 
improvement over those from whom he borrows. John (father o f Thomas) Sharp, for example, 
whom New sees as closest to Steme in theology and whose capable lucidity Gordon Rupp, above 
[p. 51] applauds,105 still presents an uninspired understanding of vanity (one of Sterne’s favorite 
topics) when he is preaching on Eccles. i i .l l .  In contrast to Sterne’s brief and poignant jabs at 
what we all know to be our condition, Sharp has eight points listing exactly how humans may be 
disappointed.106
Likewise, though he borrows from him elsewhere, one cannot help assuming Steme 
would have come up with a more imaginative way of launching into a discussion o f Matt, v.3 
than John Norris [1657-1711], for example, who in his first ‘practical discourse’ on the 
Beatitudes says:
in my Discourse upon these Words I shall,
I Resolve what we are to understand by Poor in Spirit.
II Shew that this Poverty o f Spirit is a Christian Duty; and the Reasonableness of it.
HI Shew the Happiness of those who are so disposed.107
Or, that for Norris’ next discourse, on Matt, v.4, Steme would have felt it more useful to develop 
one instance of human sorrow than simply to refer to numerous places in scripture where sorrow 
is mentioned.
The basic elements o f Sterne’s tendency to simplify stylistic forms o f his ‘sources’ are 
these: his paragraphs flow without landmarks of headings and sub-headings. His appeal focuses 
on illustration of common situations rather than on comprehensive accounts of all possible proofs 
and scenarios. Instead of stacking scriptural references to support his position, he develops
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stories and incorporates engaging allusions without fanfare. Unlike many writers from whom he 
borrows, Steme rarely gives biblical citations with chapter and verse, and he avoids using or 
explicating words in Hebrew, Greek and Latin. Like all preachers he repeats himself from 
sermon to sermon, but in any given discourse he is relatively free of the nauseating tautologies 
that seem unavoidable in the style used by Tillotson and Clarke. Marks of scholarly precision are
10Savoided. Sterne’s rare citation of a source is integrated with his prose (“as Arch-bishop 
Tillotson wittily observes upon it”). Though this may be accounted for by Sterne’s sermons 
initially not having been written for publication (S 1.20) he consistently makes an effort to 
produce verbally pleasing discourses in accordance with Swift’s directions above. In short, 
although Steme and those from whom he borrows share the latitudinarian perspective, the means 
and skill by which this is communicated vary considerably.
Removing what had become impediments to clear flowing sermons, Steme presents 
himself as a man involving a congregation rather than reciting dogma, thereby provoking 
renewed appreciation. One of the simplest evidences of this is his frequent change o f second- or
10Qthird-person to first, seamlessly personalizing source material. It is worth considering a few 
instances.
Tillotson in his sermon ‘The Prejudices against Jesus and his Religion considered’110 has: 
“the excellency o f the doctrine, and its proper tendency to make men holy and virtuous, are a 
plain evidence o f its divine and heavenly original.”111 Steme changes this to “the excellency of 
Christianity in doctrine and precepts, and its proper tendency to make us virtuous as well as 
happy, is a strong evidence of its divine original” (S 315.6). He adds “Christianity” and
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“precepts,” changes “men” to “us” and “plain” to “strong,” replaces the unnecessary “holy” with 
“happy,” and deletes the tautology “heavenly.” Interestingly, the sermon in which this occurs, in 
which Stillingfleet, Tillotson, and Clarke are liberally re-ordered, re-worded and meshed 
together, is one Sterne did not, so far as we know, prepare for press.
Consider how Steme further personalizes a section of Clarke’s sermon ‘The shortness and 
vanity o f humane life’. Instead of copying Clarke’s layers o f encomium (New’s note to 146.5-16 
leaves out considerable repetition and embellishment), he puts the mournful man in the first 
person and gives him a lengthy soliloquy. He replaces “without whose direction no Evil can befal
1 1 *7us, without whose Permission no Power can hurt us” with “without his direction I know that
no evil can befall me,—without his permission that no power can hurt me, —it is impossible a
being so wise should mistake my happiness.” (S  146.15)
Steme works in a similar way with an already passionate Walter Leightonhouse. “Trust in
G od . . . who knows thy Necessities afar off, and puts all thy tears into his bottle. He eyes every
careful Thought and pensive Look, afflictive Sigh, and Melancholly Groan which thou 
11**
utterest.” This becomes “when our heart is in heavmess, upon whom can we think but thee, 
who knowest our necessities afar off, —puttest all our tears in thy bottle, —seest every careful 
thought, —hearest every sigh and melancholy groan we utter. — ” (S 188.10). The shift literally 
brings the congregation one step closer to an appreciation of what the text is trying to 
communicate: the nearness o f God.
In the same spirit, Steme is not shy o f including himself as a culprit in his various 
catalogues o f vices. In countless instances he makes a slight but telling change. It is important to
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note that Sterne’s inclusion of himself as part of the congregation, in the denunciation of sins, 
goes farther than was usually prescribed for not alienating one’s parishioners; “least they should 
think that you are become their enemie . . . you must entertain and profess a tender respect and 
real desire for their welfare and hope of amendment.”114 For example, Tillotson’s “God hath so 
ordered, in his providence, that very often, in this world, men’s cruelties return upon their own 
heads, and their violent dealings upon their own pates”115 becomes “God has so ordered it in the 
course o f his providence, that very often in this world—our revenges return upon our own heads, 
and men’s violent dealings upon their own pates” (S  120.11). Sterne’s presence as 
simultaneously both priest and member of the congregation is not only recognizable in his 
reworked borrowings. His conclusion to most sermons in each volume illuminates a theme of 
inclusive community. “—But thou art merciful, loving and righteous, and lookest down with pity 
upon these wrongs thy servants do unto each other: pardon us, we beseech thee, for them, and all 
our transgressions; let it not be remember’d, that we were brethren o f the same flesh, the same 
feelings and infirmities—” (iS 176.11)
Steme more than most sermon-writers with whom he was familiar engages us with 
occurrences of ‘cross accidents’ and unexpected events. All pastors touch on the topic to suggest 
that behind apparent chaos lies the providence of God. Usually the preacher presents the 
contradictions of humanity with copious examples, but remains aloof himself, remarking on the 
shortsightedness or faithlessness of his caricatures. Steme places blame where he feels it 
appropriate, but includes himself in his judgments.
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Alongside this tendency to simplify and personalize his discourses is an inclination to 
moderate harsh statements. Where his sources frequently flourish with invectives against vice, 
Steme reserves elaboration for empathetic situations. Tillotson and Clarke each have a sermon 
with Eccles. ix .ll  as text. Steme uses both of these and Edward Young for his sermon on this 
passage, ‘Time and chance’. It is instructive therefore to note the difference in Sterne’s tone. 
Clarke’s begins by distinguishing between the “slothful and negligent” who would wait for God 
to act on their account, and those “who rely with such confidence on the Effects o f their own 
Wisdom and Industry, and so presumptuously depend upon the natural and regular Tendencies of 
second Causes.”116 These two “extremes” are treated to copious scriptural quotations proving 
their pretensions to be unfounded. Steme, in contrast, is more than willing to admit, or pretend to 
admit, mystification, even consternation, at the inexplicable nature o f ‘time and chance.’ He 
sympathizes with the man introduced in his first sentence who “casts a look upon this 
melancholy description of the world [Eccles. ix .ll] , and sees,contrary to all his guesses and 
expectations, what different fates attend the lives of men” (S 74.8). In the next paragraph he 
identifies himself with those seriously trying to fathom the mystery: “things are carried on in this 
world, sometimes so contrary to all our reasonings, and the seeming probabilities o f success.” {S 
74.26)
Steme is careful not to foist upon his congregations a foregone conclusion supported by 
scripture without delving into the humanity that makes the doctrine palatable. Where Steme does 
borrow from Clarke’s ‘The Events of Things not always answerable to Second Causes’, he justly
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refers to him as “a great reasoner.” The style is reminiscent more o f a theological treatise than o f
a preachable sermon. Clarke is in the abstract having just argued:
for as Chance is nothing, so Nature also is nothing but an empty word. Every 
effect, every Event, must have a real Cause; must proceed, immediately or 
mediately, from That which has a True Existence and Active Power. And to an 
Omnipresent Mind, there is no more difficulty in attending to every thing at one
117time and the same Time, than to any one thing.
What follows is partially quoted at pp. 131-32 of the fifth volume o f the Florida Works. From 
that, typically, Steme removes the reference “I Kings xvii.4” and deletes the conflation of six 
further quotations (four of which are fully referenced) that Clarke uses to embellish his point. 
Clarke was no slouch with scripture, but in this instance Sterne’s treatment shines. Clarke’s 
offering is :
not only piously therefore, but even with the strictest and most philosophical 
Truth of expression, does the Scripture, tell us, that God commandeth the Ravens,
I Kings xvii.4. that they are his directions, which even the Winds and Seas obey; 
that he causes His Sun to rise on the Evil and on the Good; that God prepared a 
Gourd, and a Worm to smite it that it withered, Jonah iv.7. that God feedeth the 
Fowls o f  the Air, Mat. vi.26. and, without Him, not a sparrow falls to the ground; 
ch.x.29. Nay, that He clothes even the Lilies, and the grass o f  the fie ld , Mat. vi.30.
1 i o
and, with Him, the very Hairs o f  our Head are All numbered.
Steme focuses this jumble by taking Clarke’s well-fed fowls and his dead but noticed sparrow,
returns them to the raven’s duty o f ministering to prophets in hiding, and voila, we find ourselves
with Elijah, in the middle of a borrowing from Joseph Hall:
so that as a great reasoner justly distinguishes, upon this point,—“It is not only 
religiously speaking, but with the strictest and most philosophical truth of 
expression, that the scripture tells us, that GOD commandeth the ravens,—that 
they are his directions, which the winds and seas obey. If his servant hides himself 
by the brook, such an order of causes and effects shall be laid,—that the fowls of 
the air shall minister to his support.— When this resource fails, and his prophet is
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directed to go to Zerepha,— for that, he has commanded a widow woman there to 
sustain h im . . . ” . (S  79.25)
Not only is Sterne’s composition superior in diction and consistency, it is also optimistic.
Clarke’s examples form a disparate list of three unrelated birds, the elements, a reluctant prophet,
and the hairs of one’s head, to prove the omnipotence of God, revenges not excepted:
God can, whenever he pleases, even without a Miracle, punish the disobedient;
And no Swiftness, no Strength, no Wisdom, no Artifice, shall in any manner avail, 
or inable them to escape the Vengeance, which even Natural Causes only, by the 
direction of Him from whom they receive their Nature, bring upon Offenders. He 
can punish by Fires and Famine, by Plagues and Pestilences, by Storms and 
Earthquakes.119
Sterne’s relish is elsewhere. As his flowing example of the ravens caring for God’s servant
leaves out the smiting worm, withering gourd, and fallen sparrow, so his examples o f providence
do not dwell on the divine capacity for revenge. Instead we are urged to
go one step higher—and consider,—whose power it is, that enables these causes 
to work,—whose knowledge it is, that forsees what will be their effects,—whose 
goodness it is, that is invisibly conducting them forwards to the best and greatest 
ends for the happiness of his creatures. (S 79.20)
Turning to Tillotson’s sermon on the same text we note that New claims “like Steme,
17ftTillotson rather laboriously repeats the argument of his opening pages.” He is more correct 
regarding the archbishop, whose ‘Success Not Always Answerable to the Probability o f Second 
Causes’ seems dedicated to lists, tautologies and explicating the various ways in which battle- 
strong, bread-wise, riches-understanding, favour-skill may be understood. Referring to Sterne’s 
note to 77.10 [“ *Vid. Tillotson’s sermon on this subject”] New’s comment that “Sterne’s 
discussion is sufficiently reworded so that here, where he actually cites a source, one is in some
1 *71doubt as to whether he copied Tillotson or an intermediate borrower” unfortunately disregards
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the creative effort implicit in most o f Sterne’s uses. Borrowing, Steme makes a conscious effort 
to trim Tillotson’s verbosity, as should be apparent to anyone who compares New’s lengthy 
quotation with Sterne’s selections.122 Sterne’s deletion of Tillotson’s biblical reference to war, 
and his alteration of “political skill” to “art and skill” (Tillotson was preaching at the House of 
Commons) is relevant. Likewise, instead of proceeding along Tillotson’s lines—that it is 
unreasonable to assign the cause of extraordinary events to “blind necessity”— Steme elaborates 
with scriptural allusions to God’s goodness, not as dispenser o f justice to the evil, but as “raising 
up the poor out of the dust, and lifting the beggar from the dunghill, and contrary to all hopes, 
setting him with princes.” What immediately follows is a reworking o f Young in which Steme 
changes “they who look no farther” and “contrary both to their Intentions and their Hopes” to 
“we who look no further” and “contrary both to our intentions and our hopes.”123
JOSEPH HALL et a l : IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF SOURCES
In all mentions of Steme as clerical plagiarist, one element o f his sermons that it seems 
has hardly been imagined, let alone discussed, is the possibility of Sterne’s improvement o f his 
elder colleagues not only stylistically and personally, but also temperamentally—even 
theologically. Presuming him to be void of either interest or capacity, we have consistently 
misinterpreted signs of dedicated effort to present the wisdom of an accurate gospel.
One can appreciate why Steme frequently incorporates elements o f Joseph Hall’s 
dramatizations of scripture; they are lively, imaginative and instructive. Bom in 1574, Hall’s 
earliest works were verse satires. Fully conversant with the discourse o f Erasmian and 
Rabelaisian theological wit, he brought his penchant for incisive composition with him to
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theology, where he became a master of the new plain style. Steme borrows from one of his 
sermons, but consistently uses the Contemplations, a fact significant for discerning Sterne’s 
homiletic tenor. Quo Vadis? A Just Censure o f  Travel, As it is Commonly Undertaken by the 
Gentlemen o f  our Nation [1617] appears useful in Sterne’s sermon ‘The Prodigal Son’, and this 
work o f “the great bishop Hall” (TS 592.20) likewise is conjured in both novels for a laugh at 
Grand Tour cubs (TS 592.16-593.2, A SJ  16.16-17.10). No ‘source’ for Sterne’s homilies is closer 
to his graphic presentations than Hall who engages with passionate reflections. Hall’s arguments 
flow easily, unencumbered by menus of headings, but he is not given to weaving dialogue 
through his stories and is quicker to condemn with hortatory explication. Unlike Steme, he tends 
toward eloquent but cutting flourishes against the world. That Steme consistently tranquilizes 
Hall’s invectives should be of considerable interest. New gives an example in his note to S  
234.23-24 but his comment that Sterne’s change of tone is due to “his well-known 
flirtatiousness” is hardly adequate.124 For one thing, Sterne’s congregation would not have been 
(if any is) fit target for Hall’s language. As consistent an influence as Hall was, in this instance 
his lack of charity was a disgrace to the beauty he hoped to encourage; Sterne’s improvement is 
frank and gracious.
Even so, John Ferriar is near the truth when he writes “there is a delicacy o f thought, and 
tenderness of expression in the good Bishop’s compositions, from the transfusion of which 
Steme looked for immortality.” New’s complementary statement, that Steme “in the lifetime 
volumes . . . sought sermons more in keeping with the narrative skills he was exhibiting in TS 
and hence the predominance of the Old Testament and the influence of Bishop Hall” is worth
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considering. But, referring to “Sterne’s dependence on Hall” New, following Hammond, 
10(\misleads. As mentioned above, frequently in Sterne’s lesser borrowings one finds oneself at a
loss as to why he even bothered to copy ordinary phrases when he was in the process o f giving
them renewed dignity. Sterne’s six borrowings from Joseph Hall for ‘The Character of Shimei’
are typical: each is very short and capably absorbed. Hammond’s example o f two o f Sterne’s uses
of Hall could amply be supplemented, as in his light but frequent use o f Wollaston. This much of
Hammond’s important comment regarding the use of Hall’s contemplation ‘The Levite’s
Concubine’ is accurate:
four short but verbatim transcripts establish a relationship between the two 
accounts. But the choice of details, treatment of the characters, management o f the 
story, and the spirit in which the whole was conceived differ so radically in the 
two narratives that Hall’s contemplation could almost be taken as an illustration 
of that very attitude against which Steme was pleading.127
But following his presupposition that Steme was capable only of slavishly following the
interpretations of others, Hammond concludes this paragraph by saying:
so different, in fact, was Yorick’s handling of the stories of the Levite and Joseph 
that one is forced to believe the passages taken from Hall had been transcribed 
into a commonplace book at least a year before use was made of them. Had Steme 
gone directly to the Contemplations during the composition of his discourse, 
would not the Bishop’s interpretation have had greater influence?128
Such has been the pall over Sterne’s sermons. On the contrary, readers need not be forced to 
believe that Steme was anything other than a conscientious sermon writer, a slave of neither 
bishops nor critics. Sterne’s use of Hall is hardly the work o f a conniving imitator. Too much is 
reworked, deleted, and divergent paths taken before and after the debts. One cannot escape the
conclusion that if Steme had been a second-rate or uninterested sermon-writer he would have
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borrowed more, and altered less. For every well-phrased idea he picks up, many more are left 
untouched.
One o f Hall’s favorite devices that would have caught Sterne’s eye, is to remark on ironic 
coincidences. Over and over again Hall drops these curious crumbs, which Steme tends to 
disregard. Recounting the story of Joseph, for example, Hall writes “if  Joseph had died for 
hunger in the pit, both Jacob and Judah and all his brethren had died for hunger in Canaan.” Later 
in Egypt: “this second time is Joseph stripped of his garment; before in the violence of envy, now 
of lust.” Joseph was accused by his brothers o f being a spy for his father, and now he accuses 
them o f the same crime. The one innocent brother, Benjamin, is made out to be guilty o f theft.129 
Regarding Hezekiah [cf. Sterne’s #17], “he [God] that delivered him from the hand of his
1 inenemies smites him with sickness.” I believe the only place Steme develops Hall’s sense of
irony is in ‘The History of Jacob considered’ (S 210.14), but where Hall naturally notes the
1 1karmic rebound and keeps on contemplating, Steme prefaces and concludes the comment with
significant questions:
I know not whether ’tis of any use, to take notice of this singularity in the 
patriarch’s life___
I do not see which way the honour of Providence is concerned in repaying us 
exactly in our own coin___
It is enough for us, that the best way to escape evil, is in general, not to commit it 
ourselves. (S'210.8, .19, .25)
If thoughts still linger of Steme the dependent hack we can turn to Hall’s treatment of the
1
unfortunate story of the Levite and his concubine. As is generally the case, Hall is more 
concerned explicitly to bring a moral that relates to the reader’s relationship with God, whereas 
Steme focuses especially on the personal psychology of the characters involved, leaving
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inferences to the reader. In this particular instance, Steme more than Hall builds up the Levite’s 
reflections and his compassion for the concubine as partner rather than ancilla. One important 
difference between the two accounts is obvious if we compare Sterne’s 170.29-172.8 and the 
corresponding passage of Hall quoted in New’s note to that section.133 While New draws 
attention to Hall’s version as “an important starting point for Sterne’s mode of sermon-writing,” 
we should notice Sterne’s complete change of temper in giving the Levite a long soliloquy by 
which we may see the progression of compassion and forgiveness in a virtuous, slighted man. 
Hall’s third-person rendition skims the surface of the possibilities Steme thoroughly dives into.
Hall is eager to point out coincidences: “the four months’ absence of his daughter is 
answered with four days’ feasting.” As in his treatments o f the Shunammite and Hezekiah, Hall 
capitalizes on the conclusion of the story: “and now this feast, which was meant for their new 
nuptials, proves her funeral. Even when we let ourselves loosest to our pleasures, the hand of 
God, though invisibly, is writing bitter things against us.”134 Hall follows the father-in-law’s 
detainment of the couple, associating it with the difficulties o f human love, claiming the tragedy 
would not have occurred had the hospitality been refused: “an honest man’s heart is where his 
calling is: such a one, when he is abroad, is like a fish in the air: whereinto if  it leap for recreation 
or necessity, yet it soon returns to his own element.”135 He continues with the story (Judges 
xix.9-30) and graphically expands its horrible conclusion: “she had voluntarily exposed herself to 
lust, now is exposed forcibly. Adultery was her sin, adultery was her death.” Hall does this for 
four pages (60 % of his contemplation) and in his conclusion concentrates on the theme o f just 
retribution that he maintains throughout his next contemplation ‘The desolation of Benjamin’.
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This being Hall’s purpose, he masterfully impresses it upon us, bringing the story to life,
and dispensing his commentary throughout. Steme takes stylistic cues from him, but his
enrichment o f the story has another purpose. After the Levite, concubine, and servant have
departed from the father-in-law he says, almost as if  he were conversing with Hall,
it serves no purpose to pursue the story further; the catastrophe is horrid; and 
would lead us beyond the particular purpose for which I have enlarged upon thus 
much o f it, —and that is, to discredit rash judgm ent.. . .  —many and rapid are the 
springs which feed it . . . let us make the discourse as serviceable as we can, by 
tracing some of the most remarkable of them, up to their source.
(S 172.31-173.16)
1i r
In contrast, if  not in censure Hall, Sterne’s anger is reserved for the ungenerous. After 
outlining four “miserable,” “cruel” inlets to evil (S 173.17; 175.6) in conclusion, again as if  to 
Hall, he says:
what then, ye rash censurers o f the world! . . . Must B eauty  for ever be trampled 
upon in the dirt for one—one false step? And shall no one virtue or good quality, 
out of the thousand the fair penitent may have left,— shall not one of them be 
suffered to stand by her?—Just God of Heaven and Earth!—
—But thou art merciful, loving and righteous, and lookest down with pity upon 
these wrongs thy servants do unto each other: pardon us, we beseech thee, for 
them and all our transgressions. (S 175.31-176.13)
In so saying, without naming Hall, Steme challenges those given to “setting up trade upon the
broken stock of other people’s failings,” to cast the first stone (S 175.10). This implicit correction
of Hall’s uncharitable emphasis, here and in the conclusion to #24, is not unique in Sterne’s
homilies. As in the examples above where Steme rearranges sources to offer a more engaging
and free-flowing prose, so in places he leaves hints o f his own criticism of those sources.
Generally these challenges are private, as few would be expected to recognize any of his
debts. But even in the midst o f indulging an occasional whim, as in the following example, his
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purpose is reform. After an uncharacteristically long borrowing from Edward Young at the 
beginning of sermon 28, Steme says “but to do further justice to the text, we must look beyond 
this inward recompence which is always inseparable from virtue—and take a view o f the outward 
advantages” (S 270.12). This Steme begins to do in the rest o f that long paragraph. Then, using 
almost exactly the very words o f his next source, James Blair, he says “for the better imprinting 
of which truth in your memories, give me leave to offer a few things to your consideration” (S 
271.19). The ‘first’ of these “few things” is “The First” as in Blair, from whom he continues to 
borrow (S  271.21-31). When Steme moves on and says “Secondly” (S  272.1) he begins to borrow 
from Samuel Clarke, but the first half o f Sterne’s sentence is reworked from a “21y” o f Clarke, 
though the latter half is a composite of another 21y and then o f a “ 1st” from three pages later in 
him. Then, immediately, Steme says “F irs t. . .” (S 272.6) and in that sentence actually borrows 
from a “3dly” section in Clarke. Sterne’s next sentences (S 272.9-17), use an earlier portion o f 
that same “3dly.” When Steme shifts at 272.17 from “plain-dealing” to “—The general. . . ” he is 
jumping three-quarters o f a folio page to a second point enveloped in Clarke’s 2dly with which 
this trail began. When Steme asks us at 272.24 to “consider, in the third place” he is introducing 
Blair’s second point that immediately follows the point in Blair where Steme left o ff to insert 
Clarke. Steme goes on for his fourth and fifth points using Blair, but for his conclusion “lastly to 
sum up the account” (S 274.4-23) lifts a sizable portion from John Norris almost verbatim, which 
leads him to make the innocuous statement to those unaware of his foregoing mosaic:
I conclude with one observation upon the whole of this argument, which is this—
Notwithstanding the great force with which it has been often urged by good
136writers,—there are many cases which it may not reach.
This is humorous, o f course, as we appreciate Sterne’s playfulness with who that I  is. But 
it is primarily instructive for us now, noticing that Steme combines important points o f four very 
capable theologians on his topic o f the ‘temporal advantages of religion’ but realizes an element 
o f reality is wanting, so he acknowledges the common frustration that good things seem to 
happen to vicious people. Neither does he soften the truth with platitudes: “it is prudent not to lay 
more stress upon this argument than it will bear:—but always remember to call into our aid, that 
great and more unanswerable argument, which will answer the most doubtful cases which can be 
stated” (S 274.30).
This sermon, then, chock-full of words o f Young, Blair, Clarke and Norris can also truly 
be said to be ‘Sterne’s’ as it easily continues the theology expressed in the lifetime volumes that 
applauds participation in earthly joys, but simultaneously admits that these are, of themselves, 
fleeting and of little consequence compared with eternal joys. Even the sentence from the 
introduction to Norris’ ‘The Importance of a Religious Life considered from the happy 
Conclusion of it’ that Steme copied into his manuscript to conclude at 275.17 was finally edited 
to retain only what would leave a positive impression. Speaking of the fragile happiness on earth 
and sure beatitude of heaven, Norris writes “and this is a portion she can never be dis-inherited of 
. . .” which Steme keeps; but where Norris continues “. . . however the Malice of Men or an ill 
Combination of Accidents may defraud her o f the Other” Steme instead simply concludes “— 
which may God of his mercy grant us all, for the sake of Jesus Christ.”137
Hammond prints this sermon entire, synoptic with its sources, to prove that “an analysis 
of [it] shows quite clearly why Steme had not selected this discourse for printing! Not only is it
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commonplace and dull but the extent of the borrowings left little room for the preacher to express
either his own ideas or sentiments.” Deaf to what one’s “own ideas” become in traditional
§
homilies, and blind to Sterne’s subtler commentary, Hammond condemns himself and 
generations o f admirers to misreading. When later he returns to this sermon saying “these various 
fragments were joined together so skil fully that, when combined, they read as though one man
1 O Q
had written them all, and at one time—truly an amazing performance” we are not sure whether 
to congratulate him for an accurate assessment or reel again with the inconsistency.
Other instances o f Sterne’s implied correction exist in the sermons and offer us a glimpse 
o f his interest in flexibly using his mentors. Briefly follow some other examples. Where Steme is 
again encouraging his congregation to look beyond the immediate confusions of this life to the 
providence of God, in sermon 44, he has Clarke’s ‘Of Resignation to the Divine Will in 
Affliction’ (#96) in mind, and borrows from it for his introduction (S 408.21-24). Clarke in this 
and his previous sermon (from which Steme borrows for #15) offers the classic ‘reasonable’ 
arguments for the promiscuous distribution of earthly happiness. Instead o f repeating these, after 
paraphrasing Clarke’s copious defence, Steme at 409.22 says “I shall desist from enlarging any 
further upon either o f the foregoing arguments in vindication of God’s providence, which are 
urged so often with so much force and conviction, as to leave no room for a reasonable reply.” 
Immediately Sterne’s sermon becomes more personal. Instead of continuing, as Clarke does in 
his next sermon, to reduce the reasons for affliction to four: “1. To teach us Humility . . .  2. To 
lead us to Repentance . . .  3. To wean us from an over-fond Love of the present World. And 4. To
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try, improve, and perfect our Virtues; and make some particular persons eminent Examples of
Faith and Patience to the World,”140 Steme engages us with ourselves:
I shall, therefore, in the remaining part of my discourse, take up your time with a 
short enquiry into the difficulties of coming not only at the true characters o f men,
—but likewise o f knowing either the degrees o f their real happiness or misery in 
this life.
The first of these will teach us candour in our judgments o f others;—the second, 
to which I shall confine myself, will teach us humility in our reasonings upon the 
ways o f God. (£410.1)
No doubt Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz [pub. 1717] and his earlier sets of Boyle 
Lectures [published in 1705-6 as:] A Discourge Concerning the Being and Attributes o f  God, the 
Obligations o f  Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty o f  the Christian Revelation, 
specifically poised against the influence of Lockean empiricism, could well have provoked 
Steme to suggest that “humility in our reasonings upon the ways of God” would develop a better 
exchange.
Again, using Clarke for a portion of his sermon on pride (#24; S  229.19-24) we get a taste 
of Sterne’s editorial capacities. Typically Steme avoids the extremes of polemic. Referring to 
“some satirical pens” who concluded “that all mankind at the bottom were proud alike” (S 229.9) 
Steme continues with “on the whole the remark has more spleen than truth in it” (S  229.15) but 
goes on to balance this with “notwithstanding this, so much may be allowed to the observation . .
. ,” and a hint of Clarke: “. . . that Pride is a vice which grows up in society so insensibly” (S 
229.18). We hear no more from Clarke in this sermon, though Steme follows a pattern similar to 
his, referring to one’s station in life and pretensions to extraordinary illumination. Sterne’s 
manner is entirely different from Clarke’s, so that for once, when he takes a few words from Hall
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for his conclusion, it strikes us as more comical than true: “a beggarly parade of remnants is but a 
sorry object o f Pride at best; —but more so, when we can cry out upon it, as the poor man did of 
his hatchet, — * Alas!Master, —fo r it was borrowed”1*1
Note how in a similar vein, when discussing an equally commonplace situation, Steme is 
careful to present a useful moderate caveat to undisciplined medievalisms: “and here, not to feign 
a long hypothesis, as some have done, of a sinner’s being admitted into heaven, with a particular 
description of his condition and behaviour there,—we need only consider . . (S 279.1).142 The 
loaded passage of John Norris that follows was also used by Steme at 222.12-18 and its obvious 
importance in Sterne’s thinking will be addressed in chapter three. In this context, Norris’ 
explicit neoplatonic perspective, the need of inner sanctification for the entire self symmetrically 
to be redeemed, is telling. After a significant pause, in which Steme gives an elegant lesson in 
how most usefully to preach, he picks up Norris again at 279.30 as he continues to question how 
a soul indisposed to heavenly things could ever be brought to their enjoyment. Steme interrupts 
and says “the consideration of this has led some writers so far, as to say, with some degree of 
irreverence in the expression, —that it was not in the power o f God to make a wicked man happy 
. . .  which thought, a very able divine in our church has pursued so far, as to declare his be lief. .  
.” (S 280.9-14). That Steme would refer to Norris (and a well-worn tradition of thought)143 in this 
way and as one who feigns a long hypothesis, and immediately after his borrowing say “—This, 
it is true, is mere speculation,—and what concerns us not to know;—it being enough for our 
purpose, that such an experiment is never likely to be tried,—that we stand upon different terms
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with God” (S 280.22) confirms he was not slavishly imitating theological perspectives, but
developing their articulation in line with a very clear impression of the gospel.
In ‘The Odd Couple: Laurence Steme and John Norris of Bemerton’ Melvyn New is
enthusiastically misleading when, instead of acknowledging Sterne’s derivations, additions and
explicit criticism of Norris’ presentation, he claims Steme “fully endorses” the position and
suggests the appellation “a very able divine” is here meant as a rare compliment.144 Regarding
the labor of attempting to catch echoes of other writers in Sterne’s sermons New says:
I know I have not been able to catch every echo. As with Sterne’s borrowings 
from his favorite authors, Rabelais, Montaigne, Cervantes, and— in the 
Sermons—Tillotson, his debt is a question o f both specific passages and more 
generalized dependencies; hence, rather than offering here a definitive catalogue 
of the relationship, I will argue only that Norris’s cannon may warrant as much 
attention when reading Steme as we have given to his known favorites— as much, 
to be sure, as has been afforded to Locke.145
For its exclusivity this is an unfortunate recommendation. Throughout the article are phrases
such as “Sterne’s absorption of Norris’s thinking,” “the thoughts borrowed from Norris seem to
tend in one direction,”
it is Norris’s theory of the natural goodness o f our senses and passions that seems 
at first glance most at odds with orthodox Christian thought—and, at the same 
time, closest to some of Sterne’s most cherished notions, particularly in A 
Sentimental Journey. A closer examination of Norris’s writings, however, reveals 
the traditional theological underpinnings o f this theory, not only in neoplatonic 
idealism, but in Augustine and Aquinas as well.146
New is working backwards, towards an understanding o f principles Steme knew by heart. The
sermons reveal Steme to have been meaningfully familiar with traditional theological
underpinnings, so we should be wary o f fathering on Norris a dependence on thoughts that to
Steme would have been commonplace. Norris’ theories, like those of Locke, were well-worn
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currency even as their works were published. By drawing these age-old epistemologies into the 
limelight o f yet another context Steme is presenting his own assay within the tradition.
Two final instances of implicit criticism in the sermons, in which the subject o f illness is 
presented, serve to show Sterne’s involvement in offering realistic comments instead o f 
platitudes. As has been recorded by others, for the composition of his sermon ‘Trust in God’ 
Steme trusted Walter Leightonhouse. It is a small alteration, but note that in reordering a long 
passage of Leightonhouse for his conclusion Steme changes the entirely optimistic exhortations 
of his source—that we consider our past deliverances from evil—to the more appropriate “— if 
thou hast recovered, — consider who it was that repaired those breaches.” (<S 329.26)147
Again we see changes that show Steme attempting to convey a realistic and therefore 
fruitful picture o f the shortness and troubles of life, using a page from a sermon of Richard 
Bentley preached before King George I, 1716/17. First, Bentley has: “how many are daily 
reprieved and rescued from the very jaws of impending death by the saving care and skill o f the 
physician!” Steme deletes this reprieve and the physician’s skill is instead that which cannot save 
beyond nature’s period (S 96.8-10). In Bentley “God has so appointed and determined the 
several growths and periods of the vegetable race, so he seems to have prescribed the same law to 
various kinds of living creatures.”148 Steme declines to beat around the bush: “as God has 
appointed and determined the several growths and decays o f the vegetable race, so he seems as 
evidently to have prescribed the same laws to man, as well as all living creatures” (S 96.10). 
Continuing with Blair’s paragraph, instead of the qualities “stature and duration” Steme chooses 
“growth, duration and extinction,” and as if his point is not sufficiently clear, doubles Bentley’s
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“the creature expires and dies of itself, as ripe fruit falls from the tree” to “the creature expires
and dies of itself, as ripe fruit falls from the tree, or a flower preserved beyond its bloom droops
and perishes upon the stalk” (S 96.16). Then, almost apologizing for an indulgent moment, he
says “thus much for this comparison of Job’s, which though it is very poetical, yet conveys a just
idea o f the thing referred to” (S 96.19). Contrary to the popular misconception, Steme was
entirely cognizant of the moral potential latent in appropriate poetical comparisons.
This last statement, that a just idea may be conveyed by a poetical comparison is central
to Steme. His art is not in masking reality, but in translating useful conceptions and experiences
of it. All sermon-writers are conscious of this need to a certain degree, but Steme had the
capacity to be particularly convincing. For example, note how James Blair, from whom Steme
elsewhere borrows, in his sermon ‘The sum of our Duty to our Neighbour’ mentions the
Samaritan, and deals with his text (Matt. vii. 12) comprehensively. Unlike Steme however, in this
case in sermon 3, he doesn’t try to develop a sense of interacting personalities and goes nowhere
towards provoking the sentiment that he himself recognizes as necessary for reform:
It is true, most Men, from an Hard-heartedness and Unconcemedness in their 
Neighbour’s Calamities, will not suffer their Minds to enter into the 
Consideration of his unfortunate Circumstances; like the Priest and the Levite in 
the Parable. . . .  But if we would accustom ourselves to the Spirit and Temper o f 
the charitable Samaritan, and heartily concern our selves for our Neighbour’s 
Misfortunes, we should soon learn to act the compassionate Part as effectually, as 
if we ourselves had been, at K same time o f our Life, in the self-same 
Circumstances.149
Tillotson was likewise aware of the advantages o f dramatic sensible representations:
the scripture loves to make use of sensible Representations, to set forth to us the 
Happiness and Misery of the next life; partly by way of Condescension to our 
Understandings, and partly to work more powerfully upon our Affections. For
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whilst we are in the Body, and immers’d in Sense, we are most apt to be moved 
by such Descriptions o f things as are sensible.150
Tillotson gives an example of a depiction of torments in hell and thereby offers the rich
man/Abraham passage borrowed in part by Steme at 174.27-175.5. What should be noted are
Sterne’s changes to Tillotson’s words, particularly his deletion of the reference to the rich man as
“this wretched wicked man,” and his use o f this passage in a context almost opposite to that o f its
original. Indeed, when Steme says, just after his borrowing that “this leads me to the observation
of a fourth cmel inlet to this evil, and that is, the desire o f being thought men of wit and parts,
and the vain expectation of coming honestly by the title, by shrewd and sarcastick reflections
upon whatever is done in the world” (S 175.6), we are probably hearing another private reproof
of “one of our divines” (S 175.2). Unlike Tillotson, Steme, practicing the forgiveness and
courtesy advocated in the story, refuses to magnify the well-known sin and ultimate torment of
another without publicly considering his own culpability.
When Clarke discusses the same parable, he too recognizes that it was Jesus’ intention
“to reprove the covetous and proud Pharisees,” that in this manner the message was “more likely
to take Effect” than by direct confrontation.151 Clarke continues to consider what the rich man’s
vices must have been to deserve this, and why Jesus was not explicit in saying which particular
vice was the cause. Clarke’s primary concentration in this sermon (sermon 115 ‘The Parable of
the Rich Man and Lazarus explained’) is the Pharisees’ sins. Instead of his belief that
“Differences of Station” are “plainly the will of God, that there should be such; and that they
1should be supported with proper Marks o f Distinction,” for Steme it is custom that imposes 
marks of distinction. The sumptuous examples of Solomon’s excesses, which in Clarke are
passed over with the citation “I Kings iv.22,” Steme fully describes (S 219.24-27). Neither 
Tillotson in his three sermons, nor Clarke in this or sermon 128 (which like Sterne’s has Luke 
xvi.31 as text), brings the dead man back to life, as does Steme. The ideas or conclusions Steme 
offers are not new,, but the experience capable of being generated is entirely different. Sterne’s 
borrowings then, like those in Tristram Shandy enhance rather than detract from their originals. 
Tillotson and Clarke are honored and improved in the usage. He applies Hugh Blair’s advice 
before it was offered, and infuses his forbears with a vigor and vitality they lacked.
On the heels o f this evidence of Steme sifting reproaches and personalizing accounts it 
may be tempting to attribute his moderation to “his well known flirtatiousness.”153 As themes 
outlined in the following chapter will illustrate, this would be a mistake; he is careful not to 
avoid repercussions of the Fall. A theme complementary to that o f reserved punishment is 
presented in Sterne’s ‘The Ways of Providence justified to Man’. In it he is at pains to note the 
complexities of persons with limited knowledge judging one another. In so doing he uses 
portions from the middle o f Wollaston’s The Religion o f  Nature Delineated. It is on the 
manuscript of this sermon that Steme is said to have written what was quoted above [p. 45] “I 
have borrowed most of the reflections . . . though the sermon is truly mine, such as it is.” 
Regardless of the anecdote’s authenticity, its sentiments are applicable to the borrowings in all o f 
Sterne’s sermons. Reflections are borrowed, hints are enlarged upon, and the resultant discourse 
is an entirely different work than a sum or arbitrary fusion of its detectable ‘sources’ (if any) 
would suggest.
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In this particular instance, both Wollaston and Steme have just finished a vindication of 
God’s providence and of man’s free will. Wollaston then begins to reason upon the character o f 
the pitiable man who has many unseen reasons for having committed a vicious act. Only later 
does he glance at the “hypocritical” characters that mask their vices. Steme reverses this order in 
Wollaston, and while he does expand the qualities o f the “modest” man, he is careful to balance 
them with the “others.” Likewise the mitigating circumstances of Wollaston are presented by 
Steme in a slightly more sceptical light, as his insertions of “perhaps” (S  411.23), “may” (S 
411.24, 25), and the change from “cannot be” to “is not always” (.25) suggest. These tend to 
soften the sense of inculpability that Wollaston does not mean, but of which he could easily be 
accused.154
DOCTRINAL POLEMIC AND RELIGIOUS DISCIPLINE
Although Steme consistently stabs at the practices of Methodists, Catholics, and 
(occasionally) Jews, he has been accused of negligence and disinterest for lacking doctrinal 
polemic. We read however in Ardeme and others that the dredging up o f heresies and infidelity 
in order to parade one’s orthodoxy was going out of fashion. One was to deal only, and then 
seldom and swiftly, with current dangers: that is, with elements posing as temptations to one’s 
congregation. Apart from good manners, the reason given for this is eminently practical: heretics 
will not be listening and the educated or faithful will find it tedious to be fed what they have 
already digested. As Wilkins put it: “the too long insisting on a confessed truth is apt to nauseate 
and flat the attention.”155 Sterne’s contemporary Anglican clergy (sometimes meanly) voice
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objections to the heretical tempers of enthusiasm, superstition and infidelity, but appear agreed 
that sustained harangue is out of place in the pulpit.
This is not to say that Steme is shy of delineating a sound, consistent, and positive 
approach to the Anglican religion, or that he was reticent to call attention to devotional abuses. It 
may be tempting from the distance of two and a half centuries to assume Sterne’s theological 
understandings and presentations are merely the sum of his education and milieu: unconsidered 
and predictable. For this reason it is important to note his assessments o f current religious 
alternatives. In fact, a careful observation of Sterne’s engagements with elements of Methodism, 
Catholicism, and Judaism makes an excellent introduction to his general approach not only to 
orthodox Anglican homiletics, but to the ribbing of wisdom’s abuses in his fiction as well.
Religion in some form has always been relied upon as a moral, spiritual and social 
corrective, but Steme is at pains to distinguish the religion he is preaching from others that he sees 
as confounding attempts at integrity. This is significant as proof o f his concern for the orthodox 
welfare o f his congregation. He reserves his heaviest rebukes for those who presume to wield God 
for selfish purposes. But in so doing, he upbraids constructively. Pharisees provide the classic 
example o f a ‘whited sepulchre’ (Matt, xxiii.27); like the posture of gravity, a symmetrical exterior 
conceals confusion and decay.
Steme may appear uncharitable for presenting follies of Jews, Catholics, and Methodists 
without registering their wisdom. But one should note he is careful only to rebuke establishments, 
organizations he believes to be spiritually dangerous. For duped individuals he has nothing but 
compassion. Steme acknowledges, for example, regarding the observant but proud Pharisee who
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prays in the temple (Luke xviii.9-14), it is scarce probable “that he should knowingly and wilfully
have dared to act so open and barefaced a scene of mockery in the face of Heaven.. . .  It must have
been owing to some delusion in his education, which had early implanted in his mind false and
wretched notions of the essentials of religion” (S 61.29-62.2). As in other sermons where the
‘Pharisee’ is Catholic, we are reminded that instead of removing self-deception, religion frequently
encourages it, “wilfully set open this wide gate of deceit” (S 260.14). “ ’Tis a much shorter way to
kneel down at a confessional and receive absolution—than to live so as to deserve it—not at the
hands of men—but at the hands of God—who sees the heart and cannot be imposed on” (S 63.15).
The deviance of Rome, shifting responsibility, parallels that of the Pharisees. In lieu of encouraging
personal repentance and integrity of word and action, systems have been established that substitute
outer observances for the inner work of repentance and reformation. This ‘Grand Inquisitor’
shortcut is the greatest temptation for any reformer, and Steme rarely chides other denominations
without explicit application to his parish:
even in our own church . . .  so strong a propensity is there in our nature to sense—  
and so unequal a match is the understanding of the bulk of mankind, for the 
impressions of outward things—that we see thousands who every day mistake the 
shadow for the substance, and was it fairly put to the trial would exchange the 
reality for the appearance. (S  63.30-64.4)
Sterne’s stance is the accepted latitudinarian position: Catholics remove God with 
ceremony, hierarchy, and by claiming to own the Mystery. Methodists appear equally warped; 
presuming the deity’s sensational proximity in enthusiastic claims of illumination, they equate 
private hallucinations with the voice and vision of God. The sin o f pride, says Steme, is at the root 
of their theology; like Pharisees “—they trusted in themselves, — ’twas no wonder then they
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despised others” (S 241.11). Neither denomination is given to religious toleration, so Steme shows 
them no quarter. One may wonder how his uncharacteristic severity in this regard accords with his 
aggrandizement o f mercy, but he is taking his cue from Jesus who, usually forgiving and enigmatic, 
is lucid and ruthless with Scribes and Pharisees for turning an intimate religion into a manipulative, 
legalistic system.
—Christianity, when rightly explained and practised, is all meekness and candour, 
and love and courtesy; and there is no one passion our Saviour rebukes so often, or 
with so much sharpness, as that one, which is subversive of these kind effects, —  
and that is pride. (S 241.2)
Superstitious ritual and misplaced enthusiasm are both deaths to a religion of humble,
reasonable faith. Consciousness thus cheated into hypocrisy by a sense of religion sufficiently
observed, in the fancies of instrumental duties and imaginary conversation, is capable o f grievous
deceit: “I believe there is no one mistaken principle which, for its time, has wrought more serious
mischiefs” (S  264.29). The mischief of “the Romish church” is as serious as that of the enthusiast,
who also studies more to seem than to be.
— See him ostentatiously cloathed with the outward garb of sanctity, to attract the 
eyes of the vulgar.— See a chearfiil demeanour, the natural result of an easy and self- 
applauding heart, studiously avoided as criminal.—See his countenance overspread 
with a melancholy gloom and despondence;—as if religion, which is evidently 
calculated to make us happy in this life as well as the next, was the parent of 
sullenness and discontent. (S 365.4)
True fruits of religion remain unripe for want of those willing to embrace quality over appearance.
These are not casual reprimands, issuing comfortable mediocrity. As William Spellman notes:
indeed, for Tillotson, it was the dangerous Catholics, with their sacramental 
guarantees of immediate pardon, “very grateful to the corrupt nature of man,” and 
the sectarian enthusiasts, firmly mistaken in their predestinarian credo, ‘"the very
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definition of presumption,” who together debased the gift o f eternal salvation by 
abrogating human obligation.156
Not only were Catholic and Methodist apologists presumptuous, they could also be
extraordinarily mean-spirited. With critical concentration on the alleged embellishments of
Sterne, it is worthwhile reading words of another camp, which Sterne obviously despised:
Thus are all you that never passed under a great change o f heart, by the mighty 
power o f the spirit o f God upon your souls___
The God that holds you over the pit o f hell, much as one holds a spider, or some 
loathsome insect, over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his wrath 
towards you bums like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to be 
cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight; you are 
ten thousand times so abominable in his eyes as the most hateful venomous 
serpent is in ours.157
Such language is not in line with the gospel. Without preying on his congregation, Steme 
instead leaves conviction to the heart and Spirit o f his listeners. Even as he borrows from 
homilies of his own persuasion, as we have seen, he is careful not to rant against vice or 
concentrate on another’s blame, trying instead to construct a profitable discourse accessible and 
useful to conscientious believers. More than many of his equally well-meaning mentors, Steme 
grasped what Wilkins wrote to would-be preachers: “this is generally to be observed, that in all 
reprehensions, we must expresse rather our love then our anger, and strive rather to convince
I ro
than to exasperate.” Sterne’s untitled sermon 33 (‘God’s forbearance of sin’) provides a typical 
example. In it he borrows from Edward Stillingfleet’s ‘The Danger and Deceitfulness of Sin’. As 
was common when preaching on propensity to vice while encouraging reformation, Stillingfleet 
sets the stage with “the Jews:” “their ancient Religion, the bottom of all was a principle o f 
infidelity, not arising from want o f sufficient reason to convince them, but from a close and
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secret love of sin which made them willing to quarrel with whatever was so repugnant to it, as
the doctrine o f Christ.”159 In Stillingfleet this tendency to love sin is primarily evidenced by the
biblical Jewish nation. A commonplace view, with roots in a branch o f Pauline theology and the
persecution of first-century Christians. Steme, however, steers clear o f what could lead to
uncharitable polemics and self-satisfied transference of blame. In his introduction he too laments
the “terrible character of the world” but quickly says
mankind have ever been bad,— considering what motives they have had to be 
better;—and taking this for granted, instead of declaiming against it, let us see 
whether a discourse may not be as serviceable, by endeavouring, as Solomon has 
here done, rather to give an account o f it, and by tracing back the evils to their 
first principles, to direct ourselves to the true remedy against them.— (S 313.26)
Needless to say, these “first principles” of evil are not the Jews. In fact Steme immediately puts
his congregation in mind o f the bleaker moments of Christian history:
Igt it here only be premised,—that the wickedness either of the present or past 
times, whatever scandal and reproach it brings upon Christians,—ought not in 
reason to reflect dishonour upon Christianity, which is so apparently well framed 
to make us good. (S 314.6).
By focussing on encouragement rather than hotheaded reproach Steme endeavours to lead his
congregation to an appreciation of the source and thereby the remedy of these evils. The moral is
orchestrated to upbraid and challenge his flock, not to generate self-congratulatory polemic.
Falling for simulation in ceremonial and personal rubrics, Methodism and Catholicism were
seen to substitute systems that could not possibly bear the weight of examination or provoke their
congregations to reliable virtues. When asked for evidence of their persuasions, Methodists could
only answer “ ‘they feel it is so’ ” (243.19), and the multiple rituals of Catholics (discussed at S
259.32, etc.) seem developed particularly to keep persons from honest encounters with their own
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shortcomings. Steme promotes a religion that will be useful to his parishioners, one that is 
sufficiently ceremonial to offer the spiritual and material blessings of the Communion of Saints, 
established doctrines and familiar patterns of worship, and which is, at the same time, personal 
enough to demand responsibilities of rigorous self-examination and active morality from each of its 
members.
We should recognize and acknowledge Sterne’s appreciation for the disciplines and
ceremonies o f authentic religion. Some have suggested he was entirely earth-bound, given to
emphasis from nature while disregarding heaven, but, again, Ardeme has expressed the standard:
in the confirmation of practical Doctrines, (in which I hope you will chiefly 
employ your Preaching abilities) you may be furnished sufficiently from such 
heads as these, to wit, the Attributes o f Gods Holiness, Justice, Soveraignty . . . 
furthermore from the dictates o f Nature, and testimony of Conscience, and 
loveliness of Vertue, and deformity o f Vice.160
Reminding us of the beauty of creation and the blessings of this life, Steme is not
recommending to us a merely ‘natural’ religion, or one based primarily on pleasant immediate
reward. That his mid-century presentation of a joyful gospel was no flight o f Shandean fancy,
should be clear from the following excerpt from a sermon of Thomas Seeker [1693-1768]
Archbishop of Canterbury during the run o f TS:
but still, both religion and morals, disguised under a forbidding look, appear so 
much less to advantage, than when they wear an inviting one; that we wrong our 
profession, as well as ourselves, if  we neglect to show it in as much beauty, as a 
modest simplicity will permit; and thus to adorn the doctrine o f  God our Saviour 
in all things.161
In fact, preachers were encouraged to make the most o f even the temporal beatitudes of a faithful 
life, using passionate oratory. Far from reducing the dignity of the pulpit, this approach offers a
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tangible catalyst issuing, importantly, from the cleric who was genuinely to resonate his assent. 
Thus Blair:
Oignity of expression, indeed the pulpit requires in a high degree; . . . But this 
dignity is perfectly consistent with simplicity. The words employed may be all 
plain words, easily understood, and in common use; and yet the style may be 
abundantly dignified, and at the same time very lively and animated; for a lively 
and animated style is extremely suited to the pulpit. The earnestness which a 
preacher ctught to feel, and the grandeur and importance of his subjects, justify, 
and often require, warm and glowing expressions. He not only may employ 
metaphors and comparisons, but, on proper occasions, may apostrophise the saint 
or the sinner; may personify inanimate objects, break out in bold exclamations, 
and, in general, has the command of the most passionate figures of speech.
Again, Ardeme had initiated the same: “beware that it come not too faintly and coldly
from you; the design is to inflame and kindle the affections, and if you be but lukewarm, they
may be benummed.”163
We may imagine that Steme would run wild with such advice, but despite his resonance
with this, and his interest in sermons dramatically presented, he is explicit that religion be
untheatrical in its congregational and personal forms. The human inclination to be enamored and
manipulated by sense should not be preyed upon, as it is in the elaborate masquerades o f penitent
Methodist and ascetic Catholic, and in the “cloud of ostentatious ceremonies and gestures” (S
62.30) that makes Roman high mass look “more like a theatrical performance, than that humble and
solemn appeal which dust and ashes are offering up to the throne of God” (S 63.1).
When Steme suggests ways in which Christians would better receive and practice their
religion, he is simultaneously fencing against the problem of tempting but inefficient shortcuts that
presume to enable one to be “virtuous by proxy” (S 137.12). The Roman confessional, for example,
is a cheat to real examination, and doubly harmful for having an appearance of sufficiency:
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when almost the whole of religion is made to consist in the pious fooleries o f 
penances and sufferings, as is practiced in the church of Rome . . .  it is putting 
religion upon a wrong scent, placing it more in these than in inward purity and 
integrity of heart, one cannot guard too much against this, as well as all other such 
abuses of religion, as make it to consist in something which it ought not. (S 350.26)
This type of religion is developed from paradigms that stretch no further than human capacities:
men o f melancholy and morose tempers, conceiving the Deity to be like themselves, 
a gloomy, discontented and sorrowful being,—believed he delighted, as they did, in 
splenetic and mortifying actions, and therefore made their religious worship to 
consist of chimeras as wild and barbarous as their own dreams and vapours.
What ignorance and enthusiasm at first introduced,— now tyranny and imposture 
continue to support. (S 351.4)
From such excerpts we should not infer that Steme has no appreciation for the classic 
disciplines of which the above reflect misuse. As unlikely as it may seem for us to hear it from 
Steme, many of his sermons revolve around the need for religious observances such as prayer and 
abstinence. Not, of course, as ceremonial ends in themselves, but as profitable assistants.
The distinction between religious disciplines appropriately and inappropriately practiced is 
of sufficient importance to Steme that he introduces his second sermon with it, dramatically. The 
text is from Ecclesiastes vii:2, “7if is better to go to the house o f  mourning, than to the house o f
feasting.—” and Sterne’s first line is: “Th a t  I deny— The careful reader should recognize what
only the sleepiest member of a congregation would have missed. Steme is putting those words into 
the mouths of his listeners, and beginning an imaginary conversation on the provocative passage. 
Steme, it should be noted, defends the text:
Steme: It is better to go to the house o f  mourning. . .  (S 12.5)
Congregation: THAT I deny— (S 12.7)
Steme: But let us hear the wise man’s reasoning . . .  (^ 12.7)
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Congregation: For a crack’d-brain’d order o f Carthusian monks,. . .  as your text would have us... 
my good preacher... (S 12.9; 12.16; 12.20)
Steme: I will not contend at present against this rhetorick. . .  (513.7)
In this way the congregation is prepared for a survey of life which will indeed ‘prove’ the ultimately
hopeful wisdom of the text: that sorrow is not good of itself, but can be made useful if “by holding
up such a glass before it, it forces the mind to see and reflect upon the vanity,—the perishing
condition and uncertain tenure of every thing in this world.” (S 19.3)
In sermon 1 the congregation was led through the journey of life in search of happiness, and 
here in sermon 2 we are led by stages in search of truth. Never does Steme deny the manifold 
pleasures o f healthy diversions available to weary travellers. But he is careful to remind us that 
there is a hierarchy of blessings, and if one would study to deserve the most refreshing, “he had 
better purchase them at the expense of his present happiness” (S  13.30). At other times, when the 
faithful are inclined to depression or acts o f fruitless penitence, they will be encouraged to take 
delight in the simple pleasures available to human nature. Both involvements may be holy or 
profane, depending on the heart and needs o f the subject. The key is that one be involved 
responsibly with sincere maintenance of faith and in moral correspondence with God and 
neighbors.
Sterne’s frequent acknowledgments o f the difficulties of a sincere religious life should not 
be read as inconsistent with his equally frequent recommendations of its joy and ease. If nothing 
else, he is echoing the same seeming contradictions in scripture, where, for example, Jesus may 
proclaim “think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword” 
(Matt, x.34) and, soon after represent himself as “meek and lowly in hearty offering a yoke that is
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easy and a burden that is light (Matt, xi.29). The good life is one of inner struggle, but this paradox
is eventually appreciated as having been the way most likely for reconciliation with God, self-
knowledge, and happiness. The preacher should be attuned to this, as Ardeme makes clear:
we must sollicit the affair, not with the understanding alone, but at the same time 
with the affections of the soul. Exhortation is that which makes the address to 
these, and causes the person’s submission to his duty not out of constraint, which 
is the most that the confirmation could do; but willingly and with a great deal o f 
complacence and readiness. This is procured principally by the consideration of 
the easiness, or at least the certain possibility o f the performance and event. . . .
But amongst other perswasives, forget not that, derived from pleasure and delight, 
by this the first temptation became unhappily successful, and by the like must we 
reduce men to Holiness and Vertue, even by demonstrating, that Religion is a way 
of pleasantness, and that Mortification it self brings joy as its fruit to those, who 
have made it their exercise.164
That Steme took this seemingly contradictory lesson to heart should be clear to anyone who reads
his sermons 36 and 37, noted below.
One of the most persistently reiterated themes of latitudinarian theology is the
‘reasonableness’ of ‘slight momentary affliction’ (slight compared to eternal torment or beatitude)
and the encouraging presence of God. Tillotson’s ‘The Precepts o f Christianity not grievous’,
(“easily the most popular sermon in eighteenth-century England”),165 echoes countless divines in
claiming that “though ‘the commandments of God be not grievous,’ yet it is fit to let men know that
they are not thus easy.” 166 Thomas Seeker, Archbishop of Canterbury:
It is a strange mistake, to imagine the burthens of religion insupportable; while we 
take much heavier upon ourselves from fancy and fashion. Were the Gospel to 
enjoin the fatigues, the experiences, the dangers, which on reflection we shall 
perceive caprice and custom do, that one argument against it would be accounted 
decisive. i fnThe most serious person in the world may justly be also the cheerfullest.
Steme is careful not to minimize the unpleasant responsibilities that true religion frequently
entails. He also reminds us that the source of these difficulties is not divine but human. The
“differences of station” and other sources of distress (“hunger, and pain and nakedness”), “are
directed by providence, and must be submitted to” (S 154.23-25). But the necessary endurance of
the painful effects of our wilful separation is not to be blamed on God: “if  the morals of men are not
reformed, it is not owing to a defect in the revelation, but ’tis owing to the same causes which
defeated all the use and intent of reason,—before revelation was given” (S 314.14). To tread the
path back to a light burden carried in the right direction, at times involves considerable suffering.
Even, or especially, those like Job and the widow o f Zarephath who have reached an apparent
pinnacle of virtue are tutored by trials. A nation may likewise be brought to a deeper awareness of
the blessings of God by pain; “it seemed as if God had suffered our waters, like those o f Bethesda,
to be troubled, to make them afterwards more healing to us” (S 202.16). That God “bruises” some
168of the best examples of his virtues, is a scriptural commonplace Steme is not shy o f representing. 
Trials wean one’s observance away from expectations of earthly rewards, and encourage one to 
maintain an attitude centered on eternal values.
Steme would have us use the inconveniences o f this life to focus on the blessings of the 
future. Such a perspective enables one to see an ultimately consistent providence at work beneath 
apparent inconsistencies. False expectation, of what a devout life and proper Messiah should appear 
to be, accounted for the early lack of converts to Christianity. To avoid a similar error, we are 
exhorted to maintain sufficient flexibility to allow the hand of God full influence in what initially 
seems incongruous. Steme points to this lesson by recalling historical reticence to embrace “a
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religion whose appearance was not great and splendid,—but looked thin and meagre, and whose 
principles and promises shewed more like the curses of the law, than its blessings:—for they called 
for sufferings and promised little but persecutions.” ( S 156.7; 342.13)
After comparing Roman high mass to a theatrical performance, and contrasting it with “that 
humble and solemn appeal which dust and ashes are offering up to the throne of God,” Steme 
continues by saying that the character o f true religion “is only to be got and maintained by a painful 
conflict and perpetual war against the passions” (S 63.1-9). That he saw no more inconsistency in 
this perspective juxtaposed to the statement (I John v.3) “his commandments are not grievous” is 
immediately evident if one reads the sermon ‘Penances’ for which that verse serves as heading. 
After a characteristic swing at the disastrous abuses of Catholic and Methodist clergy who spoil the 
reputation of Christ and his religion by a misuse of holy suffering, Steme proceeds not to some 
sentimental romp on the perpetual joy of a comfortable faith, as we may have expected, but rather 
to say:
where there is a virtuous and good end proposed from any sober instances o f self- 
denial and mortification,—God forbid we should call them unnecessary, or that we 
should dispute against a thing—from the abuse to which it has been put;—and, 
therefore, what is said in general upon this head, will be understood to reach no 
farther than where the practice is become a mixture of fraud and tyranny, but will no 
ways be interpreted to extend to those self-denials which the discipline of our holy 
church directs at this solemn season. (S 352.17)
If we remember that in his censure of unbounded submersion in the world’s fancies, Steme 
was always careful to say, with the same focus as that above, far be it from us to deny the 
appreciative use of God-given refreshments, we may gain some respect for the middle way which 
informs his faith. In no instance is it essentially contradictory or extreme, though at times by
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following scripture he is bound to present elements in their context that will be sure to baffle those 
unprepared to entertain bifocal paradigms. With this in mind, it is useful to examine a few 
quotations in light of a comment of Professor New in his headnote to sermon 37 (‘Penances’). After 
reminding us that the ‘Christianity is not grievous’ theme is also explicit in sermons 2, 26 and 28, 
he says
at the same time, it seems to contradict, at every important turn, the preceding 
sermon (36), with its praise o f the unworldly Apostles and the implied imperative to 
follow their ways. The middle position that Steme defines in this sermon, between 
the perceived excesses of Roman Catholicism on the one hand, Methodism on the 
other, was obviously broad enough to contain the contradictions between a 
Christianity not “grievous” and one that requires great sacrifices (of our appetites, if 
nothing else). Eighteenth-century Anglican sermon-writers—following Tillotson— 
had mastered precisely this capacity to sustain conflicting ideas in the face of 
conflicting pressures and changing situations.169
In recognizing the inadequacies of New’s perspective regarding the theological sense o f 
what Steme is trying to communicate, we are not neglecting the necessity of reading the sermons 
with an appreciation for their setting in contemporary rhetorical context. First of all, we should 
recognize that a mediation of seeming inconsistencies or extremes of theology is not a task 
exclusive to eighteenth-century Anglican sermon-writers. Tillotson notwithstanding, Christian 
apologists of any age, along with theologians of most religions, undertake the challenging task of 
presenting the ultimate blessings and spiritual comfort o f the way of virtue within the realistic 
context of the inevitable trials and tribulations of the journey. O f course all of Sterne’s theological 
“contradictions” have their root in the canon of Christian scripture. A moral system that would be 
without ‘conflict’ or seem consistent on New’s terms would not be a biblical theology. In these 
sermons, Steme is not presenting latitudinarian theology as a middle way between the excesses of
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Roman Catholicism and Methodism but as higher, more accurate and scriptural, than the abuses of 
those denominations. At this point Catholics and Methodists are united in Sterne’s mind and he 
attempts to transcend their misapplication of the gospel.
Like Seeker, George Fothergill [1705-1760; principal o f St. Edmund Hall, Oxford], prior to 
the main body of his sermon ‘the Pleasantness of a Good Life’, after saying he will recommend 
religion as the surest way to happiness, makes clear his understanding of the confusion New 
exhibits.
“A bold undertaking this!” will the sensualist be ready to say, “and something like 
that of reconciling contradictions; for what else is it to pretend, that a life o f religion 
is still a life of pleasantness? Religion, which seems rather calculated to rob us of 
those enjoyments we already have, than to furnish us with any additional ones; 
which finds us placed in the midst of sensible objects, and continually solicited by 
them, and restrains us from the participation of them by a severe interdict? Which 
engages us in a perpetual war with our inclinations and appetites, expressly 
enjoining us to deny ourselves, and to mortify our affections? And can you, after all 
this, pretend that the practice of virtue and religion is the way to pleasure? Might 
you not as well tell us, that we may please ourselves at the same time that we are 
denying ourselves; that we may gratify our inclinations even whilst we are 
mortifying them: that is, that we may both please and displease ourselves at the 
same time?” 170
The responses, of course, are as would have been expected: religious discipline is only 
‘unpleasant’ to “our degenerate nature.” “Gratification is a relative thing, depending not absoloutely 
on the outward objects themselves, but on their suitableness to the faculties employed about
171them.” Seeker himself sums it up nicely and removes any doubt regarding Sterne’s alleged 
contradiction:
the duties, which God hath enjoined us, though reasonable and beneficial in the 
highest degree, are yet, through the depravity of human nature, and the prevalence of 
bad customs, become so unacceptable, as they are practiced, as we must be sensible,
177but imperfectly by the best, and very little by the largest part of the world.
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We will return to this concept, key for Steme, that one’s faculties o f emotion and cognition 
are primary in determining the value of phenomena; it is but a small step from here to Smelfungus. 
Suffice it at this point to note the acceptance of a simple spiritual hierarchy that appreciates passing 
refreshment but consecrates the journey to the soul’s home. As Fothergill put it: “that is, we must
17^deny the inferior, and please the superior, part of our composition.”
Thus, the ungrievous Christianity theme should not blind us to Sterne’s frequent references 
to the difficulties involved in following a path of sincere faith. The “sufferings, and promised 
persecutions” of 342.13 and the “unpalatable to all its passions and pleasures” o f 344.28 are 
brought together in the conclusion of sermon 16 ‘The character o f Shimei’. Statements claiming 
that the true character of a Christian “is only to be got and maintained by a painful conflict and 
perpetual war against the passions” (S 63.6) illustrate that Steme openly maintained this dilemma in 
sermons he chose to publish.
We should note that in sermon 36, Apostolic heroism in a milieu of social persecution (at S  
342.12-16 for example) is presented as an example to shame the congregation’s disregard of the 
much smaller evidences required of them, evidences which it is in their advantage to give (S 
345.17-346.18). The “prepossessions” (S 340.8; 341.21) and “general prejudices o f the Jewish 
nation concerning the royal state and condition of the Saviour” (5 340.5) disabled them from being 
able clearly to recognize the majesty of God in making “himself of no reputation,—that he might 
settle, and be the example of so holy and humble a religion, and thereby convince his disciples for 
ever, that neither his kingdom nor their happiness were to be of this world” (S 341.30). This 
sentiment is not contradicted by the following sermon. In sermon 36, Steme is preaching against the
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prejudices of a comfortable religion, the reward of which is expected in this world and does not 
demand a sober and righteous life. Sermon 37 opens by preaching against another unscriptural 
‘prejudice:’ “ “that the commandments o f God are grievous” ”(£ 347.10). So as not to be 
misunderstood, he immediately reminds us of the lesson in sermon 36, that there are demands of 
the Gospel which, though perhaps not grievous, certainly involve restraint: “the way which leads to 
life is not only strait, for that our Saviour tells us, and that with much tribulation we shall seek it” (S 
347.11). Correcting the penitential focus and abuses of Catholics and Methodists, Steme reveals the 
unfortunate irony, that for all their elaborate asceticisms the necessary penances which lead to 
eternal life are unaccomplished. “It is true, on the other hand, our passions are apt to grow upon us 
by indulgence, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under exact discipline” (S  350.21); 
“where there is a virtuous and good end proposed from any sober instances of self-denial and 
mortification,—God forbid we should call them unnecessary.” (S  352.17)
It is not, we should now realize, the saying of something new from the pulpit that, even if 
it were possible, would be valued. The ability fruitfully and accurately to encourage a 
congregation to act in accord with the desire of heaven which is their highest pre-established 
happiness is the attempted mark. The discourse then literally becomes an illustration and force of 
enabling. In accord with this, Sterne’s pulpit practice, as evidenced in his highly conversational 
sermons, is tuned to fulfilling its half of the dialogue.
From the foregoing examples it should be clear that Steme was far from the uninterested 
deceptive parson that he has seemed to many to be. We have countless hints in the forty-five 
sermons that point to his great capacity and relish for his profession. With conversational
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exclamations (“one would think,” “perhaps you will say,” “O Moses!” “Eternal God! See!”)174 he 
brings himself, his characters and congregation to life. He appears as chaperone to his dramas 
and galleries, appealing directly to the imaginations and hearts o f his listeners: “Let us take a 
survey of the life,” “consider slavery,” “I see the picture o f his departure,” “to bring the matter
175 • icloser to us let us imagine.” Must we think him deceiving us when he writes that he wishes 
Yorick’s sermons will do the world good? In each o f them, subtly and to effect he orchestrates 
situations in which a willing communicant is encouraged not to judge the words but to consider 
an experience: “let us make this discourse as serviceable as we can.”
The preaching o f salvation for Steme does not dwell on or point towards an enthusiastic 
event o f one moment, but attempts a process o f communication in which elements o f earth will 
resonate with their corresponding elements in heaven. Mercy rather than judgment is the theme 
he iterates: “for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world 
through him might be saved” (John iii.17). Because this event is organic, “through” not “by,” 
Steme epitomizes a high understanding of this weighty claim. In a complementary way he does 
not presume by his preaching to demand reform, but rather that through it his auditors may hear 
what will do them good. It was with this in mind that he developed his practical genius, 
borrowing what he liked from others and cutting through the high verbiage of less effective 
sermons.
Storms of hermeneutic passion such as that between Melvyn New, Everett Zimmerman 
and Jonathan Lamb176 regarding Sterne’s interest in ‘the Job controversy’ have failed to take 
account of our parson’s misgivings about the importance of such polemical banter. The
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antiquarian $itz im feben and its potential for contemporary political manoeuvring is of no 
interest to Steme: beefy clerics arguing history to no purpose. His consistently maintained focus is 
the usefulness of present-day meanings surrounding biblical characters and their value for 
anchoring personal crises in a milieu of faithful order. He presents and develops the characters as 
probes to plumb the depths of human capacity. Sterne’s approach is the same with New Testament 
stories:
Whether this parable of the prodigal (for so it is usually called)—is really such, or 
built upon some story known at that time in Jerusalem, is not much to the 
purpose; it is given to us to enlarge upon, and turn to the best moral account we 
can. (5 186.13)
It is in telling these stories, regenerating the myth, that the moral is “insensibly 
incorporated” (S 29.29), and the imagination o f his congregation set to work. The consequent 
experience o f one’s moral responsibilities and theological perspectives brings the abstractions of 
dogma to life. There will always be some, however, in every congregation who fail properly to be 
engaged. James Swearingen writes well of Walter’s misplaced appreciation of ‘Abuses’: “the
1 77meaning remains hidden to him because he listens to rather than through the words”. We turn 
now to examine that “through”.
I l l
III ~ “AUXILIARIES ON THE SIDE OF VIRTUE”
A LARGER CONGREGATION
Appreciating Sterne’s devotion to good sermon writing, we need still to address the
elements of his beliefs because lack of explicit dogmatic argument in his sermons, the nature of his
extraordinary fiction, and his social persona, have spawned critical misgivings. Ian Ross notes of
Sterne’s first visitings in the milieu o f Parisian philosophes at Baron D’Holbach’s:
One regular guest, the ‘Great Infidel’ himself, David Hume, was initially taken aback 
by the atmosphere of the gatherings, which were notorious among contemporaries 
for the anti-religious conversation. Even Edward Gibbon, another of Holbach’s 
guests, declared himself unable to approve ‘the intolerant zeal of the philosophers 
and Encyclopedists, the friends of d’Olbach and Helvetius . .  .[who] laughed at the 
scepticism of Hume, preached the tenets of atheism with the bigotry of dogmatism 
and damned all believers with ridicule and contempt.’ The fact that Steme felt so 
much at home among what he termed this ‘joyous set’—gives some circumstantial 
weight, at least, to the possibility that he was himself tempted by contemporary 
religious scepticism.1
Steme naturally was tickled by the invitations and lavish entertainments offered in the 
salons but, contrary to Ross, there is no evidence amongst Sterne’s papers to suggest he was 
tempted by heresy. Persons of Sterne’s pastoral experience, magnanimous wit, and grounding in 
faith are not surprised, shocked, or titillated by the opinions o f others and, thus, are usually quite at 
home making meny with whomever is entrusted to them. In fact, during the spring of 1762, through 
Steme, Diderot ordered the works of Pope, Cibber, Chaucer, Tillotson and Locke.
Sterne’s letters during this period, to his wife and to David Garrick, discover an important 
focus of his philosophy of oratoiy and presentation. Twice he refers to “preaching” in a derogatory 
way —but with regard to plays:
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the French comedy, I seldom visit it—they act scarce any thing but tragedies—and 
the Clalron is great, and Madlle Dumesnil, in some places, still greater than her—yet 
I cannot bear preaching—I fancy I got a surfeit o f it in my younger days.—There is a 
tragedy to be damn’d to-night—peace be with it, and the gentle brain which made 
it!3
One month later Steme criticizes another tragedy: “it has too much sentiment in it, (at least for me)
the speeches too long, and savour too much ofpreaching—,”4
Steme is obviously using the term preaching to refer to the one-sided presentation of
argument—an ill-mannered way of approach—not unlike that displayed in sermons of Tillotson
and Clarke discussed above. As if church and playhouse have been exchanged, Steme recounts his
appreciation of a better manner of enlightenment:
I have been three mornings together to hear a celebrated pulpit orator near me, one 
Pere Clement, who delights me much; the parish pays him 600 livres, for a dozen 
sermons this Lent; he is K. Stanislas’s preacher—most excellent indeed! his matter 
solid, and to the purpose; his manner, more than theatrical, and greater, both in his 
action and delivery, than Madame Clairon, who, you must know, is the Garrick of 
the stage here; he has infinite variety, and keeps up the attention by it wonderfully; 
his pulpit, oblong, with three seats in it, into which he occasionally casts himself; 
goes on, then rises, by a gradation of four steps, each of which he profits by, as his 
discourse inclines him: in short, ’tis a stage, and the variety o f his tones would make 
you imagine there were no less than five or six actors on it together.5
The English pulpit did not call for such expansive theatrics, but Sterne’s obvious appreciation for a
style that incorporates “matter solid, and to the purpose” with a presentation that “keeps up the
attention” should be noted. That, in 1762, he freely praises a French Popish priest (and repeats his
patronage) suggests a mature theological confidence that Ross’s assessment would deny.
While secular influences abounded, in the works of Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke and
Mandeville for example, the disrepute into which ‘religion’ had fallen on the continent had not 
spread to England.6 So one is advised to recall the milieu enveloping any publication in that century.
113
As Melvyn New notes in ‘Modes of Eighteenth-Century Fiction’, “the most widely read and often 
discussed collection of narratives in eighteenth-century England was scripture. . . . the trade in 
scriptural commentary was by far the most thriving part o f the eighteenth-century book trade.” 
Samuel Johnson enthusiastically retorts to Wilkes’ surprise at seeing many sermons in the library of 
Topham Beauclerk: “why, Sir, you are to consider, that sermons make a considerable branch o f 
English literature; so that a library must be very imperfect if  it has not a numerous collection of
Q
sermons.” Sterne’s contemporaries took umbrage at his complex publicity in nomine Domini; we
find him difficult from some quite different prejudice. Unchurched readers then would number
fewer than his Anglican readers today. Weekly those congregations repeated from memory rubrics
few o f us would even recognize: “the liturgy, uncompromisingly ‘Augustinian’ and repeated each
Sunday, is what drums itself into the churchgoer’s mind.”9 We need harbour no longer the popular
misconception that latitudinarian exegesis was unorthodox and deistic. Indeed, the scholarly
community has in recent years been aligning itself with a more just assessment:
By seeing as results of the Fall not the complete depravity of humankind, the 
necessity of sinning, and the futility of moral endeavour, but rather the many natural 
infirmities consequent to mortality—the unruliness o f the passions, the impairment 
of reason, the shortness and inconsistency of judgment, the preoccupation with 
sensual satisfaction—the Broad-Churchmen were able to prescribe solutions to the 
problem of depravity through the encouragements of a godly life.10
Sterne’s fiction, no less than his sermons, is designed to be part of this solution.
The previous chapter vindicates Steme from the long-standing charge of plagiarism, and we
shall see that suggestions of dogmatic laxity are equally unfounded. Though we may believe Steme
was finally fatigued by the pulpit medium,11 we are unjustified to conclude he disbelieved or tired
of the messages he had consistently proclaimed. Voice ground down to a hoarse whisper, he strove
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to communicate with the “great world” upon which the nucleus of “a small circle described” had
for so long engaged his talents (TS 10.12). His shift from preaching, pamphlets, and mediocre
fanning, to the publication of Life and Opinions was indeed dramatic, but we would be the wrong 
10kind of fools to imagine that “I Wish either my father or my mother... had minded what they were
11about” (TS 1.1) is the melancholy jest of a new or different man.
One member of Sterne’s expanded congregation was the philosophe author of Candide. As
Trim reads the sermon, which aptly fell out of Bishop John Wilkins’ Mathematical Magick, Slop
snoozes and the brothers canter about, but, to Yorick’s credit, Voltaire is attentive. The deceptive
quality of conscience, he wrote, “perhaps has never been better treated '
among several pictures superior to those of Rembrandt and the pencil o f Callot, 
there is one of a gentleman and man of the w orld__
We must agree with this priest that the great men of the world are often in this 
position. . . . Thus it is good to awaken often the conscience both of dressmakers 
and of kings with a moral story that can make an impression on them; but to make 
an impression, one must talk better than most do today.14
This “picture” was originally delivered and published in 1750 and, according to Steme, “could find 
neither purchasers nor readers” (S 1.15). Two questions immediately arise upon its appearance in 
Tristram Shandy: why this, and why here? Michael Rosenblum succinctly gives the worst 
conceivable answer: “Steme put in the sermon because he chose to, and that choice is totally 
arbitrary.”15 But, giving Steme a little more credit, is the sermon especially significant, or is it 
merely the first act in a circus that was to include Walter’s Life of Socrates and other dancing 
bears?
The first sentence of Sterne’s preface to the first volumes of sermons illuminates. “The 
sermon which gave rise to the publication of these, having been offer’d to the world as a sermon of
Yorick’s , I hope the most serious reader will find nothing to offend him, in my continuing these two 
volumes under the same title” (S  1.2). As he tries to peel off the label ‘Jesting Parson,’ the words 
“gave rise” and “continuing” are clues to the progress of Sterne’s canon. Later, as noted above, in 
what may be called the epilogue to readers o f his sermons, he will refer to TS (then eight volumes) 
as “a moral work, more read than understood” (S 255.5). Initially he promised sixteen sermons for 
these final ‘lifetime’ volumes, so we may see the insertion of ‘Abuses’ (twelfth and last) as 
desperate.16 On closer scrutiny of themes, however, one concludes that he wrote “Finis” after the 
duo of discourses ‘Advantages of Christianity to the World’ and that which had accompanied the 
beginnings of Tristram, to recall to us the moral significance of his fiction—a significance he felt
1 7had been ignored.
The considerable echoes of ‘Abuses’ in his first homiletic volumes should be recognized as 
establishing a thematic continuity. Sterne’s consistency with his gospel, intimated above, will 
become obvious as these themes are sifted. The weight of ‘Abuses’, so present in his other sermons, 
was not in fact the favored concentration of contemporary Anglican discussions of conscience. 
Concentrating on the darker side of human psychology, in line with the sceptical tradition, Steme
1 ftfollows a path less worn but shared with Locke, Swift, and Joseph Butler. Generally divines were 
content to praise the God-given faculty and to exhort their congregations to use it, offering at most 
brief remarks on the dangers of self-deception. “Conscience,” writes John Balguy [1686-1748; vicar 
of north Allerton, Yorkshire and Prebendary of SarumJ “is God’s deputy and vicegerent; and 
whatever sentence it really passes, is ratified in heaven. Whoever therefore enjoys this testimony, is 
secure of his Maker’s approbation.”19 Tillotson’s ‘A Conscience void ofO ffence towards God and
men’ is likewise classic. He acknowledges the fallible nature o f conscience only in passing, and, 
like Steme at 267.1-5, says that conscience “is not the law and rule of our actions; that the law of 
God only is: but it is our immediate guide and director, telling us what is the law of God and our 
duty.” The majority of his sermon is, however, designed to extol the virtues of this inner guide 
which he calls a “domestick judge, and a kind of familiar god.” We are warned to stand in awe of 
conscience, and to fear its reprisals.20 For Steme though, conscience as “a judge within us” is 
instead a “once able monitor” that “by an unhappy train of causes and impediments,—takes often 
such imperfect cognizance of what passes,—does its office so negligently,—sometimes so 
corruptly, that it is not to be trusted alone” (S 261.10). Where Tillotson lists four reasons why 
conscience works efficiently, Steme explains four reasons why it will not.
Sterne’s preoccupation with this fundamental problem of human activity reverberates 
through his sermons and is instrumental to his novels. The clearest echoes are in ‘Self-Knowledge’, 
where many verbatim parallels to ‘Abuses’ are supported by Sterne’s clarification of the need for 
“parables, fables, and such sort of indirect applications” to woo people to truth and virtue (S 33.27). 
Reading the advertisement for ‘Abuses’ in Volume iv, where the grave are faulted for their inability 
to receive morality from fiction, we begin to appreciate the reciprocity o f Sterne’s publications. 
Carol Kay acknowledges this, writing that ‘Abuses’ “functions not to prove the superior didactic 
force of the novel that surrounds it, but to work a peculiarly modem magic: to convert moral
71writing into literature.” Too few have realized that ‘the sermon in Tristram Shandy’ is not ‘The 
Abuses of Conscience considered’, it is the experience o f that peculiarly modem magic. The 
‘meaning’ of Sterne’s fiction, like that of the folly of the cross, is realized not in a presumed
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understanding of symbol or doctrine, but by reflecting upon one’s responses to it, as it were: set for  
the fa ll and rising again o f  many.
For decades Steme had preached from scripture which, we should remember, is by no 
means the history o f efficient individuals or o f a successful nation. As Morris Golden writes,
“Sterne’s dramatic exchange with us . . .  is a sermon pointing to specimens: a representation not of
00human conflicts leading to universal meaning but of man caught in a series of symbolic states. 
Like Yorick, Steme was loath to explicate his attempts at benevolence and wisdom. Had explicit 
explanation been possible, the serpentine works would have been unnecessary. Though seeking to 
teach us better to love, he was under no illusion that many would heed him, however entertaining 
his presentations. “Ironically’ writes Max Byrd, ‘Abuses’s’ “moral points are, first, that we should 
rigorously scrutinize our consciences to root out self-deception and complacency, and, second, that
O ' Xwe are not really likely to pay attention to the first point.” Fully conscious, as only a professional 
moralist can be, of our reticence to be undeceived, Steme approaches his congregation with novelty 
and perception.
Steme admits he is not presenting new ideas, or even set discourses (e.g. S  228.32). As in 
his novels, we are weaned from dependence on a visible text to encounter instead the mysterious 
communications of imagination and spirit. Without presuming to present a ‘system o f theology’ 
according to Steme,24 the following chapters outline the theological and aesthetic perspectives 
that inform the patterns of his works. We will follow those patterns from the problems of human 
existence, through the state o f the world and individuals, to creative avenues revealed for 
solutions to those problems.
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PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS
The sermons open with “THE great pursuit of man is after happiness” (S 3.6) — since Plato 
and Aristotle a crux for practical discourses on human endeavour. No less in Sterne’s day: “there is 
not any one Point,” proclaimed Bishop Matthew Hutton in 1745, “wherein the ancient Masters of 
Reason have differ’d more, than in setting wherein human Happiness consists.” The elements on 
which Steme concentrates are informative: following the Nicomachean Ethics, the happiest life is 
one lived in accordance with the highest virtue, that is, with the principles o f that which is divine
•y/r •  •  •  •  •within oneself; and, once this contemplative virtue is attained (self-knowledge), it is necessary to 
use it. Aristotle is aware of the difficulty o f reform, that passions yield not to argument but to
97force, so he recommends training in legislation. Steme, realizing that this too will prove
insufficient, suggests a reorientation of paradigms in the sermons that follow. These discourses are
eminently practical, according well with the many instances in TS and ASJ  when action supersedes
the sentiment of words and opinion. Avoiding abstractions, Steme consistently plumbs the motives
and characteristics o f individuals to establish a workable catalyst that will overcome the curse of
pagan morality that can preach but cannot practice. Jonathan Swift, usually reticent to chide pre-
Christian moralists, echoes the classic conundrum:
the first point I shall mention was that universal defect which was in all their 
schemes, that they could not agree about their chief good, or wherein to place the 
happiness of mankind, nor had any of them a tolerable answer upon this difficulty, 
to satisfy a reasonable person. For, to say, as the most plausible of them did, that 
happiness consisted in virtue, was but vain babbling, and a mere sound of words, to
951amuse others and themselves.
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To avoid “vain babbling” Steme maintained an integrity in his discourses by never steering
far from the idiom and stories of scripture: “that grand charter of our eternal happiness” (S  396.27).
It is his reiterated conviction that the Bible beautifully conveys the human condition and is of
unique value for reconciliation. Sterne’s concentration on the search for happiness is entirely in line
with the fundamental gist of both scripture and his colleagues’ discourse. John Traugott’s “the zany
in the pulpit gives no moral calipers by which to measure this world or the next” is unacceptable,
as is this conclusion of Francis Doherty:
the evident absurdities which are in life are the reason for laughter, the laughter of 
skepticism. When Steme laughs at the misfortunes of others and the 
incomprehensible, he laughs, as Voltaire did, to keep his sanity.
Bloom and Bloom also muddy the waters:
since we cannot duck the blows so mysteriously intended for us, why not subsume 
our anxiety in hedonistic satisfactions? The pleasures that engage Steme are 
selfish.31
Against an arsenal of critical bagatelles we come to appreciate that the passages of scripture 
Steme especially relishes and wishes to address involve suffering and the unpleasant realities of 
human existence. The expressions o f Solomon on the shortness of our lives and the length of our 
trials are “beautiful” (S 368.15-26.). Likewise, “THERE is something in this reflection o f holy Job’s, 
upon the shortness of life, and the instability of human affairs, so beautiful and truly sublime” (S
91.8). These descriptions of life, he claims, are “just” (S 94.24) and “more to the purpose than the 
most elaborate proof’ (S 95.7). As parson Yorick’s “favorite composition” is “the funeral sermon 
on poor Le Fever” (TS 515.23-27), so the sermon Steme thought one of his best is the one he
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always referred to not as ‘The House of Feasting’ but as ‘The House of Mourning’. Writing to
Henry Egerton from Paris in March of 1762 he says:
I just rec. a Translation into french of my Sermon upon the house of Mourning, from
£
a lady of Quality—who proposes to print it, for the Caresm, & to give y people here 
a specimin of my Sermons—so You see, I shall be Lent Preacher at Paris, tho’ I
rshall never have the hon at London. The Translation is very fine.
And writing to his daughter in February of 1767:
—I am also much pleased with the account you give me of the Abbe de Sade—you 
find great comfort in such a neighbour—I am glad he is so good as to correct thy 
translation of my Sermons—dear girl go on, and make me a present of thy work— 
but why not the House of Mourning? ’tis one of the best.34
His contemporaries appreciated elements of the pathetic, Job and Ecclesiastes affording the 
finest examples. As Harry Solomon notes, “nowhere in the bible is ‘the uncertain and equivocal 
position of man’ more profoundly stated than in Job, and Pope’s Christian contemporaries,
-1C
including Blackmore and Young, were constantly publishing paraphrases of it.” Steme is fond of 
recalling this equivocal position, not to exploit literary pathos but to encourage accurate 
appreciation of the human condition. References to Job and Ecclesiastes are particularly relevant 
for anchoring scepticism and disappointment at the appearance of things, within the faithful context 
of scripture. Faith is not lessened by honest representation of our dark nature; it is placed on its true 
feet where the work o f redemption may begin. The journey is made more light and meaningful for 
this realistic, historical company. The sermons are brimming with references to these two books 
and it is by their morals and perspectives that Steme presents a mirror to our situations and our 
selves. By using scripture to explicate our frail condition, Steme offers an orthodox and helpful 
avenue for further understanding.
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In case readers of Tristram’s first volumes anticipated sermons focusing on pleasures o f this
life with suggestions o f our intrinsic abilities to relish them, Steme is quick to correct. The figure of
Solomon —author of Ecclesiastes—  as “reformed sensualist” (S 6.11) and foil to vanities and
illusion is complemented by that o f Job, the righteous sufferer. Though appreciated by some as an
unlikely poetic myth, full o f exotic pathos and impossible fluctuations, Steme concludes “that upon
the whole, when we have examined the true state and condition of human life, and have made some
allowances for a few fugacious, deceitful pleasures, there is scarce any thing to be found which
contradicts Job’s description of it” (S 101.13). That “description” of Job [xiv.1-2] was not
unappreciated in Sterne’s decades either. By an ironic twist of fate we read that William Dodd the
celebrated chaplain to the king, popular preacher of charity sermons, and unsuccessful forger, likens
our lot to Job’s in his Reflections on Death:
how various, how innumerable are the shafts of deathl They fly unerring from his 
quiver around us, and on so thin a thread hangs human life, to so many accidents 
and disasters is human life subject, that one would rather marvel that we continue to 
live, than that we should forget one moment that we are to die! Nothing can be more 
beautiful, nervous, and expressive, than the following fine prayer used in our Burial
' i - j
Service:__
Steme too was intimately familiar with what he refers to as Job’s “just and beautiful” description: 
‘‘that man that is bom of a woman, is of few days, and full of misery . . .  he cometh forth like a 
flower, and is cut down; he fleeth also as a shadow and continueth not” (S 94.25). Presiding over 
the interment of his flock and children, he would have proclaimed it often, from the Order for the 
Burial of the Dead “when they come to the Grave, while the Corpse is made ready to be laid into 
the earth.”
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Steme is explicit: the world presents a succession of “cross accidents and disasters to which 
our conditions are exposed” (S 18.10,143.16, etc.). One who carefully observes this scheme cannot 
help concluding with the biblical sages that we are bound to “vanity,—the perishing condition and 
uncertain tenure of everything in this world” (S 19.4). Though laboring constantly to another end, 
with the best of prospects, “time and chance happeneth to them all” (S 74.6, Eccles. ix .ll) . That 
some “have fortunately sailed through and escaped the rougher toils and distresses” (S 99.7) is 
exceptional: “the general complaint of all ages, and . . .  the histories of mankind . . .  contain but the 
history of sad and uncomfortable passages, which a good-natured man cannot read but with 
oppression of spirits” (S 99.11-14). None is exempt from the “sad accidents and numberless 
calamities” (S 100.32) that eventually draw near. In short, for a wise observer “nothing in this world 
springs up, or can be enjoyed without a mixture of sorrow” (S  102.6). This vision of the human 
plight, drawn from Sterne’s first volumes, should begin to inform our definitions ofiShandyism.
We are frequently reminded that good and evil are mixed in all worldly things. Indeed, from 
the first page of sermon 1, where the groundwork is laid for understanding the deception o f worldly 
expectations, through each lifetime volume to ‘Advantages o f Christianity to the World’ and the 
treachery of an undisciplined conscience, we are variously reminded that “our pleasures and 
enjoyments slip from under us in every stage of our life” (-S' 10.19), and that “in spite o f reason and 
reflection” (S 16.22), our imaginations run wild leading us to act at odds with our ethics and to form 
unreasonable opinions.
These vacillations of our condition were being addressed from pulpits throughout the 
kingdom. John Conybeare notes •*
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even desire itself, o f whatever kind it be (without which, from the very nature o f the 
thing, there can ordinarily be no enjoyment) is ever accompanied with some degree 
of pain: And the enjoyment arising from having such a desire answered, is often 
little more than a short relief from this pain. The great English Philosopher hath 
maintained, that “the human will is ever determined by uneasiness.”38
Samuel Johnson begins his Sermon 5 with no uncertain terms. “There is nothing upon
which more writers, in all ages, have laid out their abilities, than the miseries o f life; and it affords
no pleasing reflections to discover that a subject so little agreeable is not yet exhausted.”39 Indeed, a
survey of Johnson’s sermons turns up a number of phrases that resonate with Sterne’s accounts:
of the uncertainty of success, and the instability of greatness, we have examples 
every day before us. Scarcely can any man turn his eyes upon the world, without 
observing the sudden rotation of affairs. . . .
Even the most simple operations are liable to miscarriage from causes which we 
cannot forsee; and if we could forsee them, cannot prevent. . . .
The history of mankind is little else than a narrative of designs which have failed, 
and hopes that have been disappointed. . . .
That almost every man is disappointed in his search after happiness, is apparent 
from the clamorous complaints which are always to be heard; from the restless 
discontent, which is hourly to be observed, and from the incessant pursuit of new 
objects, which employ almost every moment of every man’s life.40
One can hardly exaggerate Sterne’s use of the perspectives of Ecclesiastes and Job. The conclusion
implied is that regardless of talents, desires, and wisdom, the world and its inhabitants will in part
remain a sorrowful mystery.
Sobriety abounds in Tristram’s world too, and has not gone unnoticed: “Sterne’s comedy,
for all its appearances of mere zaniness and teasing caprice, is based upon a very sober conception
of the state of man.”41 “In the most general sense, no doubt, the world o f Tristram Shandy is
fallen.”42 Tristram Shandy, “sport of small accidents” (TS 196.18, etc.), is bom to confusion. Even
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this youngest of travellers is faced with terrors threatening to ruffle him beyond repair. We learn 
early that if he makes it alive to daylight, without title or estate he will likely proclaim ours “one o f 
the vilest worlds that ever was made” (TS 8.17). This “little gentleman,” reflecting, introduces us to 
a “hero” whom we begin to admire in the nick of time, for very quickly, “about ten years ago 
[Yorick] had the good fortune to [die].” (TS 24.6)
The black page that signifies this death illuminates one o f the most pervasive themes o f the 
lives and opinions that follow. Yorick is not, as some suspect, “killed o ff’ by Tristram or Steme 
with Oedipal vengeance or to hail a “counterstatement” to the sermons.43 Melvyn New rightly 
warns us to remember “Yorick’s function in Hamlet is not that of a jester, but rather a memento 
mori.”44 This is true of Sterne’s Yorick too, though we may come to appreciate that the work’s 
progress away from that haunting sheet—with the parson continuing to communicate in good form 
even unto the last line of the novel—is an emblem of extraordinary, even eternal, life. “This initial 
juxtaposition of origin and destiny would seem significant in itself in a work whose core is the 
meaning of being.”45 Remember, had it been sure “that the child was expiring” (TS 343.17), 
Tristram would have been given the expendable name of his godfather. Tristram-gistus escapes 
with his life, but even as he finally succeeds in relating his birth and beginnings, we hear Death 
rapping on his door (TS 576.1). The line separating fiction from fact, we are reminded, is a wave. 
Tristram’s first generation of readers were promised a couple volumes each year under the all-too- 
human condition of their author’s being alive to record them. We ourselves might have read the 
instalments with more comfort had not that vile nagging cough prevented our laughter (TS 8.18, 
402, 575,663; ASJ  162.13).
125
Tristram, and Yorick in ASJ, are such festive fellows that we may be ashamed to register, or
too preoccupied to notice, the consistently presented mementos o f corruption. And it is important to
understand the setting of the sermons to appreciate this corruption in context. The Shandy domain,
a little world, surely provides a feast, but, like the homilies and life itself, it is a house of mourning.
As in any domicile not all tears are o f equal gravity, but in sundiy ways, at the crescendo of
expectation a hope is lost, and we step back down with the characters, to earth.
— Viva la joia! was in her lips— Viva la joia! was in her eyes. A transient spark of 
amity shot across the space betwixt us—She look’d amiable!—Why could I not live 
and end my days thus? Just disposer of our joys and sorrows, cried I, why could not 
a man sit down in the lap of content here—and dance, and sing, and say his prayers, 
and go to heaven with this nut brown maid?
Why not indeed! we enthusiastically cheer; but before the reason appears from our own small
memories, Tristram’s prayer is answered: “capriciously did she bend her head on one side, and
dance up insiduous—Then ’tis time to dance off, quoth I” (TS 651.2-10). Sterne’s Nature is not coy
to exhibit the frailties of her elements. Readers are often reminded that the path of the best-
intentioned travellers is strewn with “what philosophy justly calls
VEXATION
upon
VEXATION.” (TS 625.10)
Wandering through life as a traveller, Tristram finds these vexations at every turn. After exclaiming 
as much (in chapter xxx of Volume vii) he takes out his list of Lyons’ tourist sites: “the wonderful 
mechanism of this great clock of Lippius of Basil,” a thirty-volume history of China “in the Chinese 
language” and the “Tomb of the two Lovers” (TS 625-627). His plan is interrupted by conversations 
with an ass, a commissary, and the chaise-vamper’s wife who has twisted his remarks into her hair.
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When he finally does get to his sites they are disappointing: the “great clock was all out o f joints,
and had not gone for some years;” his enthusiasm for the Chinese history cools as he approaches
the Jesuits and he finds the college under the pall of an extraordinary cholic. The tomb o f Amandus
and Amanda, at which he longed to pay homage, he finds, does not exist. (TS 642-43)
A clock easier to describe in its decay, a locked and cholicked history in impossible
characters, and a tomb of lovers from which one cannot fly, are familiar emblems to any thoughtful
traveller beginning to realize that to be sustained his desires must constantly be changing targets
and tunes. “THE fifteenth chapter is come at last; and brings nothing with it but a sad signature of
‘How our pleasures slip from under us in this world’ ” (TS 767.1). Even as he appreciates human
beauty, its fragility is uppermost in his mind: “he who measures thee, Janatone, must do it now—
thou carriest the principles of change within thy frame; and considering the chances of a transitory
life, I would not answer for thee a moment” (TS 589.23). Even a radical moisture on the thinnest of
draperies merely reveals a posture bound to decay, supreme appreciation issuing inevitable
despondency: “ ‘Quod omne animal post coitum est triste’ ” (TS 475.16). “—But there is nothing
unmixt in this world; and some of the gravest of our divines have carried it so far as to affirm, that
enjoyment itself was attended even with a sigh—” (ASJ 116.7).46 Sure enough, while Steme has
Yorick recall Montaigne and Charron for the sexual proof,47 he is not shy of recalling us to his own
clerical echo of the commonplace phrase at the conclusion of sermon 10, ‘Job’s Account of the
Shortness and Troubles of Life, considered’.
When we reflect that this span of life, short as it is, is chequered with so many 
troubles, that there is nothing in this world springs up, or can be enjoyed without a 
mixture of sorrow, how insensibly does it incline us to turn our eyes and affections 
from so gloomy a prospect, and fix them upon that happier country, where
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afflictions cannot follow us, and where God will wipe away all tears from off our 
faces for ever and ever? (S 102.5)
In such territoiy Steme feels gravity appropriate, page after page witnessing that “in this night o f 
our obscurity” “time wastes too fast” (TS 232.23, 754.17, etc.). Even the tenderest tokens are not 
exempt; we are not adamant: “nothing in this world, Trim, is made to last fo r  ever.” (TS 684.3)
We are creatures bom to habitudes (TS 608.27), but scuttling across these tracks is an 
infinity of suggestions that, if entertained, play us like pipes. Recalling the thought that floated in 
Slop’s mind “without sail or ballast,” each of us is host to millions which “are every day swimming 
quietly in the middle of the thin juice o f a man’s understanding, without being carried backwards or 
forwards, till some little gusts of passion or interest drive them to one side” (TS 197.9). Regardless, 
or even because of the defenses of tradition and effort, Steme suggests, we are as prey to these gusts 
as we are to death. They blow through his works: Tristram is governed by his pen, (TS 500.5) 
Yorick by circumstances (ASJ 104.17), both trumpet and excuse themselves accordingly.
Not only, then, are we reminded that the world seems inconsistently mixed, and providence 
blind, but Steme is careful to demonstrate that each individual participates with infirmity. What 
would seem to be the simplest knowledge, that of one’s self, is in fact rarely even approached —a 
common observation popular in Sterne’s day as a subject for general reflection, philosophical 
debate, and religious consideration. Like Sterne’s other concentrations, the theme of the complexity 
of individuals and the difficulty of self-knowledge is one that needed little introduction and he is 
careful to establish this gist early with his readers. He thrives on leading us through stages of life, 
trusting us to concur with the implied conclusions. Reality, or the-way-things-are is the touchstone
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of his works. We begin with a truism: “THE great pursuit of man is after happiness” (S  3.6), and 
acknowledge from experience that “in this uncertain and perplexed state” (S 5.9) we usually fall 
short o f our hopes. He admits the world perplexes, that individual constitutions are inclined to 
misread the opportunities in which their true happiness lies. Favorite scriptural examples are drawn 
from Ecclesiastes, o f which sermon 1 is a paraphrase: contrary to the best intentions and 
calculations of body and mind, most attempted enjoyments are insufficient to issue joy or 
contentment. In the spring of 1760 those who had recently finished the first Shandy volumes, 
digesting ‘The Abuses of Conscience considered’, may not have expected the theme of their 
selective blindness and its consequences to be so thoroughly re-encountered in Yorick’s other 
works. The world in Tristram Shandy is admittedly perplexing, and it is presented as equally so in 
the sermons.
After the rehearsal o f this theme in ‘Inquiry after Happiness’, we meet with two
recommendations. The first, in the following sermon, uses Solomon to suggest that a happy life will
be one tutored by mourning:
so strange and unaccountable a creature is man! he is so framed, that he cannot but 
pursue happiness—and yet unless he is made sometimes miserable, how apt is he to 
mistake the way which can only lead him to the accomplishment of his own wishes!
(514.6)
The second, from sermon 3, warns that when one foregoes the inconvenience of being charitable,
one forfeits humanity:
inconsistent creature that man is! who at that instant that he does what is wrong, is 
not able to withhold his testimony to what is good and praise worthy. (S 29.21)
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By the time we arrive at sermon 4, we are prepared for its title: ‘Self-Knowledge’. Its theme,
“the deceitfulness of the heart o f man to itself, and of how little we truly know of ourselves” (S
31.6) is aptly presented using the provocative story of David and Nathan. Not only is he elaborating
on the sermon from Tristram Shandy, but beginning with the first paragraph we are even reading
some of the same lines. Again we are reminded that though “one would think” self-knowledge
“could be no very difficult lesson,” it is in fact as elusive as a good conscience. Steme anchors his
theology in this basic principle o f human illusion:
we are deceived in judging o f ourselves, just as we are in judging of other things, 
when our passions and inclinations are called in as counsellors, and we suffer 
ourselves to see and reason just so far and no farther than they give us leave. (S
32.9)
This perspective was established in ‘Abuses’, reiterated in the first sermons o f Volume i, and is 
influential in all that follow.
‘ABUSES’, PREPOSSESSIONS, AND INAPPROPRIATE SOLUTIONS
A number of inconveniences are associated with inaccurate knowledge, not the least of 
which is stated in the motto to the first volumes of Tristram. The hard jostlings and comical 
encounters of the players at Shandy Hall and o f Yorick in France are clearly multiplied by opinions. 
Characters seem unable to come to terms with their environment and with those who dwell within 
it. Ideas formed according to the appearances of ‘things’ inevitably lead interested minds to 
confusion.
It is the nature of an hypothesis, when once a man has conceived it, that it 
assimulates every thing to itself as proper nourishment; and from the first moment
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of your begetting it, it generally grows the stronger by every thing you see, hear, 
read, or understand. (TS 177.15)
The association of ideas, the unsteady uses of words, and ancillary complexities combine to fix the
sermon as an anchor of Sterne’s work: “surely if there is any thing in this life which a man may
depend upon, and to the knowledge of which he is capable of arriving upon the most indisputable
evidence, it must be this very thing,—whether he has a good conscience or no.” (TS 145.7)
Unlike the few who heard or read this in 1750, Steme reasonably could have expected his
new congregation, after their introduction to the Shandys, to anticipate what follows:
at first sight this may seem to be a true state of the case; and I make no doubt but the 
knowledge of right and wrong is so truly impressed upon the mind of man,—that 
did no such thing ever happen, as that the conscience of a man, by long habits of sin, 
might (as the scripture assures it may) insensibly become hard;—and, like some 
tender parts of his body, by much stress and continual hard usage, lose, by degrees, 
that nice sense and perception with which God and nature endow’d it:—Did this 
never happen;—or was it certain that self-love could never hang the least bias upon 
the judgment;—or that the little interests below, could rise up and perplex the 
faculties of our upper regions, and encompass them about with clouds and thick 
darkness. (TS 147.1)
The so-far humorous instances of men being bubbles to themselves take a sinister turn. 
One’s banker and physician are suspect enough, we are told, when personal gain is at stake. But, as 
Trim recalls with horror, the monstrous pride of the Inquisition is witness to how opinions fixed as 
law by powerful systems tend generally to torment helpless victims. Walter means well in 
comforting Trim, but he is wrong to say “this is not a history, — ’tis a sermon thou art reading” (TS
162.9). ‘Abuses’ is the history of what occurs in public and private when Human Understanding 
presumes itself sufficient, thus it is an exposition of how the Fall of man is perpetually rehearsed.
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It is no small part of what should be the overwhelming success of the sermon as the initial
crux of the novel, that Walter and Toby applaud it while simultaneously proving the validity o f its
accusations. The homily of 1750 has entered another dimension, has gathered a cast. Though he
seems to misunderstand Locke, in his article ‘The Sermon in Tristram Shandy’ Arthur Cash
recognizes an important focus: “Locke, exploring the uses and limitations o f reason, saw only an
intellectual fault in man’s failure to know and judge himself. Steme made o f it a central theme in
his moral teaching.”48 Careful readers register this focus.
Thus conscience, this once able monitor,—placed on high as a judge within us, and 
intended by our maker as a just and equitable one too,—by an unhappy train of 
causes and impediments, takes often such imperfect cognizance of what passes,— 
does its office so negligently,—sometimes so corruptly, —that it is not to be trusted 
alone; and therefore we find there is a necessity, an absolute necessity o f joining 
another principle with it to aid, if not govern, its determinations. (TS 154.3)
Henceforth we are to refrain from premature judgement and dogmatic slumbers, and to allow the
author flexibility. We will then be prepared for the complementary passage in Volume iii:
—Inconsistent soul that man is!—languishing under wounds, which he has the 
power to heal!—his whole life a contradiction to his knowledge!—his reason, that 
precious gift of God to him—(instead of pouring in oyl) serving but to sharpen his 
sensibilities,—to multiply his pains and render him more melancholy and uneasy 
under them! (TS 239.13)
Straight reason has become pharisaical like the priest and Levite in the parable to which Tristram 
alludes (Luke x.25-37). Hope for health rests with the outsider—the Samaritan—persons like “poor 
Yorick” (TS 35.10), “poor Tom” (TS 162.6) and “poor Trim” (TS 162.4, 163.4) who have shown 
compassion to those in need.
Having established the elusive nature of happiness and the difficulty o f self-knowledge, 
Steme proceeds by demolishing expectations o f unaided inclinations having capacity to suggest
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appropriate entertainment. But we should not misunderstand him to mean that only passions or
spontaneous reactions are untrustworthy. Reason and reflection, in other words one’s settled
opinions, are equally incapable of properly governing the imagination (S  16.21-27). They betray us
if used as sufficient guides: we are “miserably cheating ourselves, and torturing our reason to bring
us in such a report of the sin as suits the present appetite and inclination” (S 38.17). We are
overthrown says Steme, by our “wants and necessities (whether real or imaginary)” (S 100.20).49
The prepossessions formed by passion and reason are variously manifest, but they stem
from a few basic roots in human disposition so it is important in explicating Sterne’s message to
distinguish between the residue of the image of God within which people are created (a heavenly
disposition), and the disposition to deviate from this (inherited from our first parents).50 One
inclined to the former is ruled by compassion, the rule of heaven, those following the latter serve
themselves. Each of these will adopt by long practice and a succession of spontaneous decisions a
settled principle that will govern their seemingly inconsistent actions. The establishment of priority
in these dispositions serves as a foundation for one’s ruling passion.51 Montaigne’s essay ‘Of the
Inconstancy o f our Actions’ offers a fit representation of the difficulty o f knowing one’s true nature:
There is indeed some possibility of forming a Judgment o f a Man from the most 
usual Methods of his Life, but, considering the natural Instability of our Manners 
and Opinions, I have often thought even the best Authors a little mistaken, in so 
obstinately endeavouring to mould us into any constant and solid Contexture.
We are all unformed Lumps, and of so various a Contexture, that every Moment 
every Piece plays its own game, and there is so much Difference betwixt us and 
ourselves, as betwixt us and others.
The Understanding has something more to do than simply to judge us by our 
outward Actions; it must penetrate the very Soul, and there discover by what 
Springs the Motion is guided: But that being a high and hazardous Undertaking, I 
could wish that fewer would attempt it.52
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If such classic distinctions are not recognized we are likely to misread Steme and presume
his presentations of the nature and culpability of individuals to be inconsistent. Superficially he
would seem to be contradicting himself by saying we are inherently good and also inherently evil.
But his perspective is compatible with reason, Christian theology and in line with contemporary
Anglican dialectic. James Foster’s sermon ‘Of the Image of God in Man’ begins:
THERE is no part of knowledge more considerable than a right knowledge o f 
human nature. . . . And yet it may well be wondered at, that men should be such 
great strangers to the design of their own nature, and of all the objects of knowledge, 
know the least of themselves.
Ten pages later he continues,
for human nature, even in its present constitution, is a reasonable nature, and the 
reasonable nature of man has no evil tendency, but. . . .  It must, after all, be 
confess’d, that there is a sickness and disorder, in our mortal frame, introduced by 
the fall. But this is entirely a natural, and not a moral defect.
Sterne’s sermon ‘Pride’ makes a further distinction between temptations “immediately 
seated in our natures” (presumably lust, gluttony, etc.), and a vice such as pride, “which grows up in 
society so insensibly;—steals in unobserved upon the heart upon so many occasions” (S 229.19). 
“Self-love, like a false friend, instead of checking, most treacherously feeds this humour” (S 
229.24). Thus a vice to which humans are not inherently inclined is nurtured by one to which they 
are. That self-love is not a vice per se, was in Sterne’s day defended by Dean Swift: “the love we 
have for ourselves, is to be the pattern of that love we ought to have towards our neighbour.”54 And 
by Bishop Butler:
self-love, in its due degree, is as just and morally good as any affection whatever.
. . .  The thing to be lamented is, not that men have so great regard to their own good 
or interest in the present world, for they have not enough; but that they have so little 
to the good of others. And this seems plainly owing to their being so much engaged
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in the gratification of particular passions unfriendly to benevolence, and which 
happen to be most prevalent in them, much more than to self-love.55
Like all inherent dispositions or ruling passions, the value of self-love is in the use to which
it is put. The influential growth of its vicious elements may be so subtle as to provoke blatant
hypocrisy without the least acknowledgment in the practitioner. The priest and Levite versus the
Samaritan (#3), David’s unknowing judgment on his own veiled crime (#4), and the Pharisee in the
temple (#6), provide examples of this blindness. The inconsistencies of king Herod are accounted
for “in three words— That he was a man o f  unbounded ambition, who stuck at nothing to gratify
it,—so that not only his vices were ministerial to his ruling passion, but his virtues too (if they
deserve the name) were drawn in, and listed into the same service” (#9; S  89.5). Preparing that
statement perhaps Steme had recently perused the sermons of John Conybeare, who in part I of
‘Reflections on the Conduct of Herod towards John the Baptist’ speaks eloquently to this point:
Now, the first thing I would observe, on occasion of the present history, is this; that 
the giving ourselves up to any one irregular passion or desire, is not only, upon its 
own account, highly displeasing to God,—but will have such an influence upon our 
lives, that our innocence and virtue shall be in no instance secure. This we see 
plainly in the conduct of Herod; who was so over-mastered by his passion for 
Herodias, that he stuck at nothing to which that passion led him.
. . .  whenever any [passion or desire] becomes a ruling principle within us, it draws 
every thing to itself; —  hath an influence on every action; and, as the helm of a 
vessel, tumeth us which way soever it pleaseth. So that if  a man be once lost to any 
criminal passion (whatsoever it be), neither he, nor any one else can say, where he 
shall make a stand.56
The ambition Herod manifests, as self-love unrestrained, is a God-given virtue misused. 
Like the desire for glory, it is a “generous and manly vice” (S  181.6), and is contrasted to greed (in 
this case of Governor Felix), which though equally treacherous, is nevertheless often “a subordinate
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and ministerial passion, exercised for the support of some other vices” (5 180.5). With avarice, we
are feeding more elemental deviances. Steme presents evil-speaking as another “contagious
malady” (5 107.9) springing from the seeds of rooted dispositions such as cruelty, ambition, and
poverty of soul. The pitiless Shimei (#16), the pride of Hezekiah (#17), the immature confidence o f
the prodigal (#20), the worldliness of the rich man (#23), and the thanklessness o f nations (#s 21
and 32, 40, 45) are displayed as further instances of how, by close observation of the everyday
unguarded actions of people, one may most likely form accurate assessments of their temper and
ruling passion (5 297). Already in ‘Abuses’ Steme drew attention to the ease with which we are
deceived in judging seemingly good men. It is to the advantage o f the banker and physician to seem
to be moral, and one would be foolish to conclude that a morality of convenience will remain
constant when the underlying passion is better served by a vicious deed. The humility o f Hezekiah,
so apparently noble in adversity, was not able to bear the glorious “shock of prosperity” which
revealed his true nature. (S 160.14)
These examples are not shown by scripture or Steme as extraordinary burdens o f
sensational characters. In every sermon we are flapped back to practical self-accusation:
we are a strange compound; and something foreign from what charity would 
suspect, so eternally twists itself into what we do . .  . whatever a man is about, —  
observe him, —he stands arm’d inside and out with two motives; an ostensible one 
for the world, —and another which he reserves for his own private use.
(5161.25-162.1)
We are revealed as participating in a negligent farce, a collective agreement by which under 
ordinary circumstances, if we are not evil-speakers, we agree not to tax one another by examining 
the dispositions beneath our masks. The deceit is effective, we grant the same license to ourselves:
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most of us are aware o f and pretend to detest the barefaced instances o f that 
hypocrisy by which men deceive others, but few o f us are upon our guard or see that 
more fatal hypocrisy by which we deceive and over-reach our own hearts. It is a 
flattering and dangerous distemper, which has undone thousands —we bring the 
seeds of it along with us into the world—. (S 38.20)
There is scarce any character so rare, as a man o f a real open and generous integrity,
—who carries his heart in his hand, —who says the thing he thinks; and does the 
thing he pretends. ( S 164.18)
According to Steme, the ultimate prepossession is our propensity to sacrifice anything to this
principle of self-love. In some characters this manifests itself as hunger for power, in others as
desire to be thought wise, and in many it lurks simply, in ordinary judgment practised according to
spontaneous fancies. In all cases, though one’s myriad actions seem contradictory, they are in fact
answering the call of one ruling passion. Many apparent inconsistencies of life and individuals may
be reconciled if the ruling passion driving superficial differences is discerned. It will not, for
example, then be unbelievable that Herod, a “person o f great address . . . generous, prince-like”
could simultaneously be responsible for monstrous crimes.
Susceptibility even to deceive one’s self exponentially multiplies this problem. King David,
with a history of unusual perception and sensitivity, feels no remorse at seducing Bathsheba and
having her good husband butchered. Steme begins his sermon ‘Self-Knowledge’ with this story,
and the words
THERE is no historical passage in scripture, which gives a more remarkable instance 
of the deceitfulness of the heart of man to itself, and of how little we truly know of 
ourselves, than this, wherein David is convicted out of his own mouth. (S 31.5)
For when Nathan presents a parable paralleling David’s sin, the king is quick to accuse the guilty.
Again, “we are deceived in judging of ourselves, just as we are in judging of other things, when our
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passions and inclinations are called in as counsellors ” (S  32.9). Steme, using the parable, recalls to 
us this elemental flaw in our natures. We are masters o f self-deceit, in “utter ignorance of our true 
disposition and character” (S 36.29). Further, we are inclined to the “dangerous and delusive” trap 
of judging the actions o f others according to “the various ebbs and flows of [our own] passions and 
desires” (S 36.32-37.2). Reality is misjudged because it is perceived according to insufficient 
terms, generated from dislodged expectations o f how things are or ought to be. Man is a bubble 
to himself because he is generally at the mercy o f forces which, even if  he manages to 
acknowledge, remain beyond his comprehension—forces summed up in the words ‘ruling 
passion.’
Hopefully underlying this prevalent disease is a capacity, with appropriate reflection many
will be able at least to agree with the diagnosis. In ‘Abuses’, Steme wrote “if any man . . .  thinks it
impossible for man to be such a bubble to himself,—I must refer him a moment to his reflections,
and shall then venture to trust the appeal with his own heart” (S 260.19). He iterates the same point
in #4 borrowing from Swift, “let any man look into his own heart, and observe” (S  37.3).57 In both
sermons, he continues with Swift to see in David the human tendency to hate sins which one has no
desire to commit, and to excuse those to which one is inclined. This fundamentally consistent
cornerstone of self-love should not blind us to understanding the full ramifications o f observed
inconsistencies. Steme himself is not being inconsistent in these pronouncements when he tackles
this problem in his sermon on the Character of Herod.
—we often think ourselves inconsistent creatures, when we are the furthest from it, 
and all the variety of shapes and contradictory appearances we put on, are in truth 
but so many different attempts to gratify the same governing appetite. (S 86.12)
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Compare this with what follows two sermons later:
the bulk of mankind live in such a contradiction to themselves, that there is no 
character so hard to be met with as one, which upon critical examination, will 
appear altogether uniform, and in every point consistent with itself. (S 103.25)
Melvyn New claims that these passages suggest “the difficulty of seeking a consistent view
of humanity in the Sermons;” “Steme appears inconsistent in trying to decide whether or not there
exists an underlying unity in the inconsistencies o f human beings.” On the contrary, Sterne’s first
statement does not claim that we are always consistent, but that when we seem inconsistent, often a
closer look would reveal various attempts to feed a consistent hunger. We are consistent according
to this hunger, not according to what it makes us do. Or, we are consistently ruled by our governing
passion that inevitably leads us into apparent inconsistencies; we are consistent in passion, not with
the expectations of reason. Sterne’s second observation approaches the enigma from another angle,
and with seemingly opposite words says the same thing: we are inconsistent with the objectively
reasoned idea of ‘what that sort of person does.’ We are inconsistent in our claims to moral
consistency, but consistent in being ruled by one passion.
Again the fundamental human crux: “Good God! said I, turning pale with astonishment—is
it possible, that a people so smit with sentiment should at the same time be so unclean, and so
unlike themselves— Quelle grossierteT (ASJ 83.14). Beneath the surface, at passion’s root there is
no fundamental inconsistency. As Joseph Butler says in his sermon ‘Upon Self-Deceit’ that focuses
on the David/Nathan story:
hence arises that amazing incongruity; and seeming inconsistency of character, from 
whence slight observers take it for granted, that the whole is hypocritical and false; 
not being able otherwise to reconcile the several parts; whereas, in truth, there is real 
honesty, so far as it goes.59
An effective honesty though, is difficult to find. In ‘Abuses’ Steme explicitly lauds the quality of 
“moral honesty” of one “who has less affectation of piety” than those zealous merely to appear 
religious (TS 159.16-27). The majority are busy with masks o f appearance “stealing from [the 
world] a character, instead of winning one” (S 162.3). That those who successfully construct a mask 
are more accepted than those whose vices are less harmful but more public, Steme claims, is a great 
moral evil of society. If justice must also be seen to be done, often it will suffer: “ ’tis the necessity 
of appearing to be somebody, in order to be so—which ruins the world” (S 221.24). Most conclude 
it is a better use of time and effort to establish an appearance of humility (S 231.15-27), wisdom (S 
245.5-246.3), or honesty (273.8-20), than to embark on the difficult road of really acquiring the 
virtues: “numbers are every day taking more pains to be well spoken of,—than what would actually 
enable them to live so as to deserve it” (S 109.33).
This theme of corporate and self deception is a key to understanding Sterne’s message and 
approach. His application of honest characterization contributes gracefully to remove these masks. 
In the Shandy family, in Yorick of ASJ  there are no masks, and thus the reader, if  he is honest, is 
enabled to see himself without his masks in an unsuspecting manner. Turning to the fiction with 
this in mind, amplification of these homiletic themes becomes apparent.
In one of his early descriptions of uncle Toby, Tristram distinguishes between influences of 
blood and of “wind or water, or any modifications or combinations of them whatever” (TS 73.5). 
Though this, like ‘philosophy’ in both novels, comes to us veiled, it is significant for maintaining us 
in the environment o f deviance and confusion that pervades the house and journey of his works. 
Remember the animal spirits, “transfused from father to son,” which account for “nine parts in ten
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of a man’s sense or his nonsense, his successes and miscarriages in this world” (TS 1.16-2.1). These
spirits are, nevertheless, governed by “you” (TS 2.2), and the path they clear is the responsibility of
the one who directed them. Generationally speaking, then, the deviance o f blood is accountable, but
that is further complicated by those of “wind and water.” Environment, whether on the grand scale
of natural latitude or in the smaller circle of coincidental gusts, provides a complementary chaos.
Doubtless Walter is to be understood as correct, that we are haunted by multitudes of
prejudices “which we suck in with our mother’s milk” (TS 448.6). Certainly Locke had much to say
on this stumbling block of ‘education.’ As outlined in the sermons, it is significant that these
prejudices are rarely removed by experience or ‘reasoning.’ “For in a great measure” anticipates
Tristram, “[my father] might be said to have suck’d this in, with his mother’s milk. He did his part
however.—If education planted the mistake, (in case it was one) my father watered it, and ripened it
to perfection” (TS 261.11). Feminist critics hunting for ungenerous squirts will here be
disappointed. Referring to the effects of mother’s milk, Steme is alluding to arguments of
theological epistemology:
it appears clearly indecorous and unworthy of a Christian to draw in his Religion 
with his Mothers Milk, and to attribute his receiving it, not to the Ingenuous 
Disquisition of Reason, but to the Laws of his Country, his education, to the 
Dictates o f some learned Man in whom he has an Implicit Faith, and such like 
Prejudices as these.60
As Walter is not redeemed from dogmatic misapplication by the blatant moral of ‘the Abuses of 
Conscience’, so Slawkenbergius informs us in his misplaced prolegomena, o f the root o f his life­
long focus on the human nose: “that ever since he had arrived at the age of discernment, and was 
able to sit down coolly, and consider within himself the true state and condition of man, and
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distinguish the main end and design of his being . . (TS 273.26). Indeed, “Learned men . . .  don’t 
write dialogues upon long noses for nothing” (TS 271.18), but what the unenthusiastic reader will 
learn from his elaborate ‘dialogue,’ is sure to disappoint that illusioned though faithful analyzer of 
our Disgrazias (TS 212.19).
The act of establishing systematic reasoning to account for every thing, instead of 
disillusioning tends only further to confuse. As objective truth, reason is insidious. Walter’s North­
west passage to the intellectual world is an apt illustration. He has realized the need to outrun time 
in his education of Tristram, but what he unwittingly discovers is a shortcut to the source of his own 
illusions:
now the use of the Auxiliaries is, at once to set the soul a going by herself upon the 
materials as they are brought her; and by the versability of this great engine, round 
which they are twisted, to open new tracks o f enquiry, and make every idea 
engender millions. (TS 485.10)
That Walter would engage his unsuspecting Meno to discourse about a “white bear” is a jest with
Sterne’s theological contemporaries that has since been hibernating. Recalling the term from his
Cambridge days Steme highlights Walter’s unfortunate appeal. Thomas Sharp gives us the
convenient definition of these “extravagant conceits . . .  in the compositions of preachers:”
we called them white bears', meaning thereby, such emblems, or similes, as were 
too bold and striking to be easily forgotten; and yet, from some strange 
impropriety or oddness in them, could not be remembered but with discredit to the 
brains that formed them.61
One problem consistently developed in TS and ASJ  is not limited to Hudibrastic tutors, 
and that is the overwhelming temptation to absorb phenomena in ways that accord with one’s 
preconceived notions. Not only, like the consultants at the visitation dinner who each form
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incorrect interpretations of “Zounds ” are we bubbled intellectually, (“how finely we argue
upon m istaken facts!”) (TS 377.20-379.8), but even  physically  w e  are prey to CURIOSITY, FANCY 
and D e sir e :
“That a rill of cold water dribbling through my in-ward parts, should light up a torch 
in my Jenny’s—”
—The proposition does not strike one; on the contrary it seems to run opposite to 
the natural workings of causes and effects—
But it shews the weakness and imbecility of human reason.
— “And in perfect good health with it?”
—The most perfect—Madam, that friendship herself could wish me— (TS 660.9)
That Tristram would be doomed by marriage articles (TS 46.26-28) to have his nose 
squashed is just one of many instances where a well-meant attempt at order and felicity becomes an 
avenue of undoing. That nothing ever wrought in an ordinaiy way with the Shandy family (TS 
73.26, 373.2) is slight consolation for the suspicion that “ordinary” is a figment of our nurses’ 
imagination and that here, as in the sermons, we are being introduced to ourselves—  hinges creak 
in our own parlours. Walter is not the only patriarch whose “rhetoric and conduct were at perpetual 
handy-cuffs” (TS 239.8). It is hinted that this need not be. Elizabeth’s “Pray, my dea r . . .  have you 
not forgot to wind up the clock?” (TS 2.9) was unnecessary and, some may argue, Walter need not 
have been put out. The mechanism of things is, of course, merely an inclination, but if  given license 
it assumes autonomy, and like hobbyhorses, becomes a rule: “so that when they are once set a- 
going, whether right or wrong. . .  --away they go cluttering like hey-go-mad” (TS 2.3).
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We are humorously introduced to the hobbyhorse as ruling passion, even Solomon stabled a 
few, but Tristram’s apparently rhetorical question “pray, Sir, what have either you or I to do with 
it?” is in earnest (TS 12.17). It is not a grave discussion we are entering, as Steme makes abundantly 
clear, but it is essential. “From the first moment I sat down to write my life for the amusement o f 
the world, and my opinions for its instruction, has a cloud insensibly been gathering over my 
father.” (TS 253.15)
As the novels unfold, inconsistencies of characters are one element upon which we come to
rely. Only “Sir Critick” who fancies himself untainted, would dare be surprised:
—How, in the name of wonder! could your uncle Toby, who, it seems, was a 
military man, and whom you have represented as no fool,— be at the same time 
such a confused, pudding-headed, muddle-headed fellow as—. (TS 97.18)
The humbler reader instead will try to “dive deep enough into the first causes of human ignorance
and confusion” (TS 97.24). But what will he find? What sort of -paedia will he be tempted to puzzle
together? The research is treacherous. Toby’s early attempts to describe events at Namur prove that
perplexities of intelligible communication are not lessened by the dubious privilege of being an
eyewitness, rather they become “almost insurmountable difficulties” (TS 94.1-12). Like Tristram
telling his story, at times he can relate when but not how (TS 42.4), and at others how but not why
(TS 74.13-15). The most obvious things have dark sides. Toby admits a month’s contemplation will
not associate a crevice with the right end of a conversation (TS 117.5-118.9), though elsewhere fast
as you can say “bridge,” he fords the gap: “ ’Tis very obliging in him . . .—pray give my humble
service to Dr. Slop, Trim, and tell him I thank him heartily.” (TS 252.16)
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Humorous, and of no eternal account perhaps, but one cannot help seeing Walter gravely
nodding at recent versions of chaos theory involving, as did his, “the dust of a butterfly’s wing:”
“error, Sir, creeps in thro’ the minute-holes, and small crevices, which human nature leaves
unguarded” (TS 171.26). The best intelligence brought by the best of messengers cannot divert the
imagination of poor Phutatorius:
it is curious to observe the triumph of slight incidents over the mind:—What 
incredible weight they have in forming and governing our opinions, both of men and 
things,—that trifles light as air, shall waft a belief into the soul, and plant it so 
immoveably within it,—that Euclid" s demonstrations, could they be brought to 
batter it in breach, should not all have power to overthrow it.
(7S 383.1 l;c f. S  413.2-7.)
Once heated, by burnt brandy or some other radical element, deviance is established. What begins
in jest ends in earnest as by long journeys and much friction, the hobby becomes the man, and
centaur-like they gallop away (TS 86.6-19, 20.11). Steme consistently makes sport of our tendency
to overreach ourselves: “there is but a certain degree of perfection in every thing: and by pushing at
something beyond that”-  Tristram is tripled in Auxerre. Again this helpfulness o f classic
scepticism; the nature of things admits only so much penetration, according to the limited capacities
of its seekers. “WHEN the precipitancy of a man’s wishes hurries on his ideas ninety times faster
than the vehicle he rides in—woe be to truth!” (TS 621.22; 586.10).
This approach by way of disclosure is as visible in the homilies as it is in the fiction. While
Sterne’s message is orthodox and not uncommon it is also fresh and poignant. He consistently
challenges us to assess our prepossessions and devotional integrity. He carefully engages the
congregation by anticipating its rational or familiar views concerning his focus: “to know one’s self,
one would think could be no very difficult lesson” (S 31.12), “it seems strange at first s ig h t. . . .
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Would not one have imagined” (S 114.10, 18). This sense of our inability initially to judge well is 
carried through the sermons, often as an aside or implied reminder that reflections provoked by the 
text, though familiar, may still be valuable to those needing to o f be wakened out of dogmatic or 
undogmatic slumbers.
As we are comically surprised at the antics in Shandy Hall and en route in France, in the
sermons Steme frequently uses a fictitious onlooker to express the inconsistencies o f reality and our
expectations: “an unexperienced man, who only trusted his ears, would imagine” (S 110.29; 286.23;
etc.); “a stranger,—when he heard— . . .  would conclude” (S 307.27,31; 420.28-31); “a speculative
man would expect” (S 121.14). With these utterances, Steme reveals the foundation of a world that
does not act according to Taws’ fabricated to explain it. This established, he has the necessary
ammunition to combat a hasty, comfortable, or superficial reading of our conditions and ourselves.
That he roots this perspective in scripture is of considerable importance.
Critics unaware of this heritage laboriously repeat the misunderstandings that Sterne’s
‘turning on his text’ is ihandean frolic, that his sermons offer quaint recommendations. Ross can
stand for them all; he begins by damning the first sermon with faint praise and continues:
by contrast with the extreme conventionality of this [first] sermon, the second, ‘The 
House of Feasting and the House of Mourning Described’, opens with strikingly
audacious wit The apparent denial of Holy Writ is powerful, even shocking. It is
hard to believe that this sermon could have been preached for Sutton or Stillington; 
indeed, the continuation. . .  suggests a very broad-minded audience indeed.
. . .  comparative audacity certainly enlivens a number of Sterne’s sermons.
One needn’t really be broad-minded, familiarity with pulpit discourse would be sufficient. This may
be audacious wit, but it is as conventional as the Lord’s Prayer. The following four examples from a
Dean of St. Patrick’s, an Archbishop of York, and a Bishop of Norwich should suffice to steer our
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appreciations. The biblical text discussed is printed in italics, and the preacher’s opening remarks
upon them given below:
And there sat in a Window a certain young Man named Eutychus, being fallen into 
a deep Sleep; and while Paul was long preaching, he sunk down with Sleep, and fell 
down from the third Loft, and was taken up dead. {Acts xx.9}
I HAVE chosen these Words with Design, if possible, to disturb some Part in this 
Audience of half an Hour’s Sleep, for the Convenience and Exercise whereof this 
Place, at this Season of the Day, is very much celebrated.63
Take therefore no thought fo r  the morrow; fo r  the morrow shall take thought for the 
things o f  itself: sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof {Matt, vi.34}
WHAT? Take no thought, no thought at all for the morrow? Attend only to the day 
that is passing over us, and make no provision for the future? Are we not to look 
forward; to suppose a continuation of life, and a want of the means which are 
necessary to support it? Should we sit still, with our arms folded, and expect that 
Providence will supply us with those means, without using our own endeavours?
Then said Jesus unto his disciples, I f  any man will come after me, let him DENY 
HIMSELF. {Matt, xvi.24}
A hard saying; who can bear it? Has God then implanted appetites and affections in 
me, only that I may be at the trouble of crossing and mortifying them? Has he spread 
pleasures and delights before me, for no other end than that I may act the self­
tormentor all my days, by abstaining from them? It is a conduct unreasonable in 
itself, and dishonorable to his nature. It cannot be. I will go back and and walk no 
more with the author of such a religion as this.64
In the middle of his sermon on Philippians iv.6, [Be careful fo r  nothing; but in every thing, by
Prayer and Supplication, with Thanksgiving, let your Requests be made known unto God],
Archbishop John Sharp exclaims: “be careful for nothing, saith the Apostle: Take no Thought fo r
your Lives, saith our Saviour. What! no Care? no Thought? That, I have already told you, is idle
and extravagant.”65
Sterne’s periodic use of beginnings that surprise is also, of course, a call to question our 
prepossessions against the background of scripture and the authority o f our own contemplated
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experience. We remember this from the sermon in Tristram Shandy. “TRUST!—Trust we have a 
good Conscience!— Surely, you will say . . (S 255.24). Sermon 2 has “It is better to go to the 
house o f mourning, than to the house o f  feasting.—” as text, which Steme follows with “THAT I 
deny— but let us hear the wise man’s reasoning upon it—” (S 12.5). After another heading from 
Ecclesiastes for ‘Time and Chance’(#8), he begins “WHEN a man casts a look upon this melancholy 
description of the world, and sees contrary to all his guesses and expectations, what different fates 
attend the lives of men . . .  —he is apt to conclude . . . ” (S  74.8). Regarding Hezekiah’s hospitality 
in #17: “— AND where is the harm, you’ll say, in all this?” (S 157.9)
The introduction to sermon 18 “The Levite and his Concubine” is not only awakening, it is 
highly instructive. The text is provocative: “And it came to pass in those days, when there was no 
king in Israel, that there was a certain Levite sojourning on the side o f  Mount Ephraim, who took 
unto him a concubine.—” Steme begins by echoing the congregation: “— A  CONCUBINE!” then
relieves them with “—  but the text accounts for it” then, within the same breath, he anticipates their 
second response, “the Levite, you will say . . .  did what was right in his own eyes, — and so, you 
may add, did his concubine too — .” Anticipating self-righteous judgement of her, the preacher 
reminds us of what actually happened. Like us he imagines the Levite’s response to her exit, but 
then quickly corrects himself: “the text gives a different picture of his situation.” Within a few lines 
we are presented with a socially objectionable situation in scripture, and have two presuppositions 
challenged accordingly by a parson who is willing to submit his own imagination to the bar of his 
text. Steme is far from humoring his congregation, he is anxious to present it with any available 
clues leading away from the deceptive serenity of independent speculation and inherited bias to the
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darker complexity of pragmatic faith. In one of his rare forays away from contemporary 
latitudinarian exegesis we realize he is in earnest. That Christ brought not peace but a sword, Steme 
suggests,
may be understood,—as a beautiful description of the inward contests and 
opposition which Christianity would occasion in the heart of man,— from its 
oppositions to the violent passions of our nature,—which would engage us in a 
perpetual warfare dividing a man against himself’ (S 387.8).
He realizes this signifies a battle of the soul in hibernation, the preference for prepossession over
thoughtful engagement.66
For Steme, as for Locke and all in the broad sceptical tradition, the deception inherent in our
use of words and in the association of ideas is the implied impression that one is accurately
experiencing a ‘something,’ when one is merely possessed of opinions based on subjective
perception. We become enthused by our opinions and they then further complicate our faculties.
Enthusiasm, writes Locke, “laying by Reason would set up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect
it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the room of it, the unguarded fancies
of a Man’s own Brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct.” There is
an important historical connection between ‘enthusiasm’ and monaxial interest that immediately
illustrates an element of Sterne’s characterizations. Henry More in Enthusiasmus Triumphatus
[1656] reiterates that an enthusiast may be entirely lucid on all points except that with which he is
enthused:
THAT which is most observable & most usefull for the present matter in hand is,
That notwithstanding there is such an enormous lapse of the Phancy and Judgement 
in some one thing, yet the party should be of a sound mind in all other, according to 
his naturall capacities and abilities.. . .
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Amongst whom I do not deny but there may be some who for the main practical 
light of Christianity might have their judgments as consistent, as those 
Melancholists above named had in the ordinary prudential affairs o f the world: But 
as for this one particular of being supematurally inspired, of being the last Prophet, 
the last Trumpet. . . and the like, this certainly in them is as true, but farre worse, 
dotage, then to fancy a mans self either a Cock or Bull, when it is plain to the senses 
of all that he is a Man.6*
Granted the Shandy men do not fancy themselves to be such instrumental beasts, but their
lives and opinions make for an exquisite parable of enthusiasm. Even, Steme suggests, an
awareness of subtle self-established deviances will not prevent repetition of past mistakes.
Following the gist of John de la Casse’s warning: first thought = evil thought, Walter is
sufficiently wise to acknowledge that the prejudices of education “which we suck in with our
mother’s milk—are the devil and air (TS 448.7). He gamely proceeds to attempt an alternative
system for his son that, naturally, is doomed. Like clocks and other mechanisms fabricated to
interpret life, the Tristra-paedia, trying to anticipate what is already being experienced, cannot keep
time with the inevitable. The tragedy of this is not that the endeavour or its fruit is useless, but that
its lucubrations abandon the essence of what it was vital to preserve. “—Certainly it was ordained
as a scourge upon the pride of human wisdom, That the wisest of us all, should thus outwit
ourselves, and eternally forego our purposes in the intemperate act o f pursuing them” (TS 448.26).
We may recall one of the earliest ‘explanations’ Steme gave o f his design in a draft of TS to his
prospective publisher Robert Dodsley:
the Plan, as you will perceive, is a most extensive one,—taking in, not only, the 
Weak part of the Sciences, in wch the true point o f Ridicule lies—but every Thing 
else, which I find Laugh-at-able in my way— 69
Science’s weak part is the attempt to fix life in what is bound to be an inappropriate 
fashion. For Steme, quacks and critics—the Scribes and Pharisees of arts and science—are more 
than targets for ridicule, they are walking parables. His criticism of them is the root o f what 
Wilfred Watson calls ‘Sterne’s satire on mechanism;’70 a satire that emanates from and parallels 
his scorn of religious pride. Steme is not mocking attempts at clarification, or imagining some 
pre-edenic lack of curiosity; he sallies forth against the proud who refuse to see things in any 
light but their own. Madness in the great needs a few observers, and the symmetry o f these 
systematick reasoners, as that of polemical divines (TS 462.13-464.28), is suspect for failing to 
incorporate nature’s inconsistencies. More than this, the quest, for Walter and his ilk, is 
something other than humble searching, it has inappropriately become a line o f argument, o f 
gravitation:
like all systematick reasoners, he would move both heaven and earth, and twist 
and torture every thing in nature to support his hypothesis. In a word, I repeat it 
over again;—he was serious. (TS 61.15)
With comments like this, Steme has Tristram expose a fundamental flaw in all attempts to solve
the mysteries and riddles of our existence.
That men particularly subject to their own prepossessions (or men subject to those men)
would miserably overreach their capacities is a foregone conclusion; and it is no small part o f the
ensuing complexities that persons thus enthusiastically bubbled are, at times and on certain topics,
wholly lucid and correct. Appreciating Sterne’s concentration on the apparent fluctuations of
Biblical personalities we recognize that what seem to be outrageous inconsistencies in Sterne’s
main characters are in fact the various phases of focused passion, working itself out in the frames of
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changing bodies as fluctuating circumstances are encountered. Confusion is not original with 
creation, it festers in synthetic opinions and immature associations and will scarcely be undeceived 
by tangible proof. “Mow DieuF exclaims the Count at Versailles, “ Vous etes Yoriclc” (A S J 113.6).
The learned do not concern themselves with facts, they reason (TS 305.26-306.5), so a true 
science is impossible. As with the hypothetical resurrection of the beggar Lazarus, the 
enlightenment of individuals and any BODY-CORPORATE does not depend upon visible evidence. 
Seeing, we fail to see. To prove “That poor Master Shandy ***” NOT “********* entirely” Toby 
suggests:
I would shew him publickly. . .  at the market cross.
— ’Twill have no effect, said my father. (TS 521.4-28)
Sadly, in this state, as happens during the muleteer’s story of the abbess, or the Strasbourg divines’
nasal argumentation, the further one goes in an attempt to communicate, the further one gets from
the point to be reconciled.
One is tempted, then, to echo Walter’s concerned words to Toby and conclude that our
“appetites are but diseases” (TS 424.20), and that these appetites, present in the homunculus,
sucked by the infant and nurtured by subsequent systems to be practiced upon subsequent
generations, are not entirely to be undone by better education:
— I tremble to think what a foundation had been laid for a thousand weaknesses 
both of body and mind, which no skill o f the physician or the philosopher could 
ever afterwards have set thoroughly to rights. (TS 3.26)
The most flourishing of those professions are quacks, their high-flying conclusions the inevitable
residue of misconceived ideas wrapped with insufficient maxims. They act and speak by rote or
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by fantastic inspirations; discoursing with them, their unsuspecting prey get nothing “beyond the
proposition, the reply, and rejoinder” too often manipulated to silence or, worse, conviction (TS
630.18-631.1). Certainly, “philosophy has a fine saying for every thing. —For Death it has an
entire set,” this, for Steme, is its poverty (TS 421.5). Great sayings are repeated ad nauseum as if the
words themselves were healing. The connoisseurs o f words, as of paint [“the whole set o f ’em are
so hung round and befetish’d with the bobs and trinkets of criticism” (TS 212.19)] are least likely to
appreciate the variety of creation: “their heads, Sir, are stuck so full of rules and compasses, and
have that eternal propensity to apply them upon all occasions” (TS 213.1). The critic, like an ill-
prepared scientist, follows a straight path, deviates neither to the left nor right and yet, with all his
auxiliaries, finds nothing of substance.
If conscience, reason and passion are consistently liable to deception, even one’s identity
is in jeopardy. Tristram is puzzled when asked who he is, and Yorick finds it easier to describe
almost anyone other than himself (TS 633.16; ASJ 112.3-5). Those like Walter who trust
misinformed systems have become dupes to their eloquence. As Cicero at the death o f his
daughter exchanged the voice o f nature for philosophical sayings, so Walter takes comfort in his
own eloquence at the death o f Bobby. What was one’s strength of perception freezes into
weakness with nothing accomplished:
My father was as proud o f his eloquence as MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO could 
be for his life . . .  it was indeed his strength—and his weakness too.—His 
strength—for he was by nature eloquent,—and his weakness—for he was hourly a 
dupe to it. (TS 4 19.17)
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No redemptive element can interrupt such a cycle as one indulgence is substituted for another.
The bulk of thought swells while the stock of learning withers, and the relicks o f  learning
become curiosities without effect (TS 408.1-10).
These bubbles are not easily burst, we are no longer ‘innocent.’ The good ship Shandy
floats like an ark on waters of God’s wrath:
unto the woman he said . . .  in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy 
desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. And unto Adam he 
said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the 
tree [of the knowledge of good and evil] . . . cursed is the ground for thy sake; in 
sorrow shall thou eat of it all the days of thy life; Thoms also and thistles shall it 
bring forth to thee . . .  In the sweat o f thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return 
unto the ground. (Gen. iii.16-19)
Loyal son of Adam, Walter “pick’d up an opinion, Sir, as a man in a state o f nature picks 
up an apple.—It becomes his own,—and if he is a man of spirit, he would lose his life rather than 
give it up—” (TS 262.20). The curse is earned: “the sweat of a man’s brows, and the exsudations of 
a man’s brains, are as much a man’s own property, as the breaches upon his backside” (TS 263.22). 
Breaches, we may remember, are another consequence of our primitive disobedience. As Tristram 
discovers with “noses,” the more one tries to clarify one’s situation with words, the more Babel is 
bound to be conjured. Those who, like Walter, would force every event into an hypothesis (7^ 
804.21) crucify truth. In response to Toby’s request to be told “what a polemic divine is,” Yorick 
produces “the best description... I have ever read,” which occurs in Rabelais’ Gargantua. An ounce 
of practical divinity, or a thrust of the bayonet, we see, is worth more than the best o f equestrian 
capers (TS 464). Such presentations have led readers of the novels to conclude that Steme endorses 
or sees no way out of this chaotic hopelessness:
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Sterne’s view, like Fielding’s, is that life is not going to change very much and that 
any attempt to transcend its imperfections and ambiguities, like Walter Shandy’s 
systems or the Man of the Hill’s delight in the nectar of infinity; is ridiculous.71
Sterne’s skepticism gives rise to a genuine relativism, to a conviction that absolutes 
are not only difficult to come by, but unnecessary-----
The world of Tristram Shandy is thus a determined world, and this is one reason 
why the novel contains so little true satire. . . .  in Tristram Shandy, a man is not 
damned for following his own lights; he has no other choice.
To challenge these assumptions we should recall the gist of Sterne’s sermons.
AIDS TO REFORMATION
Steme consistently reveals how self-love and specific interests taint judgments. Therefore, 
“there is nothing generally in which our happiness and honour are more nearly concerned, than in 
forming true notions both of men and things” (S 182.7) and “whatever our condition is, ’tis good to 
be acquainted with it in time, to be able to supply what is wanting” (S  132.22). According to Steme, 
the necessary disillusionment happens by a series of three helps. First is the importance of taking “a 
little time for reflection” (S 13.27; also e.g. 39.12; 183.24; 260.21) at the expense of one’s present 
happiness (S 13.31). The second help is another’s artful presentation of one’s situation that engages 
the unsuspicious mind and heart, leading one to conclusions otherwise obscured by prejudice. Such 
is the journey on which the prophet Nathan leads David.
Because both of these aids ultimately remain dependent on the individual’s perception, the 
third element of disillusionment is an appeal for direct divine support; David’s request of God to 
cleanse him from secret faults, for example (S 39.26; Psalms xix.12). Frequently Steme reminds us 
that personal reform is the responsibility of each individual. But he is careful we do not presume
155
reformation to be an exclusively human endeavour. The journey will inevitably be fruitless unless 
accompanied by the grace of Providence thwarting prepossessions, directing one in ways which 
would otherwise be impossible to discern. We now observe Sterne’s treatment o f these ways of 
regaining integrity.
He reminds us that the human quest to be reconciled with the troubles of this life has 
assumed such a focus that “the patient enduring of affliction has by degrees obtained the name of 
philosophy, and almost monopolized the word to itself, as if it was the chief end, or compendium of 
all the wisdom which philosophy had to offer” (S  143.28). But again, the problem of disengagement 
is encountered. No amount of eloquence will translate into valuable experience for one in torment: 
“what they said proceeded more from the head, than the heart, ’twas generally more calculated to 
silence a man in his troubles, than to convince, and teach him how to bear them” (S' 144.1).
In line with the gospel, Steme is fond of representing ways in which the wisdom of this 
world proves an untrustworthy guide. Even when borrowing from Edward Sti 11 ingfleet for sermon 
33, we can see how he consciously tempers explicitly positive references to human reason, by 
shifting the tenor of his source. He deepens Stillingfleet’s observations by altering the role of 
reason in revelation. Just before his borrowing Steme writes “if  the morals o f men are not 
reformed, it is not owing to a defect in the revelation [of Christianity], but ’tis owing to the same 
causes which defeated all the use and intent of reason,—before revelation was given” (S  314.14). 
Stillingfleet has:
Such is the fram e and condition of humane nature considered in it self, so great 
are the advantages of reason and consideration for the government of our 
actions, so much stronger are the natural motives to vertue than to vice, that they 
who look no farther, would expect to find the world much better than it is. For
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why should we suppose the generality o f mankind to betray so much folly, as to 
act unreasonably and against the common interest o f their own kind? as all 
those do, that yield to the temptations of sin, to sin is nothing else but to act 
foolishly and inconsiderately.73 [bold type mine]
Steme incidentally changes “such is the frame” to “whoever considers the state,” deletes “that
they who look no farther,” after “better than it is” adds “or ever has been,” and alters “sin” to
“what is wrong.” But the three deletions of references to the unreasonableness of sin are most
significant. He consciously disconnects Stillingfleet’s link of sin and virtue with reason. Steme
follows this with three lines o f verbatim borrowing: “but on the other side,— if men first look
into the practice of the world, and there observe the strange prevalency of vice, and how willing
men are to defend as well as to commit it . . ..” So far, except for the dash, this is verbatim
Stillingfleet; however when Stillingfleet continues, “. . . they would be apt to imagine that either
there is no such thing as Reason among men or that it hath very little influence upon their
actions” Steme again avoids the ‘reasonable’ passage and instead, to continue the same sentence,
skips the equivalent o f two folio pages to lift and rework part o f another sentence that becomes
“— one would think they believed that all discourses of virtue and honesty were mere matter of
speculation for men to entertain some idle hours with; and say truly, that men seemed universally
to be agreed in nothing but speaking well and doing ill” (S  314.24-31). Then, Steme picks up his
reason/revelation thread from 314.16 and inserts “—but this casts no more dishonour upon
reason than it does upon revelation;—the truth o f the case being this” before going back in
Stillingfleet to a section occurring even earlier than Sterne’s first borrowing: “that no motives
have been great enough to restrain those from sin who have secretly loved it” (S 315.1-3). The
value of reason is not being denied, but Steme implicitly questions its utility in unconvincing one
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who is passionately devoted to vice. A useful appeal is one that appropriately counters the 
problem. If one has been led into vice through passion and imagination, one will best be 
discouraged through the same avenues.
When Steme to conclude the sermon finally glances at a use o f “reason” in reformation, 
it is not, as in Stillingfleet, with surprise that it did not conquer one’s evil inclinations, but to 
remark that it is only “by reason, and the probability of things” that one may trust that 
Christianity has serviced the world with provocations to reform. This faith is justified, claims 
Steme, because Christianity “gives us the most engaging ideas of the perfections of God,— at the 
same time that it impresses the most awful ones of his majesty and power;—a Being rich in 
mercies, but if they are abused, terrible in his judgments;—one constantly about our secret paths, 
—about our beds;—who spieth out all our ways” (S  320.30). That is, he presents an immanent 
God o f a religion that engages and impresses, initially seeming to be more effective than 
reasonable. And so, because Steme is aware of the subtleties of temptations to vice and to virtue 
he says (as he does with similar words at 216.14 and 289.30) “if either the hopes or fears, the 
passions or reason of men are to be wrought upon at all, such principles must have an effect, 
though, I own, very far short of what a thinking man should expect from such motives.” (S 321.7) 
Steme fully endorsed the belief that ‘learned ignorance’ is the beginning of wisdom, which 
he filtered from the Bible, Erasmus, Montaigne, and—on his own turf—the Royal Society and 
Cambridge Platonists. One cannot help hearing echoes of More, Sprat, Glanvill and the host of 
reticent knowers in his canon:
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ONE of the first things to be done in order for the enlargement, and encrease of 
Knowledge, is to make Men sensible, how imperfect their Understandings are in the 
present state, and how lyable to deception. . . .
For all things are a great Darkness to us, and we are so to our selves: the plainest 
things are as obscure, as the most confessedly mysterious. . . .
And these prejudices, by custom and long aquaintance with our Souls, get a mighty 
interest, and shut them up against every thing that is different from these Immages o f  
Education,74
The “calamities and cross accidents” are so great, and the actual comforts of refined 
philosophy so little, that faithful stamina was found to be impossible “upon moral principles — 
which had no foundation to sustain this great weight, which the infirmities of our nature laid upon 
it” (S 143.21). The “infirmities o f our nature” demand that a consistent anchor of strength be found 
beyond our own contrivance.
Steme closes his second volume of sermons by readressing the central question with which 
he opened the first: the search for happiness. The way to contentment, he suggests, is not by riding 
the wheel of inappropriate hopes and subsequent frustrations, but to recognize with Job that ‘Sve are 
bom to trouble,” and that “in whatever state we are, we shall find a mixture of good and evil; and 
therefore the true way to contentment, is to know how to receive these certain vicissitudes of life” 
(S 148.19; Job v.7). Due to unfulfillable desires and unchecked imaginations people are perpetually 
vacillating and seem to have no inner consistency, when in fact they have traded a consistent spring 
of heaven for a ruling passion that feeds on arbitraiy desires. It is not by chance that events in the 
world seem to mirror our own inconsistencies. As we have invented a god that corresponds to our 
perceptions,
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God, for wise reasons, has made our affairs in this world, almost as fickle and 
capricious as ourselves. —  Pain and pleasure, like light and darkness, succeed each 
other; and he that knows how to accommodate himself to their periodical returns, 
and can wisely extract the good from the evil,—knows only how to live:—this is 
true contentment, at least all that is to be had of it in this world, and for this every 
man must be indebted not to his fortune but to himself. (S 149.4)
An important focus of the chaotic nature of Sterne’s fiction is this presentation of an
argument for the subtle providence of God that revolves around the lottery of chance. It is an old
fideistic commonplace and he consistently represents the belief that because the race is not to the
swift, nor riches to the wise, and because we cannot control the outcome of events, “there is some
other cause which mingles itself in human affairs, and governs and turns them as it pleases” (S
76.28) and that this is the Providence of God. Improbabilities inherent in our existence are placed
there and so ordered to testify to our dependence.
You must call in the deity to untye this knot,—for though at sundry times— sundry 
events fall out,—which we who look no further than the events themselves, call 
chance, because they fall out quite contrary both to our intentions and our hopes,—
. . .  are [however] pure designation, and though invisible, are still the regular 
dispensations of the superintending power of that Almighty being. (S 77.16)
He is not merely offering a dogmatic context for suffering; the understanding is resolved and the
mind satisfied by a sense that the Source of one’s being is active for one’s best interest. So Joseph is
able to say to his brothers, “ye verily thought evil against me,—but God meant it for good” (S 79.6;
Gen. 1.20). This view refuses to mask the reality of human suffering, and instead somewhat
accentuates the gulf between heaven and earth by acknowledging the fact o f wilful human evil.
Steme cushions the foregoing argument that chaos proves Providence, by saying “the
providence of God suffered every thing to take its course . . .  though it did not cross these events,—
yet providence bent them to the most merciful ends” (S 78.22-31). That God is present beneath the
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riddles and mysteries of life is the support of Sterne’s confidence to represent the “natural and 
moral vanity of man” (S 94.29) and the harsh realities of life that would otherwise be intolerable.
Steme drew confidence from a spiritual integrity discerned in the mayhem of creation, 
integrity he ascribed to the providential hand of God. This is o f more than occupational 
significance. Certainly he inherited from birth and education a facility and understanding of 
latitudinarian principles, but his presentation of the content of those doctrines is clearly sincere so 
we should challenge the facile assumption that fideistic confidence is incompatible with the author 
of Tristram Shandy. In fact, the carefree elements we associate with ihandyism are in large 
measure made possible by Sterne’s faith. Such jocularity is otherwise entirely inconsistent with his 
poignantly reiterated perspective on the enigmas and troubles o f this life. His sermons fully 
incorporate the Christian elements of fall and redemption. The themes he revisits and the way in 
which he presents them clarify the concerns uppermost in Sterne’s communication.
The morals of Job and Ecclesiastes, which Steme was fond of rehearsing, were literally 
close to his heart. He did not learn that life is a parade of vanity, subject to unearned catastrophe, 
from books. Probably the most lasting lesson he carried away from Cambridge was the practical 
knowledge that he could bleed a bed full, that the world is fleeting and his temporal existence 
bound to it. From this he developed understandings that life is too short to be long about its forms, 
and, that to be sustained, happiness needs an eternal focus. These are the catalysts to what he calls 
Shandyism. Occurrences in “this scurvy and disasterous world of ours” on “this vile, dirty planet of 
ours” (TS 8.4,9) are rightly enveloped in clouds and thick darkness (TS 147.14, 225.14; cf. Ex. 
xiv.20, xix.9), but may become beacons to a universe of abiding joy.
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This is the ultimate in wish-fulfillment, as New is fond of proclaiming, but what else are we
to expect eternal truth to be? The paradoxical nature of Christian faith, Steme believed, is the
reasonable key to our riddles, emancipation from the horror of opinionated self-sufficiency. Welling
up from this realization is laughter. Not sophisticated snickering or stoic composure but a good
hearty chuckle at our tendency to strain gnats while swallowing camels —the same beasts we
would drive through needles’ heads. Seeking to grasp a universe we outwit ourselves in small-
minded enterprises. Our critiques of his endeavours, Steme knew, would not reveal him, but our
own folly in trying: “his final joke is again and again that he is not joking.”76 Steme does not ‘agree
with’ the sentiments o f Ecclesiastes or plagiarize faithful sceptics, he is possessed o f the very same
spirit. Not entertainment by a jesting priest, but ejaculations of a grinning prophet, £handyism is a
theological perspective that accounts for our limitations and encourages our potential with an
uncritical spirit of good cheer. This divine gift o f freedom from the shallows of humanistic
skepticism and religious enthusiasm forms a bridge between his sermons and fiction. To our peril
we ignore the pontifical supports girding Tristram and the Journey.
A thoughtful acceptance, if not a festive participation, in life-as-it-is is a vital element of
ihandyism. One of the most important clues to Sterne’s art, and a considerable contribution to the
moral element of his work, is the sustained recognition that we appreciate the pleasures o f this life
best when they are snatched from us. That the quest for happiness inevitably involves the vale of
sorrow is the root of Sterne’s sermons as it is of his fiction. In the latter we sense it fittingly encased
in palatable vignettes and phrases. Tristram recalls Montaigne as having said^
the world enjoys other pleasures . . .  as they do that of sleep, without tasting or 
feeling it as it slips and passes by—We should study and ruminate upon it in order
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to render proper thanks to him who grants it to us—for this end I cause myself to be
disturbed in my sleep, that I may better and more sensibly relish it. (TS 347.10)
This is more than another plea for digressional integrity. It is the essence o f Sterne’s work that he 
attempts to bridge the gap between unconsidered experience and contemplative fantasy. It is the 
interruption, digression, and surprise that brings with it hope for a sensible assessment o f who 
and where one is. And it is, of course, those very surprises that render his works so life-like. 
Calculating that he lives 364 times faster than he writes (TS 342), Tristram discovers 
considerable autobiographical reflection, even with the best of intentions, to be an impossible 
task.
Thus it is the preacher’s vocation to assist those, like him, struggling to discern their way in 
life. So we should not be surprised to see Steme developing a gallery from which we may gain 
perspective sufficiently removed from our prepossessions to offer a glimpse of who we are. If we 
“consider man, as fashioned by his maker—innocent and upright—full of the tenderest dispositions 
—with a heart inclining him to kindness, and the love and protection of his species’’ we must also 
balance the account by considering him “—not as he was made —  but as he is — a creature by the 
violence and irregularity of his passions capable of being perverted from all these friendly and 
benevolent propensities” (S 84.2-12). By the time we open Volume ii of the sermons, we have had 
numerous overviews of our tendency to deceive ourselves regarding our characters, our 
expectations, the insufficiency of our enjoyments to procure happiness, the treachery of men to one 
another, and the susceptibility of the world (for lower intents and purposes) to the apparent mayhem 
of time and chance. Thus it is fitting that concluding his first sermon on Job Steme remarks :
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but some one will say, Why are we thus to be put out of love with human life? To 
what purpose is it to expose the dark sides of it to us, or enlarge upon the infirmities 
which are natural, and consequently out of our power to redress?
I answer, that the subject is nevertheless of great importance, since it is necessary 
every creature should understand his present state and condition, to put him in mind 
of behaving suitably to it. (S 101.21)
With sentiments such as this, Steme begins to advocate reform.
He repeatedly highlights the need for intervals of self-examination by introducing scriptural
tags and awakening phrases that seem initially pessimistic: “it is better to go to the house of
mourning,” “trust we have a good conscience!,” “I returned and saw under the sun that the race is
not to the swift,” and so on. With these we are introduced to patterns of discovery revealing the
need to reassess prepossessions in order to achieve a wider perspective. In a quotation of
unidentified origin, Steme acknowledges the paradox that, although man has the unique and God-
given capacity inwardly to reflect, he is “ ‘generally so inattentive, but always so partial an observer
of what passes, that he is as much, nay often, a much greater stranger to his own disposition and
true character than all the world besides’ ” (S 31.30). To remedy this Steme suggests we converse
more and oftener with ourselves, than the business and diversions of the world 
generally give us leave.
We have a chain of thoughts, desires, engagements and idlenesses, which 
perpetually return upon us in their proper time and order,—let us, I beseech you, 
assign and set apart some small portion of the day for this purpose—of retiring into 
ourselves, and searching into the dark comers and recesses of the heart, and taking 
notice of what is passing there. (S 39.7)
It would be a mistake to write off these exhortations as dutiful repetitions of disciplinary 
thoughts expected at Lent or Communion services. Half the sermons chosen for Volume i are 
specifically Lenten, the others not frivolous, and it is difficult to find a sermon in those following 
that does not at least implicitly call for hearty self-examination. If one is significantly ruled by a
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“grand bias,” it behooves one to know what it is, and to strive to entertain it accordingly. Because
time is fleeting, reflection must be embraced as a discipline if it is ever to be practiced. The stages
of life as recounted in ‘Job’s Account . . .’ are presented specifically to remind us of this duty,
because life “generally runs on in such a manner, as scarce to allow time to make reflections which
way it has gone” (S 97.5).
Does not the consideration of the shortness of our life, convince us of the wisdom of 
dedicating so small a portion to the great purposes of eternity? (S 102.1)
It is worth remarking that the lesson Steme leads us to take from his survey of the justice of
Job’s pronouncement is, as in so many of his sermons, that reflection on the numerous tribulations
in our short span of life should incline us to “turn our eyes and affections from so gloomy a
prospect, and fix them upon that happier country” (S 102.8). He is adamant that true happiness is
not of this world. Critics lacking an appreciation for Sterne’s anchoring of misery in strictly human
attempts at transcendence have concluded “from the lamentations of Job, Steme extracted scriptural
support for his premise that man is beholden to ‘contingency’ for much of his success and failure,
77 • •joy and grief.” Sterne’s view is the very opposite. Job and Ecclesiastes resonate with
recommendations to faith , an act of the will that recognizes ‘contingencies’ to be enveloped by the
mystery of God’s presence and ‘future’ blessings. We are reminded that if one would escape being
bound to the fluctuating wheel one had best reassess one’s opinions concerning the nature of
success and failure, joy and grief.
—There is a giddy, thoughtless, intemperate spirit gone forth into the world, which 
possesses the generality of mankind,—and the reason the world is undone, is, 
because the world does not consider,— considers neither aweful regard to God,—or 
the true relation themselves bear to him. (S 132.10)
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So, there can be a mercy in the loss of earthly supports. Job is able to acquaint himself with 
God when his friends prove faithless. “Nothing so powerfully calls home the mind as distress” (S 
188.4); the prodigal begins his journey home: “his first hour of distress, seem’d to be his first hour 
of wisdom” (S 188.24). When his concubine runs off, the Levite is afforded a “blessed interval for 
meditation upon the fickleness and vanity of this world and it’s [sic] pleasures!” (S 167.17) The 
same interval is offered by God to self-satisfied nations who have forgotten the source o f their 
prosperity: “a long and undisturbed possession of their liberties, might blunt the sense of those
751providences o f God, which had procured them” ( S 196.1). Therefore,
whether it was to correct an undue sense of former blessings,—or to teach us to 
reflect upon the number and value of them, by threatening us with the deprivation of 
them,— we were suffered, however, to approach the edge of a precipice, where, if 
God had not raised up a deliverer to lead us back—all had been lost. (S 202.8)
Clearly Sterne’s commendations of contemplative self-awareness and active reform should
not be understood as moralistic advice for a ‘good life’ apart from God. The enjoyment of created
things is encouraged only in the context of their ability to reflect or renew heavenly enjoyment.
When Steme says that “to judge rightly of our own worth, we should retire a little from the world,
to see all its pleasures—and pains too, in their proper size and dimensions” (S 183.24), he is not
claiming that the prospect is dark and hopeless. We may be surprised to find, he never tires o f
hinting, that deeper than the passions which disorient us on to unrequited tracks, there is potential to
redeem the ‘upright’ nature of our heart and judgment (e.g. S  183.3). It is not, of course, the
distractions that are at fault. “The truth is, they are often too dangerous a blessing for God to trust us
with, or we to manage” (S 221.1). The rich man is “the more empty for being full” (S 221.12), “had
he fared less sumptuously, —he might have had more cool hours for reflection” (S 220.2); so he is
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distracted from seeing the plight of Lazarus at his gate, and from seeing the state of his own soul.
This mania for temporalities Steme calls a “universal ruling principle, and almost invincible
attachment, to the interests and glories of the world.” With no uncertain terms he claims
there is no one point of wisdom, that is of nearer importance to us,—than to purify 
this gross appetite, and restrain it within bounds, by lowering our high conceit of the 
things o f this life, and our concern for those advantages which misled the Jews.—To 
judge justly of the world,—we must stand at a due distance from it. (S 343.14-23)
In spite of the attainment of enjoyments, happiness remains elusive. We are tormented not
by things but by the images we have created surrounding them. (S 236.25):
And in truth there is nothing so common in life, as to see thousands, whom you 
would say, had all the reason in the world to be at rest, so tom up and disquieted 
with sorrows of this class, and so incessantly tortured with the disappointments 
which their pride and passions have created for them, that tho’ they appear to have 
all the ingredients of happiness in their hands,—they can neither compound or use 
them.
Our sorrow at the loss of these things is as inordinate as our joy in having them:
If there is an evil in this world, ’tis sorrow and heaviness of heart.— The loss of 
goods,—of health,—of coronets and mitres, are only evil as they occasion 
sorrow;—take that out—the rest is fancy, and dwelleth only in the head of man.
(£212.30)
Eventually we understand that by ‘appropriate reflection’ Steme means sincere, reasonable 
inner searching before the tribunal of heaven. Initially, but not ultimately, this quest may be 
unpleasant, the beginning of accurate communication. To this end he recommends we adopt simple 
disciplines to keep ourselves in perspective. These seeds lodged within the heart of each person 
suggest that regardless o f the many instances of brutality (e.g. Herod), the humanity of compassion 
is “still so great and noble a part of our nature, that a man must do great violence to himself, and 
suffer many a painful conflict, before he has brought himself to a different disposition” (S  29.10).
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Sterne’s hope in human beings is founded on this secret spring, not on the image o f an 
‘enlightened’ humanism. Without God, even the moral man is presented as an object o f pity, 
desperately trying to accomplish nobility with insufficient faculties.
All is not lost, in ‘Vindication o f Human Nature’, Steme uses James Foster to remind us 
that the image of God within which we have been created, though obscured, remains. Though the 
body cannot help resonating with the virtues (or vices) of the soul, this image is not primarily “in 
the sensitive and corporeal part” (£ 66.16). Experiences of moral rectitude correspond with the body 
of another and tend to appropriate appreciation of the spiritual element supporting them. It is 
necessary to understand this complementary sympathy of spirit, mind, and body if one would 
engage others in spiritual conversation. Its effects may most readily be seen in commonplace 
instances where a physical gesture is laden with symbolic meaning. Though we are frequently 
deceived by appearances, we rely upon action to articulate inner dispositions. Joseph’s brothers, 
after artfully imposing upon their father, and probably upon their own consciences, were 
undeceived by their brother’s later act of charity and forgiveness. This act, though beyond their 
capacity, was understandable in the sense that it was deeply affecting, and the result is a clear sense 
of grace which words could not have communicated:
joy is not methodical . . .—words are too cold; and a conciliated heart replies by
tokens of esteem___
When the affections so kindly break loose, Joy, is another name for Religion.
(£190.21-29)
Ritual, such as that expressed by the peasant family in the part of Yorick’s journey where 
the above words are repeated, is vital to maintaining a sound constitution. We are advised that the 
day should be opened and closed with prayer: “a frequent correspondence with heaven by prayer
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and devotion, is the greatest nourishment and support of spiritual life:— it keeps the sense of a God 
warm and lively within us,—which secures our disposition” (S 401.31). Good and pious 
recommendations, but to what extent are most persons willing or able to abide them in that form? 
As we recall from ‘The Abuses of Conscience considered’, without careful observances, our inner 
guide of conscience becomes “safely entrench’d behind the letter of the law, sits there invulnerable, 
fortified with cases and reports so strongly on all sides,—that ’tis not preaching can dispossess it o f 
its hold” (S 259.23). If we are to penetrate the preaching Steme embraced we need to come to terms 
with that quotation lodged in the sermon Trim read out. Steme shows a healthy regard for the limits 
of didactic communication. Recall his derogatory use of the word ‘preaching’ in Paris, and his 
request to be excused from the anticipated half hour of preaching at the Foundling Hospital by 
writing
I never could preach so long without fatiguing both myself and my flock to death— 
but I will give you a short sermon, and flap  you in my turn:—preaching (you must 
know) is a theologic flap upon the heart, as the dunning for a promise is a political 
flap upon the memory:—both the one and the other is useless where men have wit
70enough to be honest.
Steme was confident that most men, though lacking stimuli to exercise it, have the potential to 
sustain wit enough to be honest. If they could be approached with parables, as David was by 
Nathan, and observe their image as in a glass, the majority could be trusted to arrive at appropriate 
conclusions. As Spellman writes, “latitudinarian Christian discipleship operated on the unshakable
OA
premise that appeals to reason alone would fail to inspire most men to obey God’s law for them.” 
Swift, in classic form, is even more succinct: “reasoning will never make a man correct an ill
oi
opinion, which by reasoning he never acquired.”
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ARTFUL PRESENTATION
What Steme composed to flap the eventually charitable congregation, one year after
publishing his first volumes of sermons, is intriguing. If the political theme of numbers 32,40, and
45 is excluded, one is hard pressed to find among “the sweepings o f the Author’s study” (5 255.15)
a theme publicly important to Steme not presented in ‘The Rich Man and Lazarus’. It is a sort of
‘greatest hits,’ having verbatim parallels to passages in nine of the posthumously published
sermons. We are presented with a quilt o f themes: remember former languishings; fortune’s wheel;
our brief existence; the ultimate justification of God and his beneficent presence. Again we are told
Christianity is surprisingly poorly represented as it asks only that one forfeit what one is better off
without; ‘morality’ seems to be more a matter of idle speculation than serious intent; even the most
insensible person feels the joy inherent in moral activity. The bed upon which Steme lays this quilt
is the understanding that both reason and passion are affected by considerations that awaken, and
that the enjoyment of any heavenly or earthly good requires some qualification in the faculty o f its
recipient. What we sense most strongly in this sermon, preached when the ideas of the early
volumes of Tristram were fresh, is a lucid presentation o f Sterne’s impressions of communication:
mankind are not always in a humour to be convinced,—and so long as the pre­
engagement with our passions subsists, it is not argumentation which can do the 
business;—we may amuse ourselves with the ceremony of the operation, but we 
reason not with the proper faculty, when we see every thing in the shape and 
colouring, in which the treachery of the senses paint it. (5216.21)
In this sermon Steme has us imagine God sending back to life a dead man, to “call home 
our conscience” (5 214.29). The resurrected one will appeal to interest, the channel to our heart’s 
attention, “but what? with all the eloquence of an inspired tongue, What could he add or say to
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us, which has not been said before?” (S 216.13). If one would lead another to a conviction of divine 
truths, the best way is not by sensational trickery or repetition of texts, but by an appeal to the heart. 
Vicesimus Knox, who so admired Sterne’s agility with scripture, wrote: “I never yet saw any 
external evidence of [evangelical history] which might not admit of controversy; but the internal 
proofs have a counterpart in every man’s bosom, who will faithfully search for it, which gives it 
incontestable confirmation.” Passion and reason are appropriately tutored by meaningful 
experience of internal proofs. The right use o f riches, for example, “may as well be known from an 
appeal to your own hearts, and the inscription you shall read there,—as from any chapter and verse I 
might cite upon the subject” (S 221.30). It is the experience o f moral delight in a human action that 
best recommends it:
in a word, a man’s mind must be like your proposition before it can be relished; and 
’tis the resemblance between them, which brings over his judgment, and makes him 
an evidence on your side. (S 222.26)
How then does Steme presume to make hoary theological reasoning experiential? He readily admits
that what he says is neither original or unique; “the reader, upon old and beaten subjects, must not
look for many new thoughts,— ’tis well if he has new language.” (S  2.5)
There can be little left to be said upon the subject o f  Charity, which has not been 
often thought, and much better expressed by many who have gone before: and 
indeed, it seems so beaten and common a path, that it is not an easy matter fo r  a 
new comer to distinguish himself in it, by any thing except the novelty o f  his 
Vehicle. (S40.20)83
However, the novelty o f Sterne’s vehicle should not go unnoticed. We have recalled his 
alleged note on the manuscript of sermon 44* “I have borrowed most of the reflections upon the 
characters from Wollaston or at least have enlarged from his hints, though the sermon is truly mine,
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such as it is.” It is of singular importance to appreciate Sterne’s genius in the preparation of 
sermons evoking reflections upon characters. Despite the popularity of attempts to develop the
QC
personalities and psychologies of biblical personae in Sterne’s (and any) day, the
preponderance of his sermons in which this is the central medium is remarkable. No other table
of contents sports such titles: ‘The Character of Herod’; ‘The Character o f Shimei’; ‘Felix’s
behavior towards Paul examined’; ‘St. Peter’s character’. For this reason it is interesting that
while Joseph Hall is prominent amongst ‘sources’ in the lifetime volumes, as far as I can tell he
is verbally absent from the posthumous.
Sterne’s consistent plumbing of psychological profiles and characterizations is
extraordinary, but the intimate manner in which he skilfully lays open the windings o f the human
heart for his congregation should not be mistaken for a repressed literary urge. He was in fact,
masterfully accomplishing what most of his peers could only admire. “Study above all things,”
wrote Hugh Blair in his discourse ‘Eloquence in the Pulpit’,
to render your instructions interesting to the hearers. This is the great trial and mark 
of true genius for the eloquence of the pulpit. . . . The great secret lies in bringing 
home all that is spoken to the hearts of the hearers, so as to make every man think 
that the preacher is addressing him in particular.. . .
Whenever you bring forth what a man feels to touch his own character, or to suit his 
own circumstances, you are sure of interesting him. No study is more necessary for 
this purpose, than the study of human life, and the human heart. To be able to unfold 
the heart, and to discover a man to himself, in a light in which he never saw his own 
character before, produces a wonderful effect. . . . Perhaps the most beautiful, and 
among the most useful sermons of any, though, indeed, the most difficult in 
composition, are such as are wholly characteristical, or founded on the illustration of 
some particular characters, or remarkable piece of history, in the sacred writings; by 
perusing which, one can trace, and lay open, some of the most secret windings of 
man’s heart. Other topics of preaching have been much beaten; but this is a field, 
which, wide in itself, has hitherto been little explored by the composers of sermons, 
and posesses all the advantages of being curious, new, and highly useful. BishopA
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Butler’s sermon on the Character o f  Balaam, will give an idea of that sort of 
preaching which I have in my eye.
If we understand Blair’s contention that good characteristical sermons are particularly
appropriate, difficult to compose, and rare, we should appreciate Sterne’s interest and genius. It is
important also to note that, as scripture does not mask the defects of its heroes, neither should its
preachers. The first paragraph of Thomas Seeker’s sermon on David and Nathan is:
In Holy scripture, not only the great and good notions of pious persons are written 
fo r our learning, that we may admire, and, as far as we are concerned, imitate them; 
but their chief transgressions also are recorded, for a caution to be on our guard, and 
a direction, if, like them, we have done amiss, like them, to repent and reform. 
Amongst all the instances of this kind, there is none more fruitful of instruction than 
that well-known history of David being seduced from a religious course o f life to 
most dreadful wickedness, and continuing regardless of his guilt till the prophet 
Nathan at length having awakened him to a sense of it, by a home application of the 
parallel case of a poor man and the ewe lamb, brought him to confession, and
•  07administered to him the comfort expressed in the text.
Clearly, what Seeker refers to as “home application” is desirable in preaching and we should 
examine the use Sterne makes of this particular incident in Scripture to that end, by which he deftly 
ties together a number of themes prominent throughout his canon: self-deceit, the value of 
plumbing the inconsistencies of characters, and the value of parables to excite reform.
The importance of the David and Nathan story for Steme is highlighted by its placement 
between the two charity sermons of Volume i. The favored themes of human inconsistency and the 
nature of our dispositions are continued, and the problem of knowing one’s self is again presented. 
To begin, Steme notes “THERE is no historical passage in scripture, which gives a more remarkable 
instance of the deceitfulness of the heart o f man to itself, and of how little we truly know of 
ourselves, than this, wherein David is convicted out of his own mouth” (S 31.5). To emphasize the
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conviction, the common-sense position to the contrary, that we do know our true springs and
motives, is stated in words echoing the ‘Abuses’ sermon. The claim is addressed on terms of
experience, and Steme moves swiftly on to claim that
we are deceived in judging of ourselves, just as we are in judging of other things, 
when our passions and inclinations are called in as counsellors, and we suffer 
ourselves to see and reason just so far and no farther than they give us leave. How 
hard do we find it to pass an equitable and sound judgment in a matter where our 
interest is deeply concerned? (S 32.9)
Knowledge o f one’s self, he proceeds to explain, “was a point always much easier recommended by
public instructors than shewn how to be put in practice” (S 33.17). The observation is made that
self-love guards the direct path to disillusionment and reformation, hence “a different and more
artful course was requisite” to “remove this flattering passion,” “stratagem” and “skilful address”
are called in,
if possible, to deceive it. This gave rise to the early manner of conveying their 
instructions in parables, fables, and such sort of indirect applications, which, tho’ 
they could not conquer this principle of self-love, yet often laid it asleep, or at least 
over-reached it for a few moments, till a just judgment could be procured.
(S 33.22-30)
The parable or fable by indirection succeeds where blatant advice or censure will not. A
mirror is held up and the viewer’s eyes are oriented in such a way that the image may clearly be
seen. William Spellman writes “in a manuscript fragment of 1693, Locke wrote that men must be
made alive to virtue, must be made to ‘tast’ it” [Locke continues:]
to do this one must consider what is each man’s particular disease, what is the 
pleasure that possesses him. Over that general discourses will never get mastery. But 
by all the prevalencys of friendship all the arts o f persuasion he is to be brought to
oo
live the contrary course.
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In Sterne’s words the voluptuous epicure, for example, must be made to ‘"take in your discourse 
greedily” or else “however glorious and exalted, [it] will pass like the songs of melody over an ear 
incapable of discerning the distinction of sounds” (S 279.21, .27-9). His excursions, like those of 
most preachers, always lead back to self-consideration within the developed context. The value of 
“indirect applications” is in providing an opportunity to experience, as nearly as possible without 
unnecessary offence, that which would otherwise remain theory, of little value for developing 
practical awareness. Steme distinguishes between the useful encouragements of a skilful address, 
and the artifice of a deceptive oration. At the core of this distinction is an understanding between 
the correspondents. Like Job, we are led through the valley of the shadow with hope for eventual 
benefit from a qualitative advance in communicating with heaven and ourselves: “I have heard of 
thee by the hearing of the ear: but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in 
dust and ashes” (Job xlii.5-6). The cogito and opinio of pride and speculation give way to the credo 
of faith. For those unprepared to benefit, parables veil; for others they reveal.
Steme explicitly points to this at the beginning of sermon 3, and maintains its implication. 
When a lawyer asks Jesus the way to eternal life, the Saviour refrains from giving a direct answer 
and “immediately retorts the question upon the man who asked it” (£21.15). He “refers him to his 
own memory” (S 21.22). And when the lawyer wants a fuller description, the way least likely to 
leave an inappropriate impression is “not by any far fetch’d refinement from the schools of the 
Rabbis, which might have sooner silenced than convinced the man—but by a direct appeal to 
human nature” (S 22.14), i.e. the parable of the good Samaritan. The quality Steme reveals here is 
that the curse of pagan moralists, who teach but cannot practice, is finally undone. “Our S aviour
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appeals to the man’s own h eart. . . and instead of drawing the inference himself, leaves him to 
decide” (S 22.23-27). The possibility that the lawyer will decide correctly is the key to the 
vindication of human nature. A legal expert of a religion rooted in legislation is brought to an 
appreciation of the true meaning and intended application of the law, by an experience of 
conversation in which certain elements necessary to the progress of the parable are anticipated and 
drawn forth from him.
The repentant publican and charitable Samaritan are examples of the possibility of
exchanging one’s own self-saddled hobbyhorse for the consistent ruling passion of heaven, the
springs of which are already inside one. The histories of Job and Joseph upon which Steme
elaborates are further examples of human expectations thwarted by time and chance, which in the
end are fully redeemed by the hand of a Providence proved ultimately to be consistent with
scripture’s omniscient and compassionate God. The abiding value of Sterne’s outlook is nowhere
more clearly visible than in this bifocal consideration of the problems of human existence and the
gifts o f God available for our succour and assistance. Again, he is confident that primarily inherent
in us is a disposition to good; we are made in the image o f God.
That such wrong determinations in us arise from any defect o f judgment inevitably 
misleading us,—would reflect dishonour upon G o d ; as if he had made and sent men 
into the world on purpose to play the fool. His all bountiful hand, made his 
judgment, like his heart, upright; and the instances of his sagacity in other things, 
abundantly confirm it: we are led therefore in course to a supposition, that in all 
inconsistent instances, there is a secret bias some how or other, hung upon the mind, 
which turns it aside from reason and truth. (S 182.30)
The “secret bias” only supersedes the “image” after much violence. The inconsistency is 
not initially part of creation and, although it occurs with frightening results and must be dealt
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with accordingly, one is mistaken to believe chaos is the predominant mode of heaven. We are 
warned that it is at least as great a misreading o f ourselves and the world not to recognize the 
foundational consistency of Providence as it is to ignore the deceitful elements of our 
dispositions and character.
Regarding time and chance: “some, indeed, from a superficial view of this representation of 
things, have atheistically inferred . . . .  Whereas in truth the very opposite conclusion follows.” (S 
76.11-19)
All history is full o f such testimonies, which though they may convince those who 
look no deeper than the surface o f things, that time and chance happen to all,—yet, 
to those who look deeper, they manifest at the same time, that there is a hand much 
busier in human affairs than what we vainly calculate. (S 79.10)
This bifocal aspect of redeemed circumstances initially challenging limited perception is especially
important for Sterne’s view of the way humans presume to judge God, the workings of His
creation, and the character of others. The tragedy of misperception and alienation from God, he
suggests, stems from a lack of considered application to the essential causal effects of each element
involved. Human nature is capable of being vindicated because it incorporates and may cooperate
with divine nature. The virtuous are to be commended because they have wilfully made the
necessary sacrifices to maintain and nurture this image. Such reconciliation and redemption Steme
celebrates. “The wisdom that is from above,” he says, expanding scripture, “is pure, peaceable,
gentle, full of mercy, without partiality, without hypocrisy.. . .  pure, alike and consistent with itself
in all its parts; like its great author, ’tis universally kind and benevolent in all cases and
circumstances” (S 105.26-31; James iii.17). It is important when reading the sermons to note these
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references to the ultimate consistency of heavenly things. From this security Steme draws courage 
honestly to represent the world’s inconsistencies.
When, in A Book fo r Free Spirits and Critical Essays^ New claims “resolution and 
positiveness are the tempting and inevitable vices of Sterne’s world-view; suspension and doubt, its 
difficult, if  not impossible, virtues,”89 he drastically misrepresents the focus of Sterne’s freedom. 
Christian scepticism, and Sterne’s perspective is Christian, is not operative in the elements offaith , 
it is a guide for inquisitive souls in knowledge inessential to belief. Where the stoic has the cold 
comfort of acceptance, the faithful are granted a confident perspective. Joseph is able to triumph 
and show himself truly brave in almost unbearable circumstances, forgiving his brothers because he 
is convinced of God’s providence. Echoing Steele, Steme agrees that forgiveness is “the most 
refined and generous pitch of virtue, human nature can arrive a t . . .  the power of doing it flows only 
from a strength and greatness of soul, conscious of its own force and security.” (S  120.18-23)90
Job’s heroic reticence to curse is similarly rooted, not in the alterable baubles o f God’s 
lesser gifts or in some proud maintenance of existential doubt, but in the immutable governance of 
God himself. This sort of “firmness and constancy of mind” Steme commends. Elsewhere, 
Pharisaical firmness or critical constancy is challenged as being a caricature of the fruits o f a faith 
that is earned. To attempt resolute firmness on one’s own strength and limited vision is presented as 
folly. One is to follow the Samaritan, acting from a deeper principle, ready to leave the straight path 
of prepossessions. One should imitate the publican and engage in honest self-doubt. Symmetry is 
not to be mistaken for greatness.
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Sterne’s mistrust o f certain forms of consistency has two fronts. One involves the self­
induced blindness of those who ignore evidence, expanded in Ecclesiastes and Job, of prevailing 
inconsistencies o f life in this world. The other, related to that, confronts the rigidity stemming from
an inability to develop one’s virtues according to the nature of one’s actual environment. Priest and
$
Levite maintain straight tracks at all cost, Pharisees strain gnats to uphold the letter of the law. The
A
deceit of these observances is that the only valuable consistency, the eternal one of charity, is
inevitably neglected. Substituting pious frauds for spontaneous compassion and honest labour,
Steme repeats, does not make the ascent to truth and virtue.
For Steme and all iatitudinarians,’ true religion involves the mysterious realities that ritual
is meant to serve, while at the same time offering appropriate checks to subjective fallibilities.
Within the closed system of pharisaical ritual or self-satisfied illuminations there is no room or need
for authentic reflection: “there is nothing in nature to induce him to this duty of examining his own
works” (S 138.3). Early in the sermons, Steme establishes the ‘straight’ theme as one of his most
important. In juxtaposition to the Samaritan who goes “out of his way” to answer the call of
humanity, the straight-hearted walk preoccupied with religious pretensions, unwilling to be
distracted from their “selfish track.”
Look into the world—how often do you behold a sordid wretch, whose straight 
heart is open to no man’s affliction, taking shelter behind an appearance of piety, 
and putting on the garb of religion, which none but the merciful and compassionate 
have a title to wear. Take notice with what sanctity he goes to the end of his days, in 
the same selfish track in which he at first set out—turning neither to the right hand 
nor to the left— . (S 24.14)
In his frequent exposure of the incapacity o f straight-hearted individuals to be charitable or 
to know themselves, we have a valuable clue to Sterne’s theological message. What seems most
direct and efficient, he reminds us, is frequently illusory. Self-chosen diversions and penances teach
us little, they are bound to be part of the practical or sentimental system we imagine ourselves to be
controlling. Worship itself is fraudulent if the god at its centre is subtly controlled. Herod and Felix
are presented as men of classic consistency, the heart’s disposition stemming through the head into
all activities of the body. This symmetry of elements in individuals enables Steme to capitalize on
examples reinforcing his arguments for a better symmetry rooted in heaven. Inner virtue, he claims,
is unavoidably complemented by a countenance of harmony and joy. Speaking of the mind and
body o f a compassionate man, Steme relies on this commonplace notion of sympathy: “as nothing
more contributes to health than a benevolence of temper, so nothing generally was a stronger
indication of it” (S 49.15). Health in the individual may then be communicated to society:
should not charity and good will, like the principle of life, circulating through the 
smallest vessels in every member, ought it not to operate as regularly upon you, 
throughout, as well upon your words, as upon your actions? (S 106.9)
The Samaritan, Sterne’s icon of compassion, transcended national scmples and, though an
‘infidel,’ showed himself more devoted to the intent of Judaism than the ‘orthodox’ priest and
Levite. His performance of a spontaneous sacrificial act welling up from “a settled principle of
humanity and goodness which operated within him” (S' 27.11), is neither mechanical nor
methodical. The “principle” is settled, what it leads to is curiouser. Jesus’ parabolic response to the
lawyer is of a similar quality. When the path to a man’s heart is blocked, he must be engaged by
indirections. The parable succeeds, and our undeniable enjoyment o f it enables Steme to remind us
of the principle of universal sympathy: “I am a stranger to the man—be it so, —but I am no stranger
to his condition” (S 28.3). “I think there needs no stronger argument to prove how universally and
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deeply the seeds of this virtue of compassion are planted in the heart of man, than in the pleasure 
we take in such representations o f it.” (S 28.31)
As has been illustrated throughout these chapters, Steme encountered ecclesiastical 
encouragements to develop such representations. Nor were incentives lacking beyond the Cloth. 
Shaftesbury in the introduction to the dialogue of Treatise V of Character is ticks, as elsewhere, 
employs examples from painting and music to connect with writing and virtue, and mourns the 
decline o f written philosophical dialogue (which he calls “a sort o f Moral Painting”) as it was 
“the politest and best way o f managing even the graver subjects.”91 Mandeville in the
introduction to part II of his Fable says:“the Reason why Plato preferr’d Dialogues to any other
manner o f Writing, he said was, that Things thereby might look, as if they were acted, rather than 
told.” Shaftesbury and Mandeville are not referring to sermon writing, nevertheless the 
sentiments are alive and well in Steme.
When he and his colleagues condemn ‘art’ it is not with reference to affecting 
presentations; studied academic posture is nearer to their meaning. Clergy were seeking to 
present the realities o f our conditions in ways most likely to provoke appropriate responses. As 
Shaftesbury writes at the very beginning of his book:“the Appearance of Reality is necessary to 
make any Passion agreeably represented: and to be able to move others, we must first be moved 
ourselves, or at least seem to be so, upon some probable Grounds.” The orator is to resonate 
with the passions he hopes to excite. Later with reference to what he calls “Moral Magick” 
Shaftesbury writes :
of all the other Beautys which Virtuoso’s pursue . . .  the most delightful, the most 
engaging and pathetic, is that which is drawn from real Life, and from the
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Passions. Nothing affects the Heart like that which is purely from it-self, and o f its 
own nature; such as the beauty o f  Sentiments', the Grace of Actions; the Turn o f  
Characters, and the Proportions and Features o f  a human Mind?*
Further on, recalling Plato’s dialogues that he says resemble the pre-philosophical mimes and
which elsewhere he refers to as “real POEMS,” Shaftesbury says •'
they were Pieces which, besides their force of Stile, and hidden Numbers, carry’d 
a sort o f Action and Imitation, the same as the Epick and Dramatick kinds. . . .
’Twas not enough that these Pieces treated fundamentally o f Morals, and in 
consequence pointed out real Characters and Manners: They exhibited ’em alive, 
and set the Countenance and Complexions of Man plainly in view. And by this 
means they not only taught Us to know Others; but, what was principal and o f 
highest virtue in ’em, they taught us to know Ourselves.
THE Philosophical Hero of these Poems . . . was in himself a perfect Character', 
yet in some respects, so veil’d, and in a Cloud, that to the unattentive Surveyor he 
seem’d often to be very different from what he really was: and this chiefly by 
reason o f certain exquisite and refin’d Raillery which belong’d to his Manner, and 
by virtue of which he cou’d treat the highest Subjects, and those of the commonest 
Capacity both together, and render ’em explanatory of each other. So that in this 
Genius of writing, there appear’d both the heroic and the simple, the tragick and 
the comick Vein. However, it was so order’d, that not withstanding the oddness or 
mysteriousness of the principle Character, the Under-parts or second Characters 
shew’d Human Nature more distinctly, and to the Life. We might here, therefore, 
as in a Looking-Glass, discover our-selves, and see our minutest Features nicely 
delineated, and suted to our own Apprehension and Cognizance.95
As Hugh Blair complains later that century in his recommendations on “the pathetic part o f a
discourse,” “there is a great difference between showing the hearers that they ought to be moved,
and actually moving them. This distinction is not sufficiently attended to, especially by
preachers.”96
Steme notes that scripture itself, though full of vigorous prose and engaging histories, is not 
given to overstatement. The story of the prodigal son is typical. “The account is short: the 
interesting and pathetic passages with which such a transaction would be necessarily connected, are
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left to be supplied by the heart:—the story is silent—but nature is not” (S 186.23). Critical 
concentration on ‘sentimental’ elaborations o f Steme, and on his skill at expanding scriptural 
narrative, misses or ignores the fact that he practiced a healthy reticence to say too much. In sermon 
23 he reiterates the rhetorical value of knowing what not to say. First at 216.12:
He might add—
But what?—with all the eloquence of an inspired tongue, What could he add or say 
to us, which has not been said before?
(at 223.5):
—What can I say more?—it is a subject on which I cannot inform your judgment,— 
and, in such an audience, I would not presume to practice upon your passions.
(finally 224.15):
Hast thou—
—But how shall I ask a question which must bring tears into so many eyes?
He goes on to finish the melancholy descriptions, but quickly ends with the purpose of his sermon:
“—as we have felt for ourselves,—let us feel for CHRIST’S sake—let us feel for theirs” —apt
conclusion to a well-crafted argument on the value of feeling over words to induce compassion.
Elsewhere, after considerably developing the Old Testament text o f Elijah and the widow,
Steme says “to illustrate this the more, let us turn our thoughts within ourselves; and for a moment,
let any number of us here imagine ourselves . . . —I appeal to your own thoughts” (S 51.8-14). This
leads him to the crux of his argument, presented on Good Friday:
the consideration o f  this stupendous instance o f  com passion, in  the Son  o f  GOD, is  
the m ost unanswerable appeal that can be m ade to the heart o f  m an, for the 
reasonableness o f  it in h im self. . . .  by reflecting upon the infinite labour o f  this 
day’s love, in the instance o f  C h r is t ’s death, w e  m ay consider what an im m ense  
debt w e  ow e each other. (,S 52.6-18)
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By coming to terms with the experience of that sacrifice, one may be led to understand its value and
purpose for oneself. This correspondence informs Sterne’s style of ecclesiastical communication:
lessons o f wisdom have never such power over us, as when they are wrought into 
the heart, through the ground-work of a story which engages the passions: Is it that 
we are like iron, and must first be heated before we can be wrought upon? or, Is the 
heart so in love with deceit, that where a true report will not reach it, we must cheat 
it with a fable, in order to come at truth? ( S 186.7)
Critics of Steme have recorded the importance of this passage to an understanding of his
presentations.97 It has not, however, been noted that he developed the gist of it from the closing
paragraph of De La Sagesse, in which Charron defends the use of eloquence:
a man may say against Eloquence that truth is sufficiently maintaind and defended 
by it selfe, and that there is nothing more eloquent then it selfe: which I confesse is 
true, where the minds of men are pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part 
of the world, either by nature, or arte, and ill instruction is preoccupated, and ill 
disposed vnto virtue and verite, whereby it is necessaiy that men be handled like 
iron, which a man must soften with fire before he temper it with water: so by the 
firie motions of eloquence, they must be made supple and manageable, apt to take
OSthe temper of veritie.
The idea or story “depends upon the telling. . . .—the danger is, humanity may say too 
much” (S 168.20). As outlined in chapter one, we are not forced to abide the pretences o f long- 
winded overly refined sermons. “Truth, like a modest matron, scorns art—and disdains to press 
herself forwards into the circle to be seen” (S 174.10). “There are two sorts of eloquence^’ Steme 
notes, borrowing from Blackwall," there is a ‘Vain and boyish eloquence” consisting “chiefly in 
laboured and polished periods, an over-curious and artificial arrangement of figures ’j the other, 
represented in scripture, “does not arise from a laboured and far-fetched elocution, but from a 
surprising mixture of simplicity and majesty” (S 392.22-393.7). The language of redemption has 
been accommodated to those for whom it is intended. Scripture speaks out of a depth of
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consistency, established beneath the impenetrable chaos and seeming inconsistencies of visible
phenomena. The Bible’s verbal power is not electric; the art of its language is not primarily to
embellish or convince but to represent reality to differing perspectives in a way least likely
generally to be misunderstood. This is also true o f the best poetry, in which we read not the poet
and his imagination, but ourselves. In scripture, the thing itself appeals to us. Parables numb
prepossessions, shuffling messages into the heart.
As noted in the introduction above, Sterne’s contemporaries were appreciating a modicum
of artful disarray, reflected in scripture. Phillip Doddridge, beginning his sermon ‘Faith is the Gift
of God’ [1741] writes:
In the works of nature, many of those things which to a superficial eye may appear 
as defects, will on a careful inquiry be found to be marks of consummate wisdom, 
and kind contrivance. And on the same principle, I confess, I have often thought 
there is reason to be thankful for the very inaccuracies of scripture.100
Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester, makes clear a point commonly made (by Addison for example)
regarding ‘oriental’ wit. Reading it, one would be obtuse not to think of Steme.
Moreover, as to the Nature and Genius o f Scripture-Style, we should ever bear in 
Mind, that the Eastern Nations are a People of great Vivacity and quick 
Apprehensions; that they conceive Things, and enter into the Spirit o f what was 
intended to be said, without the Formality o f a long Series of Propositions, and of 
producing each Argument in its full Length. They would have disdained, as heavy 
and spiritless, the methodical Compositions of our Times and Climate. They 
delighted in bold figurative Expressions, and quick Sallies from one Subject to 
another.—And St. Paul was remarkable for this oriental Cast and lively Imagination.
For God, when he makes the Prophet, or the Apostle, doth not unmake the natural 
Temper and Disposition of the Man. This Vivacity therefore, both of Style and 
Imagination, is easily discemable in all his Writings. His Eloquence was strong and 
impetuous; his Apostrophes, or turning from one subject to another, sudden and 
unexpected.—In this very Epistle to the Romans he often lays down the Premises, 
and only hints at the Conclusion; or gives us the Inference, with but just pointing at 
the Topick he took it from. In the second, third, and following Chapters, he carries
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on a Dialogue between himself and an unbelieving Jew, without giving any previous 
Notice of it.—In the seventh Chapter he personates the Character of an unregenerate 
Man describing his State of Mind at large; The Good that I  would, says he, I  do not, 
but the Evil, which I  would not, that I  do.—This has made some persons weakly 
imagine, (because he did not tell them expressly, that he only personated another 
Man’s Character) that he was describing his own State of Mind, and speaking of 
himself. But to mention no more, I have shewn in the Exposition of the Context, 
how often he answers and solves the Objections, without formally stating them, as is 
the Manner with us.—Nay he was distinguished for this Vivacity of Genius, and 
Suddenness of Thought, even in his own Times, and among his own Countiymen.
For St. P eter hath observed that there were many Things hard to be understood in 
his Epistles:—Which doubtless was occasioned by his Writing in so concise and 
figurative a Style. For this naturally begets Obscurity, unless great Care and 
Attention are used to unravel the Subject.101
From the following assessment of Gerard Reedy, who has the patience of Job in seeing the 
useful side of long-winded discourse, we can appreciate an element of Sterne’s awakening 
impressions.
Although sermons are supposed to be clear, Tillotson from time to time left an 
audience puzzled about intention . . . .  Here he joined in a favorite eighteenth-century 
literary game, wherein the text disturbed readers into examining their own 
interpretive bias . . . .  The text thus dissuades readers from confidence in their 
interpretive skills; in Tillotson’s hands this process becomes one of conversion from
i (vya religion of common sense to a religion of mystery.
If religion is valid, that which is behind the reasonable unknowability of it will correspond with
sympathetic recipients. “Representations” of affecting scenes abound in Sterne’s sermons and
fiction. Wilbur Cross writes:
Steme was more than an actor. His best sermons are embryonic dramas, in which an 
effort is made to visualize scene and character, as though he were writing for the 
stage. Everywhere a lively imagination is at work on the Biblical narrative. If the 
preacher wishes to vindicate human nature against the charge of selfishness, he 
simply portrays the life of an average man, like scores in his congregation, from 
boyhood through youth, and through manhood on to old age, and lets the proof of 
his thesis rest with the portrait.. . .
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Safe to say, no more readable collection o f sermons came from the press o f the1 ftteighteenth century, and none with a clearer stamp of literature upon them.
Cross is correct in his estimation of Sterne’s prowess, though we would like to have heard 
an appreciation for this style as being particularly adapted for religion. It has obviously been 
tempting to discount the worth of Sterne’s sermons by aligning his skill with a penchant for 
sentimental and literary flourishes. As Hogarth referred to his works as moral essays, so Steme, I 
believe, educated his genius with language to express something far greater than the sum of literary 
urges. Thus Fenelon, in his Second Dialogue Concerning Eloquence:
B. I see too that Eloquence is not a trifling Invention to amuse and dazzle People 
with pompous Language; but that ’tis a very serious Art; and serviceable to 
Morality.
A. It is both a serious and a difficult Art. For which Reason Tully said he had heard 
several Persons declaim in an elegant engaging manner; but that there were but very 
few compleat Orators, who knew how to seize, and captivate the Heart___
A. We have seen that Eloquence consists not only in giving clear convincing Proofs; 
but likewise in the Art of moving the Passions. Now in order to move them, we 
must be able to paint them as well; with their various Objects, and Effects. So that I 
think the whole Art o f Oratory may be reduc’d to proving, painting, and raising the 
Passions. Now all those pretty, sparkling, quaint Thoughts that do not tend to one of 
these Ends, are only witty Conceits.
C. What do you mean by Painting? I never heard that Term apply’d to Rhetorick.
A. To paint, is not only to describe Things; but to represent the Circumstances of 
’em, in such a lively and sensible manner, that the Hearer shall fancy he almost sees 
them with his Eyes. For instance: if a dry Historian were to give an Account of 
D id o ’s Death, he wou’d only say; She was overwhelm’d with Sorrow after the 
Departure of A in e a s ; and that she grew weary of her Life: so she went up to the top 
of her Palace; and lying down on her Funeral-Pile, she stab’d herself. Now these 
Words wou’d inform you of the Fact; but you do not see it. When you read the Story 
in V irg i l ,  he sets it before your Eyes. When he represents all the Circumstances of 
D id o ’s Dispair; describes her wild Rage; and Death already staring in her Aspect; 
when he makes her speak at the Sight of the Picture and Sword that Tineas left, your
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imagination transports you to Carthage; where you see the Trojan Fleet leaving the 
Shore, and the Queen quite inconsolable. You enter into all her Passions, and into 
the Sentiments of the suppos’d Spectators. It is not V ir g i l  you then hear: You are too 
attentive to the last Words of unhappy Dido, to think of him. The Poet disappears: 
and we see only what he describes; and hear those only whom he makes to speak.
Such is the Force of a natural Imitation, and of Painting in Language. Hence it 
comes that the Painters and the Poets are so nearly related: the one paints for the 
Eyes; and the other for the Ears: but both of them ought to convey the liveliest 
Pictures to People’s Imagination.104
Such presentations, for better or worse, evolve emotions that transcend the barriers of 
prepossession and accumulated reasonings. As Joseph Butler says of the effect o f a worthy 
presentation of Christian compassion: “by this voluntary resort to the house of mourning, . . .  we 
might learn all those useful instructions which calamities teach, without undergoing them 
ourselves; and grow wiser and better at a more easy rate than men commonly do.”105 Yorick too, in 
a veiled way, makes clear the potential value of honoring this capacity for being refreshed by 
leaving one’s self behind. The Count, mistaking him for Shakespeare’s Yorick, has abruptly slipped 
out to procure the desired passport, “so taking up, “Much Ado about Nothing,” I transported myself 
instantly ”
Sweet pliability of man’s spirit, that can at once surrender itself to illusions, which 
cheat expectation and sorrow of their weary moments!—long—long since had ye 
number’d out my days, had I not trod so great a part of them upon this enchanted 
ground: when my way is too rough for my feet, or too steep for my strength, I get off 
it, to some smooth velvet path which fancy has scattered over with rose-buds of 
delights; and having taken a few turns in it, come back strengthen’d and refresh’d—
When evils press sore upon me, and there is no retreat from them in this world, then 
I take a new course—I leave it—and as I have a clearer idea of the elysian fields 
than I have of heaven, I force myself, like Eneas, into them—I see him meet the 
pensive shade of his forsaken Dido— and wish to recognize it—I see the injured 
spirit wave her head, and turn off silent from the author of her miseries and 
dishonours—I lose the feelings for myself in hers—and in those affections which 
were wont to make me mourn for her when I was at school.
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Surely this is not walking in a vain shadow—nor does man disquiet himself in vain, 
by it—he oftener does so in trusting the issue of his commotions to reason only.—I 
can safely say for myself, I was never able to conquer any one single bad sensation 
in my heart so decisively, as by beating up as fast as I could for some kindly and 
gentle sensation, to fight it upon its own ground. (A SJ114.11)
This may seem sentimentally far from legitimate cogitation, but Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning
the Principles o f  Morals resonates sympathetically:
the perusal o f a history seems a calm entertainment; but would be no entertainment 
at all, did not our hearts beat with correspondent movements to those which are 
described by the historian___
The indifferent, uninteresting style of Suetonius, equally with the masterly pencil of 
Tacitus, may convince us of the cruel depravity of Nero or Tiberius: But what a 
difference of sentiment! While the former coldly relates the facts; and the latter sets 
before our eyes the venerable figures of a Soranus and a Thrasea, intrepid in their 
fate, and only moved by the melting sorrows of their friends and kindred. What 
sympathy then touches every human heart! What indignation against the tyrant, 
whose causeless fear or unprovoked malice gave rise to such detestable barbarity!
If we bring these subjects nearer: If we remove all suspicion of fiction and deceit:
What powerful concern is excited, and how much superior, in many instances, to the 
narrow attachments of self-love and private interest!106
107J. T. Parnell has written with understanding on Sterne’s place in the sceptical tradition, so
it comes as no surprise that his assessment of ‘sentimentalism’ in Steme is equally perceptive.
Parnell roots the sentimental in elements that appeal more to the heart than to the head. Pity,
sympathy and philanthropy are not ways of becoming distracted from devotion, but necessaiy
encouragements and participants in it. Indeed, the gospel itself seems more directed at provoking
one to feel for others, while taking no thought for one’s self. In “A Story Painted to the Heart?
Tristram Shandy and Sentimentalism Reconsidered)’ Parnell writes:
in spite of Sterne’s role as a Church of England man, and in spite o f the fact that the 
first instalment of the Sermons o f  Mr. Yorick ran to more lifetime editions than 
Tristram Shandy, so little effort has been made to comprehend its pathos and
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sentiment from the perspective of Anglican theology and pulpit rhetoric. Thus we 
have ignored not only the most obvious, but what is surely the most fruitful context 
for comprehending the nature of sentimentalism in Tristram Shandy. . . .
No small part of what makes Sterne’s sentimentalism ‘unreadable’ for twentieth- 
century readers is that its theological underpinnings are almost entirely lost to us.
While we can recover, from eighteenth-century sermons, part of the religious 
context that gave it meaning we can never, perhaps, reconstruct the belief that made 
it sincere.108
Understanding this, Parnell does well, for example, to liberate the Le Fever episode from the 
clutches of cynicism. To appreciate Sterne’s use of affecting discourse is not to imply that the 
effervescence and pathos evoked in Tristram and Yorick are whole-heartedly endorsed. The 
narrators fully attest to the pitfalls o f this avenue to awareness; the misuse of sentiment is o f course 
roundly mocked—in order to liberate honest affective correspondence.
Steme, we should remember, was no slave to vocabulary and definitions. It has been 
infrequently noted that the first translators of ASJ  into both French and German struggled to find 
appropriate corresponding words for its title. Thus Joseph Pierre Frenais in his 1769 preface: “no 
exact French equivalent could be found for the English word ‘sentimental’ and hence it has been
109left untranslated. Perhaps the reader will conclude that it deserves to pass into our language.” If
Cash is correct that “the word sentimental very likely was taken to mean ‘moral’,”110 we must admit
that Steme will often have none o f it. He uses the word and its derivatives in a variety of settings,
with various accents. Moglen makes an interesting attempt:
Steme shares Hume’s belief in the possibility of a man’s entering into the 
sentiments of others. This concept does in fact become the cornerstone of his ethical 
and social philosophy___
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Sentimentality, according to Sterne’s view, is a self-conscious stage in the 
development of the empathic process. It is a self-induced state of empathy which 
attempts to retain the valuable elements o f instinctual emotionality.111
What should be realized alongside these assessments is that Steme frequently presents
sentiment as an emotion of the head; as fruitless as an enthusiastic heart attempting to reason. The
Journey opens with a sentiment soon to be disproved by experience: “—THEY order. . .  this matter
better in France—” (ASJ 3.4). Sentiment’s lack of significant communication will tutor the well-
heeled traveller to seek characters less conniving. Watson recognizes this establishment by Steme
of a “distinction between the merely speculative and the practical. . .  in his doctrine of the head and 
11^the heart.” Steme was no dupe to the poses of either organ:
the duce take all sentiments! I wish there was not one in the world!—My wife is 
come to pay me a sentimental visit as far as from Avignon—and the politesses 
arising from such a proof of her urbanity, has robb’d me of a month’s writing, or I
I IT
had been in town by now.
POTENTIAL EMANCIPATION
Yorick’s specific criticism of French characteristics in ASJ  is tempered by his presentation
of the great joy expressed in humane folk with whom he interacts. His “Quelle grossiertel” is
tutored by the well-travelled French officer.
Le POUR, et le CONTRE se trouvent en chaque nation; there is a balance, said he, of 
good and bad every where; and nothing but the knowing it is so can emancipate one 
half of the world from the prepossessions which it holds against the other—that the 
advantage of travel, as it regarded the sqavoir vivre, was by seeing a great deal both 
of men and manners; it taught us mutual toleration; and mutual toleration, 
concluded he, making me a bow, taught us mutual love. (A SJ83.23)
Yorick’s musings upon this speech of “the kindly French officer”—an officer in an army at war
with England—illuminate his reflexive capacity:
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the old French officer delivered this with an air of such candour and good sense, as 
coincided with my first favourable impressions o f his character—I thought I loved 
the man; but I fear I mistook the object—’twas my own way of thinking—the 
difference was, I could not have expressed it half so well. (ASJ 84.5)
It is a practical, not a sentimental lesson that the officer suggests and with which Yorick concurs.
We should remember what has just transpired between the German and the dwarf: “injury
sharpened by an insult.” Referring to himself as a man o f sentiment, Yorick claims he “could
have leaped out of the box to have redressed it.” But, with a nod and a gesture, “the old French
officer did it with much less confusion” (ASJ 81.27). This unsentimental gesture, fitting a remedy
to its cause, is significant in Yorick’s education. The gesture accomplishes what he is capable of
imagining but would not do, a spontaneous link of true sentiment with virtuous act. Steme was
vocationally tuned to the efficacy of gesture in preaching.114 His extraordinary punctuation for
the printed sermons attests to his understanding of Thomas Sharp’s conclusion to his discourses
on preaching: “a period, delivered by one who is master of pronunciation, shall be better
remembered, and do more good, then a whole sermon from the mouth of another who is
regardless of his delivery.”115 “It is not a case of supplanting words with gestures,” writes Lamb,
“but of finding the complemental force of both that makes words, bodies, and things speak.”116
There is hope in ‘The Dwarf. Paris’ as there is liberally sprinkled throughout Sterne’s
works, if we have eyes to see it. Tempering Ross’ suspicion that Steme was tempted away from
himself by the philosophic salons, “for three weeks together,” says Yorick,
I was of every man’s opinion I met . . . . —And at this price I could have eaten and 
drank and been merry all the days of my life at Paris; but ’twas a dishonest 
reckoning—I grew ashamed of it—it was the gain of a slave— every sentiment of 
honour revolted against it—the higher I got, the more was I forced upon my
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beggarly system—the better the Coterie—the more children of Art—I languish’d 
for those o f Nature.” (ASJ 147.27)
What begins delicious has become prostitution. Nature, art, travel, sentiment, learning, religion,
each involves mixed qualities, and both novels suggest that the way not to confuse sympathetic
commerce with lines of gravitation is to forfeit one’s monopoly on perception:
for my own part I never wonder at any thing;—and so often has my judgement 
deceived me in my life, that I always suspect it, right or wrong,—at least I am 
seldom hot upon cold subjects. For all this, I revere truth as much as any body; and 
when it has slipped us, if  a man will but take me by the hand, and go quietly and 
search for it, as for a thing we have both lost, and can neither of us do well 
without,— I’ll go to the world’s end with him:—But I hate disputes,—and therefore 
(bating religious points, or such as touch society) I would almost subscribe to any 
thing which does not choak me in the first passage, rather than be drawn into one—
(ZS' 439.1)
As Walter kindly leads his friends and acquaintances by the hand to chat an hour by the recovering 
Toby’s bedside (TS 88.14-89.9), we too are led in Sterne’s fiction to converse with wounded men 
struggling to clarify their situations. The injuries proceed more from gravity than projectile force 
(TS 88.11), and if  “the history of a soldier’s wound” does not beguile the pain of it (TS 88.25), at 
least it provokes one to search a map, reconnoiter, and seek a creative avenue to health.
 Endless is the Search of Truth!
No sooner was my uncle Toby satisfied which road the cannon-ball did not go, but 
he was insensibly lead on, and resolved in his mind to enquire and find out which 
road the ball did go. (TS 103.9)
Steme implies, and at times more than insensibly hints, ways in which truth may be 
encountered. Paul McGlynn offers a classic misunderstanding of Yorick: “he is philandering and 
downright uncharitable, and nowhere does he show any signs of romantic irony on his own part or 
any sign of awareness of the lack of virtue in his acts.”117 Apart from being untrue, such faulty
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reading exhibits a neglect to fulfil a necessary role in Sterne’s literary conversation. The notion that
he or Yorick or Tristram is presenting a blueprint for happiness in their lives and opinions is
Walter’s mistake with Trim’s oratory. The characters he presents, even more than those of scripture
in his sermons, are to be looked through, not at We underrate Sterne’s art if we miss the winking
grin with which he presents himself and his biographers. Charles Moran registers the corrective.
“Just as Yorick the narrator judges Yorick the traveller in the Journey, so Tristram the narrator
judges Tristram the traveller in the novel.”118 Their deeds are represented knowingly. One wouldn’t
have expected this to be so elusive a conclusion. “But Steme did not release the starling, cry the
critics . . .  his praiseworthy sympathy does not issue in action and is therefore the grossest
sentimentality and self-indulgence. As if  Steme himself were unaware o f that irony.”119
W.B.C. Watkins notices and writes well on this high capacity o f Steme which so many have
so obviously missed.120 From Perilous Balance: “Steme . . .  is eminently self-conscious; he sees
himself complexly.” “He thoroughly knew himself, and knowing himself, he knew what weakness
and wretchedness and temptation are.” Sterne’s novels are another Lillabullero—he is not trying
to say something, but in the lives and opinions of his characters an impression is left reflecting an
appreciation for the layers of consciousness in fallible persons. His interest in developing the
characters of biblical personae is, in the fiction, evolved towards the same end of personal
reflection. Integrity in this focus remained central to him, as we see in one of his earliest and fullest
apologies for Tristram:
reason and common sense tell me, that if the characters o f past ages and men are to 
be drawn at all, they are to be drawn like themselves; that is, with their excellencies, 
and with their foibles—and it is as much a piece of justice to the world, and to virtue 
too, to do the one, as the other.—The ruleing passion et les egarements du cceur, are
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the very things which mark, and distinguish a man’s character; —in which I would
199as soon leave out a man’s head as his hobby-horse.
Steme trusts his readers to be equally self-conscious. Just as his ‘digressions’ 
(egarements) are not from his story but from the image we have of what we are reading, so we do 
well to remember we are not enjoying the story his narrators speak of writing, but rather the 
whistling of some sort o f music of which that writing is merely one instrument. Critics who drive 
a wedge between Steme and, especially, Yorick and Tristram, have failed to come to terms with 
the complex catharsis that these narrators embody and present. To conclude “this is what 
Tristram Shandy is finally all about: the triumph o f the uncreating spirit in man, the celebration 
of chaos and confusion, destruction and death, whether in Toby’s bowling-green, Walter’s 
household, or Tristram’s study”123 is to mistake a progressive sceptical stage for the last word in 
a man’s philosophy. Steme does not define his characters satirically, or indeed in any way 
whatsoever. They are fragments of life, alive and wriggling, not on display, but encounterable as 
they themselves record reflections. Sterne’s desire in this, as in his sermons, is development of 
fruitful experience. As Henry More stated in what was essentially the Cambridge Platonists’ 
handbook of ethics:
to estimate the fruit o f virtue by that imaginary knowledge of it which is acquired 
by mere definition, is very much the same as if one were to estimate the nature o f 
fire from a fire painted upon the wall. . . . Every vital good is perceived and 
judged by life and sense If you have ever been this, you have seen this.124
D.W. Jefferson:
the charge of false feeling, of indulgence in sentiment, has frequently been leveled 
against [Steme]. But may it not be said in reply that his indulgence is always 
allied to a self-knowledge, that an ironical consciousness of the limitations of his 
feelings adds just the right flavour to his presentation of them?
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Yes. Steme referred to ASJ  as his Work o f  Redemption because it is a confession, the explication
of a journey challenging assumptions o f the heart and head.126 After being chided as an “English
philosopher,” for sending notices to the brain that reverse the heart’s knowledge—“when the
situation is, what we would wish, nothing is so ill-timed as to hint at the circumstances which
make it so” (ASJ 24.11)—Yorick is quick to learn. A few sheepish moments later, after a glance
at the biblical Samaritan (ASJ 24.21), instead of a dissertation on romantic posture he simply says
“some way or other, God knows how, I regained my situation” (ASJ 25.3). Over the page he is
still on track: “I had infallibly lost it a second time, had not instinct more than reason directed
me.” (ASJ 25.21). Again, in the very next scene, “I blush’d in my turn; but from what
movements, I leave to the few who feel to analyse—’’ and “I knew not that contention could be
rendered so sweet and pleasurable a thing to the nerves as I then felt it.—We remained silent” (ASJ
26.15-25). This leads to the exchange of snuffboxes with the Catholic monk—Father Lorenzo—
whom he had misused. The exchange is sentimental according to one translation, but it is entirely of
a piece with the meanderings o f a compassionate heart in search o f happiness that Yorick would
guard this box, as I would the instrumental parts of my religion, to help my mind on 
to something better: in truth, I seldom go abroad without it; and oft and many a time 
have I called up by it the courteous spirit o f its owner to regulate my own, in the 
justlings of the world. (ASJ 27.11)
Yorick finds a noble use for the token, he is under no illusion regarding his need of some 
thing to help his mind and regulate his spirit, and considering its fruits the ‘instrumental’ 
comparison is well appointed. As Yorick proved to himself when Lorenzo was begging just 
minutes before, one’s prepossessions often will not be dislodged even by affecting gestures: “—I
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was bewitch’d not to have been struck” (ASJ 8.23). Such epiphanies are strewn throughout the 
sermons. Recall the warning in ‘Abuses’: “what is there to affright his conscience? —Conscience 
has got safely entrenched behind the Letter of the Law; sits there invulnerable, fortified with Cases 
and Reports so strongly on all sides —that it is not preaching can dispossess it of its hold” (TS 
151.16).
To his credit, Yorick writes “not to apologize for the weaknesses of my heart in this tour, —
but to give an account of them” (ASJ  21.13). Again, his journey is an Assay upon human nature. He
does not travel with a checklist o f destinations and popular sites. A plain is as fertile as a valley,
because ‘sights’ are merely ways of enabling him to see himself. Hume admitted that to regain
humanity he had to forego authoring critical speculations. In contrast Sterne’s writing-in-transit, and
that of his narrators, is life itself: “the pleasure of the experiment has kept my senses, and the best
part of my blood awake, and laid the gross to sleep” (ASJ 36.16). The voyage leads up and down
unsuspected paths and into dark alleys. One who would search nature has no choice but to follow
her, and most appropriately this is primarily an attempt of the pragmatic heart. As Phutatorius’ de
Concubinis retinendis will be most useful where concubines are most practical (TS 387), so
Yorick’s visitation sermon is cut up—to the scholastic doctors’ horror—to be used to light pipes:
I was delivered of [the sermon] at the wrong end of me—it came from my head 
instead of my heart—and it is for the pain it gave me, both in the writing and 
preaching of it, that I revenge myself o f it, in this manner.—To preach, to shew the 
extent of our reading, or the subtleties of our wit—to parade it in the eyes of the 
vulgar with the beggarly accounts of a little learning, tinseled over with a few words 
which glitter, but convey little light and less warmth—is a dishonest use of the poor 
single half hour in a week which is put into our hands— ’Tis not preaching the 
gospel—but ourselves—For my own part, continued Yorick, I had rather direct five 
words point blank to the heart—(TS 376.23)
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Steme focuses on the inability to forgo trust in self-propelled reason and conscience, and
never relents showing us the inevitable consequences, offering statements suggesting his method:
“now consider, sir, what nonsense it is either in fighting, or writing . . .  to act by plan” (TS 704.18).
We do not bear Momus’ glass; a true artist clarifies human nature instead:
—our minds shine not through the body, but are wrapt up here in a dark covering of 
uncrystalized flesh and blood; so that if we would come to the specifick characters 
of them, we must go some other way to work. (TS 83.26)
Tristram is adamant in requiring the courtesy of patience when he seems sparing o f narrative or
trifling in detail (TS 9.9). Readers are warned of the inevitably mysterious nature o f the assay and
requested not to mistake strangeness for absurdity, or foolishness for lack o f wisdom. The novels
are presented as works in progress. We are, for instance, perpetually challenged to anticipate
events and ideas, but invariably reminded that such an attempt for that end will prove fruitless,
“inasmuch as I set no small store by myself upon this very account, that my reader has never yet
been able to guess at any thing” (TS 89.13). We are called to attentive reading: “read, read, read,
read, my unlearned reader!” (TS 268.1). As with ellipses in St. Paul’s letters and Sterne’s
impressionistic sermons, in his fiction he trusts that we will begin to understand what we have
not explicitly been told (“as the reader must have observed him” TS 57.10, etc.). Such daunting
challenges are prologues to effective communication, a relationship grounded not on
introductions and formalities, but in assumed histories of ideas and experiences shared now in
friendly gestures of assent rather than hortatory epistles. The reader’s capacity for the adventure
is trusted, the author’s task is to lead him through it. To be sure, for some the “slight
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acquaintance” will never grow into “familiarity” (TS 9.13-16), but Sterne admits he writes not for 
them, offering many intermissions from which to skulk away.
The novels are best read with our infirmities close at hand. “It is important to note,” 
writes Peter Briggs,
that the perceptual relativism and consequent skepticism implicit in Sterne’s 
methods is not necessarily bound up with moral relativism.. . .  
if the powers o f the mind are themselves in apposition and understanding is 
finally only appositive, then the artistic forms which would express understanding 
must be similarly appositive, tentative, and forever unfinished. A well-formed 
work does not offer ‘conclusions’ but coherent options for interpretation.127
The extraordinary nature of the novels, we come to realize, is a release from the mechanisms o f
those who, writing or preaching in straight lines, are incapable of puncturing prepossessions.
Working with these notions Sterne provides, if not Momus’ glass, at least an effective mirror in
which attentive readers may view themselves and proceed with fresh eyes to behold the
mysteries. Writing of Montaigne, Howard Anderson relates the importance of giving an
“appropriate form to his inquiring ignorance ”r
if this inquiry is to reveal, beneath the ignorance, a solid new understanding of 
human nature, the form which it takes must also be new. . . . The form that he 
chooses, though apparently random, is in fact an artfully artless assembly of 
thoughts that, beneath their superficial irrelevance, cohere in the mind of the 
writer.128
1'JOIn Steme even the old cliches are resurrected. ‘Life’ becomes the journey it has always been, 
and the novel follows suit: “being determined to write my journey, I took out my pen and ink, 
and wrote the preface to it in the Desobligeant ” (ASJ 12.15).
At an impasse, Steme is concerned to upbraid the critic and encourage weary pilgrims 
that a journey in search of, and therefore reflecting tmth, is bound to be full of inconveniences:
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“the judgment is surprised by the imagination” (TS 655.4). Even the most earnest o f cabbage — 
planters will have to bend a line or two. As Cervantes wrote in captivity, so Tristram’s 
seasickness issues in appropriate prose because his imagination is tutored by actuality (TS 578.7- 
15). After all, the chief advantage of travel is to encounter that which would evade one at 
home—due perspective issuing from unexpected, often thoroughly disagreeable occurrences. 
This value of feeling life at basic levels is supplemented with the Pythagorean need to get “out o f  
the body, in order to think w e ir  (TS 593.21). Getting out of one’s body to think, and out of one’s 
mind to feel, are complementary adventures. It is for this reason that elements such as the 
‘pathetic’ preached in a way so as to arouse the passions are valuable criteria o f a good sermon. If 
undertaken with a wise humility, the voyager may find that the arguments (and sentiments) lead 
toward the gentle irony of reconciliation. Otherwise, a neglected body offers no frame with which 
to practice wisdom, and, similarly, a body without reason is a liability.
Attempting authentically to address his readers, the structure of Sterne’s novels is itself 
an image of ensuing complexities. In Wayne Booth’s phrase, he performs “in public the tasks 
which most writers perform behind the scenes.”130 Like the Centre Pompidou, the shell o f his 
work is inside out, flesh inside the skeleton. “—A just medium,” Toby was advised by Walter, 
“prevents all conclusions” (TS 726.23). As in the surprising rhetorical turns of his sermons, in the 
fiction Steme anticipates our preconceptions and uses them accordingly. He leads us skilfully 
because he has visited our destination. The contribution of style to Sterne’s purpose in this regard is 
recognized by Howard Anderson:
Steme repeatedly manipulates us by deliberately disappointing expectations o f
narrative form that we have developed through our prior reading. By arbitrarily
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departing from conventions of customary narrative form in the epic, the novel, and 
the romance, Steme insists that arbitrariness lies in the conventions themselves and 
that our allegiance to them is a sign of preference for convenient artifice over 
inconvenient reality___
especially in the first part of [TS], when he offers his parables of preconception to 
the reader, Tristram usually takes pains to ensure that we will apply them to 
ourselves and not sit back and smile in amused complacency at the folly o f others.131
His fiction, no less than his homilies, is a caged starling, interrupting us in the hey-day of
our soliloquies. The terror of the Bastille is not “in the word,” but “folly, or nonchalance, or
philosophy, or pertinacity” or any other self-driven quality is incapable of undeceiving us (ASJ
94.9-20). So masks, parabolae and such are conscripted for duty. To claim “for Joyce, as for
1 •Steme, there can be no self-discovery. There is only the endless repetition of the quest” is to 
misunderstand Sterne’s purpose. His works differ from other accounts of the human journey that 
appear in the novels. Locke’s essay and Smollett’s travels come to life, implicitly criticized but, 
more importantly, presented in a way that exhibits their lack of personality. As he implicitly 
criticized Tillotson and Clarke for telling us our duty without inspiring us to do it, the shame of 
the “learned SMELFUNGUS” is not that his book was “nothing but the account o f his miserable 
feelings,” but that nothing further proceeded from those feelings (ASJ 37.5-9). Like Locke on 
time, words, education or wit, the most insightful of paragraphs is a bubble to readers if they 
cannot access the extent of the meaning that gives significance to the words. The history of what 
passes in a man’s mind is only valuable to recollect if it be brought to bear on some current 
presently flowing in the minds thus engaged. Somewhat paradoxically Sterne’s extraordinary 
technique brings us closer to a balanced understanding o f what passes in conversation.
This is tricky business, in numerous ways an author of life and opinions is challenged 
inexplicitly to communicate. The preacher cannot expect fresh assent to commonly phrased 
platitudes. This is equally true for situations involving lower passions. Tristram bums to reveal 
the two words without which “a French post-horse would not know what in the world to do” (TS 
605.9). They “must be told [the reader] plainly, and with the most distinct articulation;” but to 
preserve decorum a story is developed by which characters and readers shoulder the articulation: 
“Now a venial sin . . . by taking it all, and amicably halving it betwixt yourself and another 
person—in course becomes diluted into no sin at all”—said the abbess to the novice (TS 613.lb- 
21). This amicable halving of spells is what enables Sterne’s vehicle to move. Vocabulary, and its 
imaginative translations from reader to reader, keeps us involved. His works are a mastery of 
balance between prevention and disclosure. As Tristram observes in the quest o f widow Wadman, 
“there is an accent of humanity—how shall I describe it? — ’tis an accent which covers the part 
with a garment, and gives the enqui :;rer a right to be as particular with it as your body-surgeon” (TS 
792.13). The key to Sterne’s effective involvement with readers is his skill in generating an 
experience without seeming to force it. Trim’s ‘funeral oration’ is an example o f the excellency of 
this way. In contrast to Walter’s dislocated fragments that serve at best for himself only as 
momentary diversion from tragedy, Trim brings the full weight of this moment home to everyone in 
the kitchen. By now we are prepared to encounter such juxtaposition.
Like his interpretation of the fifth commandment, Trim’s oration would have pleased 
Yorick. Recalling Yorick’s theory of preaching [quoted above, pp. 195-96], Trim’s dirge was 
delivered at the right end of him: “five words point blank to the heart” (TS 377.10). He is successful
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by engaging the passions of those willing to be thus engaged. Trim adopts the stance he held 
reading the sermon (TS 431.4), eloquence natural without seeming arbitrary. Tristram interpolates 
an opinion: “the preservation of our constitution in church and state . . . may in time to come 
depend greatly upon the right understanding of this stroke o f the corporal’s eloquence” (TS 431.17). 
Indeed the scaffolding o f Sterne’s entire work could be summed up in ‘Trim’s hat,’ its profound 
effect emanating from the fact that we are neither stocks, stones nor angels, but “cloathed with 
bodies and governed by our imaginations” and are best addressed accordingly. (TS 431.26-432.2)
That “the soul and body are joint-sharers in every thing they get” (TS 764.9) is a 
commonplace Steme never lets us forget. The jerkin and its lining (TS 189.19) informs his self- 
consciousness as author and he strongly suggests that the implied sympathy will have far reaching 
effects on his readers. Like Yorick in his Desobligeant, the elements of life and writing are 
mingled: “a man cannot dress, but his ideas get cloath’d at the same time; and if he dresses like a 
gentleman, every one of them stands presented to his imagination, genteelized along with him—so 
that he has nothing to do, but take his pen, and write like himself’ (TS 764.9). In context this is one 
more angle of the author as spontaneously present, but it is particularly telling if we are aware o f the 
hints by which Steme is presenting that well-dressed gentleman to our companies.
Trim’s address is valuable because it speaks not only to the heart of the listeners, but from 
the heart of what is being communicated. In simultaneous contrast, Walter’s recitation of antiquity 
(from dust to dust) is more than one chamber apart. An exact or explicit articulation of the desired 
effect spoils the relation. Trim is not teaching his congregation, he is giving them a focus by which 
to mourn, or, at least, personally to consider the event. The moral, if one calls it that, is incorporated
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in the act. This may seem like a detour, a fanciful untrustworthy way o f sharing sentimental 
information, but considering alternate routes, it is least offensive. The artifice of oratorical capering 
gives way to the art of appropriate gesture. A form of sympathy exists between participants in this 
exchange. The author has freedom to tell his story in his own way, and readers are sufficiently 
prepared to accommodate what they are hearing. Tristram is resonating with his subjects and cannot 
help writing himself:
FROM the first moment I sat down to write my life for the amusement of the world, 
and my opinions for its instruction, has a cloud insensibly been gathering over my 
father.. . .
I enter upon this part of my story in the most pensive and melancholy frame of 
mind, that ever sympathetic breast was touched with.—My nerves relax as I tell 
it.—Every line I write, I feel an abatement of the quickness of my pulse. (TS 253.15- 
254.8)
The author changes with his subject; Tristram aligns his text with the extremes of human temper
(TS 524.13-525.23), and here too is paradox.
These different and almost irreconcilable effects, flow uniformly from the wise 
and wonderful mechanism of nature,—of which,—be her’s the honour.—All that 
we can do, is to turn and work the machine to the improvement and better 
manufactury of the arts and sciences. (TS 525.4)
“A man o f the least spirit,” says Tristram, in recounting history, “will have fifty deviations 
from a straight line to make with this or that party as he goes along” (TS 41.13). For this reason, 
the writers and readers who are mocked in Sterne’s fiction are those bent on proceeding like
|  *5*5
Pharisees and cabbage planters. Despite Johnson’s “nothing odd will do long,” in a fallen
world authenticity abides most nearly with what seems strange.
Mundungus, with an immense fortune, made the whole tour . . . without one 
generous connection or pleasurable anecdote to tell of; but he had travell’d
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straight on looking neither to his right hand or his left, lest Love or Pity should 
seduce him out of his road. (.ASJ 37.24)
Writer or reader, one who travels thus gets nothing for his pains. The Journey pivots on this
understanding. Smelfungus and Mundungus, lacking heat in this faculty of exploration will be
numb even to the warmth of heaven. To be inappropriately heated is sin, but not to be heated is
the recourse of prudes and cowards. The glory of Sterne’s work, then, is in providing provocative
distractions from our own soliloquies, inclining and tempering us toward discovery. “I like the
sermon well, replied my father,— ’tis dramatic,—and there is something in that way of writing,
when skilfully managed, which catches the attention.” (TS 165.15)
Steme presents myths; following his heroes we are caught up in the life while at the same
time considering the opinions of that life. Richard Lanham quotes a provocative passage from
Kenneth Burke:
“in sum, the comic frame should enable people to be observers o f  themselves, 
while acting. Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness.
One would ‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles. He would provide a 
rationale for locating the irrational and the nonrational.”
And then immediately condemns himself:
unless we greatly mistake it, Tristram Shandy destroys such a rationale. It includes 
and illustrates too many kinds o f comedy. . .  . neither Tristram nor Steme tells us 
which meaning is the reference one, which comic theory is to be applied.134
The point of a reference meaning, of course, is that it can not be told. The rationale insensibly
builds upon the reader’s wit.
The spontaneous rhetorical styles of Tristram and Yorick support the progression of their
mythic quests. During the journeys especially, the events are recorded as they happen, but as seen
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through the calmer eyes o f one participating in hindsight. The principal participant gives us the
action and, simultaneously, criticism and context of it:
HAVING, on first sigh t o f  the lady, settled the affair in  m y fancy, “that she w as o f  the 
better order o f  b e in gs”— and then laid it dow n as a second  axiom , as indisputable as 
the first, That she w a s  a w idow , and wore a character o f  distress— I w ent no further;
I got ground enough for the situation which pleased me— ” (ASJ 30.1)
Humble reflection redeems the apotheosis of sentiment. The implied self-criticism does not
negate the value of unaffected reactions and initial impressions of the heart, but it acknowledges
the need for these to be tempered by considered experience. As D. W. Jefferson notes of Sterne’s
(and Y orick ’s) bifocal perception:
it is surprising that he has not been more valued for these corrective effects. There 
are two kinds of sophistication in him which our age might well find enjoyable: 
his recognition o f foibles and vanities in the sphere of the affections and 
sympathies, and his uninhibited expression of the latter, notwithstanding this 
recognition.135
Events, even the books themselves, are presented under way, chapters haphazardly 
divided, deleted or bound out o f order, expanding the reader’s appreciation for being able at the 
same time to be elsewhere considering. ‘Digressions,’ which Tristram honestly presents as the 
soul of his work, like Montaigne’s alarm clock, serve as punctuation and the chief medium by 
which we assess what is otherwise the works’ progress. What is accomplished is more than 
realism, as the creation is greater than the sum of one man’s representation of life. That nothing 
ever wrought with the Shandy family, or with Yorick, after the ordinary way is why authentic 
presentations of their lives and opinions will of themselves need to be extraordinary. Again the 
focus of the communication is on indirection. The “drawing” o f Toby’s character goes on “gently 
all the time” (TS 80.21) while we are otherwise concerned.
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By this contrivance the machinery of my work is o f a species by itself; two 
contrary motions are introduced into it, and reconciled, which were thought to be 
at variance with each other. In a word, my work is digressive, and it is progressive 
too,—and at the same time! (TS 80.27)
Knowing that a man’s mind requires sympathy with a proposition in order to accept it, 
Steme forms propositions accessible to the minds he encounters. Because definitions are a mark 
o f distrust, the reader is asked to suffer mysteries and riddles for the sake of comprehensive 
communication. Without much reading (much knowledge), the moral o f the “motley emblem of 
my work” remains impenetrable (TS 268.7).
“Mysteries” exclaims Yorick, “which must explain themselves, are not worth the loss o f  
time, which a conjecture about them takes up” (ASJ 114.5). In the crises and monotony of life, 
perspective is synonymous with health. One track or passion is most fruitfully challenged by 
another of equal or greater intensity; to exchange enthusiasm for complacence is inappropriate. 
As Yorick transports himself to Messina via Much Ado About Nothing and again admits to losing 
his own feelings in thoughts o f Dido (ASJ 114), so the reader is encouraged to encounter a form 
of entertainment and perspective in the somersaults o f Steme. Tristram is trying to let us “into the 
whole secret from first to last, of every thing which concerns” him (TS 5.1), but knows that 
indirection, or parabola, is our only hope of accurately interacting with his character as it is. The 
narrators are concerned to place words as close to activity as possible: “Ptr..r..r..ing—twing— 
twang—prut—trut—” “there are such an infinitude of notes, tunes, cants, chants, airs, looks, and 
accents with which the word fiddlestick may be pronounced” (TS 443.14; 789.1). But their 
offspring are antitheses of a prose version of say, Smollett’s ‘Register of the Weather, kept during a 
Residence of Eighteen Months in that city’. Trim’s I  says as much as Walter’s syllogisms (TS
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744); the grisset’s gestures say more than the barber’s sentimental proof (ASJ 67-71). Time, enemy
and accomplice of autobiographers, must be warped if one is to relate anything useful:
there is not a secret so aiding to the progress of sociality, as to get master of this 
short hand, and be quick in rendering the several turns of looks and limbs, with all 
their inflections and deliniations, into plain words. (ASJ 77.5)
By this means, demanding we take upon us the “translation” of gestures in the works, 
Steme incorporates us into his pages. “ ’Twill come out of itself, by and bye.—All I contend for is, 
that I am not obliged to set out with a definition of what love is.” Thus we are invited, in this 
instance, not to comprehend a definition to “conceive this right,” but instead to paint a 
representative figure (TS 564.21-567). This figure becomes our responsibility, our Beatrice or 
Dulcinea. By inviting us to acts o f creation, we are led into an experience of what the author would 
falter to define. Sterne’s criticism of the misuse of sentiment takes its cue from this understanding. 
One natural example of relational shorthand and accelerated formalities is repeated in ASJ. As the 
lady in their first fortunate meeting (ASJ 24.8-17) tutored Yorick, so he is given a chance to tutor 
her in their second. Again they have “been left together by a parcel of nonsensical contingencies” 
(ASJ 33.4), but instead of proceeding in the manner of a Frenchman “to make love the first 
moment, and an offer of his person the second,” he offers an explanation for a way more likely to 
succeed:
—To think of making love by sentiments!
I should as soon think of making a genteel suit of cloaths out of remnants:—and to 
do it—pop—at first sight by declaration—is submitting the offer and themselves
with it, to be sifted, with all their pours and contres, by an unheated mind___
—What a want of knowledge in this branch of commerce a man betrays, whoever 
lets the word come out of his lips, till an hour or two at least after the time, that his 
silence upon it becomes tormenting. A course of small, quiet attentions, not so 
pointed as to alarm—nor so vague as to be misunderstood,—with now and then a
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look of kindness, and little or nothing said upon it—leaves Nature for your mistress, 
and she fashions it to her mind.— (ASJ 33.15-34.11)
The Lady is attentive, and declares that Yorick has been making love to her “all this 
while.” On the very next page, when his unarticulated proposal is interrupted, she assures him 
that a man “has seldom an offer of kindness to make to a woman, but she has a presentiment of it 
some moments before—” (ASJ 35.11). Yorick attributes this to a natural instinct for preservation of 
females, but we are to understand that this is simply one more facet of works, like sermons, that 
thrive on presentiments orchestrated by “a course of small, quiet attentions.” As Yorick’s prejudices 
are tutored more by his recollection of the monk’s gestures, than by verbal argument, so the reader 
is led insensibly but surely to encounter elements of his own misconceptions.
It is not “the most important matters of state” but “nonsensical minutiae” that explicate 
natural characters, and it is “ye small sweet courtesies of life” that open doors “and let the stranger 
in” (ASJ 69.1). Yorick’s philosophy is educated by the “complexional philosophy” o f La Fleur: 
“there was a passport in his very looks.” This “prevenancy” engages us in the windings of the 
Journey (ASJ43.19; 59.13).
That the medium resembles characters floating in it, is appropriate. Led by words’ unsteady 
use to question the full effect of a spectrum of possible meanings, the reader’s view o f his own 
mind, not necessarily that of the author, surfaces. The pronunciation of “noses” and “whiskers,” 
thus any word, unavoidably involves accents implying “something of a mystery” (TS 410.19). And, 
to penetrate truth, the mystery must be recognized as such. The point of Sterne’s stories, like those 
of Ecclesiastes and Job, is not to tell us what we do not know, but to represent our common 
situation in such a way as to emphasize the fragile supports of what seems fundamentally to be
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reliable. An old saw perhaps, and we hear hints of worn expressions, but the application of these 
phrases, and the importance of the way in which they are revisited is integral to the moral they are 
enlisted to convey. By using the complexities of words, with a reader willing to consider, a new 
‘definition’ or ‘translation’ may present itself. Because this occurs conversationally, the laurels, or 
blame, are shared, and the offence of a didactic treatise is avoided.
A window into Sterne’s mastery is provided by the complementary passages on plagiarism 
that appeal to the precedents of Montaigne and Burton. The scene most illustrative of Sterne’s self- 
image as ‘plagiarist’ or translationist occurs in ASJ. Yorick, to “gratify” La Fleur, chops incidents in 
the borrowed letter, “took the cream gently off it, and whipping it up in my own way—I seal’d it 
up” (ASJ 64.3). What we see in TS though, is even more revealing. The first passage relates to the 
tom-out chapter that prevents the reader’s shock from a piece “so much above the stile and manner 
of any thing else I have been able to paint in this book” (TS 374.18). Tristram, humming Homenas’ 
sermon notes, recalls Montaigne as having “complained in a parallel accident” when forced to read 
a dull text in which occurred an air “so fine, so rich, so heavenly” that it served only to discredit the 
mire within which it was sunk. Editions of the novel duly point to the section in ‘Of the Education 
of Children’ to which Steme refers but the original context should be fully appreciated.
First it will strike one as a particularly wry bit o f humor to see that Steme has lifted the 
words of Cotton’s translation; in so doing, of course, he proclaims himself equal to the essayist. 
Annotations for the most part have disregarded the fact that Montaigne is far from suggesting that 
borrowing well-phrased elements of others is in itself culpable; certainly he is sufficiently 
experienced to know the folly of presenting any ideas as ‘new.’ Montaigne admits that he too is
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naturally subject to self-repetition, borrowing and patching. “I know veiy well,” he says two 
sentences after the portion used by Steme,
I know very well how imprudently I myself at every Turn attempt to equal myself to
my Thefts, and to make my Stile go Hand in Hand with any one of them, not
without a temerarious Hope of deceiving the Eyes o f my Reader from discerning the
Difference; but withal, it is as much by the Benefit o f my Application, that I hope to1do it, as by that of my Invention or any Force of my own.
Again, as with Sterne’s borrowings for his sermons, it is in the application that we discern 
genius. Here, Sterne’s hidden quotation of Montaigne’s own flourishing comment originally 
occurring in an argument against the juxtaposition of poor original— excellent quotation, beside 
what it says, implies that we are in the hands of a capable applicator; from Montaigne to him is 
no precipice.
The lesson is immediately repeated the following year (sooner for most readers now). 
Upon opening the next instalment, Volume v, we are told that a couple of “mettlesome tits” and 
their madcap postilion, flying “like lightning” over “a slope of three miles” (juxtaposed to the 
London wagon, scarce progressive) suggested to both “brain” and “heart” that a little zest would 
not be unwelcome in a book bulky with borrowings. As we know, the “castigation of plagiaries” 
that follows is “itself cribbed from Burton!”.137 Again, fully to appreciate Sterne’s presence in his 
presentation, Burton requires review.
In the same sentence as the “apothecaries” of TS 408.4, Burton first anticipates Yorick’s 
use of La Fleur’s letter in ASJ: “we skim off the cream of other men’s wits, pick the choice 
flowers of their tilled gardens to set out our own sterile plots,” and then “they lard their lean 
books with the fat of others’ works.”138 Steme, in turn, rightly asks, “shall we for ever be adding
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so much to the bulk—so little to the stock?” (TS 408.1).139 But indeed, as Montaigne also 
realized, to swell the bulk seems inevitable, the secret is meanwhile to improve the stock. The 
London wagon with its “eight heavy beasts” could use a push, out o f “the same track” and 
according to a different pace (TS 408.6). We are again encountering Sterne’s implicit contention 
that this is not his way.
James Work rightly makes note o f the fact that “Burton himself had borrowed heavily in 
these particular passages.”140 Without reading this preliminary section of The Anatomy, full of 
others’ castigations of plagiaries, it is impossible to feel Sterne’s sympathetic glee. Even so, the 
primary slant of Steme, Montaigne, and Burton is not the jest they share, or a sophomoric prank 
of patchwork. They allude to an important philosophical struggle within the literature o f ideas. 
Burton’s magnificent confession stands for all three: “for my part I am one of the number [of 
plagiarists], nos numerus sumus: I do not deny it, I have only this of Macrobius to say for myself, 
Omne meum, nihil meum, ’tis all mine, and none mine.”141 Touche. “I have borrowed . . . though 
the sermon is truly mine.”
As Steme makes abundantly clear throughout his works, pilfered words, like drugs and 
spices, of themselves are impotent, application determines their efficacy (TS 404-5). Regarding 
the first three chapters of Volume v, H. J. Jackson notes, “in the introductory sentences, Steme 
implied that his use of materials from Burton’s neglected Anatomy o f  Melancholy was not to be a 
tedious display o f ‘the relicks o f  learning* but a kind of resurrection.”142
The method of Steme and his narrators is variously exhibited. As we have seen, one of 
the most pervasive literary stances is that of the wily prophet; we are challenged with the fact that
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we cannot guess where next the author will take us. These junctions, though presented with a
veneer o f spontaneity, are not to be misunderstood as inessential. We are told that Tristram
(alluding to St. Paul foregoing traditional prejudice: Gal. i.16) at an impasse never stands
conferring “with pen and ink one moment” (TS 763.9), and that his “most religious” way of
starting a book is to “begin with writing the first sentence—and trusting to Almighty God for the
second” (TS 656.18). Lighthearted as these statements are, we should realize that the challenge of
writing, conceiving, this sort of conversation is an act necessarily complex and mysterious. A
play is formed in which the pen and other elements initially outside exact control of the mind will
operate alongside, even roll over, what was at first thought to be one’s agenda. The confusion we
have in pinning down Steme and Tristram, is really an image of the conundrum of human nature.
Sterne’s works bear witness, as we have seen, to the presence o f the inscrutable. No
simple answer is given, no easy path marked G 9 happiness this way. As Fluchere justly notes,
“the avowed didacticism of the work is only an amusing or mock-heroic mask which hides a
second didacticism that is much more profound.”143 Answers devised under the sun are trotted
out to pasture. What is established as trustworthy is a sense of chaos, the unexpected, so much so
that otherwise perceptive scholars have mistaken this means for an end. Overriding the mayhem,
however, and giving strength to Steme, to Tristram and Yorick, is the experience of
benevolence—of sanctified humanity. Toby and the grisset, for example, spark something in
their beneficiaries that is invigorating and undeniable:
I felt every vessel in my frame dilate—the arteries beat all chearily together, and 
every power which sustained life, perform’d it with so little friction, that ’twould 
have confounded the most physical precieuse in France: with all her materialism, 
she could scarce have called me a machine— (ASJ 5.19)
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We remember how long this sentiment is sustained, but it is at least a starting point, a recognized 
way out of the hopeless confusion which otherwise reigns in all campaigns for happiness. Yorick 
later admits “if ever I do a mean action, it must be in some interval betwixt one passion and 
another: whilst this interregnum lasts, I always perceive my heart locked up—I can scarce find in 
it, to give Misery a sixpence” (.ASJ 44.20). While not particularly noble, this confession is 
instructive in offering readers a chance to judge for themselves which way their passions or 
coolnesses sway them.
214
IV ~ “ECCO LOIL VERO PUNCHINELLO!”
HOMILETIC HUMOR?
On the heels of the first Tristram volumes, opening the Sermons o f  Mr. Yorick, many 
readers could not help wondering if Steme was mocking his clerical past. A gesture to this 
phantom of a clergyman in motley is appropriate. Earliest faultfinding focused on the impropriety 
o f a parson publishing what Owen Ruffhead refered to as “an obscene romance,” and then, soon 
after, offering sermons from a jester’s namesake. “But are the solemn dictates o f religion,” 
continued Ruffhead, “fit to be conveyed from the mouths o f Buffoons and ludicrous Romancers? 
Would any man believe that a preacher was in earnest, who should mount the pulpit in a 
Harlequin’s coatT,] Broadly understood, these two queries form the nucleus of private and 
public criticism o f Sterne’s sermons: may the imagination stretch to appreciate sincerity in 
sermons from the author of Tristram Shandy, and, if so, what sort of religion is capable o f that 
sort o f presentation? Unorthodox, one might presume, but even Ruffhead himself, in the same 
review, admitted that his quarrel was with “the manner o f publication;” “the matter o f his 
sermons” on the other hand “may serve as models for many of his brethren to copy from. They 
abound with moral and religious precepts, clearly and forcibly expressed.”
Indeed, as soon as 1762 three of Sterne’s sermons appeared in The Practical Preacher, a 
collection of exemplary homilies, side by side with those of Tillotson, Clarke, Sherlock and 
Sharp. The popularity and evident orthodoxy of Sterne’s sermons was established, and we find 
another two of his included in The English Preacher [1774].3 This later publication, in nine
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volumes, is subtitled: ‘Sermons on the Principal Subjects o f Religion and Morality, selected,
revised, and abridged from Various Authors’. It is significant that the sermon of Tillotson chosen
for Volume 8, ‘Against Hypocrisy in Religion’ is in fact edited snippets o f his three sermons on
the text II Tim. iii.5, each titled ‘Of the Form, and the power of Godliness’. In contrast, in this
same volume the ‘revision and abridgement’ o f Sterne’s ‘Vindication of Human Nature’ and ‘On
setting Bounds to our Desires’ consists in removing his dashes.
In various forms this challenge of a ‘heteroclite parson’ has survived. In Steme criticism
of any era one encounters either indignation at the juxtaposition, or disbelief that fiction and
sermons could simultaneously be presented for any other reason than to advance the fortunes of
their author. Even Melvyn New offers this poor sensational impression:
indeed, in his heady success, Steme made a major blunder. In May 1760, four 
months after his “triumph,” he tried to “cash in” by publishing two volumes of 
sermons (hastily scraped together from his drawer) under the name “Mr. Yorick”;
Steme may have wanted fame, but after a lifetime on a country vicar’s stipend, he 
seems to have had a healthy interest in fortune as well.4
Some would have felt more comfortable enjoying Tristram Shandy were it written by a 
coachman, and been more attentive to the sermons had they no association with jest. Perhaps, we 
hear, Steme was not as vicious as Thackeray implied,5 but he was personally imprudent with the 
Decalogue and not wholly sincere in his preaching. Accordingly he inserted ‘The Abuses of 
Conscience considered’ into his novel as “a shameless plug”6 to advertise sermons composed at 
least a decade prior, immediately to capitalize on the projected success o f his newfound anti­
clerical love of bawdy satirical fiction. With some notable exceptions, critics of Steme have felt
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inclined to accept some form of this argument. But is it a just reckoning of any of Sterne’s 
works?
We are examining the sermons, and threads in Sterne’s fiction to reveal an integrity that 
suggests desires other than cash and notorious preferment. Even if the reader chooses to maintain 
these practical (and of themselves innocent) ends as having been uppermost in the author’s desire 
to publish his homilies, the examination is useful in proving Steme to be far more involved in 
presenting theology than has been assumed. The answers to Ruffhead’s questions above may in 
fact be a resounding “yes.” And when he asks “must obscenity then be the handmaid to Religion 
— and must the exordium to a sermon, be a smutty tale?” we may indeed open the first volume 
o f sermons and, gazing at Reynolds’ portrait of Sterne’s “own comic figure at the head of them”
• ftimagine it responding: “not necessarily, b u t . . . . ”
In late 1759 Steme mounted a broad fictional pulpit with cap and bells, in a harlequin’s 
coat, but perhaps most odd is that after that ascension -upon closing Volume ii of Tristram- 
what we see and read from his clerical post is actually black and white, no jangling bells, no 
flashing jerkin. Persevering to read the sermons, one may well agree with Thomas Gray that they 
“are in the style I think most proper for the Pulpit, & shew a very strong imagination & a sensible 
heart,” though disagree with his prepossessed vision: “but you see him often tottering on the 
verge of laughter, & ready to throw his perriwig in the face of his audience.”9 The sermons are 
vigorous and engaging, but as we have seen, their rare frolics have both point and precedent, so it 
is strange that this impression ofShandaic sermons has been so persistent. Steme was keenly 
aware o f the folly of an “insatiate lust of being witty” (S  107.5): “this all-sacred system, which
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holds the world in harmony and peace, is too often the first object, that the giddy and 
inconsiderate make choice of to try the temper of their wits upon” (S 184.23). Margaret Shaw is 
precise in writing ‘"there is nothing [in the sermons] that can rightly be described as an unseemly 
use o f humor.”10 Considering the extent of Sterne’s wit it is surprising how reserved he is in the 
pulpit.
Maijorie David offers this inaccurate reckoning: “Steme probably meant his preaching to
be, like ‘true Shandyism,’ against nothing except ‘spleen.’ If he did not throw his perriwig into
his congregants’ laps, he did make them laugh.”11 That Sterne’s sermons would be misread in the
twentieth century, when most readers are unfamiliar with the manner and tempers of eighteenth
century Anglican homilies is understandable. But that some in Sterne’s generation, while praising
the addresses, still read them as part of a jest is testament to extreme prepossession:
but will you allow his sermons no merit? I allow some of them the merit of the
pathetic; but the laborious attempts to be witty and humorous have spoiled the
greater part of them. The appearance of sincerity is one of the best beauties of a
sermon. But Steme seems as if he were laughing at his audience, as if he had1 ?ascended the pulpit in a frolic, and preached in mockery.
Tristram’s asterisks, blanks, and whimsies encourage readings of things that are not. Readers are
thereby offered glimpses of themselves clutching the handle which best “suits their passions,
1 ^their ignorance or sensibility” —grand challenge from “a moral work, more read than
understood” (S 255.5). But to say The Sermons o f  Mr. Yorick [“where no jest was meant” (S
1.10)] are ‘shandaic’ is either to grasp a handle that is not there, or considerably to expand the 
adjective. Sterne’s lament that “the world has imagined, because I wrote Tristram Shandy, that I
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was myself more Shandean than I really ever was,”14 suggests it is fitting to probe possible
meanings, even perhaps an agenda, beneath his seeming folly.
Of course his sermons are not void of cheerfulness. It seems typical o f Steme that some
of the most pathetic scenes imaginable would be enveloped in hearty optimism. This balancing of
intent and medium was widely acknowledged to be the cornerstone of good sermons. One
preface after another echoes this hope; thus John Norris:
upon these Considerations I am encouraged to send these Discourses abroad . . . 
they consist of very weighty and serious matter, and are indifferently Correct as to 
their Composition; that they speak both to the Reason and to the Affection of the 
Reader, and are in good measure fitted both to Convince and to Perswade; In short 
that they may be read with a great deal of Profit, and not without some 
Entertainment. 15
Though they would have disagreed on other matters, and allowing for a measure of
difference in the type of discourse, I believe Steme would have shared Shaftesbury’s view that
provided we treat Religion with good Manners, we can never use too much good 
Humour, or examine it with too much Freedom and Familiarity. For if it be 
genuine and sincere, it will not only stand the Proof, but thrive and gain 
Advantage from hence: if it be spurious, or mix’d with any Imposture, it will be 
detected and expos’d.16
As Bishop John Sharp generously wrote, “the truth of it is, so long as we consist of Bodies and
17Souls, we cannot always be thinking of serious Things.” Isaac Barrow, no mean preacher, sums
up the godly use of wit:
when plain declarations will not enlighten people, to discern the truth and weight
of things, and blunt arguments will not penetrate, to convince or persuade them to
their duty; then doth Reason freely resign its place to Wit, allowing it to undertake1 &its work o f instruction and reproof.
Frequently we hear bantering jibes as otherwise staid preachers take relish in outwitting sinful 
devices. New notes this with regard to Joseph Hall,19 and samples from virtually every sermon- 
writer of any denomination could be found. Usually these are brief and carefully chosen; 
Jeremiah Seed, for example, comments on the immoral rich by saying simply “they are in the 
right to value themselves upon, what is the only valuable Thing they have, Their great Wealth.” 
And elsewhere, as if addressing Walter Shandy: “it seems to be something providential, that 
those who trusted too much to the Strength of their Reason, should always be the Proofs o f the 
Weakness of it.” In fact, Sterne’s title page motto for A Political Romance, taken from 
Horace’s Satires, unequivocally orients the morality of his wit: “for ridicule often decides matters
71of importance more effectually and forcefully than gravity.”
Taking up the belief that Christianity is primarily a religion of joy, Shaftesbury refers to 
David’s triumphal dance (II Sam. vi.14) saying that Jesus’ manner was likewise “mild,” “sharp, 
humorous, and witty,” “his Miracles themselves (especially the first he ever wrought) carry with 
them a certain Festivity, Alacrity, and Good Humour so remarkable, that I shou’d look upon it as
77impossible not to be mov’d in a pleasant manner at their Recital.” In Steme as in Shaftesbury 
“melancholy and Gloominess” ost relegated to the wilds of enthusiasm with its concentrations on 
judgment, self-incapacity, God as tyrant, and a world void o f intrinsic beauty: “in the main,” 
Shaftesbury comments, Christianity is “a witty and good-humoured RELIGION.”23 Sterne’s 
published sermons give no evidence that he overstepped the bounds of propriety. The examples 
we have attest to his use of wit not to get a laugh or to lessen the sacred nature o f his office, but
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to envelop his congregation in an experience that will ultimately be rewarding (S 169.9-15, 
210.13-14,257.4-7).
A few scholars recently have complained that by reiterating that Sterne’s sermons are
conventional, and by passing over Sterne’s alterations of his borrowed passages, New’s Notes to
the Sermons conceal a “Shandean” bent in the homilies. The question o f why some
contemporaries found the sermons over-laden with wit is well elaborated upon by Paul Goring
using the critique o f Thomas Weales’ The Christian Orator Delineated. However, that Weales,
in 1778, praises Tillotson’s simplicity and unity of design while blasting Steme for
impressionistic renderings should best be understood as testament to the range of opinion and
taste in the midst o f shifting styles.
[Steme] hath adulterated the word of God with a vicious mixture o f foreign or 
unnatural ornaments. Loose sparkes o f wit, luxuriant descriptions, smart 
antitheses, pointed sentiments, epigrammatical turns or expressions, are frequently 
to be met with. The great truths of the Gospel are enervated by the supernumerary 
decorations of stile and eloquence. In fine, his oratory is decked in all the glowing 
colours o f poetry, as it first appeared in Greece?*
Weales of course is welcome to his opinion, but his critical assessment is heavy-handed, if not
entirely unfair. Much to which he objects was, devotionally, what was desired and praised by
others. As noted above [pp.214-15], in the same decade in which Weales was writing, The
English Preacher (nine volumes, usually with 15 sermons in each) was issued and included two
of Sterne’s homilies. The compiler, noting the huge output of sermons in the past hundred years,
explains the purpose of such a collection in his preface:
. . .  it is then extremely desirable, that those pieces which are most excellent in 
each kind should be selected from the rest, and brought into one view .. . .
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A Collection of such discourses as shall fall in with the taste for practical 
preaching, which seems at present to be happily gaining ground, and which should 
by all means be encouraged, is therefore to be wished fo r .. . .
Moreover, the method formerly used in the division of sermons, according to 
which all the thoughts in a discourse, both leading and subordinate, were parcelled 
out in regular divisions and subdivisions, numerically distinguished, is so different 
from the present, that the best discourse in which this peculiarity is retained, 
appears formal and antiquated. And lastly, such is the variable nature o f language, 
that many words and phrases which would not formerly have been noticed, now 
appear low and inelegant.
That a Collection of Sermons may be generally acceptable, it seems therefore 
proper, that the Compiler, while he faithfully retains the sentiments and diction of 
each author, should venture to omit those parts o f a discourse which may be 
spared; to take off, in some degree, the air of formality from the ancient manner of 
dividing sermons; and occasionally to change a word or phrase which time has 
rendered obsolete or offensive.. . .
The Editor flatters himself that this publication may possibly be of use to PRIVATE 
FAMILIES, by furnishing them with a large collection of discourses on the most 
important topics of morality and religion; and to YOUNG PREACHERS, by 
exhibiting before them at one view, a great variety of the best MODELS for their 
imitation; and will, he hopes, contribute somewhat towards the support of the 
interests of religion and virtue in the world.25
Sterne’s able companions in Volume 8 are: John Tillotson, Francis Atterbury, Thomas Walker,
James Foster, Edward Owen, John Balguy, Jeremiah Seed, John Holland, William Wishart, and
Benjamin Hoadly. The editor, we should note, did not find the spirited opening to ‘Vindication of
£
Human Nature’ offensive. The text is Romans xiv.7, For none o f  us liveth to himslf. Sterne 
begins:
THERE is  not a sentence in scripture, w h ich  strikes a narrow soul w ith  greater 
astonishm ent— and one m ight as easily  engage to  clear up the darkest problem  in 
geom etry to an ignorant m ind, as m ake a sordid one com prehend the truth and
reasonableness of this plain proposition.—No man liveth to himself! Why------
Does any man live to any thing else?—In the whole compass of human life can a 
prudent man steer to a safer point?—Not live to himself!—To whom then? (S  65)
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One easily imagines Weales’ response to such poetic vigor. This editor, however, contents
himself by removing Sterne’s dashes, replacing the first with a semicolon and the third with an
exclamation mark (!). Weales’ bias for reading >£handean antics aside, Sterne’s sermons exhibit
the virtue of devotional flexibility paralleled by the Yorick of Tristram Shandy who, though
despising postured gravity, when appropriate could be most grave (TS 28.9-16).
—What a vein of indolence and indevotion sometimes seems to run throughout 
whole congregations!—what ill-timed pains do some take in putting on an air of 
gayety and indifference in the most interesting parts o f this duty [prayer],— even 
when they are making confession of their sins, as if they were ashamed to be 
thought serious with their God? (S 406.15)
MOITIE MORAL & MOITIE BUFFON
Throughout Sterne’s works we are given clues to an earnest, joyful perspective on the 
value of searching well into human nature. Professions most concerned to explicate our condition 
are naturally especially scrutinized. Throughout Sterne’s canon we have a running invective 
against the vice o f inappropriate criticism and the all-too-inhuman tendency to separate wit and 
judgment. Instead of criticism, Steme offers authentic ways of interacting with sources of 
happiness and discomfort, “trusting to the passions excited in an air sung, or a story painted to 
the heart,—instead of measuring them by a quadrant” (TS 233.16). In so doing, he exchanges 
Pharisaical modes of judgment that offer secure prepossessions, for a magnanimous fragility at 
the beck and call o f fortune’s whims. Frequently in Steme, as in life, we encounter perspectives 
broad enough to reconcile seemingly opposite extremes.
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The structure and means of Sterne’s fiction is Gothic: tippling and sober, and then
probably tippling again. He represents our condition in media capable of bearing the extremes of
that condition. His ‘beds of justice’ appropriately involve appetite—full and fasting—, as the
measure of heaven, he elsewhere explains [TIS 593.26, and concluding ‘Abuses’], for better or
worse is the measure of that faculty. By approaching us with wit and judgment both, fool’s cap
and mirror, his works lack neither vigor nor discretion;
betwixt both, I write a careless kind of a civil, non-sensical, good humoured 
Shandean book, which will do all your hearts good—
—And all your heads too, —provided you understand it. (TS 525.20)
He is, we are reminded in his letters, writing a world of nonsense, as a man of sense. Wisdom is
approached by ways that, though complementary, would initially seem to be irreconcilable.
Elizabeth Kraft concludes her chapter on Steme in Character & Consciousness with a paragraph
that calls for attention.
The three lives of his sermon on the abuses of conscience witness his commitment 
to the truth it contained, his belief in the ability o f that truth to transcend and even 
profit by the various contexts, and his desire to bring to the attention of his readers 
and followers the disjunction between himself, his various roles in life, and the 
truth he voiced by divine authority. He reveled in his celebrity, but in its comedy, 
its fundamental instability, not in anything it suggested about his importance or 
his ultimate identity. His adoption of both Yorick and Tristram as pseudonyms 
speak to the temporality of fame and the public mask, as does his lack of concern 
about the consistency of the personae. He donned each, however, to point us 
toward what he saw as the fundamental truth of human existence—mortality—and 
the fundamental truth of spiritual existence—immortality. In spite of the 
implications o f narrative and of Lockean psychology, Steme maintains that
0 Aidentity is finally a matter, not o f proof, but of faith.
As Steme indicates in the motto to the second instalment of Tristram Shandy, which 
followed upon the first set of sermons, his purpose is ‘to pass from the gay to the serious and
from the serious again to the gay’ (TS 183). That he expands his quotation to be cyclical is as 
appropriate as his borrowing it from a preface to Rabelais.27 His mottoes throughout the run o f 
TS follow this theme, so prevalent in Rabelais, of provoking readers to give him credit for being 
a jester in earnest. With the mottoes to v and vi, chiding tartuffes who are to be damned for 
knowing laughter-inciting words, he prays to be excused by those who think him excessively 
jocular. In the motto to the following instalment we have more than an excuse for the 
meanderings of Volume vii. By this time the attentive reader understands that for Steme 
digressions really are the heart and soul of writing, that in like manner what is read first as comic 
whim is in fact of central importance to his communication. As he later informs us, there is a 
“just balance betwixt wisdom and folly, without which a book would not hold together a single 
year . . .  if it is to be a digression, it must be a good frisky one, and upon a frisky subject too, 
where neither the horse or his rider are to be caught, but by rebound.” (TS 761.5)
Volume ix attests to Sterne’s fatigue at writing for misunderstanding heads. It contains 
none of the creative plagiarisms that formerly challenged the author and his readers. Its motto, a 
sort of swan song, reiterates his understanding that a more polite amusement was desired, but 
that nevertheless his friskiness was not meant “badly,” it was meant to ease, not burden the 
reader’s heart. Indeed Steme seems happy enough to hint that as the entertainment-value o f a 
novel is shared by author and reader, so too is the shock- or vice-value. “If [/!<£/] is not thought a
? o
chaste book, mercy on them that read it, for they must have warm imaginations indeed!” The
line following Tristram’s farewell to Maria, to which many have objected: “ What an
excellent inn at Moulins!” (TS 784.18), is at once testimony to the often absurd juxtaposition of
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travel-writers’ thoughts and mandates, and a very real admission of how quickly our sentimental 
and physical attachments vanish. This too is a human condition, and one can only suppose that 
those who fault the author for evoking it, would hesitate to recognize themselves in a mirror. 
Here Steme has Tristram reflect in writing how people act but wish not to feel, a lesson rehearsed
9Qin the sermons, where, for example, we are reminded “that we bear the misfortunes of others
with excellent tranquility” (S 148.10). Again, in ‘The History of Jacob considered’:
every looker-on has an interest in the tragedy;—but then we are apt to interest 
ourselves no otherwise, than merely as the incidents themselves strike our 
passions, without carrying the lesson further:—in a word—we realize nothing:— 
we sigh—we wipe away the tear,—and there ends the story of misery, and the 
moral with it. (S 207.1)
Sterne’s entertainment follows through. Recalling the bawdy undertones of the fiction for which 
he has been scolded, we do well to leave ourselves open to moral entertainment.
After creatively bewailing “imitators” via passages borrowed from Burton (TS 407-409), 
Steme shows us his difference. He is not “sneaking on at this pitiful—pimping—pettifogging 
rate” (TS 408.17) by which, as Burton had said, a “new invention” is “but some bauble or toy 
which idle fellows write, for as idle fellows to read, and who so cannot invent?” Instead we are 
offered an example o f shared-writing, “the affair of Whiskers.” Sterne’s novelty, in applying a 
horsical disease to humans continues the juxtaposition between the “mettlesome tits” and “eight 
heavy beasts” of page 407. The “chain of ideas” (TS 408.25) which leads us from “farcy” to 
“whiskers” (and for that matter back to poor Tom and into the lap of the abbess of Andouillets) is 
left “as a legacy in mort main to Prudes and Tartufs to enjoy and make the most o f ’ (TS 409.1). 
Like La Fosseuse, Steme pronounces the word with an accent that “implies something of a
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mystery” (TS 410.18). But it is our fault for being so curious. As with “nose,” the accent is not 
sensuality, but the effect of a new creation in the reader’s imagination: “the Queen went directly 
to her oratory, musing all the way, as she walked through the gallery, upon the subject; turning it 
this way and that in her fancy—Ave Maria f —what can La Fosseuse mean?” (TS 411.19). The 
queen is ourselves, led to question the full extent o f all possible meanings and effects we can 
discover. The author is not telling us who he or one of his characters is, our translations are a 
reflection of the “accessory ideas” in our own minds (TS 414.15).
Just as Locke’s Essay is presented by Tristram early in his memoirs as a history “of what 
passes in a man’s own mind” (TS 98.22), so the “cause of obscurity and confusion, in the mind of 
man” (TS 99.2) is best related by easy similes—in this instance Dolly. Locke’s use of the 
properties of wax to describe the cognitive faculties of perception and retention is used bawdily 
by Steme not primarily to establish the philosopher’s point or to titillate, but to give us a simple, 
undeniable example of the pervasive quality of the association of ideas. We jump from Locke to 
sex. The thing itself is inert, our reception of words used to describe it, and the opinions formed 
upon that foundation, will determine our interaction with it. Thus Tristram is able to say that 
Locke’s reasoning was not, in this case, the cause of Toby’s confusion. Instead it was “the 
unsteady uses of words”—“and a fertile source of obscurity it is” (TS 100.6). This is fit fodder 
for the upcoming sermon, preparing us to appreciate self-impressions as untrustworthy.
Connection between aesthetic principles, language and sex are especially present in TS. A  
few post whiskers pages, we are again reminded of the fragile nature of oratorical 
communication. The snapping o f Walter’s pipe is given as “one o f the neatest examples o f that
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ornamental figure in oratory, which Rhetoricians stile the Aposiopesis” (TS 115.22). We are told
eloquence and fame depend upon “slight touches” and “the insensible MORE or LESS”. Catching
Tristram’s nuances, and simultaneously noticing ourselves catching them, the “true swell which
gives the true pleasure” o f the book is revealed. (TS 115.25-116.2)
Steme often referred to his writing in procreative terms. Yorick and Tristram also see
their books as “children,” their work as creative reproduction. Walter, we cannot fail to have
forgotten, is unamoured with the natural vent of childbirth; and finally our suspicions that he is
equally sceptical of the manner of conception are fully endorsed. That “the race o f so great, so
exalted and godlike a Being as man” is continued “by means of a passion which bends down the
faculties, and turns all the wisdom, contemplations, and operations of the soul backwards— a
passion . . . which couples and equals wise men with fools” is what we have been hearing
throughout Tristram Shandy (TS 806.1).
He’s in good company of course, and Sterne’s alleged misogyny in this regard [as with
“mother’s milk,” above pp. 140, 148] is best clarified by recognizing his interest in representing
the effects o f passion on reason. As Swift, in “Thoughts on Religion”, explains:
although reason were intended by providence to govern our passions, yet it seems 
that, in two points o f the greatest moment to the being and continuance of the 
world, God hath intended our passions to prevail over reason. The first is, the 
propagation of our species, since no wise man ever married from the dictates of 
reason.31
That folly and wisdom are mixed or coupled by fortune, chance, or grace in all worldly 
endeavours is a fact Walter is loath to face. Passion and reason are a necessary and dangerous 
couple engendering fruitful commerce from one generation to another. This is no less a
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redemption o f passion than it is of reason; either wielded exclusively issues in dissatisfaction or
despair. Sterne’s writing is an attempt to repair the natural bridge between these elements. Like
Rabelais’, his bawdy neither excites desire nor suggests a philosophy of sexuality, it embarrasses
us into laughter and roundly reminds us o f our humble beginning and susceptibility to folly.
Drunkenness, ignorance, and bawdy are classic rungs on the ladder of wisdom. For aspiring souls
they encourage a receptivity more appropriate than premature, calculated judgment. It is
unfortunate that Erasmus has been largely absent from discussions on Steme. In explaining the
ribald nature and profitableness of his Colloquies, Erasmus wrote:
I judge it to be much better to instruct those out o f this little Book, than by 
Experience, the Mistress of Fools. . . .  I cannot tell that any Thing is leam’d with 
better Success than what is leam’d by playing: And this is in Truth a very 
harmless Sort of Fraud, to trick a Person into his own Profit. . . .
What can you do with those of a sour Disposition, and averse to all pleasant 
Discource, who think all that is friendly and merry, is unchaste. . . .
I have taken upon me to sustain the Person of a Fool, in blazoning my own Merit; 
but I have been induc’d to it, partly by the malice o f some who reproach every 
Thing, and partly for the Advantage of Christian Youth, the benefit o f whom all 
ought with their utmost Endeavour to further. . . .
But, say they, it does not become a Divine to jest; but let them grant me to do this, 
at least among Boys, which they themselves take the liberty to do among Men, in 
their Vesperiae, as they call them, a foolish Thing by a foolish Name.
An exceptional gloss on Sterne’s canon is Erasmus’ Praise o f  Folly, hinted at in the motto to
Volumes v and vi of TS and in Sterne’s early apologetical letter. The preface, to Thomas More,
makes clear this connection.
There may well be plenty of critical folk rushing in to slander it, some saying that 
my bit of nonsense is too frivolous for a theologian and others that it has a 
sarcastic bite which ill becomes Christian decorum. . . .
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If they want they can imagine I’ve been amusing myself all this time with a game 
of draughts, or riding my stick if  they like that better. How unjust it is to allow 
every other walk of life its relaxations but none at all to learning, especially when 
trifling may lead to something more serious! . . . Nothing is so trivial as treating 
serious subjects in a trivial manner; and similarly, nothing is more entertaining 
than treating trivialities in such a way as to make it clear you are doing anything 
but trifle with them.33
In the amusement that follows, the magnanimous theologian parades the extent of human 
foolishness and the value of folly to initiate accurate perspectives. To recall a few of these 
perceptive capers sheds light on the tradition from which Steme drew strength. “The life of 
man,” he writes, as if gazing at baby Tristram, “is nothing but the sport of folly.”34 And, 
anticipating Walter, it is immediately established that the “halter o f matrimony” demands 
foolishness of even the bearded stoic. Folly says what “my father” (TS 807) was never able to 
articulate: “the propagator o f the human race is that part which is so foolish and absurd that it 
can’t be named without raising a laugh. There is the true sacred fount from which everything 
draws its being, not the quartemion of Pythagoras.” Recalling Lucian’s The Cock, a further 
incarnation of Pythagoras expresses the most obvious human folly that Yorick experiences on his 
journey:
far more to be desired is the life of flies and little birds who live for the moment 
solely by natural instinct.. . .  Once they are shut in cages and taught to imitate the 
human voice all their natural brightness is dulled, for in every way nature’s 
creations are more cheerful than the falsifications o f art. And so I could never 
have enough praise for the famous cock who was Pythagoras. When he had been 
everything in turn, philosopher, man, woman, king, commoner, fish, horse, frog, 
even a sponge, I believe; he decided that man was the most unfortunate of 
animals, simply because all the others were content with their natural limitations 
while man alone tries to step outside those allotted to him.
*37Beneath this bold view of our “farce” is great optimism, rooted in reality: “nature hates any 
counterfeit, and everything turns out much more happily when it’s unspoilt by artifice.”
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The ultimate folly for all within this high tradition is love, “for anyone who loves
intensely lives not in himself but in the object o f his love. . . .  the more perfect the love, the
greater the madness—and the happier.”39 As folly continues we come to realize it is Christ, the
king o f folly, who is being praised: “because the foolishness o f God is wiser than men, and the
weakness of God is stronger than men.” (I Cor. i.25)
Christ too, though he is the wisdom of the Father, was made something of a fool 
himself in order to help the folly of mankind. . . . Nor did he wish them to be 
redeemed in any other way save by the folly of the cross and through his simple, 
ignorant apostles, to whom he unfailingly preached folly. He taught them to shun 
wisdom, and made his appeal through the example of children, lilies, mustard- 
seed and humble sparrows, all foolish, senseless things, which live their lives by 
natural instinct alone, free from care and purpose.40
For this reason Tristram devotes a chapter to praising the communicative provocations o f
an ass (TS 629-632). No other animal is appropriate, not because of some bawdy connection or
sentimental attachment, but because the donkey is, historically, the comic beast of humility. Thus
Erasmus: “Christ seems to have taken special delight in little children, women and fishermen,
while the dumb animals who gave him the greatest pleasure were those furthest removed from
cleverness and cunning. So he preferred to ride a donkey.”41 Tristram’s and Yorick’s
presentations of sentiment and conversation with this beast of burden continue to be grossly
misinterpreted, so it is useful to lift a page from Walter Kaiser’s fine study of folly in Erasmus,
Rabelais, and Shakespeare. We pick up near the end of his chapter on Panurge, and the
significance of Her Trippa. References are to Agrippa’s De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum
etArtium  [1529], the first and third paragraphs being paraphrased translations.42
It is because learning frustrates our approach to this truth that Christ was rejected 
by the learned scribes and pharisees and received by fools, idiots, and children.
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And it is because of their ability to approach the Word directly that Christ chose 
as his disciples ignorant common people, the unread, the unlearned, and the asses 
(e rudi vulgo idiotas, omnis literaturae expertes, inscios et asinos [11.241]).
The last word here provides Agrippa with the subject of his penultimate chapter,
‘Ad Encomium asini Digressio’ (CII), which was probably suggested by Stultitia’s 
concluding encomium o f the Fool in Christ and which in turn may have suggested 
Giordano Bruno’s encomium of the Asino Cillenico at the end of his Spaccio 
della bestia trionfante. The ass, o f course, is nothing less than the fool in Christ, 
with no pretense to learning but with a simplicity o f heart, lack o f pride, patience, 
and an endurance of persecution that make him, as Agrippa says, more than any 
other animal capable of divinity. It is upon this symbol of the fool, the ass, the 
pure in spirit, that Agrippa brings his long treatise to a close, extolling not the 
learned, but the ‘gens de bien’ who are able to approach God. Just as Stultitia’s 
message was summed up in her portrait o f the Fool in Christ, so Agrippa’s is 
finally contained in his evocation o f that foolish creature who has challenged the 
imagination from Philo to Tolstoy, the ass of Balaam, symbol o f the wisdom of 
ignorance:
For when that prophet and learned man Balaam went forth to curse the people of 
Israel, he did not see the angel of the Lord, but his ass did and spoke to Balaam 
his rider with a human voice. Thus often a rude and simple idiot sees what the 
scholastic doctor, corrupted with human learning, is unable to see.
It is the scholastic doctor who is the simple idiot; it is Balaam, as Ronald Knox 
was fond of observing, who was the ass.43
Lacking appreciation for the historical and scriptural context, pointing to Sterne’s use of
the term ASS and to his use o f names such as Jenny and Toby to suggest it, scholars have
naturally turned to their buttocks for clarification. Juliet McMaster, for instance, calls attention to
Sterne’s use of St. Hilarion’s appellation o f his body as an ass (TS 715.14-21), suggesting:
this explanation of the ass as the body (particularly the lowest end of it) comes 
late in the novel; but it accounts for the prominence of all those horses, hobby­
horses, asses, mules, donkeys, jackasses, and jennys that cavort their quadruped 
way through Tristram Shandy: Yorick’s Rosinante, Tristram’s mule that he rides 
through France when he is in flight from death, and Don Diego’s mule, which he 
addresses alternately with his beloved Julia, in Slawkenbergius’s Tale. The 
Abbess o f Andouillets neatly reverses the story of St Hilarion by exhorting her
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mules to “bou-ger” and "fou-ter,” words which she has heard “will force any 
horse, or ass, or mule, to go up a hill.” Tristram holds a conversation with an ass 
in an entrance-way in Lyons: “with an ass,” he claims, “I can commune forever.” 
Sterne’s characters, that is to say, are in constant communion with the flesh. 
Tristram implores his reader not to confuse his hobby-horse with Walter’s ass, but 
the request is about as disingenuous as the claim that a nose means a nose and 
nothing else. The relation of the rider to his hobby-horse, carefully explained, is 
yet another metaphor for the mind’s relation to the body; and both sink inevitably 
towards the unmentionable.44
Elizabeth Kraft recalls Tristram’s conversation with the ass in Lyons concluding that the
sympathy therein is “self-flattery, for Tristram reads into the ass’s face the conversation he
wishes to hold. . . .  To his credit, Steme finds such a relationship ludicrous.”45 Twenty pages
later, addressing the dead ass that diverts Yorick and La Fleur in ASJ, Kraft writes:
the mourner’s lament prompts Yorick to say to himself, “Did we love each other, 
as this poor soul but loved his ass—’twould be something.” Yorick’s insight is as 
old as the gospels; it is, in fact, a comic restatement of the second “great 
commandment” (Matthew 22:36-39): Each of us should love the world as he 
loves his own ass. More decorously put, in the words o f Christ, we should love 
our neighbour as we love ourselves. This sentiment is not a cold moral principle 
but one that is underwritten by the emotions. And it is best understood in 
spontaneous bursts of feeling for another, as Yorick’s later adventures 
demonstrate.46
A fitting moral for Steme, but there is more to it, and Kraft herself almost hits it between those
two passages when she refers to Tristram’s query of Maria, whether she finds any resemblance
between himself and her goat. Checking his wit in the presence of sorrow, Tristram gives us the
nod to look a little higher than we may be inclined for the significance of such allusions:
I do intreat the candid reader to believe me, that it was from the humblest
conviction of what a Beast man is, that I ask’d the question; and that I would
not have let fallen an unseasonable pleasantry in the venerable presence of Misery, 
to be entitled to all the wit that ever Rabelais scatter’d—  (TS 784.1)
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To those familiar with the tradition informing Sterne’s presentations, the statement “what a Beast
man is” is significant. We are returned, here at the close of Tristram Shandy, to the basic
principles of a humble, compassionate perspective. The scriptural precedent, popular with
Sterne’s contemporaries, is, as might be expected, in the book of Job.
Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto 
perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? Deeper than hell; what 
canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than 
the sea. If he cut off, and shut up, or gather together, then who can hinder him?
For he knoweth vain men: he seeth wickedness also; will he not then consider it?
For vain man would be wise, though man be bom like a wild ass’s colt.
(Job xi.7-12)
Alongside the importance of Agrippa’s testimony to the sanctified ass, we should be
made aware of the familiarity Sterne’s contemporaries had with the image of man as a wild ass,
and of its root in the inscrutable nature of divinity for mortals. Such understanding reinforces
Sterne’s place in the tradition o f humble access or “fideistic scepticism.” Alexander Pope glosses
line 16 of his Essay, “But vindicate the ways of God to man,” writing “main Drift of ye Whole,
Justification of ye Ways of Provi,” and “ 16. Verse, To ye Subject wch runs thro ye Whole
Design, Justification of ye Methods of Providence.” Noting this, Harry Solomon suggests “a
primary connective in Pope’s mind is Bishop William Sherlock’s enormously popular Discourse
Concerning the Divine Providence (1694).” Solomon continues:
Sherlock rails against philosophers who “are impatient to think, that God should 
do any thing which they cannot understand,” citing the verse from Job that “Vain 
man would be wise, tho man be bom like a wild asses colt.” He argues that “this 
is a matter of such vast consequence, to silence the Sceptical Humour of the Age, 
and to shame those trifling and ridiculous Pretenses to Wit and Philosophy, in 
Censuring the Wisdom and Justice of Providence, that it deserves a more 
particular Discourse.” Pope’s manuscript notes to line sixteen make it clear that he 
characterized the initial epistle as just such a discourse. Sherlock especially
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recommends stressing the limits of human reason: “There is not one thing in 
Nature, which they do understand: And if we cannot understand the Mysteries of 
Nature, why should we expect to understand all the unsearchable Depths and 
Mysteries of providence?” This tradition of apologetics inherited from the Hebrew 
scriptures and recently reinscribed in Matthew Prior’s Solomon reaches its 
eighteenth-century acme shortly after publication of Pope’s Essay in Joseph 
Butler’s Analogy o f  Nature [i.e. Religion] (1736). Immediately above his gloss to 
line sixteen on the Houghton manuscript, Pope notes the “Limits of Reason” as 
one theme of the “second book”; and near the beginning of Epistle II, Pope uses 
Isaac Newton as an example of the metaphysical blindness of even those who 
have seen most deeply into the mysteries of nature:
Superior Beings, when of late they saw 
A mortal man unfold all Nature’s law,
Admir’d such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And shew’d a N ewton as we shew an Ape.
Could he, whose rules the rapid Comet bind,
Describe or fix one movement o f his Mind?
Revelatory of his debt, on the manuscript o f Epistle II immediately beneath these 
lines on Newton, Pope has interlineated the identical verse cited by Sherlock:
“Job. Man is as a wild ass.”47
Indeed the Son of Man is recorded as having entered Jerusalem “meek, sitting upon an ass, and a
colt the foal o f an ass” (Matt.xxi.5). Jesus, we recall, without education, as a child and as a man
confronted the established opinions, the mother’s milk of his environment, and the irony was not
lost on his apostles.
Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath 
not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of 
God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness o f 
preaching to save them that believe.. . .
But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and 
God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are 
mighty. (I Cor. i. 20,27)
This tradition of God thwarting human systems of strength is as old as the expulsion from 
Eden and the destruction of Babel. Each of the prominent players in scripture’s vast theatre is an
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unlikely hero by ordinary criteria and this is explicitly reiterated to signify the grace o f God 
overarchingly active in human frailty. This is why Leigh Hunt is correct to call Uncle Toby the 
“high and only final Christian gentleman.”48 For Toby is presented as a fool in Christ.
As we saw in his use of ‘sources’ for his sermons, so in his fiction Steme is not shy of 
undercutting the wisdom o f  this world by referring to popular theories and the great names behind 
them with a measure of censure. Locke was bubbled regarding wit and judgment. Burton’s 
castigation of war is tempered in Toby’s oration, and Burton’s enquiry into the ins and outs of 
“what love is” is exposed as comically insufficient (TS 557; 563). Plato is blasted for allowing 
himself a “monstrous liberty in arguing,” his opinion that love is below a man is pronounced 
“damnable and heretical” (TS 563.14; 565.14). These lead us to the blank page, upon which we 
are encouraged to paint an object of love, and to the following pages of squiggly lines, by which 
we are to appreciate Tristram’s digressive progress. We have been led from the black page of 
death, through the motley chaos of our interpretations to the white sheet with which to please our 
fancy (TS 566). Intellectual cabbage-planters will scarce be able to participate in the adventure. 
Pmdes and Tartuffes, wormed out of the woodwork in criticizing Sterne’s diversions, proclaim 
themselves incapable of life’s variety. Of course one o f the beauties of human nature is that few 
self-styled anythings are adamantly so. Steme appreciates Plato, Burton and Locke, builds with 
their folly and their wisdom. Though Walter is the epitome o f the incapable knower, he is 
inspired to claim “every thing in this world . . .  is big with jest,—and has wit in it, and instmction 
too,—if we can but find it out” (TS 470.1). But because his manner of ‘finding’ is unmatched to
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his quarry, he is incredulous with Trim’s naive but practical commentary on the fifth 
commandment.
SYMPATHY AND GRACE
Christian faith is not knowledge per se. One is provoked to worship an invisible Person and 
engage in self-sacrifice without assurance of tangible recompense. While steering clear o f abuses, 
fit worship retains “external parts” (S  63.29) that “tend to excite and assist it” (S 63.32). Thus an 
experience may develop from rhetoric. Steme pivots his communication on this need to transcend 
Smelfungus’ incapacity to relish pleasure. As noted above, the proposition that one’s faculties need 
appropriately to be tuned to the object to be enjoyed was reiterated by divines, most of whom use it 
along the lines of Yorick in ASJ, that the enjoyment of heaven is impossible to one who is not 
aligned with its principles here below.
We may appreciate how this is appropriate to Sterne’s artful manner of presenting a realistic 
view of our condition when we notice its frequency in contemporaiy homilies. George Fothergill, in 
his sermon ‘The Pleasantness of a good life’, for example, writes, “gratification is a relative thing, 
depending not absoloutly on the outward objects themselves, but on their suitableness to the 
faculties employed about them.”49 Clearly the sentiment is not merely a neoplatonic hangover, or 
quaint conceit of poetic divines. Phillip Doddridge picks up the phrase in his Practical Discourses 
on Regeneration:
I know, sinners, it will be one of the most difficult things in the world, to bring you 
to a serious persuasion of this truth. You think heaven is so lovely, and so glorious a 
place, that if  you could possibly get an admittance thither, you should certainly be 
happy. But I would now set myself, if possible, to convince you that . . . that
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unrenewed nature and unsanctified heart of yours, would give you a disrelish for all 
the sublimest entertainments of that blisful place, and turn heaven into a kind of hell. 50to you.
Sterne’s interest in this concept of sympathy is not limited to our relatively passive 
reception and extension of phenomena. If one is to live with integrity, released from the hypocrisy 
inevitable to the inconsiderately inclined, one must especially endeavour to make one’s inner and 
outer ‘person’ coincide with a pattern of heavenly virtue. “In vain shall we celebrate the day with a 
loud voice, and with shouting, and with trumpets,—if we do not do it likewise with the internal and 
more certain marks of sincerity,—a reformation and purity in our manners” (S 382.25). The 
development of sincerity and clarity of the inner man is important, but it is vain to think one’s 
responsibility is exempt from manifestations. “External behaviour is the result o f inward reverence, 
and is therefore part of our duty to God, whom we are to worship in body as well as spirit” (S 
406.6). In short,
we find such a strong sympathy and union between our souls and bodies. . . .  to 
argue against this strict correspondence . . .  is disputing against the frame and 
mechanism of human nature.— We are not angels, but men cloathed with bodies, 
and, in some measure, governed by our imaginations, that we have need of all these 
external helps which nature has made the interpreters of our thoughts. (S 402.14-24)
It is clear that for Steme visible elements can raise us to appreciate their suggested invisible
counterparts, and that our interactions with each other and God must take into account this
sympathy. Thus Henry More:
HENCE it appears, that all the animal Instincts and Impulses do belong to the Region 
of Nature, and are but imperfect Shadows and Footsteps of the Divine Wisdom and 
Goodness, which vouchsafes as in this manner to glimmer in the dark. . . .
Wherefore if we can but skill our Passions aright, They are as lamps or Beacons, to 
conduct and excite us to our Journey’s end.51
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Steme builds on these notions of sympathy to turn the pessimism inherent in accounts such
as Doddridge’s to more hopeful horizons. With appropriate catalysts a person may be brought to
develop a disposition that will appreciate the virtues of heaven. In his sermon ‘The excellency of
Charity above Faith and Hope’ John Conybeare writes:
our nature itself must be reformed before we are capable of those pleasures, which 
are suited only to an innocent, or to a reformed, nature. Now this is done by the 
introduction of Charity; by implanting and cultivating in us an ardent desire of the 
good of others; — that principle which renders us most like God himself, —  and 
teaches us to practice every virtue whereby we may serve ourselves or others.
Christianity “in its doctrine, its precepts, and its examples, has a proper tendency to make us
a virtuous and a happy people;—every page is an address to our hearts to win them to these
purposes” (S 253.26). “Religion ever implies a freedom o f choice” (S 254.2), and this freedom,
Steme shows us throughout the sermons, is comprehensive. In ‘Asa’ Steme reiterates what he
consistently implies: “men are apt to be struck with likenesses in so different a manner, from the
different points of view in which they stand, as well as their diversity of judgments, that it is
generally a very unacceptable piece of officiousness to fix any certain degrees of approach” (S
381.31). Montaigne, in his exquisite apology for scepticism makes clear the difficulty of true faith:
’tis Faith alone, that lively and certainly comprehends the deep Mysteries o f our 
Religion___
We must here do the same, and accompany our Faith with all the Reason we have, 
but always with this Reservation, not to fancy that it is upon us that it depends, nor 
that our Arguments and Endeavours can arrive at so supernatural and Divine a 
Knowledge. If it enters not into us by an extraordinary Infusion; if  it only enters, not 
only by Arguments o f Reason, but moreover, by human Ways, it is not in us, in its 
true Dignity and Splendour; and yet, I am afraid we only have it by this way. If we 
laid hold upon God by the Meditation of a lively Faith: if  we laid hold of God by 
him, and not by us: If we had a Divine Basis and Foundation, human Accidents
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would not have the power to shake us as they do; our Fortress {pace Toby] would 
not surrender to so weak a battery.
Thus St. Paul, after establishing the redeeming quality of folly, clarifies the value of this necessaiy
extraordinary infusion'.
and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man’s wisdom, but 
in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: That your faith should not stand in the 
wisdom of men, but in the power of God. (I Cor.ii.4-5)
Christianity properly presented is therefore not a catalogue of inflexible regulations and dogma, but
fundamentally a development of “a true sense of our dependence, and of the mercies by which we
are upheld” (S 400.26). Because the religion is founded on individuals encountering historical fact
established within them, the essence of it transcends the mere moralizing of philosophers and the
regulations of judges. Steme would remind us that righteous development is enabled by grace:
that the necessities of society, and the impossibilities o f its subsisting otherwise, 
would point out the convenience, or if you will,—the duty of social virtues, is 
unquestionable:—but I firmly deny, that therefore religion and morality are 
independent of each other: they appear so far from it, that I cannot conceive how the 
one, in the true and meritorious sense of the duty, can act without the influence of 
the other: surely the most exalted motive which can only be depended upon for the 
uniform practice of virtue,—must come down from above. (S 252.6)
The reunification of religion and morality is central to Sterne’s vision of a happy, or at least
most likely to be contented, individual. Without a due sense of the nature o f God and of one’s
position with relation to the divine, one is bound incorrectly to relate to one’s self and surroundings.
The simple concluding advice of Solomon is that of Steme as well: “he advises every man who
would be happy, to fear God and keep his commandments” (S 11.21). Commandments without fear
of God become divorced from their original intent, and fear o f God without active morality
becomes hypocrisy.
Only by anchoring one’s faith in the omniscient God of providence, Steme suggests, may 
one escape the illusions inherent in the tendency to judge, by appearances, what cannot be 
fathomed. It is important to acknowledge this accent in his sermons. The title of sermon 7, 
4 Vindication of Human Nature’ might suggest a confident humanism, but he points us elsewhere. 
Human nature is ‘vindicated’ precisely because of its root and participation in the nature of God. 
The best in our natures, courage and compassion, originates in God and suggests a universal bond 
of mutual dependence: 44to the honour o f human nature, the scripture teaches us, that God made 
man upright” (S 67.20); “with what impressions he is come out o f the hands of G od,—with the very 
bias upon his nature, which prepares him for the character, which he was designed to fulfil” (S 
68.28); “God having founded that in him, as a provisional security to make him social” (S 69.7); “he 
is but an instrument in the hands of G od to provide for the well-being of others, to serve their 
interest as well as his own” (S 71.1); “so closely has our creator link’d us together, (as well as all 
other parts of his works) for the preservation of that harmony in the frame and system of things 
which his wisdom has at first established.” (S 72.8)
Following Sterne’s theological map we should note his insistence on the activity of God 
through Christ as the necessary catalyst enabling persons to live according to the image within 
which they were created. The communications o f God with humans, whether initially involving 
comfort or affliction, are poised ultimately to benefit the human recipient. From what we have seen 
of the importance of tangible communication for Steme, it is not difficult to imagine his sense of 
reverence for an incarnated God: “this is my body which is given for you” (Luke xxii.19). To settle 
religion and happiness on a base of holiness and humility, established not on earth but in heaven,
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Christ came down from heaven and assumed the form of a servant. The temper of Christianity was 
sympathetically established by the temper of its instigator (S 341.17-342.16). Regardless of how 
frequently rehearsed, Steme finds it useful to engage us with the ramifications of this kenosis. By 
sincere interaction with an image of the saviour, Steme tries most effectively to communicate his 
Gospel. “The consideration of this stupendous instance of compassion, in the Son of G od, is the 
most unanswerable appeal that can be made to the heart of man, for the reasonableness of it in 
himself’ (S 52.6). To perfect “the most refined and generous pitch of virtue, human nature can 
arrive at. . . .  we must call in to our aid that more spiritual and refined doctrine introduced upon it 
by Christ” (S 120.18; 121.2).
Jesus was fundamentally conversational; we remember how he engaged the lawyer (Luke 
x.25-30). Though equal with God, his manners were not sensational. He did not presume to 
manipulate persons by offering more than half a conversation. Hints of profound religious 
importance were presented to ordinary people through story, parable, and symbolic acts of 
compassion; theological argument being reserved to correct abuses of religious systems. Common 
congregations were simply and mysteriously invited to follow their hearts. As theologian T. W. 
Manson writes, “the true parable . . .  is not an illustration to help one through a theological 
discussion; it is rather a mode of religious experience.”54 And, as M.A. Screech reminds us, 
“parables are not ways of revealing religious truths to simple understandings; they are ways of 
hiding it from everybody except those to whom God chooses to unfold their meaning.”55 The 
Gospel was initially presented not as argument or treatise, but mysteriously in simplicity through
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example and experience. Steme, within the sceptical and latitudinarian traditions, is comfortable
maintaining this priority.
Concluding ‘Abuses’ he notes that judging the merit of a notion by its fruit is a short and
decisive rule left by our Saviour “worth a thousand arguments” (S  266.3). This virtue of a religious
touchstone becomes eminently practical if we consider our tendency to resonate with virtuous
images, of which Christ is chief. Regarding humility, again we are confronted with
the most unanswerable appeal that can be made to the heart o f man . . . every 
believer must receive some tincture o f the character or bias towards it from the 
example of so great, and yet so humble a Master, whose whole course of life was a 
particular lecture to this one virtue. (S 240.1)
It is interesting that in the lines immediately above these, Steme, with a favorite image from
painting, presents Jesus exhorting his disciples “to copy the fair original he had set them of this
virtue, and to learn o f  him to be meek and lowly in heart” (S 239.30)
For Steme the direct appeal of Christ is of value not only as the supreme example of the
virtues leading to integrity and happiness, but, as the Son of God and by way of the Holy Spirit,
Christ enables believers to fulfill the otherwise impossible elements o f these virtues. He has
instigated a way of reflection that enables one to search one’s self (using will and reason) in such a
way as to generate experiences o f truth rather than mere assent to platitudes. The example of his
life, and the w isdom  o f  his reflections, speaks “more to the heart” and has “m ore coercion . . .  than
all the see-saws of philosophy” (S 181.30). This holds true for inner virtues, redeeming our clouded
self-knowledge, and for the outward acts of charity that follow:
by reflecting upon the infinite labour o f  this day’s love, in the instance o f  CHRIST’S 
death, w e m ay consider w hat an im m ense debt w e  ow e each other: and by calling to
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mind the amiable pattern of his life, in doing good, we might learn in what manner 
we may best discharge it. (S 52.16)
Thus for all his relish of worldly refreshments, Steme still exhorts us to maintain the 
perspective o f heaven. He suggests that the way to self-knowledge and accurate interaction with 
present circumstances depends upon a cooperation with the spirit of Christ exemplified in humility, 
compassion, and healthy unattachment to the fugitive glories of this world. The otherwise abortive 
attempts of stoical philosophy to tread this least grievous of paths are finally vindicated by an 
effective empowering which is the property of a well-placed faith. It is only on the ground of this 
faith that the cooperation of religion and morality may be established with a root of compassion, 
maintaining the courage and strength necessary to meet subsequent demands. “—Blessed Jesus! 
how can the man who calls upon thy name, but learn of thee to be meek and lowly in heart?—how 
can he but profit when such a lesson was seconded—by such an example” (S 240.29).
Though this theology is explicated, we are not to lose appreciation for the mystery at its 
heart. Steme goes on to say that the cooperation of our wills and the “inspiration of G od’s spirit” 
within us is so intermixed that it would be presumptuous to attempt to distinguish between the 
effects of “the efforts and determinations of our own reason” and those of the Spirit (S 241.31- 
242.2). Religion and morality, faith and reason, are servants to the “stupendous instance o f 
compassion” which is ultimately the greatest riddle and parable. As these guides are not to be 
forced, many neglect them: “the fact is, mankind are not always in a humour to be convinced” (S 
216.21). However, without the opportunity offered by God through Christ, “the world would be 
infinitely worse;—and therefore we cannot sufficiently bless and adore the goodness of God, for 
these advantages brought by the coming of Christ” (S 321.15).
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Regarding the fruits o f a faithful life, we should note the renewal of individual integrity, a
redemption of the proportionate alignment of body, mind and spirit. Physical and moral happiness
is presented as dependant upon having one’s mind wrought with the corresponding virtues of God.
As this is accomplished, one eventually comes to enjoy the blessings of life, as one’s receptive
faculty is reoriented in sympathy with the blessings as they were actually intended to be enjoyed:
—without some previous similitude wrought in the faculties of the mind, 
corresponding with the nature of the purest of beings, who is to be the object of our 
fruition hereafter;—it is not morally only, but physically impossible for it to be 
happy. (S 278.25)
We are returned to the theme of inherent correspondences and the necessity of incorporating them
well to fulfil the purpose for which God gave us birth (S 97.23).
This gradual conversion to our simple natures as rooted in God allows the original image
unlimited prominence in the life of an individual. Acting according to intimations of this principle
enables the “settled principles” of humanity, goodness, and generosity to operate without hindrance
from inhibiting ruling passions, in the Samaritan (S 27.11) and Joseph (S 115.12). These same
principles are made sure and more explicit by the activity of Christ, instigator of “that more spiritual
and refined doctrine” (S' 121.3). Just as the works o f Christ were more effective than rhetoric on his
contemporaries, so actions of the devout will involve a similar integrity. They will be known by
their fruits and need no human commission to prove their worth. The wisdom from above, Steme
uses St. James to say,
is pure, peaceable, gentle, full of mercy, without partiality, without hypocrisy. . . . 
alike and consistent with itself in all its parts; like its great author, ’tis universally 
kind and benevolent in all cases and circumstances. Its first glad tydings, were peace 
upon earth, good will towards men; its chief comer stone, its most distinguishing 
character is love, that kind principle which brought it down, in the pure exercise of
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which consists the chief enjoyment of heaven from whence it came. (S  105.26- 
106.2; cf. Jas. iii.17)
The true Christian, Steme reminds us, will be in sympathy with this, consistent in the way of 
heaven that, though often mysterious and seemingly contradictory, is manoeuvred by the best of 
beings with perfect intent. On this note, finally, we come to the key to Sterne’s fiction: the amours 
o f Uncle Toby.
UNCLE TOBY
In line with scripture, Sterne’s sermons and novels incorporate elements o f the heroic —  
in weakness, dressed in common garb. Yorick and Tristram, in a way inseparable from their 
author, introduce us to his saint. The campaigns of uncle Toby are the salt o f Steme, the man 
himself the standard by which characters and readers may be measured. Toby’s colossal 
simplicity, unwavering faith and generous compassion confound all manner o f counterfeit living, 
including immoderate judgment of those manners. Yorick, Tristram, Walter and Trim all bow to 
him as a significant presence, so it is good to try to plumb the aspects of Sterne’s presentation of 
this singular character.
One o f Toby’s chief recourses in matters of philosophy or surprise is the Argumentum 
Fistulatorium (TS 78-9). Juxtaposed to Walter’s many systems we come to appreciate its virtues. 
Variously we are told and shown that Toby is the antithesis of scholasticism. Capable of logic 
and rhetoric he nevertheless troubles himself little with matters even of common speculation. 
Happily he admits his ignorance: “I know no more of calculations than this balluster... 
[THWACK]” (TS 335.5). Unlike Walter (and Tristram) “he had as little skill, honest man, in the
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fragments, as he had in the whole pieces of antiquity” (TS 423.3). But this does not keep him
from acting well, even when abused.
—That’s impossible, cried my uncle Toby.—Simpleton! said my father,— ’twas 
forty years before Christ was bom.
My uncle Toby had but two things for it; either to suppose his brother to be the 
wandering Jew, or that his misfortunes had disordered his brain.— “May the Lord 
God of heaven and earth protect him and restore him,” said my uncle Toby, 
praying silently for my father, and with tears in his eyes. (T S 423.18)
With the prevalence of time in the novels, it is o f importance to recall “my uncle Toby was no
chronologer” (TS 443.3). And this can be understood as widely as possible, for the more we learn
of Toby, the more he seems literally to be out of this world. Walter, on his best behavior, trots
out a little Locke:
to understand what time is aright, without which we never can comprehend 
infinity, insomuch as one is a portion of the other,—we ought seriously to sit 
down and consider what idea it is, we have of duration, so as to give a satisfactory 
account, how we came by it.— What is that to any body? quoth my uncle Toby.
(TS 224.4)56
Toby’s smoak-jack, like the Decalogue on Sinai, smoldering in clouds and thick darkness, 
gradually seems a more suitable medium for terrestrial conjectures. To Walter’s credit, in his 
sober moments, he almost admits it: “—there is a worth in thy honest ignorance, brother Toby, 
— ’twere almost a pity to exchange it for a knowledge.” Though he fails himself to unlearn: “— 
—But I’ll tell thee. —” (TS 224.1).
Toby is blessed with this ‘ignorance,’ and to his credit maintains it steadfast. “—My 
uncle Toby could not philosophize upon it; ’twas enough he felt it was so” (TS 95.25). More than 
this, he acts upon such feelings. Ordinarily a character incapable of philosophy acting on feeling
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flashes red in Sterne’s reader’s mind, but with Toby we are going elsewhere. The terminus is his
amour, presented in simplicity.
The world is ashamed of being virtuous—My uncle Toby knew little of the 
world; and therefore when he felt he was in love with the widow Wadman, he had 
no conception that the thing was any more to be made a mystery of, than if Mrs. 
Wadman, had given him a cut with a gap’d knife across his finger. (TS 711.1)
As the situation continues we eavesdrop on another conversation at Shandy Hall, on the subject
of love. It is a fine scene, complete with one of the many gestures of fraternal affection that
incorporate what is being said: “my uncle Toby stole his hand unperceived behind his chair, to
give my father’s a squeeze—” (TS 719.8). Again, we are given a glimpse of where Toby’s lack of
philosophy got him:
there is at least, said Yorick, a great deal of reason and plain sense in Captain 
Shandy’s opinion of love; and ’tis amongst the ill spent hours of my life which I 
have to answer for, that I have read so many flourishing poets and rhetoricians in 
my time, from whom I never could extract so much— (TS 720.6)
But Walter is astride, platonically cantering, and cannot “stop to answer” that question by now
we knew would be asked “—Pray brother, quoth my uncle Toby, what has a man who believes in
God to do with this?” (TS 720.24) This refrain is the libretto of his whistling. At every significant
moment this is Toby’s question to himself and to those with whom he shares the stage. Not
words but action, not confusion but faith, not sentiment but practicality: these support Toby’s
frame. Tristram is familiar with this perspective. He counteracts one vexation by an extravagant
sally in another direction. Wisely he refrains from philosophizing on this oft-revisited quality:
we know not why—But mark, madam, we live amongst riddles and mysteries— 
the most obvious things, which come in our way, have dark sides, which the 
quickest sight cannot penetrate into; and even the clearest and most exalted 
understandings amongst us find ourselves puzzled and at a loss in almost every
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cranny of nature’s works; so that this, like a thousand other things, falls out for us 
in a way, which tho’ we cannot reason upon it,—yet we find the good of it, may it 
please your reverences and your worships—and that’s enough for us. (TS 350.10)
To the Walters of this world, “that’s enough for us” is “cutting the knot” (TS 332.22), but
the rest of us are thereby taught to know better. It smacks of wishful thinking, simply to transfer
the riddles to another realm and rest assured, but, particularly through Toby, Sterne asks that we
consider faith to be the reconciliation of quest with ultimate response. O f course, this is the
classic Christian sceptical stance. As George Berkeley says concluding his sermon preached
before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in 1731.
The Christian religion was calculated for the bulk of mankind, and therefore 
cannot reasonably be supposed to consist in subtle and nice notions. From the 
time that divinity was considered as a science, and human reason enthroned in the 
sanctuary of God, the hearts o f its professors seem to have been less under the 
influence of grace. . . . Doubtless, the making religion a notional thing hath been 
of infinite disservice. And whereas its holy mysteries are rather to be received 
with humility of faith, than defined and measured by the accuracy of human 
reason; all attempts of this kind, however well intended, have visibly failed in the 
event; and, instead of reconciling infidels, have, by creating disputes and heats
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among the professors of Christianity, given no small advantage to its enemies.
Joseph Butler echoes the same sentiments in his sermon ‘Upon the Ignorance of Man’.
Men of deep research and curious inquiry should just be put in mind, not to 
mistake what they are doing. If their OiscoW 'ts  serve the cause of virtue and 
religion, in the way of proof, motive to practice, or assisstance in it; or if they tend 
to render life less unhappy, and promote its satisfactions; then they are most 
usefully employed.. .  . But it is evident that there is another mark set up for us to 
aim at; another end appointed us to direct our lives to: an end which the most 
knowing may fail of, and the most ignorant arrive at. . . . The only knowledge 
which is of any avail to us is that which teaches us our duty, or assists us in the 
discharge of it.58
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What by all reasonable accounts would be poverty in Toby’s understanding is no grounds
for alarm. A true soldier, he has learned the value of life, and of a grateful, contented disposition.
Speaking of the young Le Fever’s sword he says:
’tis all the fortune, my dear Le Fever, which God has left thee; but if  he has given 
thee a heart to fight thy way with it in the world,— and thou doest it like a man of 
honour,— ’tis enough for us. (TS 518.3)
Faith supports Toby, and he becomes a conduit for its strength to others. In this realm he is no
enthusiast. He “never spoke o f the being and natural attributes o f God, but with diffidence and
hesitation—” (TS 692.9). When he does speak, defending God’s compassion in refusing a port to
Bohemia for example, his suggestions are noble, if fit for a God who looks at the heart. This
composure is effective:
it is one of the most unaccountable problems that ever I met with in my 
observations of human nature, that nothing should prove my father’s mettle so 
much, or make his passions go off so like gun-powder, as the unexpected strokes 
his science met with from the quaint simplicity of my uncle Toby’s questions.—
’Twas all one to my uncle Toby,—he smoaked his pipe on, with unvaried 
composure,—his heart never intended offence to his brother,—and as his head 
could seldom find out where the sting of it lay,—he always gave my father the 
credit of cooling by himself. (TS 283.15-284.3)
So Walter nods and proceeds— after saying that but for the “aids of philosophy, which befriend
one so much” he could not bear Toby’s inattention—to explain the “causes of short and long
noses,” to which Toby confidently replies:
—There is no cause but one . .  . because that God pleases to have it so . . .  ’Tis he 
. . . who makes us all, and frames and puts us together in such forms and 
proportions, and for such ends, as is agreeable to his infinite wisdom.— ’Tis a 
pious account, cried my father, but not philosophical,—there is more religion in it 
than sound science. ’Twas no inconsistent part of my uncle Toby’s character,— 
that he feared God and reverenced religion.—So the moment my father finished
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his remark,—my uncle Toby fell a whistling Lillabullero, with more zeal (though 
more out of tune) than usual.— (TS 284.17)
Then, as if we had forgotten Walter’s incapacity for sound activity, “what is become of my wife’s
thread-paper?”
In a nutshell we have the faith o f Toby, impenetrable to the passionate, systematic 
artillery of proud ‘science.’ This is no isolated anecdote. Toby’s simplest of philosophies buoys 
the family. We remember him, untalented with words, silently bearing Walter’s grief over 
Tristram’s nose. It is not the full hour and a half o f self-indulgence, but the benignity o f Toby’s 
countenance that melts down the ice of Walter’s grief “in a moment” (TS 327.6-328.4). This does 
not quench Walter’s sorrow but it releases his tongue towards what for him will be somewhat of 
a catharsis. Humorously enough, for all beside himself, Walter breaks the silence echoing the 
weeping prophet Jeremiah; naturally Toby cannot help bringing him back to earth with an 
anecdote of misfortunes worth “lying down and crying over” (TS 329.22). When Walter is given 
a chance to resume his oration, again he echoes scripture in the commonplace list of the dark side 
of affliction that men must undergo in this world. And again Toby cannot help correcting him. 
Toby has come to terms with the fact that life under the sun does not proceed according to one’s 
calculated philosophy, and, though events may seem to contradict doctrine, this should, in a 
world where even soldiery is necessary, be no cause to doubt providence. Wounded Toby says he 
was not bom to “eat the bread of affliction,” and neither is it by any “hidden resources” of his 
mind that he is able to stand it out and bear up under the “cross reckonings and sorrowful items 
with which the heart of man is over-charged” (TS 332.1-15). No:
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’tis by the assistance of Almighty God . . .— ’tis not from our own strength, 
brother Shandy—a sentinel in a wooden centry-box, might as well pretend to 
stand it out against a detachment o f fifty men,—we are upheld by the grace and 
the assistance of the best of Beings. (TS 332.15)
Walter, then, seeking instead to untie this knot, assumes Raphael’s pose o f Socrates to proclaim
as we have heard so often that “there is a secret spring within us” “that great and elastic power
within us o f counterbalancing evil, which like a secret spring in a well-ordered machine, though
it cannot prevent the shock—at least imposes upon our sense o f it” (TS 333.22-334.9). Walter
sloughs off Toby’s belief that this “spring” is “Religion” (“it makes everything strait for us”), as
being merely a figurative comfort. That the “greatest good” of which Walter’s spring is capable,
involves the christening of “Trismegistus” should need no further comment. The efficacy of the
sacred occasion is, or was meant to be, transferred from act to name, and we prepare ourselves
for yet another hard justling.
Cynicism over the fool’s comfort o f cutting the knot instead of persevering to untie it in
another way than Walter’s still looms over Toby in some critical eyes, but one cannot understand
the gist of Sterne’s sermons and fail to appreciate the heroic nature of this uncle. He is
unequivocally Sterne’s embodiment o f Christian virtue. His foibles do more than endear him to
readers, they make him believable, and his virtues accessible. In the midst of the scene outlined
immediately above, it is Toby who chides Trim that “tears are no proof o f cowardice” (TS 329.7).
Throughout Tristram’s life and opinions Toby is graciously present as the most brave, most
compassionate o f men—qualities that for Sterne are the acme o f Christianity. As Walter writes
his life of Socrates, and upon occasion adopts Socratic postures, Toby lives a life of which
Socrates would have approved:
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—there never was a better officer in the king’s army,—or a better man in God’s 
world; for he would march up to the mouth o f a cannon, though he saw the lighted 
match at the very touch-hole,—and yet, for all that, he has a heart as soft as a child 
for other people.—He would not hurt a chicken. (TS 437.22)
With his life anchored in a world more capable o f joy than even his bowling-green, Toby 
fears not death. Brave, he is capable of forgiveness, the most difficult of social virtues. 
Forgiveness cuts the knot. Toby’s actions, his beaming face, accomplish more for the little 
Shandy world than the most eloquent Tristrapaediae or sermons. We should not ultimately be 
confused by the semblance of inconsistency in a man so good and so tethered to his horse. 
Traugott calls him “exactly Locke’s madman”59 But we are relieved by his obsession, to balance 
our growing suspicion that he is not to be mocked. To encourage this perspective, in A 
Sentimental Journey before recording the efficient compassion of the French officer, Sterne has 
Yorick carefully “rescue one page from violation” by writing the name and telling the world of 
“Captain Tobias Shandy, the dearest of my flock and friends, whose philanthropy I never think of 
at this long distance from his death—but my eyes gush out with tears” (ASJ 76.7). He admires 
Toby as the epitome of “the man whose manners are softened by a profession which makes bad 
men worse” (ASJ 76.5). Any critical discussion of Toby’s equivocal participation in the evils of 
war must account for the actions of this most gentle o f captains juxtaposed to those who sally 
near him. There is a fundamental difference in the two brothers’ mounts. Walter’s horse does not 
lead him to a reconciliation with the sorrows and mysteries o f life, he feels them keenly and at 
best skips quickly from one to the next to avoid eternal persecution. He is buoyed by words and, 
not unlike Trim, the sound of himself talking. Toby also has his crises, the treaty of Utrecht was 
no guarantee of peace to him, but we miss the peak of his character if we fail to recognize that,
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unlike his brother’s horse, his—like young Yorick’s noble mounts (TS 21.9-28)—is subject to 
the cries of others.
Critics have long loved and long mocked Tristram’s uncle from a plethora of angles. To
say, as does Salle, “my uncle Toby is the first full-length study of a man whose life has lost its
meaning, and who merely survives in order to recapture the excitement of his past” is entirely to
miss Sterne’s point.60 As Golden remarks, “though motivation may—perhaps must—derive from
delusions, merit lies in transcending them. The more heated the rider, the greater his goodness in
dismounting in sympathy for someone else.”61 Walter’s horse feeds on misery, Toby’s is
sacrificed to those in need.
I t  was to my uncle Toby’s eternal honour,—though I tell it only for the sake of 
those, who, when coop’d in betwixt a natural and a positive law, know not for 
their souls, which way in the world to turn themselves—That notwithstanding my 
uncle Toby was warmly engaged at that time in carrying on the siege of 
Dendermond, parallel with the allies, who pressed theirs on so vigorously, that 
they scarce allowed him time to get his dinner—that nevertheless he gave up 
Dendermond, though he had already made a lodgment upon the counterscarp; — 
and bent his whole thoughts towards the private distresses at the inn; and, except 
that he ordered the garden gate to be bolted up, by which he might be said to have 
turned the siege of Dendermond into a blockade,—he left Dendermond to itself,
—to be relieved or not by the French king, as the French king thought good; and 
only considered how he himself should relieve the poor lieutenant and his son.
(TS 509.2)
Thus he enlightens Trim to a distinction we had perhaps not thought him capable of drawing: 
“thou didst very right, Trim, as a soldier,—but certainly very wrong as a man” (TS 510.6). The 
entire force of the difficulty of maintaining virtue in a world of inconsistencies is hereby brought 
home. Exchanging the horse o f battle for that of extravagant succour, Toby accurately
distinguishes between the natural and the positive laws. Trim’s well-meant actions, those of a
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servant, are nevertheless pharisaical for being straight, learned by rote. For Toby the epitome of
soldiering is that which it would seem not to be: mercy. His bravery is his humanity, shown in
tears effective, at least, in the realm where accusing spirits and recording angels hold sway.
This humanity is the philosopher’s stone for which Tristram and Yorick yearn. The
palpitations of the heart and campaigns of the imagination are blessed through compassionate
action. Circumstances and elements of earthly life are transmitted to the eternal realm. Toby’s
brief encounter with the elder Le Fever clearly demonstrates how sincere affection hurdles
needless formalities. Toby “without preface or apology, sat himself down upon the chair by the
bed-side, and independantly of all modes and customs, opened the curtain in the manner an old
friend and brother officer would have done it, and asked him how he did” (TS 512.2). This sort o f
communication is as close to Momus’ glass as flesh can fathom. Versed in various arts o f
communication and intimacy, Tristram and Yorick acknowledge Toby’s superiority o f
spontaneous action over artful calculation and avoidance. Tristram and Yorick, who struggle to
translate gestures and to communicate directly with those they encounter, acknowledge Toby’s
extraordinary simplicity.
There was a frankness in my uncle Toby,—not the effect o f familiarity,—but the 
cause o f it,—which let you at once into his soul, and shewed you the goodness of 
his nature; to this, there was something in his looks, and voice, and manner, 
superadded, which eternally beckoned to the unfortunate to come and take shelter 
under him. (TS 512.16)
Ripples of his effect on those around him shimmer throughout both novels. He is not 
prone to rash judgment, and his difficulties are resolved by riding (TS 87). Rider and horse are o f 
a piece and, unlike Yorick, Toby is blessed with troubling “his head very little with what the
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world either said or thought about it” (TS 87.15). This freedom earns others’ trust o f him. Like 
Jesus’ dying glance to his mother and the apostle John, Le Fever “looked up wishfully62 in my 
uncle Toby"s face,—then cast a look upon his boy,— and that ligament, fine as it was,—was 
never broken.—” (TS 512.28; John xix.26-7).
Time and again it is Toby’s countenance, gesture, or simple inquiry that instantly 
enlightens an impasse, or confounds a galloping illusion (e.g. TS 133.2, 392.3). Oblivious 
conduit of grace, he becomes an artful rhetor. His actions give the lie to Walter’s mathematical 
nature; the antitheses of those “working with might and main at the demonstration” wasting “all 
their strength upon it, [having] none left in them to draw the corollaiy, to do good with” (TS 
125.4). But for all this, Toby’s character is not the offspring (or father) of any system. When 
Trim asks if he might presume to differ from his master, he mildly replies “—why else, do I talk 
to thee Trim” (TS 712.9). On a voyage not o f self-satisfaction but of honest advancement, he 
would happily be led deeper into the mysteries. Though we are to be reconciled through 
experiencing him, we should remember that the riddles are reoriented, not solved in Toby. 
Susceptible to misapprehension, his benevolence is not subject to his hobby. He is void of guile, 
kindest of translators, “the benignity of [his] heart interpreted every motion of the body in the 
kindest sense the motion would admit o f ’ (TS 192.12). Ill at ease in the presence of one of the 
greatest mysteries to him, when beholding a woman “in sorrow or distress; then infinite was his 
pity” (73 741.10).
This benevolence has far-reaching effects on his family. Toby’s amours run in Tristram’s 
head as he journeys toward the shorn lamb Maria, and “the kindliest harmony” which he thereby
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finds vibrating within him puts him “in the most perfect state of bounty and good w i l l . . .  so that 
whether the roads were rough or smooth, it made no difference; every thing I saw, or had to do 
with, touch’d upon some secret spring either of sentiment or rapture” (TS 781.17). Toby is the 
guardian spirit o f the better part of these encounters. When Tristram speaks o f his uncle’s death 
“the first—the foremost of created beings” it is with more than an ordinary sense of the levelling 
effect of grief:
all my father’s systems shall be baffled by his sorrows; and, in spight of his 
philosophy, I shall behold him, as he inspects the lackered plate, twice taking his 
spectacles from off his nose, to wipe away the dew which nature has shed upon 
them—” (TS 545.18)
Indirectly Toby confounds the congregations around him, without artifice; his frank responses cut
through storms of passion and hyperbole:
I believe, an’ please your reverence . . . when a soldier gets time to pray,—he
prays as heartily as a parson, —though not with all his fuss and hypocrisy.------
Thou shouldst not have said that, Trim, said my uncle Toby,—for God only knows 
who is a hypocrite, and who is not. (TS 506.14)
—They are a pack of liars, I believe, cried Trim—
—They are some how or other deceived, said my uncle Toby. (TS 690.17)
Toby’s heroic presence is established early in Tristram Shandy. Embodying so many
facets o f Sterne’s philosophy, we are never long without the Captain. The critically revisited
anecdote involving an over-grown fly is, for once, explicitly instructive. Tristram reiterates that
Toby’s “peaceful, placid nature” was not owing to cowardice, “insensibility or obtuseness of his
intellectual parts” (TS 130.15-25). But what is especially to be noticed is that Tristram believes
he owes half o f his “philanthropy to that one accidental impression” (TS 131.22). It is significant
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that Toby’s moral character cannot, initially, be communicated to us according to “mere HOBBY- 
HORSICAL likeness” (TS 131.72). Tristram makes special note, that, as Toby’s simple act of 
releasing the fly, “has never since been worn out of my mind,” so the recounting of the event and 
its harmonious effects “is to serve for parents and governors instead o f a whole volume upon the 
subject” (TS 131.17,23). Critics dismissing this passage as gross hyperbole (thee and me) or 
sentimental cliche, have misunderstood Sterne’s valuation o f “philanthropy” in the sermons, and 
his contention, reiterated only a few pages above the fly incident (TS 125.15-23), that a well- 
mannered author leaves something for his reader to imagine. Searching too high, or too low, for 
Sterne’s thumb print, separating him from his characters, they have missed what, for once, 
should be perfectly obvious. The lesson is wordless, even beyond an exact determination o f its 
elements:
whether it was, that the action itself was more in unison to my nerves at that age 
of pity, which instantly set my whole frame into one vibration of most pleasurable 
sensation . . .  or in what degree, or by what secret magick,—a tone of voice and 
harmony movement, attuned by mercy, might find a passage to my heart, I know 
not. (75131.8)
Here again we are in the realm of authentic communication, melting otherwise petrified 
articulations. The incident itself is in parentheses, and when we return to Walter’s insult we find 
Toby maintaining benevolence, looking “up into my father’s face, with a countenance spread 
over with so much good nature;—so placid;— so fraternal;— so inexpressibly tender towards 
him;—it penetrated my father to his heart” (TS 133.2). The ironic folly of a soldier unwilling to 
harm a fly is played deftly by Steme.
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Toby’s virtue is no myth, or misremembered event o f a confused lad; it is a living force of
grace to the Shandy household. Tristram wishes to honour this, and is explicit that we understand
“the choicest morsel o f [his] whole story” is the amours of uncle Toby. It is no accident, that in
the last pages o f  the secon d  instalm ent o f  TS, w hen “FROM th is m om ent” w e  are to  consid er
Tristram as heir-apparent to the Shandy family, the focus is on his “earnest desire” to relate these
amours (TS 400-402). Likewise it should not surprise us that Tristram’s hopeful language
anticipating this task would involve the more amorphous aspects of communication, nor that
Sterne’s three decades of clerical vocation would ring in our ears:
I lament . . . that things have crowded in so thick upon me, that I have not been 
able to get into that part of my work, towards which, I have all the way, looked 
forwards, with so much earnest desire; and that is the campaigns, but especially 
the amours o f my uncle Toby, the events of which are of so singular a nature, and 
so Cervantick a cast, that if I can so manage it, as to convey but the same 
impressions to every other brain, which the occurrences themselves excite in my 
own—I will answer for it the book shall make its way in the world, much better 
than its master has done before it— (TS 400.19; cf. 779.1-7)
Gradually we come to anticipate this unveiling. A significant point in our approach to the 
mystery occurs well into Volume vi, just after the corporal has discovered a means of incessant 
firing (TS 546-549). We are asked to assist Tristram “to wheel off my uncle Toby's ordnance 
behind the scenes—to remove his sentry-box, and clear the theatre” (TS 549.16). From here to 
the end of the novel we are upon new footing. With Volume vii Tristram is racing death. As 
Steme indicates in the motto to this instalment, this journey is not out of step with the book, as 
suddenly we too may be caught up in cart wheels and forced to flee (TS 576). But, getting back to 
Toby, we are told that he will now be exhibited “dressed in a new character, throughout which 
the world can have no idea how he will act” (TS 549.22). This is common Shandy-talk, Walter is
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likewise unguessable; however, with Toby we are told something extraordinary. After the
countless times we dared to guess and were mocked for prophetic incapacity, we are now told
and yet, if pity be akin to love,—and bravery no alien to it, you have seen enough 
of my uncle Toby in these, to trace these family likenesses, betwixt the two 
passions (in case there is one) to your heart’s content.
Vain science! thou assists us in no case o f this kind—and thou puzzlest us in 
every one.
There was, Madam, in my uncle Toby, a singleness o f heart which misled him so 
far out of the little serpentine tracks in which things o f this nature usually go on.
(TS 550.2)
Toby takes the Samaritan’s path. Though critical eyes cannot discern it, readers who have
felt the beat of his heart on theirs finally can have some conception o f how the man will act in
untrodden territory. For Toby the precipice from war to love has already been scaled. His
“singleness of heart” is an innocence that in any situation is consistent with its source; not
immune to mistakes and oddity, but fundamentally trustworthy. Sterne elaborates this virtue
throughout his sermons:
a charitable and benevolent disposition is so principal and ruling a part of a man’s 
character, as to be a considerable test by itself of the whole frame and temper of 
his mind, with which all other virtues and vices respectively rise and fall, and will 
almost necessarily be connected. (S 30.11)
Toby himself, alas, uses this as a rule by which to measure the widow’s affection: “that which
wins me most, and which is security for all the rest, is the compassionate turn and singular
humanity of her character” (TS 801.20). His “plainness and simplicity of thinking, with such an
unmistrusting ignorance of the plies and foldings of the heart of woman” (TS 550.11) lead him to
dignified slaughter:
He took it like a lamb 1 say. (TS 710.1, 10)
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Toby is faithful throughout to things of importance; this is what matters. In context it is 
impossible to read his oration on war as anything but a tribute to this best of captains. Toby 
thoroughly embodies the virtues o f peace, indeed he is not at all war-like. Melvyn New makes a 
provocative attempt to debunk warm-hearted readings of Toby’s perspective on war. To claim 
that his “definition of war is amazingly naive (and obtuse)” misses the point, and to suggest 
Sterne is satirizing war with the “pompous conclusion” of Toby’s oration squares not with 
Sterne’s life.64 “As a political journalist in the 1740s he bitterly denounced those who criticized 
the notion o f a standing army.” 65 During the Jacobite rebellion “he began by making a personal 
contribution to the defence fund o f £10—a far from insignificant sum for one of his means.”66 In 
the memoir o f his family, written for his daughter, he refers to his soldiering father with tender 
words, as Ross says:
emphasizing as it does the soldier’s kindliness, amiability, and innocence, this 
touchingly warm account recalls Uncle Toby even more strongly (and indeed 
Steme was later to have Tristram apply the last phrase of the account to Toby).
No, it is grossly sentimental to conclude Steme was a modem pacifist. New disregards
the explicit and reiterated notices of Toby’s capacity to understand all the criticisms that would
be laid against him.
I Am not insensible, brother Shandy, that when a man, whose profession is arms, 
wishes, as I have done, for war,— it has an ill aspect to the world;— and that, how 
just and right soever his motives and intentions may be,—he stands in an uneasy 
posture in vindicating himself from private views in doing it. (TS 554.5)
Toby’s oration is a confession, even more clear than those of Yorick in ASJ.
What, I hope, I have been in all these, brother Shandy, would be unbecoming of 
me to say:—much worse, I know, have I been than I ought,—and something 
worse, perhaps, than I think: But such as I am, you, my dear brother Shandy, who
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have sucked the same breasts with me. . .— Such as I am, brother, you must by 
this time know me, with all my vices, and with all my weaknesses too, whether of 
my age, my temper, my passions, or my understanding. (TS 554.19)
Significantly he asks Walter “upon what one deed of mine” is his cynicism grounded. And this is
exactly Sterne’s point. Toby’s deeds are justified. The test o f a good hobbyhorse, if  we glance
from entertainment to values, is the nature of its fruition. “Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know
them.” (Matt, vii.20)
The concluding pages of ‘The Abuses of Conscience considered’ as presented in Tristram
Shandy serve to set the military endeavours of Toby and the Corporal in their true light. The
necessary marriage of morality and religion is reiterated, and the “moral honesty” o f those not
given to affectation praised:
and you will find that such a man, thro’ force o f his delusion, generally looks 
down with spiritual pride upon every other man who has less affectation of piety,- 
-tho’, perhaps, ten times more moral honesty than himself. (TS 159.23)
The horrors of unhinged power are then ably laid out:
in how many kingdoms of the world has the crusading sword of this misguided 
saint-errant spared neither age, or merit, or sex, or condition?—and, as he fought 
under the banners of a religion which set him loose from justice and humanity, he 
shew’d none; mercilessly trampled upon both,— heard neither the cries of the 
unfortunate, nor pitied their distresses. (TS 160.13)
The interpolation that follows is significant for linking Trim, with all his passions and
misinterpretations, to the man of moral honesty; it illuminates his heart and that of his master:
I have been in many a battle, an’ please your Honour, quoth Trim, sighing, but 
never in so melancholy a one as this.—I would not have drawn a tricker in it,
against these poor souls, to have been made a general officer.—Why, what do
you understand of the affair? Said Doctor Slop, looking towards Trim with 
something more contempt than the Corporal’s honest heart deserved.— What do 
you know, friend, about this battle you talk of? 1 know, replied Trim, that I
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never refused quarter in my life to any man who cried out for it;—but to a woman 
or a child, continued Trim, before I would level my musket at them, I would lose 
my life a thousand times.—Here’s a crown for thee, Trim, to drink with Obadiah 
to-night, quoth my uncle Toby, and I’ll give Obadiah another too.—God bless your 
Honour, replied Trim,—I had rather these poor women and children had it.—Thou 
art an honest fellow, quoth my uncle Toby.— My father nodded his head,—as 
much as to say,—and so he is. (TS 160.20)
The simple and unwavering humanity expressed by Trim and Toby in this scene is amply
reinforced in the inquisition scene that follows, where we are given to understand that mercy is
the key to religion.
— See him dragg’d out of it again to meet the flames, and the insults in his last 
agonies, which this principle,—this principle, that there can be religion without 
mercy, has prepared for h im . . . .
The surest way to try the merit o f any disputed notion is, to trace down the 
consequences such a notion has produced, and compare them with the spirit of 
Christianity;— ’tis the short and decisive rule which our Saviour hath left us, for
these and such-like cases, and it is worth a thousand arguments, By their
fruits ye shall know them. (TS 163.14-24)
Like the better sermons of Yorick, tied fast with the unraveling o f his whiplash (TS 514.15-23),
Toby’s militancy is one o f Christian service. His faith, we are told, informs his capacities; he
broadcasts compassion.
By deftly switching from the oration in Volume vi to the apostrophe in Volume ix, New
ignores the jovial context in which the latter conversation takes place. Toby has proceeded from
the oration on war “—what is it, but the getting together of quiet and harmless people, with their
swords in their hands, to keep the ambitious and the turbulent within bounds?” (TS 557.9) to a
last thought before rapping on the widow’s door: “that branch o f it which we have practised
to g e th e r  in  o u r  b o w lin g -g re e n , h a s  n o  o b je c t  b u t  to  s h o r te n  th e  s t r id e s  o f  A mbition, a n d  in tr e n c h
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the lives and fortunes of the few  from the plunderings o f the many—” (TS 753.13) New 
continues:
it is Steme, not I, who italicizes the two words that remove war from the 
“humanity and fellow-feeling” Toby invokes in his oration, two words that place 
war where it truly belongs, among privilege and inequity and the preservation of 
property and wealth. Many years ago, I pointed out that whatever “humanity” 
means to Toby, it does not encompass the masses, since his fellow-feeling is 
limited to few  rather than to many “fellows.” In all the many readings o f Uncle 
Toby as a sentimental hero, no one mentions this passage, much less attempts to 
explain it.68
On the contrary, in war it is the few—the preyed upon—who are usually vanquished by the many. 
It is a scriptural commonplace analogous to that of the folly o f God’s wisdom, that divine power 
and favour is made visible and unconfused with human strength by small armies vanquishing 
those far larger. The unlikely few are to be preserved from the brutish maw of the many: “the 
Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any 
people; for ye were the fewest of all people” (Deut. vii.7). Of course a moreShandean twist could 
be given to Toby’s words at this critical shift from bowling-green to courtship couch, for what is 
it to woo a nubile widow but to hope one might “intrench the lives and fortunes of the few  from 
the plunderings of the manyT'>
Certainly Toby’s oration and apostrophe, as any from the heart on war, love or another 
crisis, is quixotic. But the “Cervantic cast” is one in favour of brave souls who with no thought 
of personal danger sally forth in quest of adventures to benefit those entrusted to them. These 
soldiers imitate their noble ancestors with what swords God has given them to fuel mercy and 
justice in their generations. As the Don’s Trim comes to appreciate at the end of their first Book, 
‘results’ are rarely what they seem to be, and nobility consists in perceiving what is unseen:
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Under the Noise o f his Arrival Sancho Panza’s Wife made haste thither to enquire 
after her good Man, who, she was inform’d, went a Squiring with the Knight.. . .
Have you brought me home e’er a Gown or Petticoat, or Shoes for my Children?
In troth, sweet Wife, reply’d Sancho, I have brought thee none of those things; I 
am loaded with better things. Ay, said his Wife, that’s well. Pr’ythee let me see 
some of them fine things; for I vow I’ve a hugeous Mind to see ’em. ...All in good 
time Wife, said Sancho; Honey is not made for an Ass’s Mouth; I’ll tell thee what 
’tis hereafter. . . . Pr’ythee Joan, said Sancho, don’t trouble thy Head to know 
these Matters all at once, and in a heap, as a Body may say: ’Tis enough I tell thee 
the Truth, therefore hold thy Tongue. Yet, by the way, one thing I will assure thee,
That nothing in the varsal World is better for an honest Man, than to be Squire to 
a Knight-Errant while he’s hunting o f adventures. ’Tis true, most Adventures he 
goes about do not answer a Man’s Expectation so much as he cou’d wish; for of a 
Hundred that are met with, Ninety Nine are wont to be crabbed and unlucky ones.
This I know to my cost: I myself have got well kick’d and toss’d in some of ’em, 
and soundly drubb’d and belabour’d in others; yet for all that, ’tis rare Sport to be 
a watching for strange Chances, to cross Forests, to search and beat up and down 
in Woods, to scramble over Rocks, to visit Castles, and take up Quarters in an Inn 
at pleasure, and all the while the Devil a Cross to pay.69
Compassion flows in Toby by NATURE, war, like preaching in others, by NECESSITY (TS 557.6).
As Jonathan Lamb points out, “we would be obtuse not to understand the relative but still real
70value of the sacrifice and the complex significance of Toby’s bowling-green campaigns.”
Shifting from the campaign on the green to that in red plush, the full force of Toby’s 
vindication is upon us. New sets us off in the wrong direction by claiming Toby to be “Sterne’s 
version of Shaftesbury’s ideal moral being . . .  [embodying] Shaftesbury’s tendency toward moral
71secularism.” Instead of recognizing Toby’s anchor in a simple faith, New places it m a
77sentimental “moral self-sufficiency” that Toby in fact nowhere displays. Morals of secular
sentiment seem in this question to be more the property of Toby’s critics. New joins a number of
them in claiming Toby’s ultimate refusal to bed the widow is a mark against him:
Toby’s virtue—his sentimentalism and feeling heart—fails in its encounter with 
human desire; indeed his most overt sexual response comes when he sits by
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himself in the comer of the sentry box, puffing on Trim’s cannon/water-pipes.
The essence of the “morality of pity,” Steme observed, is, paradoxically, self- 
indulgence rather than a legitimate response to the “other,” which is possibly one 
reason why more traditional moral systems (such as Christianity) do not trust the 
unaided human heart (that is, the human mind).73
On the contrary, it is not “Toby’s fear o f sexuality”74 that is self-indulgent and fruitless, it is the
widow’s concupiscence and lack of communication over a twelve year period, which should be
registered. Toby is not afraid o f sexuality, he is blissfully ignorant and, like Yorick, knows better
than to engage himself with an insidious partner. When Fred Pinnegar claims, “the affair with
Wadman ends because o f Toby’s revulsion at her aggressive sexuality and his denial of both it
and life” one shudders to imagine what sort o f life he would have Toby adopt. Must we all, like
Steme, be coupled with a conniving spouse? Militants in the service o f humanity, like Don
Quixote, are not to be disillusioned by well-meaning characters knowing not what they do.
REDEMPTION: LOVE WITHOUT DEFINITION
A few critical years pass between the squiggly lines at the end of TS Volume vi and the 
“vile cough” with which we begin vii. The book, and body, as all creatures, is subject to time. 
Volume vii leads quite a chase, but death supersedes the dance, and we end not in Nanette’s lap, 
but with another attempt to give some account of Toby’s love (TS 651). We need to remember 
that though the “memoirs of my uncle Toby's courtship of widow Wadman” are “one of the most 
compleat systems, both o f the elementary and practical part of love-making” we are not to expect 
“a description of what love is” (TS 562.15-24). Such theories and “monstrous liberty in arguing” 
are reserved for Walter and his ilk; theories “with which, by the way, he contrived to crucify my
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uncle Toby s mind, almost as much as his amours themselves” (TS 564.7). We are made to pant 
for this choicest of morsels severed by science. Volume ix weaves toward chapter xv, which 
brings
nothing with it but a sad signature of ‘How our pleasures slip from under us in 
this world;’
For in talking of my digression—I declare before heaven I have made it!
(75767.1)
We begin to suspect in these amours, as with other revealings in Sterne’s works, that the 
destination is in fact the journey. As Tristram learns more by vibrations than words, we are to be 
treated accordingly.—
Let us drop the metaphor.
—AND the story too— if you please: for though I have all along been hastening 
towards this part o f it, with so much earnest desire, as well knowing it to be the 
choicest morsel of what I had to offer to the world, yet now that I am got to it, any 
one is welcome to take my pen, and go on with the story for me that will—I see 
the difficulties of the descriptions I’m going to give— and feel the want of my 
powers. (TS 778.24; cf. 400.19-401.6)
Nestled in this exhaustion is the exclamation that in speaking of Toby generally, he has 
recorded his love. In writing his life and opinions Tristram has approached death. To articulate 
the “ S i tu a t io n ”  (TS 723.12) of love in any other way would literally have spoiled the romance. 
Losing blood, Tristram feels his powers wane, he may as well have said “cup” as “pen.” To 
anyone familiar with scripture the language with which we are prepared unmistakably parallels 
Christ’s ultimate ascent to Jerusalem for the Passion. For Tristram, enabling us to feel the 
amours of his uncle is, in a way, to participate in a eucharist. When Battestin claims “what 
matters [in ASJ\ to Steme is, as it were, the human face of Christ, not the orthodox doctrines of
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77 ♦ •grace or the redeeming efficacy of the crucifixion,” he fails to see Sterne’s appreciation of the 
reason that human face was assumed. Without the mysteries that become doctrines, the humanity 
o f Jesus is without purpose.
Steme maintains a due distance by calling upon the “GENTLE Spirit of sweetest humour, 
who erst didst sit upon the easy pen of my beloved CERVANTES” (TS 780.1). The invocation, we 
suppose, remounts him. This jaunt, however, fuelled by Toby’s amours having “the same effect 
upon me as if  they had been my own” (TS 781.17), leads to Maria—an immediate test o f the 
essence o f the amours he is trying to convey. An obvious complement to this focus of Tristram is 
encountered in the last scenes o f ASJ, where it is Yorick’s ‘sentiment’ that is put to the test. We 
remember from the earliest pages of TS that this heteroclite parson was acquainted with grief. He 
rides the horse he does as it accords best with a thoughtful soul hourly called forth to visit “the 
many comfortless scenes . . . where poverty, and sickness, and affliction dwelt together.” (TS 
22.16)
O f interest further south is the popular legend with which Steme would have been
familiar, that Maria Magdalene with her siblings Martha and Lazarus sailed to the south of
France. A tomb said to be hers was venerated during the Middle Ages at Aix-en-Provence.
Joseph Addison in Remarks on Several Parts o f  Italy, &c. In the years 1701, 1702, 1703 recalls:
we were here [Cassis, near Marseilles] shown at a distance the Deserts, which 
have been rendered so famous by the presence of Mary Magdalene, who, after her 
arrival with Lazarus and Joseph of Arimathea at Marseilles, is said to have wept 
away her life among these solitary Rocks and Mountains. It is so romantic a
7 0
Scene, that it has always probably given occasion to such chimerical Relations.
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Now Yorick, as Tristram before him, is on the outskirts of Moulins. Having left the
children of Art in Paris, Maria takes precedence even as he feels “the distress of plenty” with the
“hey-day of the vintage” beginning to beckon. He goes out o f his way to enquire after her. A
Samaritan of sorts, well aware of his capacity for self-indulgence:
’tis going, I own, like the Knight o f the Woeful Countenance, in quest of 
melancholy adventures—but I know not how it is, but I am never so perfectly 
conscious of the existence of a soul within me, as when I am entangled in them.
(ASJ 149.20)
His affection, whatever the mixture o f springs, is not mechanical:
I felt such undescribable emotions within me, as I am sure could not be accounted 
for from any combinations o f matter and motion.
I am positive I have a soul; nor can all the books with which materialists have 
pester’d the world ever convince me o f the contrary. (ASJ 151.4)
He takes leave of her with words that again recall the Samaritan’s charity, and a benediction
acknowledging the superiority of a better Comfort.
Adieu, poor luckless maiden!—imbibe the oil and wine which the compassion of 
a stranger, as he joumieth on his way, now pours into thy wounds— the being who 
has twice bruised thee can only bind them up for ever. (ASJ 154.13)
For her, he is at most a passing refreshment, and for him Maria is another starling.
THERE w as nothing from  w h ich  I had painted out for m y se lf  so  jo y o u s a riot o f  
the affections, as in th is journey in  the vintage . . . but pressing through this gate  
o f  sorrow to it, m y sufferings had tota lly  unfitted m e. (ASJ 155.2)
This difficulty he has in casting a shade across her influence continues the redemptive 
strain of the journey. It remains a mystery to him, but he embraces it fully. The wound, the oil 
and wine are media by which the grace o f feeling  becomes one of faith by the act of another 
whose resources are spontaneously available to the needy. Mourning is turned to dancing as the
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cycle o f seasonal festivity gives way to perpetual thanksgiving, but not without reflection. The
issue of this heart-rending journey is only nominally ‘sentimental,’ for the fruits involve the long
anticipated capacity to begin to appreciate happiness on authentic terms, at home in this house of
mourning, as well as celebrating our destination in the great Feast.
— D ear sensib ility! source inexhausted o f  all that’s precious in our jo y s , or costly  
in  our sorrow s! thou chainest thy martyr dow n upon his bed o f  straw— and ’tis  
thou w h o lifts  h im  up to HEAVEN— eternal fountain o f  our feelin gs!— ’tis here I
trace thee—and this is thy divinity which stirs within me not that, in some sad
and sickening moments, “my soul shrinks back upon herself, and startles at 
destruction”— mere pomp of words!—but that I feel some generous joys and 
generous cares beyond myself—all comes from thee, great—great S ensorium  of 
the world! which vibrates, if a hair of our heads but falls upon the ground, in the 
remotest desert o f thy creation. (ASJ  155.9)
This is highflying language, and though some have concluded it to be sarcastic, unearned, or
deistic, it is Sterne’s voice at its most earnest, as if  from a pulpit. When Yorick does move on to
sport with the generous swain and his lambs, it is not insidious as with the frivolous Nanette, it is
instead the sacrament for which we have been prepared.
Like Toby, Yorick is not long about the forms of human companionship. He walks
directly into the peasant home, finds an honest welcome and a “feast of love.” Lentil-soup, bread,
“and a flaggon of wine . . . promised joy thro’ the stages of the repast” (ASJ 157.26). Common
enough ingredients, but significant in the context of what follows:
was it this [welcome]; or tell me, Nature, what else it was which made this morsel 
so sweet—and to what magick I owe it, that the draught I took of their flaggon 
was so delicious with it, that they remain upon my palate to this hour?
(ASJ 158.12)
As Toby’s act with the fly remains with Tristram to this hour, and as TS leads to the morsel of 
Toby’s amours, so A SJ  has led to this. And as Tristram at ix.15, so Yorick sees that his projected
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joys have slipped from under him, that in writing his journey it has been accomplished. So he is 
given a glimpse of eternal happiness—fancies he “could distinguish an elevation o f spirit 
different from that which is the cause or the effect of simple jollity” (ASJ 159.17). “I thought I 
beheld Religion mixing in the dance,” he says; and, with the self-doubt many have felt he lacked, 
makes the scene infallibly holy, by continuing: “—but as I had never seen her so engaged, I 
should have look’d upon it now, as one of the illusions of an imagination which is eternally 
misleading me, had not the old man . . .” (ASJ 159.18). ‘The Grace’ New rightly calls “the 
penultimate chapter o f everything Steme ever wrote. . . . Importantly, the ‘grace’ is not spoken 
but acted out; but equally important, Yorick is able to find the words to express the joy of the
7Qdance without equivocation or innuendo.”
It is a commonplace that Sterne’s hodgepodge is a serving of life. Elizabeth Harries
reminds us of Jesus’ command to “gather up the fragments” after the miracle o f loaves and fishes
(John vi.12). “The fragmentary,” she writes,
was always connected with the notion of overflow—or plenitude in apparent 
dearth; with the command to collect that overflow—or the significance of the 
apparently insignificant; and ultimately with the Eucharist—a memorial that is 
also a renewal. . . .
By giving us fragments and thwarting ordinary coherence, Steme forces us to 
contemplate a different kind of order—an order not governed by ‘any m an’s rules’ 
but by rules more inscrutable and divine, [her italics] . . .
the fragmentary for Steme always had biblical overtones, overtones that suggested 
the importance of the fragment as a gesture towards a greater fullness and as a 
reminder of a more perfect communion.80
Sparks, Steme realizes, momentarily visible, are the most o f illumination we are likely to 
see or be able to bear. His brief flourishes serve instead of hypothetical treatises. Tristram
271
implies, suggests Elizabeth Kraft, “the importance of the momentary as a suggestion o f the 
ineffable, the inexpressible spark o f divinity that resides in the corporeal form.”81 This element 
within the individual is awakened sporadically, by justlings maintained by grace.
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V ~ CONCLUSION
With so much ink shed over Sterne’s use and impressions of Locke, it is curious to realize
that the apparent ‘influence’ is rather a shared mood sympathetic to this redeeming “inexpressible
spark.” He shows no concentration on Locke’s philosophy qua philosophy; what stares back at
one from every chapter of each of these men’s opera is an undogmatic gaze comfortable with its
limitations, convinced of the vitality of that spark within them. This issues a broad freedom for
both. Sterne’s playful use of words is a return to the chaos from which an initiating experience of
their limits and the value of direct experience is gained. The ‘riddles and mysteries’ passage is
the theme of Locke’s great Essay, not a glib apology. He is explicit:
there is not so contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound the most 
inlarged Understanding. Though the familiar use of Things about us, take off our 
Wonder; yet it cures not our Ignorance. . . . The Workmanship of the All-wise, 
and Powerful God, in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof, 
farther exceeds the Capacity and Comprehension of the most inquisitive and 
intelligent Man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the 
Conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. Therefore we in vain 
pretend to range Things into sorts, and dispose them into certain Classes, under 
Names, by their real Essences, that are so far from our discovery or 
comprehension.1
This is Christian scepticism—freedom from Walter’s need to make life meaningful by 
systems. The essential unknowability of the riddles, confidence that this mystery is as it should 
be, and the hopeful exposure of fancies that presume to be certainties, pervades Locke’s Essay 
and all of Sterne’s works. Hence their relish of the demise of systems prematurely or unnaturally 
mechanical. We know few things certainly, but given the good magnificence o f our creator, we 
should neither expect nor require to know more. The understanding, and the refusal to equate 
‘unknowable’ with ‘nonexistent’ or ‘irrelevant’ led Locke to contemn magisterial opinions and to
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believe God-given human faculties sufficient to all necessary endeavours. This attitude is what
Sterne shares most with him. A theological mood of toleration, humility, and unwavering
confidence in providence steers the works of both writers. This should not be surprising. Other
great minds have reiterated the claim:
it would be well, if  people would not lay so much weight on their own reason in 
matters o f religion, as to think every thing impossible and absurd which they 
cannot conceive. How often do we contradict the right rules of reason in the whole 
course of our lives? Reason itself is true and just, but the reason o f every 
particular man is weak and wavering, perpetually swayed and turned by his 
interests, his passions, and his vices.2
The ‘riddles and mysteries’ refrain in Sterne is a basis for accurate hope, not the triumph 
of confusion.
That in many dark and abstracted questions of mere speculation, we should err—
—is not strange: we live amongst mysteries and riddles. (S 182.21)
The main purport o f this discourse, is to teach us humility in our reasonings upon 
the ways of the Almighty. . . .
—Does not the meanest flower in the field, or the smallest blade of grass, baffle 
the understanding of the most penetrating mind? (S 414.18,415.3)
Sterne was not dependent on Locke (or Norris) for so classic a notion, but it is good to be
reminded of its context and its centrality to An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The
section in which the ‘riddles’ passage occurs begins
our Knowledge being so narrow, as I have shew’d, it will, perhaps, give us some 
Light into the present State o f our minds, if  we look a little into the dark side, and 
take a view of our ignorance: which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, 
may serve much to the quieting of Disputes, and Improvement o f useful 
Knowledge. . . .  He that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he 
need not seek long for Instances o f his Ignorance. The meanest, and most obvious 
Things that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest Sight cannot 
penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men 
find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every Particle of Matter.
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As Donald Wehrs justly notes, “from a Christian perspective, the desire for certitude is 
potentially heretical.”4 Indeed, what must have been a reticence actually to read Locke’s 
formidable tome (evidenced by this passage’s use by Sterne being publicly first noted in 1985)5 
has cheated students o f what Sterne really admired in his sagacious philosopher. The 
‘reasonableness’ o f Christian doctrine is its unassailable mystery. And he is most reasonable, in 
matters o f faith, who ceases to rattle infantile opinions. Even Hume has his Philo speak it in 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: “to be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the 
first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian.”6 Step.
Locke would agree with our equally sagacious preacher that “a little time for reflection ... 
is all that most of us want to make us wiser and better” (S 13.27). But for Sterne the way to this 
wisdom and virtue depends on something more than judgment according to distinctly known 
terms. The least inaccurate way to truth is through a medium mysterious as truth itself, one not 
presuming to bring all the revelation with it. It is vain, Locke also claims, to expect 
demonstrative certainty of those things that transcend the limits of our faculties.7 “We must 
therefore, if we will proceed, as Reason advises, adapt our methods of Enquiry to the nature of
O
the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after.”
Contrary to Locke, however, Sterne believed the way best to receive and wield reason and 
revelation is by the complementary activities of a spontaneous congruity of various ideas (wit), 
and a contemplative sifting (judgment).9 The value of this conjunction, writes Sterne, was missed 
by Locke precisely because of the insidious problem o f inherited prejudice (TS 235-238). The 
way to disillusionment is through demonstration: the chair’s two knobs, Nathan’s parable. The
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fact (for Locke) that all human knowledge derives from sensation and reflection, sets up the 
primary importance of sensual experience for the understanding. Diagrams are not liable to the 
same uncertainties as words; they should be stamped in the margins of dictionaries.10 Sterne’s 
fiction presents paintings, diagrams, conversation-pieces o f themes not foreign to his sermons, 
appealing thereby to the experiences of his readers. Because reason alone is incapable o f forming 
accurate perceptions, he develops encounters of what Locke calls “intermediate terms,” by which 
seemingly unrelated ideas may be connected. To be effective a word must be demonstrable: 
“active” and “shewn.”
At Versailles Yorick explains to the count that he has come to spy out the nakedness of 
hearts; the “original drawings and loose sketches” in the temple of each individual being of more 
delight “than the transfiguration of Raphael itself’ (ASJ  111.6-15). By recognizing grace in 
common human endeavour, we too may trace a map through the complex varieties of our own 
existence. Eve Tavorj offers a perceptive reading:
Tristram Shandy is the culmination o f the sceptical tradition in the novel 
developed by Defoe, Richardson and Fielding. It is a parody which exposes and 
explodes the genre they created by taking its techniques and underlying 
assumptions to their absurd conclusion. And, at the same time, it represents a 
return from scepticism to reality, convention and belief, which lays the foundation 
for the nineteenth-century novel. By demonstrating that scepticism is no more true 
of the world than the systems it was used to question and subvert; by insisting that 
the sceptical problem exists only on the level o f opinions, not on the level of 
things themselves; and by redefining the way God has given men ‘whatsoever is 
necessary for the conveniences of life’ and ‘Light enough to lead them to a 
knowledge of their Maker and the sight o f their own duties,’ Tristram Shandy 
undermines scepticism and prepares the ground for a new positivism and a new 
belief.11
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As Yorick moves from ‘The Grace’ to ‘The Case of Delicacy’ he is back in the realm o f 
veiled exchanges: “we were both too delicate to communicate what we felt to each other upon 
the occasion” (ASJ 162.24). Thus transpires the last of Sterne’s ‘paintings’ of human nature and 
its coincidental meanderings. The humor of this nether part does not snicker, it displays the 
inescapable jest of fortune presenting its backside to an adventuresome soul. Yorick, we are told 
early in TS, loved a jest in his heart, and was never shy of involving himself as its object (TS 20).
Judges complaining of immorality in TS have either not comprehensively looked into the 
matter, or have no aptitude for good fim and parabolic wisdom; as Tristram says, “their honours 
and reverences had not seen my bills” (TS 764.24). The Rabelaisian elements in Sterne’s stories 
are a blatant contention that as nothing is unmixed in the world, so fiction, or sermons, or any 
painting of life, will be bound somehow to involve elements that remind us we are creatures. 
Yorick, who we recall could not bear the affectation of gravity, carries a copy of Rabelais in his 
coat pocket (TS 463). We may well wonder if this is a device, like that o f his horse, perpetually to 
remind him of the earthiness of his calling, as much as it should remind us of the parabolic 
religion of that monk’s book. Just as Sterne’s “dearer Cervantes” (TS 225.21) represents the 
quest for active integrity in a boorish and critical age, so Sterne’s “dear” Rabelais is not a flag o f 
extravagant bawdy, but a jovial and unrelenting critic of systems, o f education, o f discovery, o f 
anything that makes of small things a kingdom and mistakes passing sights for paradise. “The
19most ingenious way of becoming foolish,” wrote Shaftesbury, “is by a System ” Ecclesiastes, 
tutored by suffering and grace, from a ruined castle, farts in the general direction o f misapplied
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scientia. Panurge is no hero, but he accomplishes the very moral service of awakening self-styled 
nobility from pretentious dreams.
The Church, and by implication a good sermon, is not an institution founded on rules, but 
on the experience of the meanings from which dogma are formed. The doctrine, precepts and 
examples have a “proper tendency to make us a virtuous and a happy people;—every page is an 
address to our hearts to win them to these purposes. . .  religion was not intended to work upon men 
by force and natural necessity, but by moral persuasion, which sets good and evil before them” (S 
253.26). This is the Sterne of the sermons. He steers clear of offering ‘good sayings’ and tries for 
‘good remedies’ in an even-minded, conversational way that has its prime example in Jesus the 
perfector of the faith. The fruit, he seems sincerely to have hoped, would be encouragement of “a 
just sense of God’s providence, and a persuasion of his justice and goodness in all his dealings.— 
Such an example, I say, as this, is of more universal use, speaks truer to the heart, than all the heroic 
precepts, which the pedantiy of philosophy have to offer” (S 145.27). By this artful course, his 
congregation may be led to an experience of the meaning of symbols whose effective value has 
been forgotten. This is achieved conversationally because within us are the seeds he is trying to 
nurture. Time and again we are referred to our own reflections, left to consider, and from an appeal 
to our hearts decide for ourselves the value of that experience or idea.
Without this heart-rending participation, preaching is useless, morality insufficient, and self- 
deception will continue to dominate. From the sermon in Tristram Shandy and the ones with which 
he chose to open Volume i, we see that first in Sterne’s mind is the necessity of encouraging the 
congregation away from harmful illusions and into a way wherein happiness will be the fruit of a
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faithful life. The virtues he finds most consistent with this are humility, pity, forgiveness and love: 
to live well, one must endeavour to be philanthropic. “What divines say of the mind, naturalists 
have observed of the body; that there is no passion so natural to it as love, which is the principle of 
doing good” (S 50.8). The image of God in man is “moral rectitude, and the kind and benevolent 
affections of his nature” (S 66.18).
Christianity, according to Sterne, was designed specifically to reconcile us to that image in 
God and within each other (S 384.6-23). Believing this reconciliation to have been accomplished by 
Christ on Calvary, Sterne suggests we pursue its personal significance by cultivating a due sense of 
the priority of eternity in our lives. Having one’s happiness rooted beyond fluctuations o f “the little 
interests below” encourages one toward the mysterious virtue of self-sacrifice. We are exhorted to 
live in such a way as to accustom ourselves here to the economy of heaven, by cutting the knot of 
distraction with which the world and our opinions have bound us. Finally, in this journey of 
disillusionment and its fruit in mercy, we may arrive with the author of Ecclesiastes at the classic 
conclusion,
—that to fear God, and keep his commandments, is the whole of man;—that, to be 
serious in the matter of religion, and careful about our future states, is that which, 
after all our other experiments, will be found to be our chief happiness,—our 
greatest interest,— our greatest wisdom,—and that which most of all deserves our 
care and application.— (S 371.21)
Thus we have Sterne’s fiction: parables of humane understanding, “auxiliaries on the side
of virtue” (TS 517.11). Championing a complementary experiment, the Right Reverend Thomas
Sprat in his History o f  the Royal Society wrote :
if we shall cast an eye on all the Tempests, which arise within our Breasts, and 
consider the causes and remedies of all the violent desires, malicious envies,
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intemperate joyes, and irregular griefs, by which the lives o f most men become 
miserable, or guilty: we shall find, that they are chiefly produc’d by Idleness, and 
may be most naturally cur’d by diversion. Whatever Art shall be able to busy the 
minds of men, with a constant course o f innocent Works, or to fill them with as 
vigorous and pleasant Images, as those ill impressions, by which they are deluded; it 
will certainly have a surer effect in composing, and purifying of their thoughts, than 
all the rigid precepts of the Stoical, or the empty distinctions of the Peripatetic 
Moralists P
In fact, the beginnings o f the Royal Society provide a fitting backdrop to Sterne’s endeavors,
linking Christian Platonists, Latitude-men, and Locke. They were in agreement that
the spiritual and supernatural part of Christianity no Philosophy can reach . . . .
How small assistance it brings, may be seen in those very points, in which its 
Empire seems most to be plac’d, in God’s Decrees, his Immateriality, his 
Eternity, and the holy Mystery of the Trinity: In all which we are only brought into 
a more learned darkness by it; and in which unfathomable Depths a plain 
Believing is at last acknowledg’d by all to be our only Refuge.14
As much as we may read Locke as epistemologically contrary to “innate ideas,”
ontologically he concurs with the classic Christian principle that, as Sterne says, each person
co m es “out o f  the hands o f  G od,—w ith  the very bias upon h is nature, w h ich  prepares h im  for the
character, which he was designed to fulfil” (S  68.29). This bias towards “undisguised tenderness
and disinterested compassion” (S 68.27), warped through experience, requires fit remedies. As
Sprat says, “the corruptions, and infirmities o f human Nature stand in need of all manner of
allurements, to draw us to good, and quiet manners.”15 As wheels turned to explicate and
champion experimental learning in the realm of visible and sensible things, there was no
question of the sustained value of experiential faith.
What can hinder him from loving and admiring this Saviour, whose Design is so 
conformable to his own, but his Ability so much greater? . . . Who . . . though he 
knew the thoughts o f men, and might have touch’d and mov’d them as he pleas’d; 
did yet not rely on his Doctrine, on his Life, on the irrisistable assistance of
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Angels, or on his own Divinity alone; but stoop’d to convince men by their Senses, 
and by the very same cours by which they receive all their Natural Knowledge.16
This comprehensive, good-natured and tangible appeal is suggested in Fraser Mitchell’s
assessment of Cambridge Platonists and latitudinarians:
from a world in which doctrines and systems of church government had set men 
by the ears, they turned to the contemplation of the great principles underlying all 
conduct and dependent, not on the fiats of inspired Book or infallible Church, but 
on the moral constitution of the Universe; “they transferred the emphasis” (as 
Professor Grierson reminds us) “from doctrines, ‘the eternal decrees,’ 
‘justification by faith,’ ‘effectual calling,’ ‘imputed righteousness,’ to the 
Christian life;” and what is more, in doing so they were able to give striking 
literary expression to their deepest conviction. For with them one is dealing not 
with the exponents o f a theological position, nor with the eccentricities of genius 
... but with men o f a larger and more generous outlook, which, though it found 
individual expression in ways which are interestingly various, yet in its broad 
outlines remained the same. For a higher synthesis than cult or dogma could 
supply had been discovered, and, although at the time it seemed inappropriate and 
unnoticed, was afterwards to bear fruit.17
Sterne, within the tradition, declares open season on tartuffes and hypocrites: those given 
to rigid precepts and empty distinctions. Other sinners are treated with mercy, gently encouraged 
to find and proceed along their heart’s highest desire. The greatest deviance is implied in those 
who would proclaim this life to be ultimate and fritter that life away in attempts to maintain its 
caprices. They have yet to realize the wisdom of scripture, that this world is a vain farce, and 
subsequently have not been led to appreciate that the one unforgivable sin “against the Holy 
Spirit” (Mark iii.28) is not satiated flesh, but a renunciation of love. Busy establishing their 
figurative and literary kingdoms here, they have had nothing to spare for honest misery. The one 
unpardonable jest is that which disregards human frailty, our common lot (TS 784). This is where 
Steme faults his critics. They fail to realize his engagement with the reader entire, and in their
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criticisms, know not what they write. Sterne is explicit that wisdom involves a kind of 
foolishness in well-tuned souls. As Bacon and Sprat had in other forums long before complained, 
Tristram’s Preface is devoted to showing that the arts and sciences are sufficiently displaced that 
an out-pouring of wit and judgment would turn them upside down (TS 227-238).
When Tristram proclaims the sort of kingdom he would advocate, it is a lay Theleme, and 
we should smile remembering that Rabelais borrowed “fay ce que voudras” from Erasmus’ letter 
to Luther.18
It should be a kingdom of hearty laughing subjects: And as the bilious and more 
saturnine passions, by creating disorders in the blood and humours, have as bad an 
influence, I see, upon the body politick as body natural—and as nothing but a 
habit of virtue can fully govern those passions, and subject them to reason—I 
should add to my prayer—that God would give my subjects grace to be as WISE as 
they were MERRY; and then should I be the happiest monarch, and they the 
happiest people under heaven— (TS 402.3)
For Sterne, such a place exhibits the Christian ‘law’ of love. This he sees active in creation,
waiting to be established as a ruling passion; sustaining, provoking, and preventing individuals,
drawing forth reactions to itself as in a hall of mirrors.
Sterne himself seems to have been far less concerned about the way he appeared to the
world than he was about living true to that passion. He applauds human familiarity in his
writings, and we have glimpses of his sincerity in life as well. The five letters he sent from
Toulouse in 1763, relating the death o f George Oswald, attest to the sincerity of his allegiance to
humanity. Reading them, one cannot help recalling elements o f his fiction. We see the full force
of a compassionate man, aquainted with grief, as he records the death o f this young man to his
father in England. Notably, recalling the “moral honesty” of Trim and Toby at the conclusion of
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‘Abuses’, the first quality Sterne lists of Oswald is that he was “inflexibly honest in his
sentiments.” 19 After receiving thanks for his attendance, Steme writes:
I return you my acknowledgements for the kind Things you say o f me—but in 
truth, there deserves no more to be said of it, but that I acted here & hope I ever 
shall do, so, only as I wish others wdact by me or mine, in like distress,—& that is 
with humanity.20
Foreshadowing the snuffbox he would write o f four years later, Steme received two gifts from 
the dying lad.
This is all, our friend has left me in trust—except, as I told you, my engagedment 
to wear his watch for his sake to my death—and his Sword whilst I was abroad—  
which I shall do, because I think it an honour to wear a mark of any good Souls 
friendship—21
For lack o f any other reference or context, I cannot help wondering if we have a memento of
Sterne’s fidelity to his promise. Arthur Cash describes one of the most enduring images of
Steme, composed by Thomas Patch when the parson was in Florence two years later:
Patch rendered Death as a skeleton holding a scythe and an hourglass flanked with 
bat’s wings. Steme, in clerical black with white bands, but curiously wearing a 
sword, bows with hands folded across his breast to Death while still looking at 
him in the face— so to speak.
The sword is not to be drawn against death—that battle is already won—but in wearing the token
he has turned a weapon into a symbol o f humanity.
That sin lurks in Sterne’s world, does not imply license for despair or unanchored
frivolity.
I love you for this— and ’tis this delicious mixture within you which makes you 
dear creatures what you are—and he who hates you for it—all I can say of the 
matter is—That he has either a pumpkin for his head—or a pippin for his heart.
(7$ 435.16)
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We are not faulted for being bom, for the machinations of our education, or for thoughts that pop
into our heads, but our responsibility to act well is underlined.
If nature has so wove her web of kindness, that some threads of love and desire 
are entangled with the piece—must the whole web be rent in drawing them out?
—Whip me such stoics, great governor of nature! . . . Wherever thy providence 
shall place me for the trials of my virtue—whatever is my danger—whatever is 
my situation—let me feel the movements which rise out of it, and which belong to 
me as a man—and if I govern them as a good one—I will trust the issues to thy 
justice, for thou hast made us—and not we ourselves. (ASJ 124.6)
Critics triumphantly pointing to Yorick’s or Sterne’s lechery in the scene that leads to this
exclamation would do well to familiarize themselves with the parable to which it alludes. In
Erasmus’ colloquy ‘A Lover and a Maiden’ we read:
is Virginity to be violated, that it may be learned? Why not? As by little and little 
drinking Wine sparingly, we learn to be abstemious. Which do you think is the 
most temperate Person, he that is sitting at a Table full of Delicacies, and abstains 
from them, or he who is out of the Reach of those Things that incite 
Intemperance?
Pray tell me, is not your Soul and Body bound together?
Yes I think they are.
Just like a Bird in a Cage; and yet, ask if  it would be freed from it, I believe it will 
say no: and what’s the Reason of that? Because it is bound by its own Consent.
This, of course, is the point of ‘the Temptation’ in ASJ, a scene paralleled by that involving the
caged starling which Yorick attempts to free but finds “there was no getting it open without
pulling the cage to pieces—” (ASJ 95.17).24 The “web of kindness” is not to be destroyed here
for the sake of a few bastard threads. The moral to which Steme points is presented in Jesus’
parable of the wheat and the tares, Matt, xiii.24-32.
So, ‘The Conquest’ is not of nature (or of a fille de chambre) but o f two propensities: that
of lust, but more importantly that of cowardice, or inhumanity, in the sense that to presume to
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fee l differently would be to hope not to feel as one was created and thereby to forfeit the capacity
for pleasure and responsibility reserved for the truly virtuous. This humanity, and the delicious
fragility of that which is mixed within it, is the spice of life. In one of his lucid moments, Walter
encourages Trim by saying he read the sermon “extremely well” because his heart was so full (TS
164.24). Nature, wrote Bacon, is to be obeyed if  she is to be commanded. Because time is
fleeting, Steme searches for a North-west passage to the heart; for this he “lusted earnestly, and
endeavoured carefully” that, like Toby’s gesture with the fly, “these little books . . . might stand
instead of many bigger books,” and waged war against spleen (TS 359.13). Unlike Walter’s
theory involving auxiliary verbs, Sterne’s passage involves seeing, even being, that about which
one is speaking. In partaking of these images, and recalling one’s place in them, the reader can be
brought to a valuable experience of another’s life and opinions. As Yorick makes many
whimsical excuses for riding the sort o f horse he does, but never really tells the true reason, so
Steme canters, walks, and pauses, not explicit in his underlying appeals, but insensibly offering
entertaining, if not comforting words. A perceptive editor hit the mark early:
to the taste, therefore, the feelings, the good sense, and the candour of the public, 
the present collection of Mr. Sterne’s Works may be submitted, without the least 
apprehension that the perus^l^gf^ any part o f them will be followed by 
consequences unfavourable tqfsociety. The oftener they are read, the stronger will 
a sense o f universal benevolence be impressed on the mind; and the attentive 
reader will subscribe to the character of the author given by a comic writer, who 
declares he held him to be “a moralist in the noblest sense; he plays indeed with 
the fancy, and sometimes, perhaps, too wantonly; but while he thus designedly 
masks his main attack, he comes at once upon the heart; refines, amends it, 
softens it; beats down each selfish barrier from about it, and opens every sluice of 
pity and benevolence.”
285
His life, like that o f his principal narrators, is bound up in words. Their instability is his.
When Yorick sells his post-chaise he loses his “remarks,” the very means by which he turns
misfortune to profit. Without these remarks he is left facing the tyranny of this world—having no
creative vehicle with which to enter into jests worth at least what he has been taxed (TS 638;
645). Thus, with all the talk of fleeing death we come to realize that in making his remarks
Steme is actually turning to face it, marching up to the mouth o f the canon and, in the manner of
Job, Toby, and all Quixotic saints, cocking a snook.
Sterne’s sermons are not polemic (“ ’Tis wrote upon neither side . . .  for ’tis only upon
Conscience” TS 139.20); he carries this good nature with him into fiction. By 1759 much of his
life had been spent composing sermons and attempting to reach the heart o f his flock. His stories
spring from the same hopes, desires and fears as those homilies, while offering more room within
which to turn himself and by which to accommodate a significantly larger congregation. Yorick’s
voice is whispering in the theatre o f that fiction ~ Tristram remarks on his habit of making notes
on his own sermons (TS 517.4): a few short, musical characters are written before the text,
— but at the end of his discourse, where, perhaps, he had five or six pages, and 
sometimes, perhaps, a whole score to turn himself in, —he took a larger circuit, 
and, indeed, a much more mettlesome one; —as if he had snatched the occasion of 
unlacing himself with a few more frolicksome strokes at vice, than the straitness 
o f the pulpit allowed. —These, though hussar-like, they skirmish lightly and all 
out of order, are still auxiliaries on the side of virtue— ; tell me then, Mynheer 
Vander Blonederdondergewdenstronke, why they should not be printed together?
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